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THE

WORKS

OF

Sir Walter Ralegh, Kt.

Political, Commercial, and Philoſophical;

Together with his

LETTERS and POEMS.

The Whole never before collected together,
and ſome never yet printed.

To which is prefix'd,

A new Account of his LIFE

BY

THO. BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

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THE

LIFE

OF

Sir *Walter Ralegh.*

THE Character of Sir *Walter Ralegh* is a Combination of ſo many eminent Qualities, of the Stateſman, the Commander both at Sea and Land, and the Writer; and the Courſe of his Life was ſo full of remarkable and intereſting Scenes at Home and Abroad, and of all the Varieties of Fortune, which could ſhew the Extent and Vigour of his Mind in every Situation; that, had he flouriſh'd in the earlier Ages of the World, the Hiſtory of him would unqueſtionably have been the Choice of the *Roman Nepos*, and the *Grecian Plutarch*; nor could the latter have found juſter *Parallels* to him, than two of the moſt illuſtrious Names of Antiquity, *Xenophon* and *Cæſar*, who were, like him, equal Maſters of the Sword and the Pen, and equally capable of performing the greateſt Actions, and recording them with Dignity. And it were to be wiſh'd, for the Honour of his Countrymen, that his Merits were repreſented with all the Advantages of Style and Genius, of which the Antients have left us ſuch admirable Models, join'd to that Accuracy, which diſtinguiſhes the Moderns.

But no Subject, perhaps, ſtands leſs in need of the adventitious Ornaments of Eloquence, (tho' few deſerve them more;) ſince even the ſimpleſt Narrative is ſufficient to raiſe and gratify the public Curioſity. Of this Kind is the preſent Attempt, to draw a general Sketch of this great Man, by reducing into a ſhort but comprehenſive View all the Facts relating to him, gather'd by the Induſtry of former Writers, or diſcovered by later Enquiries. And ſuch an Account of him has a peculiar Propriety in this Place, as it will both give Light to, and receive it from the Collection, now exhibited to the World, of his invaluable Pieces, all of them hitherto ſcatter'd, and few generally known; tho' the Preſervation of them in ſuch a Form has been a Debt long due to his Memory, to the Honour of our Language, and the Service of our Country.

Sir *Walter Ralegh* was deſcended of an antient Family in *Devonſhire*, which was ſeated in that County before the Conqueſt; [a] and was fourth Son of *Walter Ralegh* Eſq; of *Fardel* in the Pariſh of *Cornwood*, eight Miles Eaſt of *Plymouth*, by his third Wife *Catharine*, Daughter of Sir *Philip Champernon* of *Modbury*, and Relict of *Otho Gilbert*, of *Compton* in *Devon*, Eſq; [b] He was born in the Year 1552, at *Hayes*, a pleaſant Farm of his Father's, in the Pariſh of *Budley*, in that Part of *Devonſhire* bordering Eaſtward upon the Sea, near where the *Ottery* diſcharges itſelf into the *Britiſh* Channel [c]. After he had paſs'd thro' his firſt Education at School, he was tranſplanted to the Univerſity of *Oxford*, where he became a Commoner of *Oriel* College [d], as likewiſe of *Chriſt Church*, according to Dr. *Fuller* [e]; and diſtinguiſh'd himſelf

[a] Prince's Worthies of Devon. p. 530. and Oldys's Life of Sir Walt. Ralegh fol. iv. v. [b] Wood, Athen. Oxon. vol. I. Col. 435. 2d Edit. and Oldys, fol. vi. [c] Wood, ibid. and Oldys fol. vii. [d] Wood ibid. [e] Church Hiſt. L. iv. fol. 104. and Lib. v. Sect. 32.

himſelf to great Advantage, both by the Strength and Vivacity of his Genius, and his Application to his Studies [f]. Upon his leaving the Univerſity, which he did without a Degree, after about three Years Reſidence there [g], he is affirmed by ſome [h] to have ſettled himſelf in the *Middle-Temple*, and to have ſtudied the Law: But this latter Aſſertion is evidently a Miſtake, ſince he ſolemnly declared afterwards upon his Tryal, that he had never read a Word of Law or Statutes before he was a Priſoner in the Tower [i]. So that if he was at all reſident in the *Temple*, it was not as a Student there. But it is more probable, that after his quitting the Univerſity, he immediately went to *France*; for in 1569, when he was not above ſeventeen Years of Age, he was one of the ſelect Troop of an hundred Gentlemen Volunteers, whom Queen *Elizabeth* permitted *Henry Champernon* to tranſport into that Kingdom, for the Aſſiſtance of the Proteſtant Princes there [k]. This Troop of Horſe arriv'd in the *French* Camp on the 5th of *October* 1569, and were very honourably receiv'd by the Queen of *Navarre*, and the Princes [l]: But what particular Services they perform'd in *France*, or how long they continued there, we have no Account, either in our own Writers, or thoſe of that Country. So great a Scene of Action, as the whole Kingdom of *France* was at that Period, gave *Ralegh* an excellent Opportunity of acquiring Experience in the Art of War, and improving himſelf in the Knowledge of the Languages and Manners of Men; and his own *Hiſtory of the World* contains ſome Remarks, which he then made upon the Conduct and Characters of ſome of the great Generals there, of which he had been

[f] Wood ibid. [g] Id. ibid. [h] Id. ib. and Sir Rob. Naunton's Fragmenta Regalia, p. 33. Edit. 1641. 4to. [i] Tryal of Sir Walt. Ralegh, State Tryals, Vol. I. fol. 180. [k] Camden's Annales Reginæ Elizabethæ p. 172. Edit. Lugd. Batav. 1625. [l] Thuani Hiſt. lib. xl i.

Witneſs himſelf [m]. It appears likewiſe from that Work, that he was employ'd with his Troop in *Languedoc* [n]; and engag'd in 1569, in the Battle of *Moncontour* in *Poictou*, where Count *Lewis* of *Naſſau*, Brother to *William* the firſt Prince of *Orange*, made the Retreat with ſuch Prudence and Reſolution, as ſav'd one half of the Proteſtant Army, then broken and diſbanded [o]. *Raleigh* ſtaid in *France* ſome Time after the Death of *Charles* IX. in *May* 1574, having ſpent at leaſt Six Years in that Kingdom [p]; ſo that he could not have return'd to *England* before the End of 1575; and the Year following, he had Chambers in the *Middle-Temple*, if the commendatory Verſes prefix'd to Mr. *George Gaſcoigne*'s *Steel Glaſs*, publiſh'd that Year, were of his Compoſition, as the Name *Walter Rawley*, tho' ſpelt differently from his own Manner, and the Style and Turn of them, ſhew them to be.

The Activity of his Temper did not ſuffer him to reſt long at home, but drew him ſoon into the Wars in the *Low Countries*, in the Service of the Prince of *Orange*, againſt the *Spaniards* [q]; in which he probably had a Share in the Battle of *Rimenant*, on the 1ſt of *Auguſt* 1578, wherein Don *John* of *Auſtria*, natural Son of the Emperor *Charles* V. and Governor of the *Low Countries* for *Philip* II. King of *Spain*, met with ſuch vigorous Reſiſtance, eſpecially from the *Engliſh* Forces commanded by Sir *John Norris* [r], that he was oblig'd to retreat with great Loſs and Diſgrace, which he did not ſurvive above two Months.

Soon after this, an Opportunity was offer'd *Raleigh* of trying his Fortune at Sea; Sir *Humphry Gilbert*, his Brother by the Mother's ſide, having obtained a Patent of

[m] Lib. v. cap. 2. Sect. 3. and Sect. 8. [n] Lib. iv. cap. 2. Sect. 16. [o] Lib. v. cap. 2. Sect. 8. [p] Oldys, fol. x. [q] Lives Engliſh and foreign, vol. I. p. 76. Edit. 1704 in 8vo. Naunton, p. 34. Aulicus Coquinariæ, p. 74. and Oldys, fol. xi. [r] Meteren, Hiſt. des Pays Bas, fol. 157, Edit. 1618.

of the Queen to plant and inhabit ſome *Northern* Parts of *America*, unpoſſeſs'd by any Prince, with whom ſhe was in Alliance: upon which Occaſion, *Ralegh* was one of a conſiderable Number of Gentlemen, who engag'd in an Expedition to *Newfoundland*, which prov'd unſucceſsful. For Diviſions ariſing amongſt the Volunteers, and many failing of their Promiſes, or refuſing to embark when the Ships were ready, Sir *Humphry*, the General, was, in 1579, oblig'd to ſet Sail with a few only of his aſſured Friends, and after a variety of Misfortunes at Sea, return'd with the Loſs of one of his Ships in an Engagement with the *Spaniards*, in which *Ralegh* was expos'd to great Danger [s].

The next Year, 1580, upon the Deſcent of the *Spaniſh* and *Italian* Forces in *Ireland*, under the Pope's Banner, for the Support of the *Deſmonds* in their Rebellion in *Munſter*, he had a Captain's Commiſſion under *Arthur*, Lord *Grey*, Baron of *Wilton*, Lord Deputy of *Ireland*, who went over into that Kingdom in *Auguſt* that Year, and was a Man of great Courage and Induſtry, but of equal Severity of Temper, which he particularly exercis'd towards the *Iriſh* [t]. But the chief Services, which Captain *Ralegh* perform'd, were under *Thomas*, Earl of *Ormonde*, Governor of *Munſter*, highly eſteem'd by Queen *Elizabeth* for his Fidelity, as well as Capacity and Activity. He ſurprized the *Iriſh Kerns* at *Rakele*, and having incloſed them, took every Rebel upon the Spot, who was not ſlain in Reſiſtance. Among them there was one laden with withies, who being demanded, *What he intended to have done with them?* boldly anſwer'd, *To have hung up the Engliſh Churls:* upon which *Ralegh* order'd him to be immediately diſpatch'd in that Manner, and the reſt of theſe Robbers and Murderers

[s] Oldys, fol. xiii. [t] Hooker's Supply of the Iriſh Chron. in the 2d vol. of Hollinſhed fol. 168. and Cox's hiſt. of Ireland, p. 366.

to be puniſh'd according to their Deſerts [u]. He aſſiſted likewiſe at the Siege of the Fort *Del Ore*, which the *Spaniſh* Succours under *San Joſepho* their Commander, aſſiſted by their *Iriſh* Confederates, had raiſed and fortified, as a Place of Retreat, whenever they found themſelves diſtreſs'd, as well as proper, by its Situation upon the Bay of *Smerwick* in the County of *Kerry*, for receiving ſuch Supplies, as they expected from Abroad. The Lord Deputy *Grey* himſelf beſieged this Fort by Land, while Sir *William Winter*, Admiral of the Fleet, attack'd it by Sea; and Captain *Ralegh* commanded often in the Trenches, and contributed ſo much to the Reduction of it, that it was at laſt, on the 9th of *November* 1589, obliged to ſurrender at Diſcretion; and the greateſt Part of the Garriſon put to the Sword, by Order of the Lord Deputy; a neceſſary Severity, the Execution of which fell to the Share of the Captains *Raleigh* and *Mackworth*, who had the Word of that Day, and firſt enter'd the Caſtle [w]. During the Winter of this Year, *Ralegh* had his Quarters aſſign'd him at *Cork*, where he having been an attentive Obſerver of the ſeditious Practices of *David* Lord *Barry*, *Patrick Condon*, and other Ringleaders of the Rebellion in theſe Parts, to diſtreſs thoſe, who were peaceably inclined, and to excite the Diſaffected to an Inſurrection; he took a Journey to *Dublin* to the Lord Deputy, and remonſtrated to him the dangerous Conſequences of theſe Practices in ſo ſtrong a manner, that his Lordſhip and the Council gave him a full Commiſſion to ſeize the Caſtle of *Barry-Court*, with all the other Lands of Lord *Barry*, and to reduce him to Peace and Subjection by ſuch Means, as he ſhould think proper; for which Purpoſe he was furniſh'd with a Party of Horſe. But during this Interval, ſuch Meaſures were taken by thoſe in Authority

[u] Hooker, fol. 167. Cox, fol. 376. [w] Spenſer's View of the State of Ireland, in the 6th vol. of his Works, and Hooker's Supply, fol. 171.

Authority at *Cork*, as render'd the Commiſſion of little Effect. However, tho' the Eſtate of *Barry-More* was conveyed over to the Mother of *David Barry*, and only rented to the Son, and tho' it was his principal Seat; yet partly thro' fear of *Ralegh*'s Commiſſion, and partly thro' Reſentment, that Lord himſelf burnt the Caſtle to the Ground, and laid waſte the Country about it, with greater Outrage and Deſtruction, than even the Zeal of his Enemies, if they had taken it, would have extended to. *Ralegh*, in his Return to *Cork*, was attacked by *Fitz-Edmonds*, Seneſchal of *Imokelly*, an old Rebel of *Barry*'s Faction, with a Party of Horſe and ſome *Kerns*, at *Corabby*, a Ford between *Yougal* and *Cork*. *Ralegh* was much inferior in Number, being, at his Setting out, accompanied but with ſix Men, and thoſe ſcattered behind, when he approach'd the Ford. Here *Fitz-Edmonds* and his Crew ſallied from their Ambuſcades, and croſs'd him to oppoſe his Paſſage, whom *Ralegh* reſolutely encounter'd and defeated, or at leaſt broke thro' them, ſo that he got clear over the River. But a Gentleman of his Company, Mr. *Henry Moyle*, following, either took a Part too deep, or unfordable, or plung'd into a Quick-ſpring, or his Horſe, otherwiſe foundering, threw him down in the middle of it; where, between the Fear of drowning, or being taken by the Enemy, he call'd out to *Ralegh* for help; who, tho' eſcap'd from both Dangers, yet ventur'd into them, in order to reſcue his Companion. But *Moyle* in Haſte and Confuſion remounting, over-leap'd his Horſe, and fell down on the other Side into a deep Mire, where he might have been ſuffocated, if *Ralegh* had not recovered him a ſecond Time, and brought him ſafe to Land. *Ralegh* waited on the oppoſite Bank, with his Staff in one Hand, and a Piſtol in the other, for the reſt of the Company, who were yet to croſs the River, among whom was his Servant *Jenkin*, who had Two hundred Pounds of his Money in Charge. *Fitz-Edmonds*,

who had now got a Recruit of twelve Men, and was in all above Twenty ſtrong, yet finding *Ralegh* ſtand his Ground, and the reſt of his Company advance, only exchang'd a few rough Words with him, and then retir'd. Not long after, in a Parley between the Earl of *Ormonde* and the Rebels, the Seneſchal boaſting of his own Exploits, *Ralegh* reproach'd him with Cowardice, and that having lately had twenty to one on his Side, yet he durſt not encounter him alone: which one of the Rebels own Companions endeavouring to excuſe, as an unuſual Inſtance of Diffidence in their Champion, and declaring, that he never would be ſo remiſs again; the Earl of *Ormonde*, provoked at this, challenged the Seneſchal, with Sir *John Deſmond*, and any four, whom they would name, to meet himſelf, Captain *Ralegh*, and four others, at the Place abovemention'd, where they would paſs the great River to them, and there, two to two, four to four, or ſix to ſix, fight, and determine the Point in Debate between them. To this no Anſwer being then return'd, *Fitz-Gibbon*, the *white Knight*, was ſent with a ſecond Challenge, which was abſolutely refuſed by the Rebels [a]. The Earl of *Ormonde* departing for *England* about the Spring of the Year 1581, his Government of *Munſter* was given to Captain *Ralegh*, in Commiſſion with Sir *William Morgan*, and Captain *Piers*. *Ralegh* reſided chiefly at *Liſmore*, and ſpent all this Summer in the Woods and Country adjacent, in continual Action againſt the Rebels [b]. He removed then with his little Band of eighty Foot, and eight Horſe, to his old Quarters at *Cork*; but receiving Intelligence in his March, that the Arch-Traytor *Barry* was at *Clove*, with ſeveral hundred Men, he reſolved to paſs thro' that Town, and offer him Combat; and accordingly at the Town's End met *Barry* with his Forces,

[a] Hooker's Supply, fol. 173. Cox's Hiſt. of Ireland, fol. 367.
[b] Hooker's Supply, fol. 174.

Forces, whom he charged with prodigious Bravery, and put to Flight. As he purſued his Journey, he overtook another Company of the Enemy, in a Plain by a Wood-ſide; whom he likewiſe attack'd, tho' he had only ſix Horſemen with him, expecting probably, that his Company would ſoon join him. But the Rebels, who had greatly the Advantage of Numbers, being cut off from the Wood, and having no other Relief, fac'd about, and fought very deſpe- rately, killing five of the Horſes belonging to *Ralegh*'s Company, and amongſt theſe his own; and he was in extreme Danger himſelf of being overpower'd by Numbers, if his Servant *Nicholas Wright* had not interpoſed; who perceiving his Maſter's Horſe mor- tally wounded with Darts, and plunging paſt all Re- covery, encountered ſix of the Enemy at once, and kill'd one of them; while *Patrick Fagaw*, another of his Fellow-Servants, reſcued *Ralegh*, after it had been ſo unſucceſsfully attempted by *James Fitz-Ri- chard* and his Kern, both of *Ralegh*'s Company, that the Man was ſlain, and the Maſter near the ſame Fate. *Ralegh*, upon the Sight of this, would not ſuffer *Wright* to fight by him any longer, but order'd him to aſſiſt *Fitz-Richard*, which he immediately did by ruſhing into the Throng of the Enemy, and diſpatch- ing the Rebel, who preſs'd upon *Fitz-Richard*, reſcuing the latter from the moſt imminent Danger. In this ſharp Skirmiſh, many of the Rebels periſh'd, and two were taken Priſoners, and carried by *Ralegh* to *Cork*; who, during his Reſidence there, perform'd ſeveral other Services, which raiſed his Reputation; particularly by his Courage and Addreſs in ſeizing the Lord *Roch* in his own Caſtle, who was ſuſpected of a Confederacy with ſome of the chief Rebels [d].

[d] Id. ibid.

In the Month of *Auguſt*, the ſame Year 1581, Captain *John Zouch* being appointed Governor of *Munſter* by the Lord Deputy, *Ralegh* attended him in ſeveral Journies to ſettle and compoſe that Country; but the chief Place of their Reſidence was *Cork*: And after *Zouch* had cut off Sir *John Deſmond*, one of the moſt formidable Rebels, and Brother of the Earl of *Deſmond*, he left the Government of that City to *Ralegh* [e]; whoſe Company being not long after diſbanded, upon the Reduction of that Earl, the Slaughter of his Brothers, and the Submiſſion of *Barry*, he return'd to *England*.

His eminent Accompliſhments ſoon introduc'd him to the Notice of the Court, and her Majeſty's Favour. In *February* 1581-2, he was one of thoſe Perſons of Diſtinction, who by the Queen's Command accompanied the Duke of *Anjou*, upon his Departure from *England* to the *Netherlands*, in order to take upon him theGovernment of that Country, and in 1582, on his Return, he brought over the Prince of *Orange*'s Letters to her Majeſty, that Prince deſiring him, at the Delivery of thoſe Letters, to ſay to her from him, *Sub umbra Alarum tuarum protegimur* [f]; as it is certain, that the *United Provinces* had at that Time their chief Support, as well as Expectation, from the Queen.

The Lord *Grey* having reſign'd the Sword of *Ireland* towards the End of *Auguſt* 1582, the Diſpute between him and *Ralegh*, upon Reaſons, which are variouſly aſſign'd by different Writers, was brought to an Hearing before the Council-Table in *England*, where the latter ſupported his Cauſe with ſuch Abilities, as fix'd him in the good Opinion both of her Majeſty and the Lords of Council [g]: And this, added to the Patronage of the favourite Earl of *Leiceſter*, is ſuppos'd

[e] Cox's Hiſt. of Ireland, fol. 367. [f] Sir Walter Ralegh's invent. of ſhipping, in his Select Eſſays, p. 36. Edit. 1656.
[g] Naunton, p. 34, 35, Aulic. Coquin. p. 90.

ſuppos'd to have been one conſiderable Occaſion of his Preferment; tho' it did not immediately take Place. Nor could the Hopes of it reſtrain him from engaging in a ſecond Expedition of his Brother Sir *Humphry Gilbert* to *Newfoundland*; for which he built a ſtrong Ship of Two hundred Tons, call'd the *Bark Ralegh*, and furniſh'd it compleatly for the Voyage, in which he reſolv'd to attend his Brother as his Vice-Admiral. That Fleet departed from *Plymouth* the 11th of *June* 1583; but after it had been two or three Days out at Sea, a contagious Diſtemper having ſeiz'd the whole Crew of *Ralegh*'s Ship, oblig'd him to return to that Port. However by this Accident, he eſcap'd the Misfortunes of that Expedition, in which, after Sir *Humphry* had taken poſſeſſion of *Newfoundland* in Right of the Crown of *England*, and aſſign'd Lands to every Man of his Company, and ſail'd Three hundred Leagues in his Voyage home, with full Hopes of the Queen's Aſſiſtance to fit out a Fleet, not only for the *North*, but one alſo for the *South* the next Year; he unfortunately periſh'd; for venturing raſhly in a Frigate of but ten Tons, call'd the *Squirrel*, he was on the 9th of *September* that Year, at Midnight, ſwallow'd up in an high Sea. Another of the Veſſels, call'd the *Delight*, ſuffer'd the ſame Fate a few Days before; and even the reſt return'd not without great Hazard and Loſs [h]. But this ill Succeſs could not divert *Raleigh* from purſuing a Scheme of ſuch Importance to his Country, as theſe Diſcoveries in the *North* of *America*. As ſoon therefore as he had drawn up an Account of the Advantages of ſuch a Deſign, and the Means of proſecuting it, he laid it before the Queen and Council, who were ſo well ſatisfied with it, that her Majeſty, on the 25th of *March* 1584, granted him Letters Patents in favour of

[h] Capt. Edw. Hayes's Report of Sir Humphry Gilbert's Voyage to Newfoundland, in Hakluyt, vol. III. p. 149. See likewiſe p. 165.

of his Project, " containing free Liberty to discover " such remote heathen and barbarous Lands, as were " not actually possess'd by any Christian, nor inhabited " by Christian People". Immediately upon this Grant, *Ralegh* chose two able and experienc'd Commanders, Captain *Philip Amidas*, and Captain *Arthur Barlow*, and furnish'd them with two Vessels fitted out at his own Expence, with such Expedition, that on the 27th of *April* following, they set sail from the *West* of *England*, taking their Course by the *Canary Islands*, where they arriv'd on the 10th of *May*, towards the *West Indies*: and that being in those Days the best and most frequented Rout to *America*, they passed by the *Carribbee Islands* in the beginning of *June*, and reach'd the *Gulph* of *Florida* on the 2d of *July*.; sailing along the Shore about One hundred and twenty Miles, before they could find a convenient Harbour. At last they debarked on a very low Land, which prov'd to be an Island call'd *Wokoken*; and after taking formal Possession of the Country, on the 13th of that Month, in the Name of the Queen of *England*, they carried on a friendly Correspondence with the Native *Indians*, who supplied them with great Variety of Fish and Venison, and gave them Furs and Deer-skins in Exchange for Trifles. Thus encourag'd by the Natives, eight of the Company in a Boat went up the River *Occam* twenty Miles; and next Day in the Evening they came to an Island called *Roanok*, which was about seven Leagues from the Place where their Ships lay. Here they found the Residence of the *Indian* Chief, whose Name was *Granganimeo*; whose House consisted of nine Apartments built of Cedar, and fortified round with sharp Pieces of Timber. His Wife came out to them, and order'd her People to carry them from the Boat on their Backs, and shew'd them many other Civilities, to express their friendly Intreaties towards them, in the Absence of her Husband. They continued their

Inter-

Intercourſe with the Natives for ſome Time, ſtill viewing the Situation of the adjacent Country; and after having obtain'd the beſt Information they could of the Number and Strength of the *Indian* Nations in that Neighbourhood, and of their Connections, Alliances, or Conteſts with each other, they return'd to *England*, about the middle of *September* [i], and made ſuch an advantageous Report of the Fertility of the Soil, and Healthineſs of the Climate, that the Queen favour'd the Deſign of ſettling a Colony in that Country, to which her Majeſty was pleas'd to give the Name of *Virginia* [k].

About two Months after, *Ralegh* was choſen Knight of the Shire for his own County of *Devon*, Sir *William Courtney* being the other [l]; and made a conſiderable Figure in Parliament, where a Bill paſs'd in Confirmation of his Patent for the Diſcovery of foreign Countries. During the Courſe of the Seſſion, he receiv'd the Honour of Knighthood from her Majeſty, a Diſtinction the more honourable to him, as the Queen was extremely cautious and frugal in the beſtowing of Honours. And beſides the Patent for Diſcoveries, ſhe had granted him about the ſame time another, to licence the vending of Wines throughout the Kingdom, which was in all probability a very lucrative one to him; but it engag'd him in a Diſpute with the Univerſity of *Cambridge*, which had oppos'd one *Keymer*, whom he had licens'd to ſell Wine there, contrary to the Privileges of that Univerſity [m].

The Parliament being prorogued on the 29th of *March* 1585, Sir *Walter* was at leiſure to purſue his Views for the Improvement of Navigation; and accordingly his Brother *Adrian Gilbert* of *Sandridge*, afterwards knighted, having been at great Charges in finding out the *Northern* Paſſage to *China* and the *Moluccas*, and obtain'd a Patent two Years before to

[i] Hakluyt, vol. III. fol. 246. [k] Oldys, fo'. xxv. [l] Willis's Notitia Parliamentaria, vol. II. p. 274. [m] Oldys, fol. xxvi, xxvii.

to profecute the Diſcovery by Partners, under the Title of *The Collegues of the Fellowſhip for the Diſcovery of the North-Weſt Paſſage*; *Ralegh* was one of the Aſſociates in this Enterprize, in which Captain *Davis*, an experienc'd Navigator, was employ'd. That Captain firſt ſet out upon it this Summer from *Falmouth* in two Barks; and when he came to Land in Sixty-ſix Degrees Forty Minutes Latitude, anchor'd in a very good Road under a Mountain, the Cliffs of which reſembled the Colour of Gold, which he nam'd *Mount-Ralegh*, in Honour of Sir *Walter*; and ſoon after fell into the very Paſſage, which he was in Queſt of, ſince well known by the Name of *Davis*'s *Streights* [n]. But the farther Search of it was made by Captain *Davis*, under the ſame Patronage and Support, in two Voyages more, the two following Years, when he in a Manner compleated that Diſcovery [o].

Sir *Walter* was ſo intent upon the planting of his new Colony in *Virginia*, that about two Months before *Davis* began his firſt Voyage, *Ralegh* ſet out his own Fleet of ſeven Sail for that Country, under the Command of his Couſin Sir *Richard Grenville*, General of the Expedition, appointing Mr. *Ralph Lane*, afterwards knighted, to be Governor of the Colony, which was now tranſported thither. They ſail'd from *Plymouth* on the 9th of *April* 1585, and purſuing the ſame Courſe, which they had done the preceding Year, they came to Anchor at *Wokoken* on the 26th of *June*, whence they ſent their Compliments to King *Wingina* at *Roanok*. Then the General, taking one Week's Proviſion with him, and a ſelect Company, made a Progreſs to the main Land, and viſited many *Indian* Towns; but unhappily, at one of them, the *Indians* having ſtolen a ſilver Cup, the *Engliſh* were

[n] John Jane's Account of Capt. Davis's firſt Voyage in June 1585, for the Diſcovery of the North-weſt Paſſage, in Hakluyt, vol. III. fol. 101. [o] Hakluyt, ib.

were ſo indiſcreet in their Revenge, as to burn the Town, and deſtroy the Corn-fields; an Act, which they had afterwards ſufficient reaſon to repent of. The General returning to his Fleet at *Wokoken*, thought fit to weigh Anchor, and remove from thence to *Hattaraſs*; where having reſted a little, ſome of the *Indian* Chiefs were entertained on Board the Admiral; and on the 25th of *Auguſt* the General himſelf ſet ſail for *England*, taking in his Paſſage a *Spaniſh* Prize worth Fifty thouſand Pounds; with which on the 18th of *October* he arrived at *Plymouth*, having left behind him in *Virginia* an Hundred and ſeven Perſons, to ſettle a Colony at *Roanok*, amongſt whom was Mr. *Thomas Harriot*, the celebrated Mathematician [p].

The rich *Spaniſh* Prize abovemention'd was not the only Circumſtance of good Fortune, which happened to *Ralegh* this Year; for the Rebellion in *Munſter* in *Ireland* being now ſuppreſs'd, and the forfeited Lands divided into Signiories among thoſe principally, who had been inſtrumental in the important Service of reducing that Country; her Majeſty granted him one of the largeſt Portions, conſiſting of Twelve thouſand Acres, in the Counties of *Cork* and *Waterford*, with certain Privileges and Immunities, upon thoſe Conditions of planting and improving the ſame, to which the other Grantees were oblig'd [q]. This great Eſtate he planted at his own Expence, and at the End of the Queen's Reign ſold it to *Richard Boyle*, afterwards Earl of *Cork* [r], who owns this Purchaſe to have been one great Step to the vaſt Fortune, at which he afterwards acquired. Encourag'd by this noble Grant, *Ralegh* fitted out a third Fleetfor *Virginia*, where the Colony left under the

[p] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 251. [q] Cox's Hiſt. of Ireland, fol. 389, 391. [r] True Remembrances of Richard Boyle, Earl of Corke, in the Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle, by Thomas Birch, M. A. p. 8, 9. Edit. Lond, 1744, 8vo.

the Care of Mr. *Lane* having ſuffer'd great Diſtreſſes, had procur'd a Paſſage into *England*, in *June* 1586, from Sir *Francis Drake*, who had viſited it in his Return from his Conqueſt of St. *Domingo*, *Carthagena*, and St. *Auguſtine* [s]. *Ralegh* had in the Spring of that Year ſent one Ship of an hundred Tuns, well provided of all Things neceſſary for the Succour of that Colony; but not arriving before the People had left the Country, this Ship return'd with all her Lading to *England*. And about fifteen Days after, Sir *Richard Grenville* arrived at *Virginia* with three Ships more, well ſtored for the ſame Company of Planters, which he had left there in 1585. But finding neither them, nor the laſt mentioned Ship, as he expected, and obſerving, that all their former Habitations were quite abandoned, Sir *Richard*, unwilling to loſe the Poſſeſſion of ſo good a Country, landed fifteen Men on the Iſland of *Roanok*, leaving them a plentiful Stock of Proviſions for two Years, and ſet ſail for *England*, and in his Return took ſome *Spaniſh* Prizes at the *Azores* [t]. *Ralegh* had likewiſe great Succeſs at the ſame Place, having about the ſame Time diſpatched two Ships, call'd the *Serpent* and *Mary-Spark*, under the Conduct of Capt. *Jacob Whiddon*, *John Eveſham*, and others, who departed from *Plymouth* on the 10th of *June* 1586, and took more *Spaniſh* Prizes than they could bring home. On Board of one of theſe Prizes, was taken Priſoner the Governor of St. *Michael*'s Iſland; and in another *Pedro de Sarmiento*, Governor of the Streights of *Magellan*, the moſt eminent and experienc'd Navigator of all *Spain* [u]. *Ralegh* was likewiſe the ſame Year an Adventurer of his fine Pinnace nam'd *Dorothy*, in an Expedition deſign'd for the South-Sea by the Earl of *Cumberland*, but proſecuted no farther than the Latitude of Forty-four Degrees

to

[s] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 264, and 547. [t] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 265. [u] Id. Vol. II. part 2. fol. 120.

to the South of the Equinoctial, in the Courſe of which Voyage ſome ſmall Prizes were taken [w].

Ralegh was now equally eſteemed for his Zeal for the Improvement of all Arts and Sciences, as the Encouragement of new Diſcoveries of Countries, and the Plantation of new Colonies; and his Patronage of learned and ingenious Men was acknowledg'd in the Dedication of their ſeveral Works. Particularly in this Year 1586, *Martin Baſſaniere* of *Paris*, having printed there a very valuable Hiſtory of the firſt Diſcovery of *Florida* about twenty Years before by *René Laudonniere*, and three other *French* Captains, the Manuſcript of which had been ſent over to him by Mr. *Richard Hakluyt*, he inſcribed it to *Ralegh*; to whom the *Engliſh* Tranſlation of it by Mr. *Hakluyt*, printed the Year following, was likewiſe dedicated. *Ralegh* gave likewiſe great Encouragement to Mr. *Hakluyt*, to enable him in the publiſhing of his noble Collection of *Engliſh Voyages*; and ſupported *James Morgues*, an eminent *French* Painter, who had been ſent over by *Coligny* Admiral of *France*, with the abovemention'd Diſcoverers of *Florida*, in the great Expence of publiſhing the Draughts and Deſcriptions of that Country in *London*, where that Painter for ſome time reſided [x].

In the latter Part of this Year 1586, he was advanced ſo highly in the Queen's Favour, that her Majeſty made him Seneſchal of the Dutchies of *Cornwall* and *Exeter*, and Lord Warden of the Stannaries in *Devonſhire* and *Cornwall*. But theſe Preferments were attended with the uſual Effects of them, and expos'd him to the Envy of thoſe, who were much inferior to him in Merit [y]; and even the Earl of *Leiceſter* himſelf, who had been formerly his Friend, grew

[w] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 769. [x] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 301.
[y] Hooker's Dedication to Sir Walter Ralegh, of his Supply of the Iriſh Chronicle.

jealous of him, and ſet up in Oppoſition to him his Nephew, the young Earl of *Eſſex* [z].

The Comedians themſelves likewiſe took the Liberty to reflect upon *Ralegh*'s Power and Influence upon the Queen; which her Majeſty reſented ſo highly, as to forbid *Tarleton*, the moſt celebrated Actor of that Age, from approaching her Preſence [a].

But neither the Factions of the Court, nor the Aſperſions of the People, whom *Ralegh* would never condeſcend to court by the uſual Arts *, could deter him from attending the Duties of his ſeveral Poſts and Employments upon all Occaſions; and in the latter End of this Year 1586, we find him in the Parliament, which was diſſolv'd on the 23d of *March*, and in which the Fate of the Queen of *Scots* was determin'd: and he was one of the Committee appointed to conſult upon the Amendment of ſome Things, to which the Clergy were requir'd to be ſworn, and for conſidering the proper Means to procure a learned Miniſtry; the Queen having in her Speech, at the Cloſe of the laſt Seſſion, reminded the Biſhops of ſome Faults and Negligences, which if they did not amend, ſhe threatened to depoſe them [b].

In the beginning of the Year 1587, *Ralegh* prepar'd a new Colony of One hundred and fifty Men for *Virginia*, under the Command of Mr. *John White*, whom he appointed Governor, and with him twelve Aſſiſtants, to whom he gave a Charter, and incorporated them by the Name of the Governor and Aſſiſtants of the City of *Ralegh* in *Virginia*. Their Fleet conſiſting of three Sail, departed from *Portſmouth* on the 26th of *April*, and on the 23d of *July* arrived at *Hattaraſs*. The Governor immediately diſpatch'd

a

[z] Sir Henry Wotton's Parallel of Devereux Earl of Eſſex, and Villiers D. of Buckingham. [a] Bohun's Character of Queen Elizabeth, p. 353. * The Lord Treaſurer *Burghley* takes Notice of this Contempt of popularity in *Ralegh*, as well as the Affectation of it in the Earl of Eſſex. *Seek not to be Eſſex; ſeem to be Ralegh.* Precepts to his Son Sir Robert Cecil. [b] Sir Simonds D'Ewes's Journal of Parliaments, p. 413, and 328.

a ſtrong Party to the Iſle of *Roanok*, expecting to find the fifteen Men left there by Sir *Richard Grenville* the Year, intending from thence to paſs to the Bay of *Cheſepiock*, where they deſign'd to fix their Seat, and build a Fort, according to the Directions of Sir *Walter Ralegh*. But they ſought their Companions in vain, whom they afterwards found to have been treacherouſly attack'd, and ſeveral of them murder'd by a Party of Savages, and the reſt driven to ſome remote Part of the Country. But this new Colony having re-eſtabliſh'd their Intereſt and Alliance with the Natives, the Planters conſidering they ſhould ſoon want freſh Supplies of Proviſions and other Neceſſaries, but differing about the Choice of an Agent to go to *England* for that Purpoſe, they at laſt prevail'd on the Governor to undertake that Office, who return'd with the Ships in the latter End of the ſame Year [c].

Ralegh, ſollicitous for the ſafety of the Colony, upon the Return of Mr. *White* the Governor, immediately order'd a Pinnace to be ſent to them, with all ſuch Proviſions, as he apprehended they might want; promiſing, that he would prepare a good Supply of Shipping and Men, with all other Neceſſaries, to be with them the Summer following. He accordingly prepar'd a Fleet at *Biddeford*, in the Weſt of *England*, under the Command of Sir *Richard Grenville*; but the Situation of the Nation under the Apprehenſions of the Invaſion from *Spain* in the Year 1588, prevented their Sailing; ſo that Governor *White* could only obtain two ſmall Pinnaces, call'd the *Brave*, and the *Roe*, with fifteen Planters, and all convenient Proviſions for thoſe, who winter'd in *Virginia*. Theſe Veſſels ſail'd from *Biddeford* on the 22d of *April* that Year; but one of them meeting with two ſtrong Men of War of *Rochelle*, about fifty Leagues to the North-Eaſt of *Madera*, ſuffer'd ſo much in the

[c] Hakluyt, Vol. III. fol. 208, 287.

Engagement with them, and was ſo thoroughly rifled by the Enemy, that it was obliged to return to *England*; as its Companion did ſoon after, having perhaps met with the like Misfortune; at leaſt without performing the intended Voyage, to the Diſtreſs of the Planters abroad, and Regret of their Patron at home [d].

Before this time, and probably in the beginning of the Year 1587, he received a new and conſiderable Mark of her Majeſty's Favour, being advanced to the Poſt of Captain of her Guard, which he held together with thoſe of Lord Warden of the Stannaries, and Lieutenant-General of the County of *Cornwall*.

The Nation, during the Courſe of that Year, being alarm'd with the Preparations in *Spain*, which ſeem'd intended againſt *England*, Sir *Walter* was, in *November* 1587, one of the Council of War appointed to conſider of the moſt effectual Methods for the Security of the Nation; upon which Occaſion he drew up a Scheme for that Purpoſe, which is a Proof of his Judgment and Abilities [e].

But he did not confine himſelf to the mere Office of giving Advice, but exerted himſelf in Action in every Circumſtance, which could contribute to the Safety of his Country. He rais'd and diſciplin'd the Militia of *Cornwall*; and after having perform'd all poſſible Services at Land, join'd the Fleet in *July* 1588, with a Squadron of Volunteers, both of Nobles and Gentlemen, and had a very conſiderable Share in the ſeveral Engagements with, and at laſt total Defeat of, the *Spaniſh* Armada, in the latter End of that Month [f]. His Merits in ſo important a Criſis juſtly rais'd him ſtill higher in the Queen's Favour, to whom he was now Gentleman of her Privy Chamber, and who granted him this Year ſome additional Advantages

[d] Id. fol. 771. [e] Oldys fol xxxix, xl, xli. [f] Id. fol. xliii, xlvi.

vantages to his Wine-Office; which he enjoy'd during the reſt of her Reign [g].

The Eſtabliſhment of the Colony of *Virginia* having met with ſo many Interruptions and Misfortunes, tho' he had ſpent no leſs than Forty thouſand Pounds upon it, he thought proper, on the 7th of *March* $158\frac{8}{9}$, to make an Aſſignment of his Right, Title, and Intereſt in it, to certain Gentlemen and Merchants of *London*, reſerving only to himſelf the fifth Part of all Gold and Silver Ore; and at the ſame time contributing an hundred Pounds towards their firſt Expences, and continuing to aſſiſt them upon all Occaſions, with his Advice and Intereſt [h].

Don Antonio, King of *Portugal*, who had been expell'd from his Dominions by *Philip* II. of *Spain*, and was here in *London* after the Deſtruction of the *Spaniſh* Fleet, having taken that Opportunity to apply to Queen *Elizabeth* for her Aſſiſtance in the Recovery of his Kingdom, and her Majeſty conſenting to bear her Share in that Undertaking, by contributing ſix Men of War, and Threeſcore thouſand Pounds, and encouraging her Subjects to concur in the Deſign; Sir *Walter Ralegh* took a conſiderable Part in it, and accompanied that Prince, with Sir *Francis Drake* and Sir *John Norris*, in the Expedition to *Portugal* in *April* 1589. But we have few Particulars, which relate perſonally to him, during the Courſe of it, except his taking a great Number of Hulks and other Ships belonging to the *Hans*-Towns, laden with *Spaniſh* Goods, Proviſions, and Ammunition, for a new Invaſion of *England*: And his Conduct in the whole Affair was ſo highly ſatisfactory to her Majeſty, that ſhe honour'd him, as well as the other Commanders, with a gold Chain [i].

In his Return home, he touch'd upon the Coaſt of *Ireland*, where he probably made a ſhort Excurſion to

[g] Id. fol. xlvii. [h] Id. fol. xlix. [i] Id. fol xlix, l.

his Seignory in *Munſter*, and ſaw the old Counteſs of *Deſmond*, who had been married in the Reign of *Edward* IV [k], and viſited *Spenſer* the Poet, who mentions the Circumſtances of this Viſit, in his Paſtoral, intitled, *Colin Clout's come home again*, dedicated about two Years after to Sir *Walter*, who carried that admirable Writer with him to *England*, and introduc'd him to the Queen, and encourag'd him to the Publication of the *Fairy Queen*; *Ralegh* himſelf having an excellent Genius, as well as Taſte, for Poetry; his Odes being celebrated for their Sublimity and Pathos in a judicious Writer upon that Art, as early as the Year 1589 *.

His Moderation with regard to the Controverſy between the eſtabliſh'd Church and the Puritans appears from his Interceſſion and procuring a Reprieve for Mr. *John Udal*, a Non-conformiſt Miniſter, who had been condemn'd in *July* 1590, for Felony, in writing *The Demonſtration of Diſcipline*. And the Warmth of his Friendſhip is evident from the elaborate Defence, which he wrote of the Conduct of his Friend Sir *Richard Grenville*, who had loſt his Life in the Expedition in 1591, for intercepting the *Spaniſh* Plate-Fleet at the Iſles of the *Azores* [l].

Ralegh had now form'd a Deſign againſt the *Spaniards* in the *Weſt-Indies*, and particularly at *Panama*, with a Deſign of meeting the Plate-Fleet; and was at a great Expence in fitting out a maritime Force for that Purpoſe, and us'd his utmoſt Intereſt to engage his Friends and others in the Adventure. The Scheme, which he had drawn up, appear'd ſo feaſible to her Majeſty, he having provided no leſs than thirteen Ships of his own, and his Fellow-Adventurers, all well mann'd,

[k] Hiſtory of the World, L. 1. C. 5. Sect 5. * The Arte of Engliſh Poeſie, p. 51. L. 1. Edit. London 1589. Wood, Ath. Oxon. Vol. I. fol. 323. aſcribes this Book to Mr. Puttenham, one of the Gentlemen Penſioners to Queen Elizabeth. [l] Oldys, fol. lix,— lxiii.

mann'd, and plentifully furniſh'd with Arms, Proviſions, and all other Neceſſaries, that ſhe added to them two of her own Men of War, the *Garland* and *Foreſight*, and gave him a Commiſſion as General of the Fleet; the Poſt of Lieutenant-General being conferred upon Sir *John Burgh*. He departed with his Ships to the Weſt of *England*, in *February* 159½; but the Winds proved ſo contrary, that he could not put to Sea from thence, till the 6th of *May* 1592; and the next Day Sir *Martin Frobiſher* follow'd and overtook him with the Queen's Letters to recall him. But he finding his Honour ſo far engag'd in the undertaking of this Voyage, that, without proceeding, he ſaw no Method of ſaving his Reputation, or ſatisfying his Friends, who had contributed ſo largely to the Adventure; and interpreting the Queen's Letters with ſome Latitude, reſolv'd to continue in the Fleet, and purſued his Courſe, notwithſtanding he underſtood, that the King of *Spain* had order'd, that no Ships ſhould ſail that Year, nor any Treaſure be brought from the *Weſt-Indies*. But on the 11th of *May*, meeting with a Storm off Cape *Finiſter*, and conſidering, that the Seaſon was too much advanced for his Deſign upon *Panama*, and that his Proviſions were now too far conſum'd for ſo long a Voyage; he divided his Fleet into two Squadrons, committing one to Sir *John Burgh*, and the other to Sir *Martin Frobiſher*; with Orders to the latter to lie off the South Cape, to keep in and terrify the *Spaniards* on their own Coaſt; while the former lay at the *Azores* for the *Caracks* from the *Eaſt-Indies*. The Succeſs of theſe Directions was anſwerable to the excellent Judgment, that form'd them. For the *Spaniſh* Admiral receiving Intelligence, that the *Engliſh* Fleet was cruiſing upon their Coaſt, collected his whole Naval Power to watch *Frobiſher*, and defend the Southern Parts of *Spain*; while the *Caracks* unguarded were left a Prey to Sir *John Burgh*, who, on the 3d of *Auguſt*, made himſelf Maſter of the

Madre de Dios, one of the greateſt Ships belonging to *Portugal*, and eſteem'd the richeſt Prize that had ever been brought to *England*, being in Burthen no leſs than 1600 Ton, whereof 900 were Merchandize. But by the Embezzlement of Jewels and other valuable Effects by the Sailors, the Cargo fell ſhort above two Thirds of the Computation of Five hundred thouſand Pounds, which had been made by *Ralegh* and Sir *John Hawkins*, his chief Partner in the Enterprize [m]: And the Queen herſelf took the largeſt Share of it [n].

In the latter End of this Year, and the Beginning of the next, Sir *Walter* exerted himſelf in Parliament with all the Abilities of an accompliſh'd Speaker, and declar'd ſtrongly for an open War againſt *Spain*, and vigorouſly promoted the Subſidies rais'd for the public Service. He was concern'd likewiſe in ſeveral Bills, particularly one *againſt Aliens ſelling foreign Wares in* England *by Retail*; and in reviſing and correcting an *Act to retain the Queen's Subjects in due Obedience*; which in its firſt Form, though levell'd againſt the *Browniſts* and other Sectaries, confirm'd ſome Clauſes, which he thought dangerous to innocent Perſons [o].

Father *Parſons*, the Jeſuit, whoſe Bigotry and Malice were at leaſt equal to his Talents as a Writer, which were by no Means contemptible, in the Libel, which he publiſh'd in Latin, in the Year 1593, under the Name of *Andreas Philopater*, againſt the great Men of her Majeſty's Court, who had been inſtrumental in framing her Proclamation of *November* 29th 1591, againſt the Popiſh Seminaries abroad, ſhew'd a peculiar Spleen againſt Sir *Walter Ralegh*. And the Imputation, which he caſt upon him, was no leſs than that of being a direct Founder and Doctor of a *School of Atheiſm*, and ambitious of making Converts of young Gentlemen to the Principles of it. A later Writer obſerves likewiſe,

[m] Id. p. lxiii and lxv. [n] Sir William Monſon's Naval Tracts, p. 181. [o] Sir S. D' Ewes's Journal, fol. 478, 484, 492, 493, 495, 509, and 517, and Townſhend's Collections, fol. 76.

likewiſe [p], that his Diſſent from ſome Principles of School Divinity expos'd him to the Reproach of *Atheiſm*, tho' *a known Aſſertor of a God and Providence*; while *Anthony Wood*, whoſe Judgment and Cenſures are very little to be regarded, tho' his Collections of Facts are extremely valuable, contents himſelf [q] with imputing to him *Deiſm*, which, that Hiſtorian pretends, he had learned from his Friend Mr. *Harriot* the Mathematician. The Lord Chief Juſtice *Popham* likewiſe upon Sir *Walter*'s Tryal at *Winchester*, in 1603, after charging him with *eager Ambition, and corrupt Covetouſneſs*, adds, that he had been tax'd by the World with the *Defence of moſt heatheniſh and blaſphemous Opinions*. But the moſt conſiderable Authority, which I have met with, to countenance the Suſpicions of Sir *Walter*'s Religion, is that of Archbiſhop *Abbot*, who, in an original Letter, never printed, dated at *Lambeth*, *February* the 19th $161\frac{8}{9}$, addreſſed to Sir *Thomas Roe*, then Ambaſſador at the *Mogul*'s Court, expreſly charges Sir *Walter* with "queſtioning God's "Being and Omnipotence; which, *adds his Grace*, that "juſt Judge made good upon himſelf, in overtumbling "his Eſtate, but laſt of all bringing him to an Execu-"tion by Law, where he died a religious and Chriſtian "Death." But it is highly probable, that Sir *Walter*'s Opinions might be miſrepreſented by his Enemies, or wrong Concluſions drawn from thoſe, which he maintain'd: And it would be a ſhocking Injuſtice to the Memory of ſo great a Man, to ſuſpect him of Irreligion, whoſe Writings contain not the leaſt Trace of it, and whoſe *Hiſtory* in particular breaths a ſtrong Spirit of real and genuine Piety. It is difficult at this Diſtance to trace the Origin of ſuch an Imputation; which ſome have imagin'd might have been the more induſtriouſly propagated on account of his having

[p] Francis Oſborne's Miſcellanies, in the Preface. [q] Ath. Oxon. Vol. I. fol. 460.

having obtain'd of the Crown a Grant in 1594, of ſome Church Lands, a Courſe of Reward uſual with Queen *Elizabeth* towards ſuch, as had perform'd any conſiderable Service to the State: For Doctor *John Coldwell*, upon his Election to the See of *Saliſbury*, having conſented to alienate the Manor of *Sherborne* in *Dorſetſhire* to the Crown, Sir *Walter* requeſted and procured it of her Majeſty [r].

But in the height of his Favour with the Queen, he fell under her Majeſty's Diſpleaſure; for being enamour'd of Mrs. *Elizabeth Throckmorton*, Daughter of that able Stateſman and Ambaſſador, Sir *Nicholas Throckmorton*, and one of the Queen's Maids of Honour, and the Conſequences of their Amour diſcovering the Intrigue, her Majeſty was highly exaſperated, and order'd him to be confin'd for ſeveral Months, and after his Enlargement forbid him the Court, whence the Lady was likewiſe diſmiſs'd from her Attendance, to whom he afterwards made the moſt honourable Reparation he could by Marriage [s], in which they were both Examples of conjugal Affection and Fidelity.

It was probably during his Confinement abovemention'd, that an Incident happen'd of a very remarkable Kind, which, as we have not the leaſt Mention of it any where elſe, will be beſt related in the Words of an original Letter, never yet publiſh'd, from Mr. (afterwards Sir) *Arthur Gorges* to Sir *Robert Cecil*, then a Privy Counſellor, and afterwards Secretary of State, Earl of *Saliſbury*, and Lord High Treaſurer. The Letter has no Date of Month or Year, but the Indorſement is 26th of *July*, and is as follows.

" Honorable

[r] Sir John Harrington's brief View of the State of the Church of England, p. 92, and Fuller's Church Hiſtory, L. x. p. 27.
[s] Camden, ad Ann. 1595, and Sir John Harrington, ubi ſupra.

" Honorable Sir,
" I Cannot chuſe but advertyſe you of a ſtraunge
" Tragedye, that this Day had lyke to have fallen
" oute betweene the Captayne of the Guarde and the
" Lyvetennant of the Ordenaunce, if I had not by
" greate Chaunce cummen att the very Inſtant to
" have turned it into a Comedye. For uppon the
" Report of hyr Majeſtie's beinge att Sir *George Ca-*
" *rye*'s, Sir W. *Rawly* having gazed and ſyghed a
" long tyme att his Study-wyndow, from whence he
" myght diſcerne the Barges and Boates aboute the
" *Black-fryars* Stayers, ſoodaynly he brake owte into
" a greate Diſtemper, and ſware, that hys Enymyes
" hadd of Purpoſe brought hyr Majeſtie thether to
" breake his Gaule in ſounder with *Tantalus* torment,
" that, when ſhee wentt away, he myght ſee hys Death
" before hys Eyes; with many ſuch lyke Conceyts.
" And as a Mann tranſported with Paſſion, he ſware
" to Sir *George Carew*, that he wolde diſguyſe hyme-
" ſelfe, and gett into a payer of Oares to eaſe hys
" Mynde but with a ſyght of the Queene, or els he
" proteſted his Harte wolde breake. But the truſty
" Jaylor wold non of that, for diſpleaſing the hygher
" Powers, as he ſayde, which he more reſpected than
" the feeding of hys Humor; and ſo flatly refuſed to
" permitt hym. But in Concluſion uppon this Diſſ-
" pute, they fell flatt owte to colloryq outragious
" Wordes, with ſtreyning and ſtruggling att theDoores,
" that all Lamenes was forgotten, and in the Fury of
" the Conflyct, the Jaylor he had hys newe Perwygg
" torne of hys Crowne; and yet heare the Battle
" ended not, for att laſte they had gotten owte theyr
" Daggers; which when I ſawe, I played the Styck-
" ler betweene theme, and ſo purchaſed ſuch a Rapp
" on the Knockles, that I wyſht both theyr Pates
" broken; and ſo with much adoo they ſtayed theyre

" Brawle

" Brawle to ſee my bloodyed Fyngers. Att the
" fyrſte I was ready to breake with laughinge to ſee
" theme too ſo ſcamble and brawle lyke mad Menn,
" untyll I ſawe the Iron walkinge; and then I dyd my
" beſt to apeaſe the Fury. As yet I canot reconcyle
" them by any Perſwaſions, for Sir *Walt.* ſweares,
" that he ſhall hate hyme for ſo reſtrayning
" hyme from the Syht of hys Miſtreſs, whylſt
" he lyves; for that he knowes not (as he ſayd)
" whether ever he ſhall ſee hyr agayne, when ſhee is
" gonn the Progreſs. And Sir Georg, on hys Syde,
" ſwares, that he had rather, he ſhould loſe hys long-
" inge, then that he wolde draw on hyme hyr Ma-
" jeſtie's Diſpleaſure by ſuch Liberty. Thys they
" contynew in Mallyce and Snarlynge, but I am ſure
" all the Smarte lyghted on me. I cannot tell wheare
" I ſhould more alowe of the paſſionat Lover or the
" truſty Jailor. But yf yourſelfe had ſeene it, as I
" dyd, yow wold have byne as hartely merry and
" ſorry, as ever yow weare in all your Lyfe for ſo
" ſhorte a tyme. I praye yow pardon my haſty
" wrytten Narration, which I acquaynt yow with,
" hoping yow wyll be the Peace-maker. Butt, good
" Sir, let no Body knowe theareof, for I feare Sir
" *W. Rawly* wyll ſhortely growe to be *Orlando*
" *Furioſo*, if the bryght Angelyca perſever agaynſt
" hyme a lyttle longer.

" Your Honor's humbly to be commaunded,
" *London*, in haſte this Wenſdaye. *A. Gorges.*

The following Poſtſcript is added upon a little Slip of Paper, wax'd on to the Letter itſelf.

" If yow let the Q. Majeſtie know heareof, as yow
" thinck good, be it; but otherwyſe, good Sir, keepe
" it ſecrett, for theyr Credytts; for they know not
" of my Diſcourſe, which I could wyſhe her Ma-
" jeſtie knewe."

While

While *Ralegh* continued under her Majeſty's Diſpleaſure, and in Retirement from her Court, he projected a greater Deſign, than any which he had yet undertaken; the Diſcovery of the rich and extenſive Empire of *Guiana*, in the South of *America*, which the *Spaniards* had then only viſited, and to this Day have never conquered. For this Purpoſe, having collected whatever Informations he could procure relating to it, and the Means of entering it, he drew up in 1594 Inſtructions for Captain *Whiddon*, an old Officer, whoſe Experience he had before tryed, and ſent him to take a View of the Coaſt, who return'd the Year following with a very favourable Report of the Riches of the Country, which he had receiv'd from ſome of the principal *Caſſiques* upon the Borders of it. This determin'd *Ralegh*'s Reſolution, who having provided a Squadron of Ships at a very great Expence, the Lord High Admiral *Howard* and Sir *Robert Cecil* conceiv'd ſo good an Opinion of the Deſign, that they both concurr'd in it. There is no exact Account of the Number of the Ships, but we may diſtinguiſh in his own Account five at leaſt, beſides Barges, Wherries, and other neceſſary Tenders. With theſe he ſet ſail from *Plymouth* on the 6th of *February* 159$\frac{3}{4}$, and proceeded to the *Canaries*, and arrived at the Iſle of *Trinidad* on the 22d of *March*; where he made himſelf Maſter of St. *Joſeph*, a ſmall City, and took the *Spaniſh* Governor, *Antonio de Berreo*; who, in return for the courteous Treatment, which he receiv'd from Sir *Walter*, frankly open'd to him the Knowledge and Experience, which he had gain'd in the many Years, which he had ſpent, together with great Sums of Money, upon *Guiana*, tho' at the ſame time he diſcourag'd *Ralegh*'s Attempt upon the Country. But Sir *Walter*, who was not to be diverted by any Apprehenſions of Difficulty or Danger, leaving his Ships at *Curiapan* in *Trinidad*, with an hundred Men in ſeveral little Barks ſail'd up the River *Oronoque*, 400 Miles, in ſearch of

Guiana.

Guiana. Several of the petty Kings of the Country reſign'd their Sovereignties into his Hand, for the Queen's Uſe. But the Weather was ſo hot, and the Rains ſo violent, that he was forc'd to retire in as much Danger of being borne down by the rapid Torrents of Water, as of his Enemies. The Inhabitants of *Cumana* refuſing to bring in the Contributions, which he requir'd, he fir'd the Town, as alſo Part of St. *Mary*'s, and *Rio de la Hacha*; and having ſatisfied himſelf of the Certainty of the Gold Mines of the Country, and made a much greater Progreſs in the Diſcovery of it in a Month, than the *Spaniards* had done in many Years; he returned home with Honour and Riches in the latter End of the Summer of 1595; and the Year following publiſhed in Quarto an Account of his Voyage and Diſcoveries, dedicated to the Lord Admiral *Howard* and Sir *Robert Cecil*, his Fellow-Adventurers.

But this Account of his was not ſufficient to procure him the public Concurrence for the Proſecution of his Diſcovery of *Guiana*; ſome affecting to treat many Things in it as fabulous, or at leaſt uncertain; and others inſiſting upon the Hazard of ſending a large Fleet well mann'd into ſo unhealthy a Climate; while Envy perhaps was the chief Cauſe of the Rejection of his Propoſals. But, to ſhew, that he had a thorough Confidence in his own Scheme, he fitted out two Ships at his Expence, the *Darling* and the *Diſcoverer*, under Captain *Laurence Keymis*, who had attended him in the firſt Voyage. *Keymis* ſet ſail in the latter End of *January* 1595-6, and having made farther Diſcoveries with relation to *Guiana*, and the Gold Mines there, he return'd to *England* in *June* following, and publiſh'd an Account of his Expedition dedicated to *Ralegh*.

Sir *Walter* continued ſtill in a State of Baniſhment from the Court in *December* 1595, tho' ſtrong Sollicitations

tations were made in his Favour; but he liv'd about *London* in great Splendor *. However in the Year following, 1596, he was ſo far reſtor'd to Favour, that he was engag'd in the important and ſucceſsful Expedition to *Cadiz*, wherein the Earl of *Eſſex* and the Lord Admiral *Howard* were joint Commanders, and *Ralegh*, with many other Perſons eminent for the military Skill, of the Council of War, and one of the Admirals [a]. The Fleet ſailed in the Beginning of *June*, and on the 20th of that Month arriv'd before *Cadiz*. The Lord Admiral was of Opinion, that the Land Forces ſhould attack the Town firſt, that the Fleet might not be expos'd to the Fire of the Ships in the Port, and that of the City and Forts adjacent at the ſame Time. The Council of War, call'd upon this Occaſion, concurr'd in this Opinion; in Conſequence of which a Reſolution was taken to attack the Town immediately. Sir *Walter* not happening to be preſent at this Council of War, nor being acquainted with the Reſolution, till the Earl of *Eſſex* was actually putting his Men into Boats, in order to land them, went directly, upon hearing of the Deſign, to that Earl, and offer'd ſuch convincing Reaſons againſt it, and for their firſt falling upon the Galleons and Ships in the Harbour, that the Earl ſaw the Neceſſity of altering their Scheme, and deſir'd Sir *Walter* to diſſuade the Admiral from that of landing; in which he ſucceeded, and prevail'd with him to conſent, that the Fleet ſhould firſt enter the Port, and attack the *Spaniſh* Galleons and Gallies. When he return'd to the Earl of *Eſſex* with the News of the Admiral's Agreement, crying out in his long Boat, *Entramos*, the Earl caſt his Hat into the Sea for Joy, and prepared to weigh Anchor. The Day was now far ſpent, and Sir

* Letter of Rowland Whyte, Eſq; to Sir Robert Sidney, Dec. 13, 1595. Sidney Papers, Vol. I. p. 377.

[a] Camden, ad ann. 1596, p. 667.

Sir *Walter* advis'd the deferring of the Attack till next Morning, and in the Night wrote the Admiral a Letter concerning the Diſpoſition of it; particularly that two great Fly-Boats ſhould board each Galleon, after the Queen's Ships had ſufficiently batter'd it. This Method being agreed upon, and both the Generals perſuaded to lead the main Body of the Fleet, Sir *Walter* in the *Warſpight* had the Command of the Van, which was to enter the Harbour, and conſiſted of the *Mary-Roſe* commanded by Sir *George Carew*, the *Lyon* by Sir *Robert Southwell*, the *Rainbow* by Sir *Francis Vere*, the *Swiftſure* by Captain *Croſs*, the *Dreadnought* by Sir *Conyers Clifford*, and the *Nonpareil* by Mr. *Robert Dudley*; beſides twelve *London* hired Ships and the Fly-Boats; the Lord *Thomas Howard* leaving his own Ship the *Mer Honeur*, to go on board the *Nonpareil*. On the 22d of *June* Sir *Walter* weigh'd Anchor at Break of Day, and bore in towards the *Spaniſh* Fleet, which lay in this Diſpoſition to ſupport the Attack. Under the Walls of the City were rang'd ſeventeen Gallies, that they might the better flank the *Engliſh* Ships as they enter'd, and hinder them from paſſing forward to the Galleons. The Artillery from Fort *Philip* play'd on the Fleet, as did the Cannon from the Curtain of the Town, and ſix Culverins ſcour'd the Channel. When the *Spaniſh* Admiral, the St. *Philip*, perceived the *Engliſh* approaching under ſail, ſhe ſet ſail likewiſe; and with her the St. *Matthew*, St. *Andrew*, and St. *Thomas*, four of the capital Galleons of *Spain*, the two great Galeaſſes of *Liſbon*, three Frigates of War, two Argoſies, the Admiral, Vice Admiral, a Rear Admiral of *New-Spain*, with forty other great Ships bound for *Mexico* and other Places. Of theſe the St. *Philip*, the St. *Matthew*, the St. *Andrew*, and the St. *Thomas*, came again to anchor under the Fort of *Pontal*, in a Streight of the Harbour, which leads to *Puerto-Real*. On the Star-board Side were placed the three Frigates, behind them the two

Galeaſſes

Galeaſſes of *Liſbon*. The Argoſies and ſeventeen Gallies were poſted in a Situation to play upon the *Engliſh*, as they entered the Harbour; and behind theſe the Admiral, Vice Admiral, and Rear Admiral of *New-Spain*, with the Body of the Fleet, in order to defend the Entrance, their Line ſtretching like a Bridge over the Streight, which was alſo guarded by the Fort of *Puntal*. Sir *Walter* advancing in the Van of the *Engliſh* was firſt ſaluted by Fort *Philip*, next by the Cannon of the Curtain, and laſtly by all the ſeventeen Gallies, which lay near the Town with all their Prows bent againſt him as he enter'd. He anſwer'd their Fire with a Flouriſh of his Trumpets, and ſtill kept driving forwards, that he might draw up a ſufficient Number of the *Engliſh* Ships into Play, and to engage thoſe, which he paſs'd by, while he attack'd the Body of the Enemy. Accordingly the Ships, which followed him, beat ſo thick upon the Gallies, that they ſoon betook themſelves to their Oars, and got up to join the Galleons in the Streight. Sir *Walter* gave them ſeveral Broadſides, as they paſs'd him, and bore down upon the St. *Philip*, as more worthy of his Fire, and came to anchor by the great Galleons, which he began to batter with the utmoſt Reſolution. The Lord *Thomas Howard* came ſoon to an anchor on one Side of him, tho' pretty much behind, with Sir *Robert Southwell*; Sir *George Carew* and the *Cliffords* on the other, and Sir *Francis Vere* towards the *Puntal*. At laſt, after they had cannonaded the Enemy for a long Time, about Ten in the Morning the Earl of *Eſſex*, impatient of continuing any longer at a Diſtance from the Action, bore thro' the Fleet, heading the Ships on the left Hand, and anchor'd near to Sir *Walter*. Captain *Croſs* afterwards advanc'd as near as he could; but *Ralegh* was always cloſeſt to the Enemy, and ſtood ſingle in the Head of all. After this vigorous Exchange of Shot for near three Hours, in which his Ship ſuffer'd ſo much, that it was ready

to ſink, he went to the Admiral in his Skiff, to deſire, that he would oblige the Fly-Boats to advance, that he might board the Enemy. The Earl of *Eſſex* was then coming up, to whom *Ralegh* declared, that if thoſe Boats did not come he would board them in the Queen's Ship; for it was the ſame Loſs to burn or ſink, and one he muſt endure. The Earl promiſed to ſecond him in whatever he attempted; as did likewiſe the Lord *Thomas Howard*; upon which after a long and deſperate Fight, Sir *Walter* having no Hopes of the Fly-Boats, prepar'd to board the *Spaniſh* Admiral; which the latter perceiving, ran his Ship aſhore, and was follow'd by the other capital Ships. The Admiral and the St. *Thomas* were burnt; and the St. *Matthew* and St. *Andrew* ſaved by the *Engliſh* Boats before they took Fire. The *Engliſh* ſhew'd great Moderation after the Victory; but the *Dutch*, who did little or nothing in the Fight, made a great Slaughter among the Enemy, till they were reſtrain'd by the Lord Admiral and Sir *Walter*. This Action was the more remarkable from the Diſproportion between the *Engliſh* and *Spaniſh* Force, there being but ſeven Ships of the former oppos'd to ſeventy-one of the latter. And the Succeſs of it was immediately follow'd by the taking of the City of *Cadiz*; in which Sir *Walter*, tho' wounded in the Sea-fight, was reſolv'd to have had a Share, and accordingly went aſhore; but finding all Things in Confuſion there, the Conduct of the Officers being far inferior to the Bravery of the Soldiers, he ſoon return'd on Board the Fleet, where his Preſence was wanted in the Abſence of the Admiral. The next Morning he ſent to the Generals for Orders to fall on the *Spaniſh Weſt-India* Fleet outward bound, and ſaid to be worth twelve Millions, then lying in the *Puerto-Royal*, where they could not eſcape him. But he receiv'd no Anſwer upon his repeated Meſſages, which he imputed to the Hurry and Confuſion, which they were in. In the Afternoon the Merchants of *Cadiz*

and

and *Seville* offer'd them two Millions of Ducats to ſpare that Fleet: But the Admiral being averſe to any Compoſition; and the Earl of *Eſſex*, deſirous that the Land Officers ſhould ſeize the Ships, which Sir *Walter* would not conſent to out of Regard to the Honour of the Sailors; the Opportunity of either taking or ranſoming them was loſt; for the next Morning *June* 23d, the Duke of *Medina Sidonia* caus'd all that rich Fleet to be burnt. Thus the Galleons, Frigates, Argoſies, the Fleet of *New-Spain*, and all except the Gallies, which appear to have eſcaped, were conſum'd to Aſhes. A good Number of the Enemy's Ordnance was recover'd out of their Ships, and the Plunder of the City in Merchandize, Plate, Jewels and Money, was very conſiderable; their whole Loſs being computed at twenty Millions of Ducats. Many wealthy Priſoners were given to the Land Commanders, who were inrich'd by their Ranſom, ſome gaining by that Means ten, ſome ſixteen, others twenty thouſand Ducats. While Sir *Walter* got, to uſe his own Words, "a lame Leg and a deformed. For the reſt, either I "ſpoke too late, or it was otherwiſe reſolved. I have "not been wanting in good Words, or exceeding kind "and regardful Uſage; but have Poſſeſſion of nought "but Poverty and Pain[a]."

The Army embark'd on the 5th of *July*; and it was deliberated in the Council of War, whether the Fleet ſhould not continue at Sea, in order to intercept the *Weſt-Indian* Ships: But the Want of Proviſions not permitting the Execution of this Deſign, it was reſolved to return towards *England*, and viſit the *Spaniſh* Coaſts in their Way, to deſtroy the Enemy's Shipping. Accordingly they ſack'd and demoliſh'd *Faro*,

[a] Sir Walter Ralegh's Relation of the Action at Cadiz in 1596, publiſh'd by his Grandſon Philip Ralegh, Eſq; at the End of an Abridgment of Sir Walter's Hiſtory of the World, 1700 in 8vo. Sir William Monſon's Naval Tracts, p. 184. Hakluyt, Purchas's Pilgrims, Vol. IV. fol. 1929. Sir Francis Vere's Commentaries, p. 26, 30, &c.

a large and populous Town, but unfortified. The Earl of *Eſſex* propoſed likewiſe ſome other Enterprizes, but met with great Oppoſition from the reſt of the principal Land and Sea Officers; which, together with other Cauſes, ſo highly diſguſted him, that upon his Return he wrote *A Cenſure of the Omiſſions* in this Expedition; in which Paper he raiſes four Objections to the Conduct of it; that they did not poſſeſs the *Indian* Fleet; that they abandon'd *Cadiz*; that they did not wait for the *Carracks* and *Indian* Ships; and laſtly, that they did not attack the Enemy in other Parts. Theſe Omiſſions he charges upon the other Commanders; and in the two laſt Articles particularly names Sir *Walter Ralegh*; whoſe Behaviour in this whole Expedition had been ſuch, as was greatly approv'd of by the Queen, and admir'd by her Subjects [b].

About two Months after his Return from the Conqueſt of *Cadiz*, he prepar'd a new Attempt in Favour of his Scheme for ſettling *Guiana*. In order therefore to enlarge his Diſcoveries, and open a Trade there, he fitted out a ſtout Pinnace, which had been with him in the late Engagement, call'd after his own Name, the *Watt*, well furniſh'd with every thing neceſſary, under the Command of Captain *Leonard Berrie*. This Veſſel ſail'd from *Weymouth* in the latter End of *December* 1596, and arriv'd on the Coaſt of *Guiana* in *March* following; and having enter'd into a friendly Commerce with the Inhabitants of it, and learned from them the State and Riches of the more inland Country, return'd to *England*, arriving at *Plymouth* on the 28th of *June*, 1597 [c].

This Expedition affords a ſtrong Proof of two Things; that Sir *Walter* himſelf was earneſt in this Diſcovery, ſince no other Cauſe can be aſſign'd, why, having ſo many Affairs of Importance upon his Hands, he ſhould yet buſy himſelf in an Undertaking of this Kind: And that his Hopes of Succeſs were as well founded,

[b] Oldys, fol. cv—cviii. [c] Hakluyt, Vol. III fol. 692.

founded, as it was poſſible in Things of this Nature, ſince the Account given us of this Voyage is ſuch, as is liable to no juſt Objections [d].

He was ſtill ſuſpended from the Execution of his Office of Captain of the Guard, tho' in the Beginning of *April* 1597, he was in great Hopes to be reſtor'd to it [e]; and had in the middle of *March* preceding ſtood for the Place of Vice Chamberlain [f]. And to ſtrengthen his Intereſt he endeavour'd about that Time to procure a Reconciliation between the Earl of *Eſſex* and Secretary *Cecil*, whoſe Conteſts had given continual Uneaſineſs to the Queen [g]; and at laſt on the 19th of *April* 1597, he effected it [h], and was admitted for ſome Time afterwards into the ſecret Conſultations, which the Earl and the Secretary held with each other [i]. On the firſt of *June* following, the Secretary brought *Ralegh* to the Queen, who treated him with great Kindneſs, and reſtor'd him to the Execution of his Place of Captain of the Guard: and the ſame Evening he rode abroad with her Majeſty, and had private Conferences with her, and attended her in her Privy Chamber, with the ſame Freedom as formerly [k].

Being thus reſtor'd to the full Favour of her Majeſty, he was employed in the *Iſland Voyage* in 1597, as Rear Admiral, the Earl of *Eſſex* having the chief Command; and the Lord *Thomas Howard* the Poſt of Vice Admiral. The Deſign of it was to defeat and deſtroy at *Ferol*, as well as in other Ports of the Enemy, the *Spaniſh* Fleet intended for a new Expedition againſt *England* and *Ireland*; and to ſeize upon ſuch *Indian* Fleets of Treaſure, as they ſhould meet with, belonging to the King of *Spain*; but eſpecially to conquer, retain, and garriſon moſt of the Iſles of

[d] Lives of the Admirals: By John Campbell, Eſq; Vol. II. p. 56. [e] Letter of Mr. Whyte, April 9, 1597. Sidney Papers, Vol. II. p. 37. [f] Letter of March 12. Ibid. p. 27. [g] Letter of March 4th. Ibid. p. 24. [h] Letter of April 19. Ibid. p. 42. [i] Letter of April 23. Ibid. p. 44. [k] Letter of June 2, 1597. Ibid. p. 54.

the *Azores*, and above all the *Tercera*. But the Succeſs of this Expedition did not anſwer the Greatneſs of the Preparations for it; the Jealouſy of the Earl of *Eſſex*, the Commander, obſtructing the great Services, which Sir *Walter Ralegh*'s Abilities might otherwiſe have perform'd. Their Differences began ſoon after the ſailing of the Fleet from *Plymouth* on the 9th of *July*. A Misfortune befalling Sir *Walter*'s Ship in the Bay of *Biſcay*, oblig'd him to lie behind the Fleet; and afterwards, when this Accident was repair'd, and he came to the Rock of *Liſbon*, he met with a large Number of Ships and Tenders, which were by him conducted to the *Azores*. This ſignal Service was miſinterpreted by the Earl's Creatures into an high Offence, as if theſe Veſſels had quitted the General to wait on the Rear Admiral. But Sir *Walter* ſatisfied the Earl, that theſe Ships came to the Rock of *Liſbon*, as the Rendezvous appointed by his Lordſhip himſelf; and that he finding them there, had brought them, according to his Duty, to attend upon his Lordſhip. In the Council of War, which was held before the Iſle of *Flores*, it was reſolv'd, that the General and Sir *Walter* ſhould jointly attack the Iſland of *Fayal*; where the latter waited ſeven Days for his Lordſhip, and hearing nothing of him, call'd a Council of War, in which it was determin'd, that *Ralegh* ſhould attempt the Town himſelf; which he did with all the perſonal Bravery of a Soldier, and all the Conduct of an able Commander, and on the 22d of *September* made himſelf Maſter of the Place. The next Day the Earl arriv'd from a fruitleſs Chace in queſt of the Enemy's *Indian* Fleets, which were not in thoſe Parts; and finding himſelf depriv'd of the Honour of taking *Fayal*, was exaſperated to ſuch a Degree, that he broke ſome of the Officers, who had behav'd with great Gallantry under *Ralegh*; and ſome of his Dependents intimated, that *Ralegh* himſelf deſerv'd to loſe his Head for Breach of Articles, in landing without his Lordſhip's Orders. But his Juſtification of himſelf, and the Mediation

Mediation of the Lord *Thomas Howard*, the Vice Admiral, brought the Earl to more Moderation, and the caſhier'd Officers were reſtor'd, and Sir *Walter* return'd to the public Service. The Earl however continued under the Influence of his own raſh and unadviſed Temper, heighten'd by the Flatteries of Sir *Gilly Morrick*, and Sir *Chriſtopher Blount*, and his other Creatures; which led him into ſeveral Errors, in Conſequence of which he miſs'd the *Weſt India* Fleet; tho' *Ralegh* had the good Fortune to take ſeveral Prizes [a]. Upon their Return to *England*, the Earl endeavour'd to transfer the Miſcarriages of the Expedition upon *Ralegh*; and indeed gain'd on his Side the Populace, whom the latter had never manag'd, while the more intelligent Part of the Nation were more juſt to the Merits of his Antagoniſt [b]; and the Queen herſelf was not well pleas'd with the Earl's Conduct, ſince it was judg'd, that he might have done more than he did; and his Proceedings againſt Sir *Walter*, in calling his Actions to public Queſtion before a Council of War, were highly diſapproved [c].

The Parliament being met on the 24th of *October* this Year, Sir *Walter*, after a ſhort Receſs to his Seat at *Sherborne*, took his Seat there, and continued an active Member during the reſt of the Seſſion, which ended by a Diſſolution on the 9th of *February*, 1597-8 [d]. During the Courſe of it, he was employ'd by the Queen, in the latter End of *December* 1597, to procure a Reconciliation between the Earl of *Eſſex* and the Lord Admiral, who having been created Earl of *Nottingham* during the Abſence of the former, it was ſo highly reſented by him, as this Promotion with the Poſt of Admiral gave *Nottingham* the Precedence [e],

[a] Sir Arthur Gorges's Relation in Purchas's Pilgrim, Vol. IV. fol. 1938. Vere's Commentaries, fol. 65, 66, 67. [b] Oldys, fol. cxxvii. [c] Letter of Rowland Whyte, Eſq; to Sir Robert Sidney, Nov. 5, 1597. Sidney Papers, Vol. II. p. 74. [d] Oldys, fol. cxxvii, cxxviii. [e] Camden, Ann. 1597. p. 692.

that *Eſſex* inſiſted upon the Alteration of the new Earl's Patent, or to maintain his own Right by Combat againſt that Earl, or any of his Sons or Family [f]; in which he was ſo inflexible, that her Majeſty was oblig'd to create him Earl Marſhal of *England*, in order to ſupport his Precedence [g].

Soon after this, in the Beginning of *January* 1597-8, Sir *Walter Ralegh*, and Sir *Robert Cecil*, Secretary of State, who had been for ſome Time upon ill Terms with the Earl of *Eſſex*, were brought into a great Degree of Familiarity, to the Surprize of the Public [h]: And Sir *Walter* ſollicited the Earl's Intereſt to obtain ſome Reward for his Service, or ſome Honour to be conferr'd upon him; having laid aſide all Hopes of the Place of Vice Chamberlain, for which he found his Lordſhip's Promiſe engaged to Sir *Robert Sidney*, whom her Majeſty was inclin'd to prefer to it [i]. He was likewiſe very importunate with Sir *Robert Cecil*, that ſomething might be done for him, before that Secretary went to *France* as Ambaſſador to *Henry* IV. to divert him from the Peace then in Treaty at *Vervins*: And an Offer was made to the Earl of *Eſſex*, that if he would aſſiſt Sir *Walter*, in procuring what he wanted, which was probably the Vice Chamberlainſhip, a third Part of the Prizes ſhould be obtain'd for the Earl towards the Payment of his Debts [k]. Before the Secretary's Departure for *France*, Sir *Walter*, who cultivated his Friendſhip at that Time with great Aſſiduity, entertain'd him with a Banquet and Play [l], and attended him to *Dover* [m], the Secretary having, before he left *London*, agreed with the Earl of *Eſſex* to bring

[f] Mr. R. Whyte's Letter to Sir Robert Sidney, St. Thomas's Day, 1597. Sidney Papers, Vol. II. p. 77. [g] Camden, ubi ſupra. [h] Mr. Whyte's Letter of the 3d of January, 1597. Ibid. p. 79. [i] Mr. Whyte's Letter of January 14, 1597. Ibid. p. 80. [k] Mr. Whyte's Letter of January 19, 1597. Ibid. p. 82. [l] Letter of January 30, 1597. Ibid. p. 86. [m] Letter of February 11, 1597. Ibid. p. 89.

bring *Ralegh*, as well as Sir *Robert Sidney*, into the Privy Council [a].

About the 18th of *February*, 1597-8, upon the Advice of a *Spaniſh* Fleet coming upon the Coaſt, in their Paſſage to reinforce their Army in *Flanders*, Sir *Walter* haſtened into *Cornwall*, in order to put that County into a Situation of Defence [b]; and on the 4th of *March* following, there was a Talk of ſending him Lord Deputy to *Ireland* [c]; which continued for ſeveral Days after [d]; and on the 15th of that Month he was ſent for by the Privy Council to give his Opinion with Relation to the Affairs of that Kingdom [e]: But he was averſe to the Acceptance of the Poſt of Lord Deputy [f].

Before the Death of the Lord Treaſurer in *Auguſt* 1598, Sir *Walter* procured the Reſtoration of the Dutchy Manors in *Cornwall* to their antient Tenures [g], and a Revocation of a Tax on the curing of Fiſh [h]; and he ſhew'd himſelf upon all Occaſions a zealous Friend to the Privileges and Intereſts of that County, where he fill'd the moſt important Offices [i].

Upon the Alarm of an Invaſion from *Spain* in the Beginning of *Auguſt* 1599, a Fleet being immediately fitted out, *Ralegh* was appointed Vice Admiral [k]; and about the 17th of that Month he took his Leave of the Court, to go on board the Fleet [l]. But the Apprehenſions of Danger from the *Spaniards* being ſoon remov'd, he return'd to Court; having a ſtrong Deſire to be created a Baron [m].

The

[a] Letter of February 15, 1597. Ibid. p. 90. [b] Letter of February 18, 1597. Ibid. p 91. [c] Letter of March 4th, 1597. Ibid. p. 94. [d] Letter of March 10, 1597. Ibid. p. 95. [e] Letter of March 15. Ibid. p. 96. [f] Letter of March 18th. Ibid. [g] Carew's Survey of Cornwall, p 36, 37. Oldys, fol. cxxviii. [h] Carew, p. 79, 80. [i] Oldys, fol. cxxix. [k] Letter of Mr. Whyte, of Auguſt 5, 1599. Sidney Papers, Vol. II. p. 113. [l] Letter of Auguſt 18 Ibid. p. 117. [m] Letter of September 20, 1599. Ibid. p. 126.

The Earl of *Eſſex*, who had given new Offence to Sir *Walter* [d], before his going Lord Lieutenant to *Ireland*, about *April* 1599, having by his Conduct there, and unexpected Return from thence, on the 28th of *September*, provok'd the Queen to order him to be confin'd, and to be examin'd the next Day before her Council, Sir *Walter* adher'd to Secretary *Cecil*, who was of the oppoſite Party to the Earl, dining with *Cecil* that very Day, after his Lordſhip's Examination [e]. And his Prejudices againſt and Jealouſy of the Earl were now ſo much heighten'd, that upon a ſlight Circumſtance of Favour ſhewn by the Queen to his Lordſhip in the beginning of *November* following, Sir *Walter* fell ſick; upon which her Majeſty graciouſly ſent to ſee him [f]. A few Days after there was diſcover'd a Breach of the long Friendſhip between him and Lord *Cobham*; tho' the Cauſe was not known [g]. In the Beginning of *December* he fell ſick [h], and his Diſorder ſoon appear'd to be an Ague; at which time he was ſuſpected with Relation to ſome Libels [i]; but of what Kind they were, we have no Account. However, in the Beginning of *January* following $1\frac{599}{600}$, he had Expectations of being advanc'd to be a Privy Counſellor [k]; and a few Days after, his Advice was aſk'd and follow'd with regard to the Victualling and Manning of *Ireland* [l]. In *March* following, he ſollicited to be one of the Commiſſioners of the Treaty at *Boulogne*; but her Majeſty, as it was thought, perceiving, that if he were appointed to that Commiſſion, he would apply to be of the Privy Council, before he went thither, which ſhe had no Inclination to grant, he was refuſed his Requeſt in the

[d] Oldys, fol. cxxxi, cxxxii. [e] Mr. Whyte's Letter of Sept. 30. 1599. Sidney Papers p. 129. [f] Letter of Nov. 4th, Ibid. p. 139. [g] Letter of Nov. 13. Ibid. p. 141. [h] Letter of December 8. Ibid. p. 149. [i] Letter of Decem. 13. Ibid. p. 150. [k] Letter of January 5th 1599. Ibid. p. 156. [l] Letter of Jan. 12. Ibid. p. 159.

the other Point [m]. Upon this Diſappointment he retir'd with ſome Diſcontent to his Seat at *Sherborne*, where he continued above two Months; but being ſent for about the middle of *May* [n], return'd to Court about the Beginning of *June*, and renew'd his Sollicitation for the Vice-Chamberlainſhip [o]. In the latter End of that Month, or Beginning of the following, he went with Lord *Cobham* to *Flanders*, to the Camp of Count *Maurice*; and as this might give Umbrage to the Arch-Duke, Secretary *Cecil* wrote to the *Engliſh* Commiſſioners at the Treaty at *Boulogne*, on the 14th of *July* [p], that *Cobham* and *Ralegh* had no Charge, nor carried either Horſe or Man, but ſome half a Dozen of their own: But that finding the Queen reſolved to have Peace, if good Conditions could be had, they had obtain'd leave with Importunity to ſee that one Action, then expected, ſince they deſpair'd of ſeeing any more of the like Kind in her Majeſty's time. And in another Letter, written on the 18th of that Month, from *Boulogne* to the Secretary, by Sir *Henry Neville* [q] one of the Commiſſioners there, he mentions it as a Report, that *Cobham* and *Ralegh* were gone over upon pretext to ſee the Camp and Siege of the Fort *Iſabella* near *Oſtend*, where Count *Maurice* lay yet unprofitably, as he had before at *Newport*: But Sir *Henry* thought, that they had ſome other End; and that in *England* there was ſome Alarm taken at theſe Matters, tho' the Commiſſioners at *Boulogne* were not worthy to know it. Sir *Henry* likewiſe, in a Letter to Mr. *Winwood* [r] obſerves, that the Journey of *Cobham* and *Ralegh* was not upon Curioſity only, but that they carried ſome Meſſage. But their Stay in *Flanders* was very ſhort, for they were return'd to *England* by the 14th of *July* [s].

Upon

[m] Letter of March 11. Ibid p. 178. [n] Letter of March 22, p. 181, April 3, 1600, p. 185. April 19. p. 188, and May 16, p. 195. [o] Letter of June 2, 1600. p. 198. [p] Winwood's Memorials, Vol. I. p. 215. [q] Ibid. p. 230. [r] Ibid p. 231. [s] Ibid p. 215.

Upon the Death of Sir *Anthony Paulet* in the beginning of *Auguſt*, the Government of *Jerſey* becoming vacant, Sir *Walter* was immediately thought the likelieſt Perſon to ſucceed in it [t], tho' he had Sir *William Ruſſel* for a Competitor, to whom it was ſaid that Sir *Walter* had offer'd to reſign his Wardenſhip of the Stanneries, and the Lieutenancy of *Cornwall*, on Condition Sir *William* would deſiſt from his Application. Sir *Walter*, who at that time was indiſpos'd with an Ague, had of late grown into high Credit with the Queen; and his Intereſt with the great Men of the Court was then very conſiderable [u]. And about the 23d of that Month of *Auguſt* it was known, that he would have the Government of *Jerſey*, upon Condition of paying the Lord *Henry Seymour* 300l. a Year out of it, who claim'd a Grant from her Majeſty of that Sum, which had been paid him before by Sir *Anthony Paulet* [w]; and accordingly the Patent was paſs'd to Sir *Walter* for that Government, on the 26th of that Month, with a Grant of the Manor or Lordſhip of St. *Germain* in *Jerſey* [x].

The Earl of *Eſſex*, who ſince his Return from *Ireland* had been confin'd and ſuſpended from all his Offices, not being yet ſufficiently humbled by the Perſecutions, which he had ſuffer'd, continued his Practices againſt his Enemies at Court, both by domeſtic Factions, and by repreſenting them to the King of *Scotland* as ill affected to his Succeſſion: And in this manner he was particularly injurious to *Ralegh*. And when that unfortunate Earl, on the 8th of *February* 160$\frac{0}{1}$, was ſo ill adviſ'd by his Creatures to attempt a a public Inſurrection, he pretended, that theCauſe of his taking Arms was to defend himſelf againſt the Violence of his perſonal Enemies, the Lord *Cobham* and *Ralegh*

[t] Mr. Whyte's Letter of Auguſt 12, 1600. Sidney Papers, p. 210. [u] Letter of Aug. 16, p. 210. [w] Letter of Aug. 23, p. 112, and Aug. 12, p. 110. [x] Rymer's Fœdera, Vol. xvi. fol. 398.

Ralegh having form'd a Deſign of murdering him; tho', on the other Hand, it is certain, that Sir *Ferdinando Gorges*, one of the Earl's Accomplices, afterwards accus'd Sir *Chriſtopher Blount*, another of them, of perſuading him to kill, or at leaſt apprehend Sir *Walter*; which *Gorges* refuſing, *Blount* diſcharg'd four Shots after him in a Boat. *Blount* acknowledg'd this, and at the time of his Execution aſk'd Sir *Walter* Forgiveneſs for it, which he readily granted. While the Earl garriſon'd his Houſe, Sir *Walter* was one of thoſe, who inveſted it; and when his Lordſhip was brought to Tryal on the 19th of *February*, he with forty of the Queen's Guard was preſent upon Duty, and likewiſe examin'd with relation to a Conference, which he had upon the *Thames* the Morning of the Inſurrection with Sir *Ferdinando Gorges*. At the Execution of *Eſſex* ſix Days after in the Tower, *Ralegh* attended, probably in his Charge as Captain of the Guard, and ſtood near the Scaffold, that he might the better anſwer, if *Eſſex* ſhould be deſirous of ſpeaking to him; but retir'd, before the Earl's Execution, becauſe the People ſeem'd to take his Appearance there in a wrong Light; tho' he afterwards repented of, ſince his retiring the Earl had a Deſire to ſee and ſpeak with him before his Death; which was, in all probability, to have aſk'd *Ralegh*'s Forgiveneſs for having traduc'd and calumniated him, in order to colour his own raſh and criminal Deſigns [a].

In the Summer of the Year 1601, *Ralegh* attended the Queen in her Progreſs; and when the King of *France* came to *Calais*, upon the Alarm of the Arch-Duke's beſieging of *Oſtend*, and ſent over to her Majeſty, then at *Dover*, Monſieur *de Roſny*, afterwards Duke of *Sully*, Sir *Walter* was one of the Perſons of Diſtinction, who receiv'd him [b].

Soon

[a] Oldys, fol. cxxxv, cxxxix. [b] Memoires de Sully, Tom. III. part. 2. p. 40. Edit. de Rouen, 1663.

Soon after the Queen's Return from her Progreſs, her laſt Parliament met at *Weſtminſter* on the 27th of *October* 1601, in which Sir *Walter* ſate as one of the Knights of the Shire for *Cornwall*, ; and this being a Seſſion full of important Buſineſs, he was frequently engag'd in it. He oppos'd the Act for ſowing of Hemp, diſapproving of ſuch Schemes of compelling People to manure or uſe their Ground, contrary to their own Judgment or Inclination ; and the Bill was accordingly rejected. He promoted the Subſidy ; and when the Complaint againſt Monopolies was brought into the Houſe of Commons, on the 20th of *November*, he defended his Patent for the Pre-emption of Tin ; but offer'd, that, if all other Patents of that Kind ſhould be repeal'd, he would give his Conſent as freely to the cancelling of that, as any Member of the Houſe [c] ; and it does not appear, that he had any Occaſion to bluſh at Dr. *Bennet*'s mentioning the Monopoly of *Cards*, as Mr. *Townſhend* * affirms he did, ſince that Monopoly belong'd to Sir *Edward Darcy*. He ſhew'd the Defects and Hardſhips in the Bill *for Reformation of Abuſes in Inns* [d] ; and was very active in that *to reſtrain the Tranſportation of Ordnance*, which was of great Importance of that time ; for tho' Sir *Henry Neville* had a Patent for tranſporting it, which produc'd a Duty to her Majeſty of three thouſand Pounds a Year, yet the Inconveniencies were great ; the *Engliſh* Cannon being exported to all Countries, which were Friends with *Dunkirk*, and Confederates with *Spain*, in ſuch Quantities, that the *Spaniards* were well ſupplied upon very eaſy Terms [e]. He declar'd likewiſe for the Repeal of the Statute of *Tillage*, which had been made in the time of Dearth ; and for the Tax *to repair Dover-Haven* ; and expoſed the

[c] Townſhend's Collections, fol. 188, 204, 235, 244, 245. Dewes's Journal, fol. 626, 633. * p. 232. [d] Townſhend, fol. 278. [e] Oldys, fol. cxli, cxlii.

the Defects of a Bill for the more diligent Resort to Church on Sundays, which was afterwards rejected [f].

It was probably in the Year 1602, that he sold his Estate in *Ireland* to Mr. *Boyle*, afterwards Earl of *Cork*. And about Midsummer he settled his Estate of *Sherborne* upon his Son *Walter*, on account of a Challenge which he had receiv'd from Sir *Amias Preston*, who had been knighted at *Cadiz* by the Earl of *Essex*; which Challenge Sir *Walter* intended to answer, and therefore put his Affairs in Order. The Cause of their Quarrel does not appear; but they were afterwards reconcil'd without proceeding to a Duel [g].

The Death of Queen *Elizabeth*, on the 24th of *March*, 1602-3, prov'd a great Misfortune to *Ralegh*; her Successor King *James* I. having been, as is already observ'd, extremely prejudic'd against him by the Earl of *Essex*. And those Prejudices seem to have been heighten'd by Secretary *Cecil* in his private Correspondences with that timorous and jealous King before his Accession to the Crown of *England*, or at least immediately upon that Event [h]; for tho' *Ralegh* and *Cecil* had united against *Essex*, yet after the Ruin of that Earl and his Party, their Friendship soon terminated in a Rivalship for Power. To which is added another very important Cause of his Majesty's Disgust to Sir *Walter*; that he, together with the Lord *Cobham*, Sir *John Fortescue*, and others, would have oblig'd the King to Articles before he was admitted to the Throne, and that the Number of his Countrymen should be limited [i]. Nor is it improbable, that an Offence might be taken from his Design of marrying his Son to a Ward of his, the Daughter and Heiress of *Basset* of *Umberleigh* and *Hinton-Court* in *Devonshire*, with an Estate of three Thousand Pounds a Year; that Family

[f] Townshend, fol. 299, 309. [g] Oldys, fol. cxlvii, cxlviii. [h] Id. fol. cxlviii. [i] Osborne's Memorials of King James, p. 102.

mily being deſcended from the *Plantagenets*, and laying ſome Claim to the Crown at this very Time [k]. But whatever Diſlike the King had of *Ralegh*, he did not diſcover it immediately upon his Arrival in *London* in the Beginning of *May* 1603, but treated him for ſome Weeks with great Kindneſs. However, his Majeſty's pacific Genius could not long reliſh ſo martial a Man, who, he apprehended, might engage him in a War [l]; and actually propos'd to him to carry two thouſand Men to invade the *Spaniards* without any Expence to the King [m]; and wrote a Diſcourſe, deſign'd to be preſented to him, *againſt the Peace with Spain* now in Agitation; adviſing his Majeſty to continue the Protection of the *United Provinces*: And he intended another Diſcourſe concerning the Method of carrying on War againſt *Spain* and the *Indies*. He offer'd likewiſe to the King a *Memorial*, in which he reflected ſeverely upon Secretary *Cecil* for his Conduct towards the Earl of *Eſſex*, transferring the whole Blame of that Nobleman's Death from himſelf to the Secretary; and imputing to him, and the Lord Treaſurer his Father, the Execution of *Mary* Queen of *Scots*, his Majeſty's Mother. But this Memorial had no Effect upon the King, and a very pernicious one to the Writer of it, by exaſperating *Cecil* ſtill more againſt him [n]. *Ralegh* therefore began to be neglected and ill treated at Court, and was ſoon after remov'd from the Captainſhip of the Guards, which was given to Sir *Thomas Erſkin*, his Majeſty's Favourite as well as Countryman [o]; nor was it long before he was charg'd with being engag'd in a Plot againſt the King and Royal Family, which appears

[k] Obſervations on Sanderſon's Hiſtory, p. 12. Edit. 1656. Prince's Worthies of Devonſhire, fol. 114. & Wood, Athen. Oxon. Vol. I. fol. 366. [l] A brief Relation of Sir Walter Ralegh's Troubles, p. 1. Edit. 1669. in 4to. [m] Sir W. Ralegh's Remains, p. 190. Edit. 1726. [n] Dr. Welwood's Notes on Wilſon's Life of King James, in Kennet's Complete Hiſtory, Vol. II. p. 663, 664. [o] Oldys, fol. cli.

appears to have had ſome Reality with Regard to ſome of the Perſons charg'd with it; but no clear Evidence has yet been produced of *Ralegh*'s having any Concern in it. *Thuanus*'s Account of this Affair [p] is entirely faulty, and has nothing of that Accuracy, which we ſo juſtly admire in his admirable Hiſtory, being form'd upon the groſs Miſrepreſentations of his Countryman *Victor Cayet* [q]: But the Sum of what our own Writers furniſh upon this Subject is to this Purpoſe. In the Train of Count *Aremberg*, who, in the Beginning of *June* 1603, came over Embaſſador from the Archduke *Albert*, to congratulate King *James*, and promote a general Peace, was one *Matthew de Laurencie*, a Merchant of *Antwerp*, with whom the Lord *Cobham* had held Intelligence ſome Years before upon Matters of State, with Licence from the Government. Five Days after *Aremberg*'s Arrival, that is, about the 9th of *June*, *Cobham* went to him with *Laurencie*, and the ſame Night ſupp'd with Sir *Walter Ralegh*, at *Durham-Houſe* in the *Strand*, who by this Means came to underſtand, that *Cobham* was enter'd into a new Negotiation with *Aremberg*; and he was, as the chief of thoſe who oppos'd the Peace, offer'd a Sum of Money by *Cobham* to be a Promoter of it; an Offer of the ſame Kind having likewiſe been made to him by *Cobham* before the Arrival of *Aremberg* [r]. But how little diſpos'd *Ralegh* was to accept of Money from, or to enter into, the Intereſt of *Spain*, is evident from his Application to the Marquis *de Roſny*, afterwards Duke *de Sully*, immediately upon his Arrival in *England* as Embaſſador Extraordinary from *France* in the Beginning of the ſame Month of *June*, and at the very Time when *Ralegh* is repreſented to have attach'd himſelf to *Spain*. For we find by a Letter

d of

[p] Tom. V. L. 129, p. 1056. p. 424. Edit. Paris 1605. 8vo. End of Oldys's Life, fol. ccxliv.

[q] Chronologie Septennaire,

[r] Ralegh's Tryal, at the

of *Roſny*'s to *Henry* IV. written from *London* the $\frac{15}{25}$ of that Month, that both *Ralegh* and *Cobham* had come to him, expreſsly to acquaint him of the Practices of the Agents and Friends of *Spain*, and eſpecially the *Engliſh* Catholics to engage King *James* in an Alliance with that Court againſt *France* and the *United Provinces*: Which Intelligence was confirm'd to him by the Earl of *Northumberland*, who had been gain'd to the *French* Intereſt by the Preſents made to him by *Roſny*, and the Offer of a Penſion *.

In the Beginning of the next Month, the Conſpiracy, in which *George Brooke*, Brother to Lord *Cobham*, *Watſon* and *Clarke*, two *Romiſh* Prieſts, and others, were engag'd, being diſcover'd, Secretary *Cecil*, who had lately been created Baron of *Eſſendon*, finding upon the Confeſſion of *Anthony Copley*, one of the Conſpirators, who was apprehended on the 6th of *July* [s], that the King's Perſon was to be ſurpriz'd by the Lord *Grey* of *Wilton*, and *George Brooke*, Brother to *Cobham*, he ſuſpected that Lord himſelf to be in the Secret; and *Cobham*'s Intimacy with *Ralegh*, who was now purchaſing an Eſtate for him, and ſettling his Domeſtic Affairs, drew *Ralegh* into the ſame Suſpicion. Lord *Cecil* therefore meeting Sir *Walter* upon the Terrace at *Windſor*, acquainted him, that the Lords of the Council had ſomething to ſay to him [t]; upon which the latter was examin'd by them about *Cobham*'s Practice with *Aremberg*, whom he fully cleared [u], and after Examination further ſaid, that whatever Correſpondence was between *Cobham* and *Aremberg*, *Laurencie* might be better able to give Account of it; and therefore advis'd the ſending for him; tho' he knew of no Intelligence between them, but ſuch as might be warranted. The ſame Advice he afterwards gave in a Letter

* Memoires de Sully, Part II. Tom 3. p. 400—403.
[s] Stowe's Annals, fol. 826. [t] Tryal, ubi ſupra, fol. ccxlii.
[u] Ibid.

Letter to Lord *Cecil* [w]. When *Ralegh* return'd from Examination a private Priſoner to his own Houſe, *Cobham* ſent to him to know what had paſs'd. *Ralegh* return'd an Anſwer by Captain *Keymis*, that he had been examined, and had clear'd him of all; and *Keymis* bid *Cobham* be of good Comfort, for one Witneſs would not condemn him. This Precaution, to arm *Cobham* againſt making Diſcoveries, was, after his Confeſſion of it, objected againſt *Ralegh*; but he abſolutely denied, that he had ſent any ſuch verbal Meſſage [x]. When *Cobham* was brought to his Examination at *Richmond*, the Date of which appears to have been the 18th of *July*, and after he had, by a conſtant Denial, cleared both himſelf and *Ralegh* of all that was queſtion'd againſt them both, he was *by Device*, as a Gentleman, who was preſent at *Ralegh*'s Tryal obſerves [y], induc'd to think, that *Ralegh* had firſt impeach'd and betray'd him. For that Part of *Ralegh*'s Letter to Lord *Cecil* mention'd above, which referr'd the Lords of the Council to *Laurencie* for the Tranſactions of *Cobham* with *Arenberg*, being ſhew'd to *Cobham*, and accompanied probably with ſuch artful Suggeſtions, as were proper to raiſe Suſpicions in him of *Ralegh*, who, he imagin'd, had accuſed him of all, or more than he knew; he burſt out into vehement Exclamations againſt that Gentleman; and in his Rage and Madneſs made the following Confeſſion; "That having a Paſſport to go to the King of *Spain*, he intended firſt to confer with the Archduke; and becauſe he knew he had not Money to pay his own Army, meant from thence to go to *Spain*, to deal with the King for ſix hundred Thouſand Crowns; then to return by *Jerſey*; and that nothing ſhould be done about the Diſtribution of that Money to

[w] Letter from a Gentleman preſent at the Tryal, to Mr. John Donne. Printed in Sir Toby Matthews's Collection of Letters, 1681. Edit. London 1660. [x] Tryal, ubi ſupra, fol. ccxlvi. [y] Letter to Mr. Donne, ubi ſupra.

" the discontented in *England*, till he had spoken " with Sir *Walter Ralegh*. And that he had never " entered into these Courses but by his Instigation." He spoke likewise of Plots, of the Particulars of which he could give no Account; yet acknowledg'd, that he was afraid that *Ralegh*, upon his Return to *Jersey*, would deliver both him and the Money, that he should bring over, to the King [z]. After all this, before *Cobham* departed to the Stair-foot, he retracted his Confession, and profess'd, that he had done *Ralegh* wrong [a]; nor is it certain, that he subscrib'd his Confession [b]. In another Branch of his Examination he said, that he had receiv'd of *Ralegh* a Book written against the King's Title, which he gave to his Brother *Brooke*, and that *Ralegh* said it was foolishly written. But this he likewise retracted. Upon this and other Parts of his Confession more foreign to *Ralegh*, concerning the Advancement of the Lady *Arabella Stuart* to the Throne, as also from that of *George Brooke*, a known Enemy to *Ralegh*, as Lord *Cecil* could not deny, asserting, that his Brother *Cobham* told him, (tho' *Cobham* in his Confession refus'd to own it) " That the Lord *Grey* and " others were only on the *Eye*, but he and *Ralegh* on " the *Main*; meaning by this, said *Brooke*, the taking " away of the King and his Issue;" together with what *Ralegh* acknowledg'd in his own Examination, " That Lord *Cobham* offer'd him eight Thousand " Crowns for his furtherance of the Peace, tho' Lord " *Cecil* and the Earl of *Northumberland* were to have " the same Proffers [c]; and that in some Discourses he " might have said, that the Way to invade *England* " was to begin with Stirs in *Scotland*:" Upon these Circumstances *Ralegh* was indicted at *Staines* in *Middlesex*,

[z] Tryals fol. ccxl. ccxli. [a] Ibid fol. ccxli. [b] Sir Thomas Overbury's Coy of Sir Walter Ralegh's Confession, p. 5. Edit. 1648, 4to. [c] Ibid. p. 12.

ſex, on the 21ſt of *September* 1603 [d]; as *Cobham* and *Grey* were three Days after; and all of them return'd Priſoners to the Tower of *London*.

The Situation of theſe unhappy Men in the Beginning of the next Month appears from Lord *Cecil*'s Letter of the 3d of that Month from the Court at *Wincheſter*, to Mr. *Ralph Winwood*, then Reſident in *Holland* [e]; wherein he obſerves, that all the Conſpirators were already indicted; and that their Deſign was reducible to theſe two Heads; "The one, the "Treaſon of Surprize of the King and Court; the "Conſequence whereof muſt needs have proved very "dangerous and bloody: the other, a Purpoſe to "propound to *Spain* the Means to raiſe him a Party "to extirpate the King and his Iſſue, by diſburſing a "Sum of five hundred thouſand Crowns. In the firſt "the Lord *Grey*, Mr. *George Brooke*, Sir *Griffin* "*Markham*, and many other private Gentlemen were "engaged: In the ſecond, the Lord *Cobham* confeſ-"ſeth himſelf guilty, and ſo doth *George Brooke*; but "Sir *Walter Ralegh* yet perſiſts in Denial of the main "Treaſons; which tho' he doth by having gotten "ſome Intelligence of the Lord *Cobham*'s Retractation, "yet the firſt Accuſation is ſo well fortified with other "demonſtrative Circumſtances, and the Retractation ſo "blemiſhed by the Diſcovery of that Intelligence, "which they had, as few Men can conceive it comes "from a clear Heart."

When the Time of their Tryal drew nigh, in the Beginning of *November*, *Ralegh* got a poor Man in the Tower to caſt up a Letter, faſten'd to an Apple, in at *Cobham*'s Window, while the Lieutenant was at Supper, to intreat him, (becauſe he then knew not but *Cobham* might be arraign'd before him) "for

[d] Stowe's Annals, fol. 83. [e] Winwood's Memorials, Vol. II. p. 8.

" God's Sake, to do him Juſtice by his Anſwer, and " ſignify to him, that he had wronged him in his Ac- " cuſation :" And *Cobham* did, by an Anſwer under his Hand, confeſs the ſame; but this not being perhaps ſo full and expreſſive as *Raleigh* expected, he afterwards ſent *Cobham* another Letter, deſiring, that he would publiſh his Innocence at his Arraignment. But tho' *Raleigh* did not now requeſt any further Juſtification under his Hand, *Cobham* ſent him another Anſwer, clearing him in the moſt ſolemn and perfect Manner [f].

The Plague raging at that Time in *London*, and the Term being proclaimed to be held at *Winchester*, Sir *Walter Raleigh* was convey'd in his own Coach, under the Cuſtody of Sir *Robert Manſel*, on the 10th of *November*, to *Bagſhot* in *Surrey*, and thence, two Days after, to the Caſtle at *Winchester*; whither the other Conſpirators were conducted about the ſame time [g].

Here *Cobham* having been again prevail'd upon to make freſh Accuſations againſt *Raleigh*, in a Letter to the Lords of the Council, at leaſt ſubſcrib'd with his Name, the Tryal of the latter was firſt brought on upon the 17th of that Month, before the following Commiſſioners, the Earl of *Suffolk* Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of *Devon*, the Lord *Henry Howard*, the Lord *Cecil*, the Lord *Wotton*, Sir *John Stanhope* Vice Chamberlain, *Popham* Lord Chief Juſtice of *England*, *Anderſon* Lord Chief Juſtice of the Common Pleas, and the two Judges *Gaudy* and *Warburton*, and Sir *William Wade*. He excepted againſt none of the Jury, being all Strangers; but it is affirm'd, that another Jury had been appointed, the Foreman of which was Sir *Michael Stanhope*, the next Sir *Edward Darcy*, the next Sir *William Killigrew*, all Men of Honour,

[f] Overbury, ubi ſupra, p. 23.

[g] Stowe's Annals, fol. 829.

Honour, and who had been near Servants to Queen *Elizabeth*: But theſe being found not proper for the Purpoſe, were all changed the Night before, and the others put in their Places [h]. The Indictment having been open'd and aggravated by Serjeant *Heath* and *Coke* the Attorney General, who endeavour'd to fix the Treaſons of the reſt upon *Ralegh*, becauſe he was *a Man of Wit and the Sword*; *Cobham*'s Examination was read; upon which Sir *Walter* ſhew'd the Improbability of the Accuſations contain'd in it. The reſt of the Proceedings upon the Tryal may be ſeen in the Account of it, which has been frequently printed: But it were to be wiſh'd, that it had been drawn up with more Clearneſs and leſs Partiality, of which there are ſtrong Marks throughout the whole. Inſtead therefore of tranſcribing from ſo common as well as ſo ſuſpected a Narrative, it will be to more Purpoſe to inſert here ſome *Paſſages* from the Letter [i] of a Gentleman preſent at the Tryal, who remarks, that Sir *Walter* during the Courſe of it, behaved himſelf ſo worthily, ſo wiſely, and ſo temperately, that in half a Day the Minds of all the Company were changed from the extremeſt Hate, to the greateſt Pity. The Points, with which he was charged, were Deſigns of Sedition in *Scotland*; of the Invaſion of *England*; of the ſetting up of Lady *Arabella*'s Title; of the procuring of 600,000 Crowns, to be diſtributed to diſcontented Perſons; the Delivery of a Book againſt the King's Title; the perſuading *Cobham* to procure, that the Lady *Arabella* ſhould write for Aſſiſtance to the King of *Spain*, and to promiſe Peace between *England* and *Spain*, the Toleration of the *Popiſh* Religion, and to be govern'd by *Cobham*, *Brooke* and *Ralegh* in her Marriage; and a Purpoſe to deſtroy the King and his Iſſue: All which

h Obſervations on the Hiſtory of Mary Queen of Scots and King James, p. 8. Edit. 1656, 4to.

i To Mr. John Donne, ubi ſupra.

things were alledged to have been undertaken at the Inſtigation of *Ralegh*. With regard to the ſetting up of *Arabella*, the Writer of the *Letter* obſerves, nothing was prov'd, any more than with regard to the Invaſion of *England*, or Sedition in *Scotland*, or Deſtruction of the King. *Ralegh* confeſs'd, that he had been offer'd by *Cobham* eight thouſand Crowns from the Archduke, which he accepted not, but referr'd him to another Time. He own'd likewiſe, that ſuch a Book, as was mention'd, had been in his Hands; but denied, that he had ſent it to *Cobham*. The Proof againſt him reſted only upon *Cobham*'s Accuſation, and ſome Preſumptions, of which that only was the Ground. He ſpent a conſiderable Time in diſabling that Accuſation, as being only utter'd in Fury, by Reaſon, that by a Device *Cobham* was brought to think, that *Ralegh* had accus'd him. He urg'd, that as the Accuſation proceeded from paſſionate Revenge, and therefore not to be alledg'd to the Prejudice of another Man's Life; ſo the Accuſer had afterwards repented of it; and tho' he was again by Practice drawn to affirm it, yet he would never be brought to ſet his Hand to the Examination. He ſhew'd them from the Maxims of Divinity, and Civil Statute, and Common Law, and Conſcience, that there ought to be produc'd againſt him two Witneſſes; and that his Accuſer ſhould be brought to accuſe him Face to Face. The Judges determin'd, that this latter Requeſt did not ſtand with the Uſe of Law; and to the former it was anſwer'd, that a Witneſs accuſing another, together with himſelf, was *inſtar multorum*. He brought ſeveral ſtrong Arguments in diſproof of theſe Opinions. The Writer of the Letter allows, that there were ſome Circumſtances to give Preſumption, but no Proof at all; but what weigh'd moſt with him was, that as ſoon as *Ralegh* had been queſtion'd the firſt Time at large, when *Cobham* was not ſo much as named,

named, he ſpeedily diſpatch'd a Letter to that Lord to this Effect: "I have been examined of divers "Points touching you before the Lords of the Coun- "cil; but I have cleared you in all. Be firm, and "know, that one Witneſs cannot hurt you:" Which Letter ſeem'd to have been written by *Ralegh* rather to arm *Cobham*, for that which might be to come, than to inſtruct him for that which was paſs'd; ſince there was in Truth no Ground for ſuch Expedition.

Again it was urg'd, that a Month before *Cobham*'s Accuſation, *George Brooke* had deliver'd it, as out of *Cobham*'s Mouth, "that *Cobham* and *Ralegh* were *up-* "*on the Main*, and that it would never be well, till "the King and his *Cubs* were taken away." To this *Ralegh* anſwer'd, that *Brooke* was his known Enemy, and therefore did not care what he utter'd to endanger him; and, beſides, that *Cobham* had never confeſs'd that under his Hand. To the other Point of the Letter to *Cobham*, the Weakneſs of his Anſwer made it ſtrong; for he denied it improbably. But the main Evidence being only *Cobham*'s Accuſation, which, all Things conſider'd, ſays the Writer of the Letter, was no more to be weigh'd than the barking of a Dog, "I would not for much, *adds he*, to have been of the "Jury, to have found him guilty." For a little be fore the Jury went out, after *Ralegh* had put himſelf upon this, that *Cobham* had never thoroughly departed from his Recantation; and that if he would *viva voce* accuſe him of any Part, he would confeſs the whole Indictment; the Attorney read a Letter from *Cobham* to the Lords, dated the 16th of that Month of *November*, wherein he again generally ac- cus'd *Ralegh* as before, and particularly, that he had promis'd to become a Penſioner to the King of *Spain* for Fifteen hundred Pounds a Year, for which he would diſcover to him all the Secrets, which he could diſcover: And withall confeſs'd, that *Ralegh* had procur'd him eight or ten Days before, to juſtify him by

by a Letter; which tho' he had done thro' Importunity, yet this laſt Letter to the Lords, he proteſted, was true. To this *Ralegh* anſwered, confeſſing, that *Cobham* had offer'd him ſuch a Penſion; but that he not only did not accept it, (tho' *Cobham* told him of divers great Counſellors, particularly Lord *Cecil*, who ſhould have been offer'd the like for the furtherance of the Peace,) but likewiſe ſo diſſuaded *Cobham* from thinking of the like, as that he believed never to hear more of it. And as for the Letter, which *Cobham* confeſs'd to have written in *Ralegh*'s Juſtification, it was true, and there it was; deſiring Lord *Cecil* to read it, (which he did), and praying the Jury to mark with how much ſtronger Proteſtations and more Particularity that was written to acquit him, than the other to condemn him. This was the laſt Evidence given; and the Jury, after about a quarter of an Hour's Deliberation, brought in their Verdict guilty: But ſome of them are reported to have been afterwards ſo far touch'd in Conſcience, as to demand his Pardon on their Knees [k]: And it is affirm'd by an anonymous Writer [l], who is ſuppoſed to be his Son *Carew*, concerning *Coke* the Attorney General, whoſe Inſolence and Scurrility of Language towards Sir *Walter* have reflected a great diſhonour upon his own Memory, which his eminent Abilities in his Profeſſion will never efface; that when his Servant brought him Word in the Garden, whither he had retir'd for Air, that the Jury had condemn'd *Ralegh* of *Treaſon*, he could hardly be perſuaded of it, declaring, that he himſelf had accus'd him but of *Miſpriſion of Treaſon*. But this latter Story is not reconcileable with the Attorney's Conduct upon the Tryal, in which he ſtrenouſly endeavours to ſupport the Indictment, which contains a direct Charge of Treaſon againſt Sir *Walter*.

Upon

[k] Oſborne's Memoirs of King James, p. 108. [l] Obſervations on the Hiſtory of Mary Queen of Scots, and her Son, p. 9.

Upon the whole, the Tryal muſt appear, to every impartial and intelligent Perſon, a moſt unjuſtifiable Proceeding; and Sir *John Hawles*, Sollicitor General to King *William*, pronounces it [m], *very irregular throughout*, and that the Accuſations againſt *Ralegh* did not amount to *legal Proof*. "I would know, "*adds he*, by what Law is the Depoſition of a Per- "ſon, who might be brought Face to Face to the Pri- "ſoner, read as Evidence? I would know, by what "Law it is forbidden, that the Accuſer ſhould be "brought Face to Face to the Accuſed? I would "know, by what Law *Brooke*'s Depoſition of what "the Lord *Cobham* told him of *Ralegh*, was Evidence "againſt *Ralegh?* I would know, by what Law the "Story *Dyer* told of what an unknown Man ſaid to "him at *Liſbon* of *Don Ralegh*, was Evidence againſt "*Ralegh?* I would know, by what Statute the Sta- "tutes of the 25th of *Edward* III, and 5th of *Edward* "VI are repealed?"

Sentence of Death being pronounc'd againſt Sir *Walter*, he humbly deſired, that the King might know the Proofs againſt him; that he ſtill perſiſted in his Loyalty, notwithſtanding that Verdict, which he pray'd that his Jury might never anſwer for; and only crav'd Pardon for concealing Lord *Cobham*'s Offer to him, which he did thro' a Confidence, that he had diverted him from thoſe Humours; and ſo accompanied the Sheriff to the Priſon with admirable Magnanimity, tho' in a manner ſuitable to his unhappy Situation [n]. He had indeed expected the Treatment which he receiv'd, as is evident by the Letter [q], which he wrote to the King juſt before his Tryal, in which he ſolemnly proteſted, that he had never intended, conſented to, or perform'd Treaſon againſt his Majeſty;

[m] The Magiſtracy and Government of England vindicated, p. 35, Edit. 1689, fol. [n] Sir Thomas Overbury's Arraignment of Sir W. Ralegh, p. 25. [q] Scrinia Sacra, p. 85, Edit. 1654, quarto.

Majeſty; "and yet, adds he, I know I ſhall fall into "their Hands, *è quibus non poſſum evadere*, unleſs by "your Majeſty's gracious Compaſſion I be ſuſtained." And in another Letter to the King, after his Tryal, he obſerves [r], that he was "loſt for hearing a vain "Man; for hearing only, and never believing or "approving: And ſo little Account made I of that "Speech of his, which was my Condemnation, that "I never remembered any ſuch Thing, till it was at "my Tryal objected againſt me."

Ralegh was kept near a Month at *Wincheſter* in daily Expectation of Death; the time of which was probably appointed, and intimated to him, ſince he wrote what he intended for his laſt Words to his Wife, the Night before he expected to die, in a very pathetic Letter [s], in which he hop'd, that his Blood would quench their Malice, who had *murder'd* him, and pray'd God to forgive his Perſecuters and Accuſers. The two Prieſts *Watſon* and *Clarke*, were executed on the 29th of *November*; and *George Brooke* was beheaded on the 5th of *December* in the Caſtle of *Wincheſter*, dying very penitently, recalling to the Biſhop, who attended him, upon receiving the Sacrament, that Accuſation, which he had made of his Brother concerning thoſe odious Words ſuppoſed to be uttered by Lord *Cobham*, that it would never be well, untill *the Fox and Cubs were taken away*. This Fact is related by the Lord *Cecil* himſelf in a Letter to Mr. *Winwood*, from the Court then at *Wilton*, the 12th of *December* 1603 [t]; who commends this *Remorſe* of *Brooke*. And it is the more remarkable, as all the Evidence, which was ever pretended, in Relation to *Ralegh*'s Knowledge of the Plot to ſurpriſe the King and Court, was the hear-ſay Teſtimony of this *Brooke*, that his Brother *Cobham* ſhould ſay the Words abovemention'd; and

[r] Ralegh's Remains, p. 188. [s] Ibid. [t] Winwood's Memorials, Vol. II. p. 11.

and likewiſe that *Ralegh* and himſelf were on the *Main*, while Lord *Grey*, *Brooke*, and others, were only on the *Bye:* Whereas *Brooke* now, upon the Approach of Death, retracted thoſe Words; which takes away the other Story grounded upon it. This Acknowledgment of an Enemy of Sir *Walter* is a new Proof of his Innocence [u]; who conſtantly upon his Tryal diſtinguiſh'd between the *ſurpriſing* Treaſon, and the Conferences with *Aremberg*; denying the leaſt Knowledge of the former; but, as to the latter, owning, that *Cobham* had talk'd to him of a large Preſent, in caſe he would be for a Peace with *Spain*.

The King ſign'd the Warrants for the Execution of the Lords *Cobham* and *Grey*, and Sir *Griffin Markham*, at *Wincheſter*, on *Friday* the 9th of *Dec. pretending*, ſays Lord *Cecil* [w], *to forbear Sir* Walter *for the preſent, untill Lord* Cobham's *Death had given ſome Light how far he would make good his Accuſation.* Accordingly *Markham* was firſt brought upon the Scaffold, and having ended his Speech and Prayers, with all he had to ſay, and being on his Knees ready to receive the Stroke of the Axe, *John Gill*, Groom of the King's Bed-Chamber, produc'd to the Sheriff his Majeſty's Warrant to ſtay the Execution; and *Markham* was told, that he muſt withdraw a while into the Hall, to be confronted by the Lords. Then Lord *Grey* was brought forth, and after having pour'd out his Prayers and Confeſſion, was likewiſe call'd aſide: and laſtly, Lord *Cobham* was expos'd in the ſame manner; and perform'd his Devotions, tho' we do not find, that he ſaid one Word of his Guilt or Innocence, or charg'd *Ralegh* with having inſtigated him. And when he had done, the Sheriff proclaim'd his Majeſty's Mercy, in reſpiting the Execution of the three Priſoners, his Warrant charging the two Prieſts, and *George Brooke*, " as the principal Plotters and Inticers of all " the

[u] Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, Vol. II. p. 65, 66.
[w] Ubi ſupra.

" the reſt, to the embracing of the ſaid treaſonable " Machinations [x]:" tho' *Coke*, the Attorney General, upon *Raleigh*'s Tryal, frequently reproach'd him with being the chief Plotter and Traytor in all this Conſpiracy.

Raleigh was remanded to the Tower of *London*, on the 15th of *December* [y] with the reſt of the Priſoners; of whom *Markham* afterwards obtain'd his Liberty, and travell'd abroad; Lord *Grey* of *Wilton* died in the Tower, *July* the 6th 1614, being the laſt of that Title [z]; and Lord *Cobham* was confin'd there many Years, during which he is ſaid to have been re-examin'd, at the Queen's and *Raleigh*'s Requeſt; and to have abſolutely clear'd that Gentleman [a], whom he ſurviv'd but a few Months, and died in the loweſt Circumſtances of Diſtreſs. Sir *Walter* not long after his Confinement in the Tower, upon the unwearied Sollicitations of his Lady, who petitioned the King, that ſhe might be Priſoner with him, was allow'd the Conſolation of her Company, and had his younger Son *Carew* born there in the Year 1604. In *February* following, a Grant was made by the King of all the Goods and Chattels, forfeited by Sir *Walter*'s Conviction, to Truſtees of his appointing, for the Benefit of his Creditors, and of his Lady and Children [b]. But ſome Debtors taking Advantage of his Misfortunes, refus'd to do him Juſtice, and particularly Mr. *William Sanderſon*, who had married his Niece *Margaret Sneedale*, Daughter of his Siſter *Mary*, and had been intruſted by him with receiving great Sums for him out of his Office of Wines, and his other Places; but now, inſtead of paying, pretended

a

[x] Copy of a Letter written from Maſter T. M. near Saliſbury, to Maſter H. A. at London, concerning the Proceeding at Wincheſter, &c. printed at London 1603, in 4to, reprinted in Stowe's Annals, and Morgan's Phœnix Britannicus p. 51. & ſeq. [y] Stowe's Annals [z] Dugdale's Baronage, Vol. I. fol. 716. Edit. 1675. [a] Obſervations on Sanderſon's Hiſtory, p. 12. and Weldon's Court and Character of K. James, p. 38, 39, 40, and Oldys, fol clxi. [b] Rymer's Fœdera, Tom. xvi. p. 569.

a Debt to himſelf of two thouſand Pounds from Sir *Walter*; who thereupon directed his Truſtees to commence a Suit againſt *Sanderſon*, who, in conſequence of it, was caſt into Priſon [c]. This Circumſtance is mention'd to account for that Spleen and Malice, which *Sanderſon* the Hiſtorian, the Son of the other, has ſhewn to the Memory of *Ralegh* in that deſpicable Performance of his, intitled *A compleat Hiſtory of King James*, which wants every Quality, even thoſe of common Senſe and Grammar, neceſſary to ſuch a Work. Sir *Walter* at laſt obtain'd a Reſtoration of his Eſtate; which having been actually made over to his eldeſt Son *Walter* before the the Death of Queen *Elizabeth*, upon his Reſolution to accept of the Challenge from Sir *Amias Preſton*; that Settlement prevented his Forfeiture of it, except during his own Life; and the King now granted him that Term in it. But he did not long enjoy it; for the new *Scots* Favourite of the King, *Robert Carr*, afterwards Earl of *Somerſet*, having no Fortune of his own, and looking out for one, diſcover'd a Flaw in the Conveyance of *Ralegh*'s Eſtate to his Son; upon which an Information being exhibited in the Exchequer by the Attorney General *Hobart*, Judgment was given for the Crown, and *Sherborne* and others of his Eſtates granted in 1609 to *Carr*; the King being inflexible to all the Petitions of the Lady *Ralegh* and her Children [d], and *Ralegh* himſelf in vain expoſtulating with the Favourite, upon the Wrong done to him [e].

He

[c] Obſervations on Sanderſon's compleat Hiſtory of Mary Queen of Scots, and her Son King James, p. 2. [d] A brief Relation of Sir Walter Ralegh's Troubles, p. 6, 7. Edit. 1669, 4to, and Carew Ralegh's Caſe at the Committee for Sale of Delinquent's Eſtates, M. S. quoted by Mr. Oldys, fol. clxiii. [e] Oldys, fol. clxiv.

He ſoften'd the Rigours of his long Confinement in an Application to various Kinds of Studies, even thoſe of Chemiſtry and Phyſic, in which laſt he diſcover'd the *Cordial*, which bears his Name, tho' the Compoſition has been ſo mix'd with an exceſſive Number of Ingredients, as has of late leſſen'd its Reputation [f]; but it is now reduc'd by the Royal College of Phyſicians at *London* to its original Simplicity [g]. He wrote likewiſe ſeveral Treatiſes upon different Subjects; but his greateſt Work, and indeed the greateſt of any Writer of any Age, is his *Hiſtory of the World*, publiſh'd in *April* 1614, in which the Collection and Diſpoſition of that vaſt Body of Facts, and the Beauty, Strength and Majeſty of the Style, are equally admirable. He ſeems to have form'd a Plan for a Continuation of that Hiſtory, but not to have had Leiſure to make any conſiderable Progreſs in it; for the Story of his throwing the ſecond Part of it into the Flames, upon his Bookſeller's complaining, that the ſlow Sale of the firſt had ruin'd him, has not the leaſt Authority or Probability [h].

The Patron of his Studies was Prince *Henry*, who had an high Eſteem for *Ralegh*'s Abilities, and for whom the latter drew up ſeveral of his Diſcourſes: And that Prince, a few Months before his Death in 1612, obtain'd the Grant of *Sherborne* for himſelf, with an Intention to reſtore it to Sir *Walter*; the King having given *Carr*, then Viſcount *Rocheſter*, twenty-five thouſand Pounds in Money for reſigning it to the Prince [i]: And his Majeſty allow'd Sir *Walter*'s Wife and Son eight thouſand Pounds for that Eſtate [k]. But the Death of this Prince, to whom *Ralegh* ſent his Cordial juſt before he expir'd, was an important Loſs to

[f] Quincy's Diſpenſary, p. 445, 446. 11th Edit. [g] Plan of a new London Pharmacopœia, p. 72. Edit. London, 1745. [h] Oldys, fol. clxxxvi, clxxxvii. [i] Relation of Sir Walter Ralegh's Troubles, p. 8. [k] Sir Walter Ralegh's Apology, p. 47.

to him, as well as to the Nation. And tho' Sir *Walter* had the Queen's Protection during the Height of Lord *Rocheſter*'s (now Earl of *Somerſet*'s) Favour, yet he could not obtain his Liberty till after the Diſgrace and Condemnation of that Favourite for the Murder of Sir *Thomas Overbury*.

However in 1614, he had the Liberty of the *Tower* allow'd him; but in *April* the ſame Year, before he obtain'd that Favour, he had the Misfortune of ſeeing his eldeſt Son *Walter* oblig'd to fly into the *Low Countries*, on Account of a Duel, in which he had been engag'd with Mr. *Robert Tyrwhit*, a Dependent of the Earl of *Suffolk*, Lord High Treaſurer [l]. At laſt by the Means of fifteen hundred Pounds given to Sir *William St. John* and Sir *Edward Villiers*, half Brother to the Lady *Villiers*, Mother to the new Favourite Sir *George Villiers*, afterwards Duke of *Buckingham*, Sir *Walter* procur'd his Liberty [m]; for which he return'd Thanks to that Favourite on the 17th of *March* 1615-16 [n]; being the ſame Day releas'd out of the *Tower* [o], after above twelve Years Confinement there. But ſome Months before he left that Place, he ſaw the Earl of *Somerſet* brought thither Priſoner, and afterwards condemn'd to Death: Which occaſioned Sir *Walter* to compare his own Caſe with that of the Earl's, and to remark; "That the whole Hiſtory of "the World had not the like Precedent of a King's "Priſoner to purchaſe Freedom, and his Boſom-"Favourite to have the Halter, but in Scripture, in "the Caſe of *Mordecai* and *Haman*." Upon hearing of which the King is ſaid to have replied, that *Ralegh*

[l] MS. Letter of the Lord Carew, to Sir Thomas Roe, dated from the Savoy, Weſtminſter, January 24, 1615-16. [m] Obſervations on Sanderſon's Hiſtory of King James, p. 10. [n] Letter of Sir Walter Ralegh to Sir George Villiers, apud Oldys, fol. cxcii. [o] MS. Letter of Lord Carew, to Sir Thomas Roe, 18th January 1616-7.

might die in that Deceit: Which prov'd true, for his Majeſty afterwards pardon'd *Somerſet*, and executed *Ralegh*, equally to the Aſtoniſhment of the World.

Sir *Walter* being now at large, had the Means of proſecuting his old Scheme of ſettling *Guiana*, with which he was ſo ſtrongly poſſeſs'd, that, even during his Impriſonment, he held a conſtant Correſpondence with that Country, ſending thither every Year, or every ſecond Year, a Ship, to keep the *Indians* in Hopes of being reliev'd from the Tyranny of the *Spaniards*, who had again incroach'd upon them, and maſſacred ſeveral, both of the Inhabitants and of his own Men. In theſe Ships were brought over ſeveral Natives of that Country, with whom he converſed in the *Tower*, and obtain'd all poſſible Informations concerning it [p]. Upon theſe Lights he offer'd his Scheme for proſecuting his Diſcovery to the Court, before he undertook it in Perſon: Nor were there then any Doubts, either as to the Improbability of the Deſign, or its Unlawfulneſs, notwithſtanding the Peace made with *Spain*; otherwiſe the King would not have made ſuch Grants as he did, even at that Time [q]; which ſhews, that he was then convinc'd, that Sir *Walter* had in his firſt Voyage diſcovered and taken Poſſeſſion of that Country for the Crown of *England*; and that conſequently his Subjects were juſtly intitled to any Benefits, that might ariſe from its Diſcovery, without the leaſt Reſpect to the Pretenſions of the *Spaniards*. Beſides, at the Time, when Sir *Walter* firſt mov'd the Court upon this Subject, the *Spaniſh* Match was not thought of; and the King's Neceſſities being then very preſſing, he may be preſum'd to have conceiv'd great Hopes from that Diſcovery; tho' he might afterwards change his Opinion, when he grew ſo unreaſonably fond of that Match [r]. Upon Sir *Ralph Winwood*'s Advancement to

[p] Ralegh's Apology, p. 52, 53. [q] Oldys, fol. cxc. [r] Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, Vol. II. p. 71.

to the Poſt of Secretary of State, which was on the 29th of *March* 1614, *Ralegh* reviv'd his Propoſal about *Guiana* in a Letter to him, in which he complain'd of having been extremely miſrepreſented by two or three Courtiers to the King to ſuch a Degree, that even the united Intereſts of Prince *Henry*, the Queen, and her Brother the King of *Denmark*, who were all convinc'd of his Innocence, could not ſet him right in his Majeſty's Opinion; but at the ſame time acknowledging, that all he had remaining was owing to his Majeſty, declar'd, that he was ready to ſacrifice it all in his Service; ſince to die *for* the King, and not *by* the King, was all the Ambition he had in the World[s]. But he could not procure Leave of the Court to execute his Deſign till after he had purchaſed his Liberty; and on the 26th of *Auguſt* 1616, obtain'd a Royal Commiſſion to ſettle *Guiana*, at the Expence of himſelf and his Friends. Some Writers[t] have repreſented this Commiſſion as under the *Great Seal* of *England*, and directed, *To our truſty and well beloved Sir* Walter Ralegh, *Knight*. But according to others[u], and the Account given by King *James* himſelf in his *Declaration* publiſh'd after *Ralegh*'s Death[w], it was only under the *Privy Seal*, and without thoſe Expreſſions of Truſt or Grace. But it is not impoſſible, that this Commiſſion might paſs both Seals; and this Conjecture is countenanc'd by a Paſſage in a Letter, which *Ralegh* drew up for Mr. *Peter Vanlore*, an eminent Merchant, to be ſent to his Brother Sir *Adrian Thibaut* in *Amſterdam*, requeſting him to engage another Merchant there to communicate to Sir *Walter* ſomething of Importance, which he knew relating to *Gui-*

[s] Sir Walter Ralegh's Letter to Mr. Secretary Winwood, printed in his Remains. [t] See Ralegh's Remains, p. 200. Coke's Detection of the four laſt Reigns, p. 85. Rapin's Hiſtory of England, and Mr. Tindall's Notes. [u] Rymer, Tom. xvi. p. 759. [w] p. 4. Edit. 1618. in 4to.

ana; in which Letter mention is made of a Commiſſion to him under the *Great Seal* [q]. However, even that Commiſſion under the *Privy Seal*, which was unqueſtionably given, grants him very extenſive Powers. By one Clauſe he is conſtituted General and Commander in chief of this Enterprize; and by another appointed Governor of the new Country, which he was to ſettle, and this with ample Authority: By a third he has Power of exerciſing Martial Law, in ſuch a Manner, as the King's Lieutenant General by Sea or Land, or any of the Lieutenants of the Counties of *England* had. Theſe Powers ſeem to imply in them a virtual Pardon to *Ralegh*; and perhaps made him leſs ſollicitous for an actual one. It is affirm'd indeed, in the King's *Declaration*, that he *ſued much* for ſuch a Pardon, but that it was refuſed by his Majeſty, "both to diſ-
"authoriſe him with thoſe, that were under his Com-
"mand, in Caſe he ſhould attempt to exceed his
"Commiſſion, and to reſerve him to the Juſtice of
"the Law, if by new Offences he ſhould make him-
"ſelf indign of former Mercies." But it is expreſsly affirm'd in a Letter of *Carew Ralegh*, that his Father had Overtures made him of a Pardon for fifteen hundred Pounds by Sir *William St. John*, one of the Perſons, of whom he had before bought his Freedom; but that Sir *Francis Bacon*, newly made Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, being conſulted by him, diſſuaded him in theſe Words; "Sir, the Knee-timber of your
"Voyage is Money. Spare your Purſe in this Parti-
"cular; for upon my Life you have a ſufficient Par-
"don for all that is paſt already, the King having
"under his Broad Seal made you Admiral of your
"Fleet, and given you Power of the Martial Law
"over your Officers and Soldiers [r]."

The

[q] Oldys, fol. cxciii, cxciv.

[r] Howell's Familiar Letters, Vol. II. Letter lxiii. p. 371. 5th Edit. London, 1678. and Obſervations on Sanderſon's Hiſtory, p. 10.

The *Spaniſh* Embaſſador Don *Diego Sarmiento de Acuna*, better known by the Title of Count *de Gondemar*, who by his Addreſs and Vivacity of Humour had gain'd a prodigious Aſcendant over the King, at the Expence of his Majeſty's Honour and the Nation's Intereſt, took immediate Alarm at *Ralegh*'s Preparations, and made loud and vehement Aſſertions to the King, as his Majeſty affirms in his *Declaration* [s], that he knew and had diſcover'd the Intention and Enterprize of Sir *Walter* to be only hoſtile and piratical, tending to a Breach between the two Crowns, and the Danger and Deſtruction of the King his Maſter's Subjects in thoſe Parts. The King's Anſwer was, as he repreſents it himſelf [t], that he would ſend *Ralegh* with a *limited Commiſſion*, and that "he durſt not, "upon Peril of his Head, attempt any ſuch Matter, "and if he did, he would ſurely do Juſtice upon "him, or ſend him bound Hand and Feet into *Spain*, "with all the Gold and Goods he ſhould obtain by "Robbery and bring home, were they never ſo great." But the *Limitations* intimated in this *Declaration* do not appear in the *Commiſſion*, in which there is no Reſtriction to any Part of *America*, not only the *Southern*, but *other Parts*, being authoriz'd, and all that is *inhabited by Heathen and Savage People*, without the leaſt Specification of *Guiana*, or Prohibition to meddle with the King of *Spain*'s Subjects there or elſewhere; but on the contrary, with full Liberty to carry what Arms and Ammunition they pleas'd for *Defence*, and the Royal Aſſurance of enjoying unmoleſted whatever they return'd with. The *Commiſſion* is not therefore ſo *well and clearly penned*, as the King repreſents in his *Declaration*; who affirms there likewiſe, that he, *in his own princely Judgment*, *gave no Belief* to Sir *Walter*'s Aſſertions, that he had ſeen and try'd the Gold Ore of the

[s] p. 5. [t] Ibid.

Mine of *Guiana*, as being perſuaded, that in Nature there were no ſuch Mines of Gold intire, or that the *Spaniards*, ſo induſtrious in the Chace of Treaſure, would not have neglected it ſo long : and yet in the Commiſſion his Majeſty takes Care to ſecure to himſelf his own Dividend of a full fifth of ſuch Gold, &c. His Majeſty obſerves alſo in the ſame *Declaration*, that he had, for further Caution, enjoin'd Secretary *Winwood* to urge Sir *Walter*, upon his Conſcience and Allegiance, to deal plainly, and expreſs himſelf, whether he had any other Intention, but only to go to theſe Golden Mines in *Guiana*; which Sir *Walter* not only proteſted ſolemnly unto the Secretary, but by him wrote a cloſe Letter to his Majeſty, containing a ſolemn Profeſſion thereof, confirm'd with many Aſſeverations, and that he never meant or would commit any Outrages or Spoils upon the King of *Spain*'s Subjects; with which Proteſtation of Sir *Walter* his Majeſty acquainted the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador, who ſtill perſiſted in his Jealouſy and Importunity to King *James* to ſtay the Voyage, alledging, that the great Number, that Sir *Walter* had prepared for it, ſhew'd manifeſtly, that he had no peaceable Intention; and offering, upon *Raleigh*'s Anſwer thereto, that thoſe Ships were only provided for his ſafe Convoy, that, if Sir *Walter* would go with one or two Ships only to ſeek the Mine, he would move the King of *Spain* to ſend two or three Ships with him back again for his ſafe Convoy to *England* with the Gold, and the Embaſſador himſelf to remain here in Pledge for the King his Maſter's Performance thereof. "But ſuch, adds "his Majeſty, were the conſtant fair Offers of the ſaid Sir "*Walter Raleigh*, and ſpecious Promiſes, as his Ma- "jeſty in the End rejected the importunate Suit of "the ſaid *Spaniſh* Embaſſador for his Stay, and reſolv'd "to let him go; but withall took Order, both that "he, and all thoſe that went in his Company, ſhould find

" find good Security to behave themſelves peaceably " towards all his Majeſty's Friends and Allies, and to " obſerve ſtrictly all the Articles of the Commiſſion, " which his Majeſty, for that Cauſe, had the greater " Care to have it well and clearly penned and ſet " down." But how clearly this Commiſſion was penn'd, has been remark'd already; and with regard to the *cloſe Letter*, which the King takes Notice Sir *Walter* had written to him, it was probably that, in which that Gentleman had, in Obedience to his Majeſty's Commands, given an Account of the Number of his Men, the Burthen and Strength of his Ships, together with the Country and River, which he was to enter [u]. This Letter appears to have been communicated by the King to the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador, by which Means the King of *Spain* had an exact Knowledge of *Ralegh*'s whole Enterprize; and accordingly ſent to *Guiana*, before Sir *Walter* left the Channel, to prepare a greater Force than his to oppoſe him [w]: And the Original of that very Letter is ſaid to have been found afterwards in the *Spaniſh* Governor's Cloſet at St. *Thome* in *Guiana*, when that Town was taken *. This Account is favour'd by this remarkable Circumſtance, of his Majeſty's omitting to inſert that *cloſe Letter*, which he mentions, of Sir *Walter*, in his *Declaration*, as he would moſt probably have done, if it had been then in his Poſſeſſion. But to juſtify the Truth of his Majeſty's Communications with the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador upon this Subject, I ſhall inſert here the following Paſſage from an original Letter [x] of *Villiers* Earl of *Buckingham* to Secretary *Winwood*, dated *March* 28, 1617, from *Lincoln* where the Court then was: " His Majeſty perceiveth by a Letter he hath

 " received

[u] Sir Walter Ralegh's Letter to Sir Ralph Winwood. [w] Shirley's Life of Sir Walter Ralegh, p. 183. Edit. 1677. Howell's Letters, ubi ſupra, p. 369. * Howell, ibid. & Shirley, ibid. [x] In the Poſſeſſion of the late Duke of Montagu.

" received from the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador, that you " have not been yet with him, to acquaint him with " the Order taken by his Majeſty about Sir *Walter* " *Ralegh*'s Voyage; and therefore would have you go " to him, as ſoon as you can poſſibly, to relate unto " him particularly his Majeſty's Care of that Buſineſs, " and the Courſe he hath taken therein." This Letter, tho' it gives us no Light into the Particulars of what Sir *Ralph Winwood* was to deliver to the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador, ſhews evidently, that his Buſineſs was of a Kind, which that honeſt Secretary had no Inclination or Forwardneſs to be employed in.

The whole Expence of *Ralegh*'s Expedition was defray'd by him and his Friends. For this Purpoſe he call'd in the eight thouſand Pounds, which he had lent to the Counteſs of *Bedford* [a], reckoned in King *James*'s *Declaration a competent Satisfaction* for all his Eſtates, tho' *Sherborne* alone was afterwards valued by the State at 5000 *l. per Annum*. He prevail'd likewiſe with his Wife to ſell her Eſtate at *Mitcham* in *Surry*, for 2500 *l.* for the promoting the Deſign [b]; in which he engaged many Adventurers. But the Company of Volunteers were ſuch, as had never ſeen the Sea nor Wars, and, except about forty Gentlemen, were a very diſſolute, diſorderly, and ungovernable Crew, " whom " their Friends thought it an exceeding good Gain to " be diſcharg'd of, at the Hazard of ſome thirty, " forty, or fifty Pounds, knowing they could not " have lived a whole Year ſo cheap at Home [c]." Several Merchants, both in *England* and foreign Parts, contributed likewiſe to this Adventure; ſo that at laſt *Ralegh* was enabled to fit out a Fleet conſiſting of ſeven Sail. The firſt was the Admiral call'd *The Deſtiny*, a ſtout Ship, built by Sir *Walter* himſelf, of the Burthen of 440 Tuns, and carrying 36 Pieces of Cannon

[a] Obſervations on Sanderſon's Hiſtory of King James, p. 11. [b] Ibid. and Ralegh's Apology, p. 47, 48. [c] Ralegh's Apology, p. 4.

non. On board of it were Sir *Walter Ralegh* General, and his Son *Walter* Captain, beſides 200 Men, of whom 80 were Gentlemen Volunteers and Adventurers, moſt of them Sir *Walter*'s Relations: Which Number was afterwards increaſed. The ſecond, *The Jaſon* of *London*, 240 Tuns, and 25 Guns, Captain *John Pennington* Vice Admiral, 80 Men, one Gentleman, and no more. Third, *The Encounter*, 160 Tuns, 17 Guns, *Edward Haſtings* Captain; ſucceeded, upon his Death in the *Weſt Indies*, by Captain *Whitney*. Fourth, *The Thunder*, 150 Tuns, 20 Guns, Sir *William* St. *Leger* Captain, ſix Gentlemen, 60 Soldiers, and ten Land Men. Fifth, *The Flying Joan*, 120 Tuns, 14 Guns, *John Chidley* Captain, 25 Men. Sixth, *The Southampton*, 80 Tuns, ſix Guns, *John Baily* Captain, 25 Mariners, two Gentlemen. Seventh, *The Page*, a Pinnace, 25 Tuns, three Rabnets of Braſs, *James Barker* Captain, eight Sailors. But before *Ralegh* left the Coaſt of *England*, he was join'd by as many Ships more, ſo that his whole Fleet conſiſted of 13 Sail, beſides his own Ship. Among theſe were *The Convertine*, commanded by Captain *Keymis*; *The Confidence*, commanded by Captain *Wollaſton*; a Shallop, nam'd *The Flying Hart*, under Sir *John Ferne*; two Fly-boats, under Captain *Samuel King*, and Captain *Robert Smith*; and a Caravel, with perhaps another nam'd the *Chudley*, beſides.

With the former Part of this Fleet *Ralegh* ſail'd from the *Thames*, on the 26th of *March* 1617, but it was the End of *June*, or Beginning of *July*, before all his Company join'd him, and he left *Plymouth* with his whole Fleet; after which he was obliged to put into *Cork* in *Ireland* thro' Streſs of Weather, and remain'd there till the 19th of *Auguſt*. He reach'd the *Canaries* on the 6th of *September*, and obtain'd there ſome Refreſhments, with an ample Certificate from the Governor, that he had behav'd himſelf with great Juſtice and Honour[d]. In the whole Voyage, between the *Cape*

[d] Oldys, fol. cxcvii—cxcix.

Cape de Verd Iſlands and *America*, he met with ſuch contrary Winds and ſo many Storms, that the Fleet was in great Want of Water, and the Crew ſo ſickly, that many of the ableſt Men both for Sea and Land died. However on the 17th of *November*, they came in Sight of *Guiana*, and ſoon after to Anchor, in five Degrees, off the River *Caliana*, where they ſtaid till the 4th of *December* [e]. Here *Ralegh* was receiv'd by the *Indians* of thoſe Parts with the utmoſt Joy, who not only aſſiſted him with Proviſions and every thing elſe in their Power, but offer'd him the Sovereignty of the Country, if he would ſettle amongſt them; which he declin'd to accept [f]. His extreme Sickneſs for ſix Weeks preventing him from undertaking the Diſcovery of the Mines in Perſon, he was oblig'd to depute Captain *Keymis* to that Service; and accordingly on the 4th of *December* order'd five ſmall Ships to ſail into the River *Oronoque*. Aboard theſe five Veſſels were five Companies of fifty Men each; the firſt commanded by Captain *Parker*, Brother of the Lord *Monteagle*; the ſecond by Captain *North*, Brother of Lord *North*; the third by his Son Captain *Ralegh*; the fourth by Captain *Thornhurſt*; and the fifth by *Prideaux*, Lieutenant to Captain *Chidley*. Sir *Warham St. Leger*, *Ralegh*'s Lieutenant, who had the Charge of theſe Companies, falling ſick at *Caliana*, it was conferr'd upon *George Ralegh*, Sir *Walter*'s Nephew, who had ſerv'd with great Reputation in the *Low Countries*; and Captain *Keymis* had the chief Charge of landing and conducting them [g]. But *Keymis* having laid down the Plan of his intended Attempt upon the Mine, and undertaken to diſcover it with ſix or eight Perſons in Sir *John Ferne*'s Shallop, *Ralegh* diſliking that Method of Proceeding, determin'd

[e] Sir Walter Ralegh's Letter to Secretary Winwood. [f] Letter to his Lady from Caliana, Nov. 14, 1617. Printed among his Remains. [g] Ralegh's Journal, MS. apud Oldys, fol. ccii.

min'd to alter it, and therefore ſent to him the following Inſtructions [g] :

" *Keymis*, Whereas you are reſolv'd, after your Ar-
" rival into the *Oronoque*, to paſs to the Mine with
" my Couſin *Herbert* and ſix Muſqueteers, and to that
" End deſired to have Sir *John Ferne*'s Shallop, I do
" not allow of that Courſe ; becauſe you cannot land
" ſo ſecretly, but that ſome *Indians* on the River Side
" may diſcover you, who giving Knowledge thereof
" to the *Spaniards*, you may be cut off before you
" recover your Boat. I therefore adviſe you to ſuffer
" the Captains and Companies of the *Engliſh* to paſs
" up Weſtward of the Mountain *Aio*, from whence
" you have no leſs than three Miles to the Mine, and
" to encamp between the *Spaniſh* Town and you, if
" there is any Town near it ; that being ſo ſecured,
" you may make Tryal what Depth and Breadth the
" Mine holds, and whether or not it will anſwer our
" Hopes. And if you find it royal, and the *Spani-*
" *ards* begin to war upon you, then let the Serjeant
" Major repell them, if it is in his Power, and drive
" them as far as he can : But if you find the Mine
" is not ſo rich, as to perſuade the holding of it,
" and it requires a ſecond Supply, then ſhall you bring
" but a Baſket or two to ſatisfy his Majeſty, that my
" Deſign was not imaginary, but true, tho' not an-
" ſwerable to his Majeſty's Expectation ; for the
" Quantity of which I never gave Aſſurance, nor
" could. On the other Side, if you ſhall find any
" great Number of Soldiers that are newly ſent into
" the *Oronoque*, as the Caſſique of *Caliana* told us
" there were, and that the Paſſages are already in-
" forced, ſo as without manifeſt Peril of my Son,
" yourſelf, and the other Captains, you cannot paſs
" towards the Mine ; then be well adviſed how you
" land,

[g] Ralegh's Apology, p. 26.

" land, for I know (a few Gentlemen excepted)
" what a Scum of Men you have, and I would not
" for all the World receive a Blow from the *Spaniard*
" to the Diſhonour of the Nation. I myſelf, for my
" Weakneſs, cannot be preſent; neither will the Com-
" pany land, except I abide by the Ships, the Galleons
" of *Spain* being daily expected. *Piggot* the Serjeant
" Major is dead; Sir *Warham St. Leger*, my Lieute-
" nant, without Hope of Life; and my Nephew,
" *George Ralegh*, your Serjeant Major now, but a
" young Man. It is therefore on your Judgment that
" I rely, whom I truſt God will direct for the beſt.
" Let me hear from you as ſoon as you can. You
" ſhall find me at *Punta de Gallo* dead or alive; and
" if you find not my Ships there, yet there you ſhall
" find their Aſhes, for I will fire with the Galleons if
" it comes to Extremity, but run away I will never."

With theſe Inſtructions the five Ships ſet forward, parting from *Ralegh* and the reſt of the Fleet, with a Month's Proviſion, on the 10th of *December*[h]. But when they found a new *Spaniſh* Town, call'd St. *Thome*, conſiſting of about 140 Houſes, tho' lightly built, with a Chapel, a Convent of *Franciſcans*, and a Garriſon, erected on the main Channel of the *Oronoque*[i], about twenty Miles diſtant from the Place, where *Antonio Berreo*, the Governor taken by *Ralegh* in his firſt Diſcovery and Conqueſt here, attempted to plant; *Keymis* and the reſt thought themſelves oblig'd, thro' Fear of having the Enemy's Garriſon between them and their Boats, to deviate from their Inſtructions, which enjoin'd them, firſt to carry a little Party to make Tryal of the Mine, under Shelter of their own Camp; and then to deal with the *Spaniſh* Town as it ſhould behave towards them. They determin'd therefore

[h] Ralegh's Journal, apud Oldys, fol. cciii. [i] Heylin's Coſmography, p. 1084.

fore to land in one Body, and encamp between the Mine and the Town [k], by which Means, tho' themſelves were the ſtronger, their Boats were expos'd, and the Mine left untry'd, contrary to *Ralegh*'s Order. For about three Weeks after their Departure, landing by Night, nearer the Town than they ſuſpected, and intending to reſt themſelves on the River Side till Morning, they were in the Night-time ſet upon by the *Spaniſh* Troops, appriz'd of, and fore-arm'd for their coming. This Charge was ſo unexpected, and ſtruck the common Soldiers with ſuch Amazement and Confuſion, that had not the Captains and ſome other Gentlemen animated the reſt, they had all been cut to Pieces. But the reſt, by their Example, ſoon rallying, made ſo vigorous an Oppoſition to the *Spaniards*, that they forc'd them to a Retreat, till in the Warmth of the Purſuit the *Engliſh* found themſelves at the *Spaniſh* Town before they knew where they were. Here the Battle was renew'd againſt them, being aſſaulted by the Governor himſelf Don *Diego Palameca*, and four or five Captains at the Head of their Companies; againſt whom Captain *Ralegh*, from the Heat and Impatience of Youth, being but twenty-three Years old, neglecting his own Safety, and not waiting for the Muſqueteers, ruſh'd forward at the Head of a Company of Pikes, and having kill'd one of the *Spaniſh* Captains, was himſelf ſhot by another; but preſſing ſtill forward with his Sword upon *Erinetta*, probably the Captain who had ſhot him, this *Spaniard* with the But-end of his Muſket fell'd him to the Ground; and after theſe Words, *Lord have Mercy upon me, and proſper your Enterprize*, young *Ralegh* ſpoke no more. His Serjeant *John Pleſſington* immediately thruſt the *Spaniſh* Captain thro' the Body with his Halbert. Two other *Spaniſh* Officers were kill'd at the

[k] Ralegh's Apology, p. 29. and his Letter to Lord Carew, printed at the End of that Apology, p. 64.

the ſame Time, and the Governor himſelf fell in the ſame Engagement [l], which happen'd on the 2d of *January* 1617-18 [m]. The *Spaniſh* Leaders being all thus diſpatch'd, and many of their Soldiers, the reſt fled and were diſpers'd, ſome to ſhelter about the Market Place, from whence they kill'd and wounded the *Engliſh* at Pleaſure, ſo that the latter ſaw no Way left for Safety but by firing the Town, and driving the Enemy to the Woods and Mountains, whence they ſtill kept the *Engliſh* waking with perpetual Alarms [n]. Others were more careful to defend the Paſſages to their Mines, of which they had three or four not far diſtant, than they had been to defend the Town itſelf [o].

Captain *Keymis* had now, by the Removal of all Obſtructions, an Opportunity of viſiting and making a Tryal of the Mine, which he aſſur'd *Ralegh* in a Letter of the 8th of *January*, he was preparing to do [p], and actually attempted, with Captain *Thornhurſt*, Mr. *W. Herbert*, Sir *John Hamden*, and others; but at their firſt Approach near the Bank, where they intended to land, he receiv'd from an Ambuſcade of the *Spaniards* in the Woods a Volley of Shot, which ſlew two of his Company, hurt ſix others, and wounded Captain *Thornhurſt* dangerouſly in the Head. This ſtagger'd his Reſolution, eſpecially as he found the River ſo low, ſo that he could not approach the Banks in moſt other Places near the Mine by a Mile, and the Woods thick and unpaſſable; and conſider'd, that if they ſhould diſcover the Mine, they had no Men to work it, the *Spaniards* themſelves having ſeveral Gold and Silver Mines near the Town, which were uſeleſs for want of Negroes. *Keymis* therefore about the middle

[l] Ralegh's Apology, p. 30, 31, 33. and his Letter to his Wife. [m] Camdeni Annales Regis Jacobi, p. 28. [n] Ralegh's Apology, p. 31. [o] Ralegh's Remains, p. 178. [p] Keymis's Letter to Ralegh's Apology, p. 32.

dle of *February* return'd to *Punta de Gallo*, without diſcovering the Mine, alledging the Reaſons mention'd above, and that the Companies of *Engliſh* in the Town of St. *Thome* were not able to defend it againſt the daily and nightly Aſſaults of the *Spaniards* [q]. Beſides, as ſome Mitigation of their ill Succeſs, and Inducement to further Hopes, *Keymis* produc'd two Ingots of Gold, which had been reſerv'd at St. *Thome*, as the King of *Spain*'s *Quinto* or Proportion, together with other valuable Spoils of the Governor, and a large Quantity of Papers, Letters, Memorials, Schemes, Plans, and Maps found in that Governor's Study. Among theſe were four Letters, which plainly diſcover'd, not only *Ralegh*'s whole Enterprize to have been betray'd, but his Life thereby put into the Power of the *Spaniards*. The firſt was from the King of *Spain* dated the 19th of *March* 1616-17, and ſent by a Bark of Advice to *Guiana*: The ſecond, another of that King of the 2d of *May*, to the Governor of that Country: The third, ſent from that King by the Biſhop of *Porto Rico*, and deliver'd to that Governor on the 15th of *July*: And the fourth from the Farmer and Secretary of the Cuſtoms in the *Indies*. Theſe Letters diſcover'd the Preparations made by the *Spaniards* to receive *Ralegh*; who complain'd of the Treachery of betraying and expoſing him to them, in the Letter, which he wrote about a Month after to Secretary *Winwood*, and in that to his Lady. To the juſt Indignation, which he conceiv'd upon this Occaſion, was added the Mortification of finding, that Captain *Keymis* had made no Tryal of the Mine; upon which he reproach'd that Captain with having undone him, and wounded his Credit with the King paſt Recovery. This affected *Keymis* with ſo ſenſible a Concern, that he retir'd to his Cabbin, where he ſhot himſelf, but finding

[q] Ralegh's Apology, p. 42—46, and Letter to Winwood.

finding the Wound not mortal, he diſpatch'd himſelf with a long Knife thruſt thro' his left Pap into his Heart [r].

The ill State of Sir *Walter*'s Health would not ſuffer him to repair the Neglect of *Keymis*, by going up the River himſelf; for all the while he lay with the five larger Ships at *Punta de Gallo*, he was incapable of ſuch a Voyage, and at the ſame Time was in continual Apprehenſion of being attack'd in this divided State of his Fleet by the *Spaniſh Armada*, ſent out purpoſely to lay wait for and deſtroy him; but the Enemy miſs'd him by ſtaying in the wrong Place [s].

However his Misfortunes and Diſappointments did not alter his Reſolution of returning home, tho' the Crew of his own Ship fell to Mutiny upon their Arrival at *Newfoundland*, where ſome were for ſtaying Abroad. But the Majority being of Opinion to return to *England*, he arriv'd with his leaky Ships at *Kingſale* in *Ireland* [t]. By this Time the News of the firing St. *Thome*, and the Slaughter of the *Spaniards* there, being brought to *England*, and the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador inſiſting upon Satisfaction for the Injuries done to his Maſter's Subjects, King *James* on the 11th of *June* 1618, publiſh'd a Proclamation [u], declaring his *Deteſtation* of Sir *Walter*'s Conduct towards the *Spaniards* at *Guiana*; and charging ſuch, as were acquainted with the Particulars, to repair to any of his Privy Council, and certify their whole Knowledge. This Proclamation aſſerts, that his Majeſty had, by *expreſs Limitation* and *Caution*, reſtrain'd and forbid *Ralegh* from attempting any Act of Hoſtility upon any Territories or Subjects of foreign Princes, with whom his Majeſty was in Amity, and more particularly thoſe of his *dear Brother* the King of *Spain*. Yet it is evident

[r] Ralegh's Apology, p. 39. and Letters to Winwood and to his Wife. [s] Ralegh's Journal and Letter to Winwood. [t] Oldys, fol. ccviii. [u] Rymer, Tom. xvii. fol. 92.

dent, that the Commiſſion, to which this Proclamation refers, contains no ſuch *Limitation*.

The Proclamation, however, did not deter Sir *Walter*, upon his Arrival at *Plymouth* in the Beginning of *July*, from landing, and reſolving to ſurrender himſelf voluntarily into the King's Hands, to whom he wrote an excellent Letter in Defence of himſelf. As he was upon the Road to *London*, before he came to *Aſhburton*, he was met by Sir *Lewis Stuckley*, Vice Admiral of *Devonſhire*, and his own Kinſman, who had Orders from the Court to arreſt and bring him up Priſoner. And this Man, who had Meanneſs enough to undertake an Office ſo unſuitable to the Relation between them, appears to have executed it with equal Diſingenuity.

Sir *Walter* return'd with him to *Plymouth*, where being now apprehenſive of the Reſentment of the King and his *Hiſpanioliſed* Miniſters, he contrived to convey himſelf out of the Kingdom in a Veſſel hired for that Purpoſe by Captain *Samuel King*, an old Officer of his. But changing his Reſolution in that Reſpect, he proceeded on his Journey towards *London* * ; yet thinking it proper to gain Time for the appeaſing of his Majeſty, at *Saliſbury*, by the Aſſiſtance of one *Manourie*, a *French* Quack, he counterfeited Sickneſs for ſeveral Days, during which he wrote his *Apology*. However, on the 7th of *Auguſt* he arriv'd at *London*, where he was permitted the Confinement of his own Houſe ; but having ſtill good Reaſons not to truſt himſelf to the Mercy of the Court, he form'd a Deſign to eſcape into *France*, which Sir *Lewis Stuckley*, who was privy to and encourag'd it, diſcover'd; and Sir *Walter* being ſeiz'd in a Boat upon the River below *Woolwich*, was a ſecond time, on the 10th of *Auguſt*, committed to the *Tower*. But tho' his Death ſeem'd abſolutely de-

f termin'd,

* Captain King's Narrative, MS. apud Oldys, fol. ccxii.

termin'd, yet it was not eaſy to find a Method to compaſs it, ſince his Conduct in his late Expedition could not be ſtretch'd in Law to ſuch a Sentence. It was reſolv'd therefore to ſacrifice him to *Spain*, in a Manner, which has juſtly expos'd the Court to the Abhorrence of all ſucceeding Ages, by calling him down to Judgment upon his former Sentence, paſs'd fifteen Years before, which they were then aſham'd or ſcrupled to execute: ſo that, by a ſtrange Contrariety of Proceedings, he, who had been condemn'd for being a Friend to the *Spaniards*, now loſt his Life for being their Enemy. A Privy Seal was accordingly ſent to the Judges to order immediate Execution; upon which a Conference was held on *Friday* the 23d of *Oct.* 1618, between all the Judges of *England*, concerning the Manner how Priſoners, who have been attainted of Treaſon, and ſet at Liberty, ſhould be brought to Execution.

In Conſequence of their Reſolution, a Privy Seal came to the King's Bench, commanding that Court to proceed againſt Sir *Walter* according to Law [a]; who the next Day receiv'd Notice from the Council to prepare himſelf for Death [b]; and on *Wedneſday* the 28th of that Month, at Eight in the Morning, was taken out of Bed in the hot Fit of an Ague, and carried to the King's Bench Bar at *Weſtminſter*. The Chief Juſtice, Sir *Henry Montagu*, order'd the Record of his Conviction and Judgment at *Wincheſter* in 1603 to be read, and then demanded, what he had to offer, why Execution ſhould not be awarded? To this Sir *Walter* pleaded the Commiſſion granted him by his Majeſty, for his late Voyage, which implyed a reſtoring Life to him, by giving him Power, as Marſhal, on the Life and Death of others. He then began to juſtify his Con-

[a] Sir Richard Hutton's Reports, p. 21. Judge Crooke's Reports, 2. fol. 495. Serjeant Rolles's Reports, 50. p. 7. [b] Camdeni Annales Regis Jacobi, p. 37.

Conduct in that Voyage, but the Court refus'd to hear him; and ſo Execution was awarded againſt him. He deſir'd them, that he might not be cut off ſo ſuddenly, ſince he had ſomewhat to do in Diſcharge of his Conſcience, ſomething to ſatisfy his Majeſty, and the World in; calling upon God to be his Judge, before whom he ſhould ſhortly appear, that he was never diſloyal to his Majeſty; *which I will juſtify*, ſaid he, *where I ſhall not fear the Face of any King on Earth.* He was then led to the *Gate-Houſe* near the *Palace-Yard*; and the ſame Day the Warrant for his Execution was produc'd, and ſign'd at *Weſtminſter*, tho' his Majeſty was then retir'd into the Country, having rejected all Petitions in his Favour [c]. The next Morning, *Thurſday* the 29th of *October*, the Day of the Lord Mayor's Inauguration, a Solemnity never perhaps attended before with a public Execution, Sir *Walter Ralegh* was conducted by the Sheriffs of *Middleſex*, to the *Old Palace-Yard* in *Weſtminſter*. He was aſſiſted in his laſt Moments by Dr. *Robert Tolſon*, then Dean of *Weſtminſter*, and afterwards Biſhop of *Saliſbury*, who has written an Account of his Death [d]; in which he obſerves, that being ſurpriz'd at Sir *Walter Ralegh*'s Contempt of Death, and expoſtulating with him upon it, Sir *Walter* told him plainly, that he never feared Death, and much leſs then; for which he bleſſed God: that as to the Manner of it, tho' to others it might ſeem grievous, yet, for himſelf, he had rather die ſo, than in a burning Fever. That this was the Effect of Chriſtian Courage, he convinc'd the Dean then, and *I think*, ſays he, *all the Spectators at his Death.* He ſaid nothing as to the old Plot, but juſtified himſelf fully as to what had been lately objected to him. The Dean

[c] Oldys, fol. ccxxiv—ccxxvii. [d] In a Letter to Sir John Iſham, of Lamport in Northamptonſhire, dated at Weſtminſter College, Nov. 9. 1618, ſtill preſerv'd in the Family, and cited by Mr. Campbell, Lives of the Admirals, Vol. II. p. 84, 85.

having put him in Mind of the Earl of *Eſſex*, he ſaid, that Lord was taken off by a Trick; which he told the Dean privately, but it is not ſet down by him. Sir *Walter* eat his Breakfaſt heartily that Morning, ſmoak'd his Pipe, and made no more of Death, than if he had been to take a Journey [c]. On the Scaffold he convers'd freely with the Lord *Arundel* and others of the Nobility; and in his Speech vindicated himſelf from two Suſpicions, which the King had conceiv'd againſt him, and which he apprehended had haſtened his Death; one of which was, that he had been engag'd in ſome Plot or Confederacy with *France*; and the other, that he had ſpoken diſloyally of his Majeſty. He confeſs'd his Attempt to eſcape, and his pretending Sickneſs at *Saliſbury*, in order to gain Time for pacifying his Majeſty. He forgave *Manourie* the *Frenchman*, and Sir *Lewis Stuckley*, the Injuries, which they had done him. He denied, that he was brought by Force into *England* from his laſt Voyage, and that he had no Intentions to return thither; and vindicated himſelf from the Imputation, that he did not deſign to go to *Guiana* at all, and that he knew of no Mine there, but merely us'd it as a Pretence to gain his Liberty. He clear'd himſelf likewiſe from another Calumny, of having deſign'd to leave his Men at *Guiana*; as alſo from having been a Perſecutor of the Earl of *Eſſex*, and inſulting him at his Death. He concluded with deſiring the Company to join with him in Prayer to that great God of Heaven, "whom, ſays he, I have "grievouſly offended, being a Man full of Vanity, "who has lived a ſinful Life in ſuch Callings, as have "been moſt inducing to it: For I have been a Sol-"dier, a Sailor, and a Courtier; which are Courſes of "Wickedneſs and Vice." Then Proclamation being made, that all Men ſhould depart the Scaffold, he prepar'd

[c] Ibid.

prepar'd himſelf for Death, giving away his Hat and Cap and Money to ſome Attendants, who ſtood near him. When he took leave of the Lords and other Gentlemen, he intreated the Lord *Arundel* to deſire the King, that no ſcandalous Writings to defame him might be publiſh'd after his Death; concluding, *I have a long Journey to go, and therefore will take my Leave.* Then having put off his Gown and Doublet, he call'd to the Executioner, to ſhew him the Axe; which not being preſently done, he ſaid, *I pr'ythee let me ſee it. Doſt thou think, that I am afraid of it?* And having it in his Hands, he felt along the Edge of it, and ſmiling ſaid to the Sheriff, *This is a ſharp Medicine, but it is a Phyſician for all Diſeaſes.* Then going to and fro on every Side of the Scaffold, he deſir'd the Company to pray to God to aſſiſt him and ſtrengthen him. The Executioner kneeling down, and aſking him Forgiveneſs, Sir *Walter* laying his Hand upon his Shoulder granted it; and being aſk'd, which Way he would lay himſelf on the Block, he anſwer'd, *So the Heart be right, it is no Matter which Way the Head lies.* As he ſtoop'd to lay himſelf along, and reclin'd his Head, his Face being towards the Eaſt, the Executioner ſpread his own Cloak under him. After a little Pauſe, he gave the Sign, that he was ready for the Stroke, by lifting up his Hand; and his Head was ſtruck off at two Blows, his Body never ſhrinking nor moving. His Head was ſhewn on each Side of the Scaffold, and then put into a red Leather Bag, and with his Velvet Night Gown thrown over, was afterwards conveyed away in a Mourning Coach of his Lady's. His Body was interr'd in the Chancel of St. *Margaret*'s Church in *Weſtminſter*; but his Head was long preſerv'd in a Caſe by his Widow, who ſurviv'd him twenty-nine Years; and after her Death, by his Son *Carew*, with whom it is ſaid to have been buried at *Weſt Horſely* in *Surry*, which had

had been a Seat of Sir *Walter* [f], who was ſixty ſix Years of Age at his Death [g].

Thus fell this great Man, the Victim of a mean and corrupt Court to a foreign Power, whoſe Influence had at that Time an abſolute Aſcendant in the Councils of *England* over the true Intereſts of the Nation. And it is remarkable, that King *James* himſelf, ſoon after *Ralegh*'s Execution, condeſcended to plead that as a Merit with the Court of *Spain*, having directed one of his principal Miniſters to write to Mr. *Cottington*, his Agent at *Madrid* [h], to preſs that Court to act with Sincerity towards him, ſince his Majeſty had given ſo many Teſtimonies of his, eſpecially in the cauſing Sir *Walter Ralegh* to be put to Death, *chiefly for the giving them Satisfaction*; in which, as well as in other Points, his Majeſty had *ſtrained upon the Affections of his People*, who were greatly affected by the Courage and Conſtancy ſhewn by him at his Death, which they attributed to the Deſire his Majeſty had to ſatisfy *Spain*. Mr. *Cottington* was likewiſe inſtructed to let that Court know, "how able a Man Sir *Walter* was to have done "his Majeſty Service; and yet, to content them, he had "not ſpared him, when, by preſerving him, he might "have given great Satisfaction to his Subjects, and had "at Command, upon all Occaſions, as uſeful a Man, "as ſerved any Prince in Chriſtendom." And in Fact, his Death rais'd ſo univerſal a Diſcontent thro' the Nation, that the King thought proper to publiſh ſoon after *a Declaration of the Demeanor and Carriage of Sir* Walter, *as well in his Voyage, as in and ſince his Return*; in which were pretended to be the *true Motives and Inducements, which occaſion'd his Majeſty to proceed in doing Juſtice upon him.* It begins with the Aſſertion of that Principle,

[f] Oldys, fol. ccxxvii—ccxxx. [g] Camdeni Annales Regis Jacobi, p. 38. Wood's Hiſtor. Oxon. Vol. I. col. 440. and Prince's Worthies of Devonſhire. [h] Ruſhworth's Collections, Vol. I. p. 9, 10.

Principle, of which himſelf was ſo fond, and which led him and his Family into ſo many Errors of pernicious Conſequence both to themſelves and their Subjects, that *Kings are not bound to give Account of their Actions to any but God.* However, he declares that he was willing to repreſent his Proceedings in this Caſe to the World; and accordingly urges ſeveral Charges againſt Sir *Walter Ralegh*, ſome of which have been already taken Notice of, endeavouring to ſhew, that the Mine of *Guiana* was a mere Fiction of *Ralegh*, and that his original and only Deſign was to plunder the *Spaniſh* Settlements, and to ſurprize their Fleets; that he had form'd a cruel Purpoſe to leave the Land Soldiers on Shore at *Guiana*; that after the Defeat of his Deſigns, he had no Intention to return home, but to go to the *Eaſt-Indies*, or to ſettle at *Newfoundland*; that after his Arrival in *England* he contriv'd ſeveral Stratagems to eſcape: By all which Offences he had made himſelf unworthy of his Majeſty's Mercy. But this *Declaration* had very little Effect in ſatisfying the Minds of the People, who likewiſe ſhew'd the utmoſt Contempt for the *humble Petition and Information of Sir* Lewis Stuckley, *touching his own Behaviour in the Charge committed unto him for the bringing up of Sir* Walter Ralegh, *and the ſcandalous Aſperſions caſt upon him for the ſame*; which was printed the ſame Year 1618. And indeed no Regard was due to a Man of his Character, who, before the End of that very Year, was ſurpriz'd in *Whitehall* clipping the Gold beſtow'd on him as a Reward for his Treachery; and being condemn'd for that Crime, and reduc'd to the Neceſſity of ſtripping himſelf to his Shirt to raiſe Money to purchaſe a Pardon, withdrew himſelf from the Odium of Mankind to the Iſland of *Lundy* in the *Severn* Sea [i], where he died mad, on the 29th of *Auguſt* 1620 [k], in leſs than two Years after Sir *Walter Ralegh*.

[i] Aulicus Coquinariæ, p. 94. Frankland's Annals of King James, p. 32. and Howell's Letters, Vol. II. p. 372. [k] Camdeni Annales Regis Jacobi, p. 60.

ADDITIONS to the Life of Sir *Walter Ralegh.*

Page xxi. THE Suppoſition, that it was in *his Return home* from *Portugal*, that *he touch'd upon the Coaſt of Ireland*, ſeems contradicted by an original Letter of Captain (afterwards Sir) *Francis Allen* to *Anthony Bacon*, Eſq; elder Brother of Lord Chancellor *Bacon*, dated at *London*, *Auguſt* 17, 1589, extant among the Papers of Mr. *Bacon*, *Vol.* I. *Fol.* 122. in the *Lambeth* Library; in which Letter that Gentleman writes, "My Lord of *Eſſex* hath *chaſed* Mr. *Ralegh* "*from the Court*, and confined him into *Ireland*. "Conjecture you the reſt of that Matter."

Page xxvi. The Conjecture about the time of Sir *Walter*'s Diſgrace and Confinement on Account of debauching Mrs. *Throckmorton*, is fully eſtabliſhed by the following Paſſage of an original Letter of Sir *Edward Stafford* to *Anthony Bacon*, Eſq; among that Gentleman's Papers, *Vol.* II. *Fol.* 123. dated at *Drury-Houſe*, *July* 30, 1592: "If you have any thing to do "with Sir *Walter Ralegh*, or any Love to make to "Mrs. *Throckmorton*, at the *Tower* To-morrow you "may ſpeak with them, if the Countermand come "not to-night, as ſome think will not be, and par-"ticularly he, that hath Charge to ſend them thither." Sir *Walter* continued in the *Tower* till the latter End of *September*, when he was diſcharged from it, and after ſhewing himſelf two Days in *London*, went into the *Weſt* to look after his Share in the great Prize, the *Madre de Dios*, taken from the *Spaniards*; as we learn from a Letter of Mr. *Morgan Colman* to Mr. *Anthony Bacon*, dated at *London*, *September* 23, 1592, among Mr. *Bacon*'s Papers, *Vol.* II. *Fol.* 142. And Mr. *Bacon* himſelf writes to Mr. (afterwards Sir) *Anthony Standen*, in a Letter about *March* $159\frac{2}{3}$, *Ibid. Fol.* 167, that Sir *Walter* "having been almoſt a Year in Diſgrace for

"ſeveral

" ſeveral Occaſions . . . . is yet hovering between " Fear and Hope." However he took his Seat in the Parliament, which begun *February* 1592, and was diſſolv'd on the 9th of *April* 1593; and diſtinguiſh'd himſelf in it upon many Occaſions. His Endeavours to recover her Majeſty's Favour prov'd unſucceſsful during the reſt of that Year: but in the End of *January* $159\frac{3}{4}$ he had Hopes of being appointed a Privy Counſellor, among ſome others then expected to be made; as we find by an original Letter of Mr. *Nicholas Faunt*, formerly Secretary to Sir *Francis Walſingham*. This Letter is dated on the 31ſt of that Month, and addreſs'd to Mr. *Anthony Bacon*, among whoſe Papers (Vol. II. fol. 34.) it is extant; but the Writer of it, who was attach'd to the Earl of *Eſſex*, was no Friend to Sir *Walter*. " Of other Choice of Counſellors, ſays " he, here is a Bruit; but nothing aſſured. Sir *Walter* " *Ralegh* looketh for a Place amongſt them; and it is " now feared of all honeſt Men, that he ſhall preſently " come to the Court; and is thereto wrought to ſerve " a turn. And yet it is well withſtood. God grant " him ſome farther Reſiſtance, and that Place he bet- " ter deſerveth, if he had his Right."

SPEECH

THE

SPEECH and BEHAVIOUR

OF

Sir WALTER RALEGH

On the SCAFFOLD.

I Desire to be borne withal, because this is the third Day of my Fever: And if I shew any Weakness, I beseech you to attribute it to my Malady, for this is the Hour I look for it.

Then pausing a while, directing himself towards a Window, where the Lord of Arundel, *and the Lord of* Doncaster, *with some other Lords and Knights sat, with a loud Voice he said as followeth.*

I thank God of his infinite Goodness, that he hath sent me to die in the Sight of so honourable an Assembly, and not in Darkness. *But by reason the Place where they sat was some Distance from the Scaffold, that they could not easily hear him, he said:* I will strain my self, for I would willingly have your Honours hear me. *The Lord of* Arundel *answered*, We will come upon the Scaffold. *Where, after he had saluted every one of them severally, he began as followeth.*

As I said, I thank my God heartily, that he hath brought me into the Light to die, and hath not

ſuffered me to die in the dark Priſon of the *Tower*, where I have ſuffered a great deal of Adverſity, and a long Sickneſs; and I thank God, that my Fever hath not taken me at this time, as I pray'd God it might not.

There are two main Points of Suſpicion, that his Majeſty hath conceived againſt me, and wherein his Majeſty cannot be ſatisfied, which I deſire to clear and reſolve you of.

One is, that his Majeſty hath been informed, that I have had ſome Plot with *France*, and his Majeſty had ſome Reaſon to induce him thereunto. One Reaſon, that his Majeſty had to conjecture ſo, was, that when I came back from *Guiana*, being come to *Plymouth*, I endeavoured to go to *Rochel*; which was becauſe I would fain have made my Peace before I came to *England*. Another Reaſon was, that upon my Flight I did intend to fly to *France* for ſaving of my Life, having had ſome Terror from above. A third Reaſon was, the *French* Agent's coming to me, and it was reported, that I had Commiſſion from the King of *France*.

But this I ſay, for a Man to call God to Witneſs to a Falſhood at any time is a grievous Sin; and what ſhall he hope for at the Tribunal Day of Judgment? But to call God to Witneſs to a Falſhood at the Time of Death, is far more grievous and impious, and there is no Hope for ſuch an one. And what ſhould I expect, that am now going to render an Account of my Faith? I do therefore call the Lord to Witneſs, as I hope to be ſaved, and as I hope to ſee Him in his Kingdom, which I hope will be within this Quarter of this Hour; I never had any Commiſſion from the King of *France*, nor any Treaty with the *French* Agent, nor with any from the *French* King; neither knew I, that there was an Agent, or what he was, till I met him in my Gallery at my Lodging un-

look'd

look'd for. If I ſpeak not true, O Lord, let me never come into thy Kingdom.

The ſecond Suſpicion was, that his Majeſty hath been informed, that I ſhould ſpeak diſhonourably and diſloyally of him. But my Accuſer was a baſe *Frenchman*, a kind of a Chymical Fellow, one whom I knew to be perfidious; for being drawn into this Action at *Wincheſter*, in which my Hand was touch'd, and he being ſworn to Secrecy over Night, revealed it in the Morning.

But in this I ſpeak now, what have I to do with Kings? I have nothing to do with them, neither do I fear them: I have now to do with God; therefore to tell a Lye now to get the Favour of the King, were in vain. Therefore, as I hope to be ſaved at the laſt Day, I never ſpake diſhonourably, diſloyally, or diſhoneſtly of the King; neither to this *Frenchman*, nor to any other; neither had I ever, in all my Life, a Thought of Ill of his Majeſty. Therefore I cannot but think it ſtrange, that this *Frenchman* being ſo baſe, ſo mean a Fellow, ſhould be ſo far credited; and ſo much for this Point. I have dealt truly, and I hope I ſhall be believed. I confeſs, I did attempt to eſcape; and I did diſſemble and feign myſelf ſick at *Saliſbury*, but I hope it was no Sin. The Prophet *David* did make himſelf a Fool, and did ſuffer Spittle to fall upon his Beard to eſcape the Hands of his Enemies, and it was not imputed to him as Sin; and I did it to prolong Time till his Majeſty came, hoping for ſome Commiſeration from him.

I forgive this *Frenchman*, and Sir *Lewis Stuckley*, and have received the Sacrament this Morning of Mr. Dean, and I do alſo forgive all the World. But thus much I am bound in Charity to ſpeak of this Man, that all Men may take good heed of him: Sir *Lewis Stuckley*, my Kinſman and Keeper, hath affirmed, that I ſhould tell him, that I did tell my Lord *Carew*, and my

my Lord *Doncaſter*, of my preſent Eſcape; but I proteſt before God, I never told *Stuckley* any ſuch thing, neither did I tell my Lord *Carew*, or my Lord *Doncaſter*, of my pretended Eſcape. It was not likely, that I ſhould acquaint two Privy Counſellors of my Purpoſe; neither would I tell him, for he left me ſix, ſeven, eight, nine, or ten Days, to go where I liſted, while he rode about the Country.

Again he accuſed me, that I ſhould tell him, that my Lord *Carew* and my Lord *Doncaſter* would meet me in *France*, which was never my Speech or Thought.

Thirdly, he accuſed me, that I ſhewed him a Letter, and that I ſhould give him Ten thouſand Pounds for my Eſcape; but caſt my Soul into everlaſting Fire, if I ever made him Offer of Ten thouſand Pounds, or One thouſand Pounds; but merely I ſhewed him a Letter, that if he would go with me, his Debts ſhould be paid when I was gone; neither had I One thouſand Pounds, for if I had had ſo much, I could have done better with it, and made my Peace otherwiſe.

Fourthly, when I came to Sir *Edward Pelham*, who had been ſometimes a Follower of mine, who gave me good Entertainment, he gave out, that I had received ſome Dram of Poiſon in Sir *Edward Pelham*'s Houſe; when I anſwered, that I feared no ſuch thing, for I was well aſſured of them in the Houſe. Now God forgive him, for I do, and I deſire God to forgive him: I will not only ſay God is the God of Revenge, but I deſire God to forgive him, as I hope to be forgiven.

Then he looked over his Note of Remembrance, Well, *ſaith he*, thus far have I gone; now a little more, and I will have done by and by.

It was told the King I was brought per Force into *England*, and that I did not intend to come again,

again, whereas Captain *Charles Parker*, Mr. *Treſham*, Mr. *Leak*, and divers others, that knew how I was dealt withal, ſhall witneſs for me: for the common Soldiers, which were an hundred and fifty, mutinied, and ſent for me to come into the Gun-room to them, for at that Time they would not come to me; and there was I forced to take an Oath, that I would not come into *England* till they would have me, or elſe they would caſt me into the Sea and drown me; afterwards they entered my Cabbin and ſet themſelves againſt me. After I had taken this Oath, with Wine and other Things I drew the chiefeſt of them to deſiſt, and at length I perſuaded them to go into *Ireland:* then would they have gone into the *North* Parts of *Ireland*; but I told them they were *Redſhanks:* But at laſt with much ado I perſuaded them to go into the *South* Parts; promiſing to get their Pardons, but was forced to give them an hundred and twenty-five Pounds at *Kingſale* to bring them home, otherwiſe I had never got from them.

There was a Report, that I meant not to go to *Guiana* at all, and that I knew not of any Mine, nor intended any ſuch Matter, but only to get my Liberty, which I had not the Wit to keep. But it was my full Intent to go for Gold, for the Benefit of his Majeſty, and thoſe that went with me, with the reſt of my Countrymen: But he, that knew the Head of the Mine, would not diſcover it, when he ſaw, that my Son was ſlain, but made himſelf away. *And then he turned to my Lord of* Arundel, *and ſaid*, Being in the Gallery in my Ship at my Departure, your Honour took me by the Hand, and ſaid you would requeſt me one Thing, that was, *That whether I made a good Voyage or bad, yet I ſhould return again into* England, when I made you a Promiſe, and gave you my Faith, that I would,

would. *And ſo you did*, (anſwered my Lord) *it is true, they were the laſt Words I ſpake unto you.* Another Opinion was, that I carried to Sea with me a thouſand ſix hundred Pieces, and that was all the Voyage intended, only to get Money into my Hands, and that I had weighed my Voyage before; whereas I proteſt I had but an hundred Pounds in all the World, whereof I gave twenty-five Pounds to my Wife. The Reaſon of this Speech was this; there was entered Twenty thouſand Pounds, and yet but Four thouſand Pounds in the Surveyor's Book: now I gave my Bill for the other Sixteen thouſand Pounds for divers Adventurers; but I proteſt I had not a Penny of Money more than One hundred Pounds, as I hope to be ſaved.

Another Slander was raiſed, that I would have gone away from them and left them at *Guiana*: but there were a great many worthy Men, who accompanied me always, as my Serjeant Major *George Ralegh*, and divers others *(which he then named)* that knew my Intent was nothing ſo. And theſe be the material Points I thought good to ſpeak of. I am now at this Inſtant to render my Account to God; and I proteſt, as I ſhall appear before Him, this that I have ſpoken is true.

I will ſpeak but a Word or two more, becauſe I will not trouble Mr. Sheriff too long.

There was a Report ſpread, that I ſhould rejoice at the Death of my Lord of *Eſſex*, and that I ſhould take Tobacco in his Preſence; when, as I proteſt, I ſhed Tears at his Death, though I was one of the contrary Faction; and at the Time of his Death I was all the while in the Armory at the further End, where I could but ſee him. I was ſorry, that I was not with him, for I heard he had a Deſire to ſee me, and be reconciled to me. So that I proteſt I

lamented

lamented his Death, and good Cauſe had I, for it was the worſe for me as it proved, for after he was gone I was little beloved.

And now I intreat you all to join with me in Prayer, that the great God of Heaven, whom I have grievouſly offended, being a Man full of all Vanity, and have lived a ſinful Life, in all ſinful Callings, having been a Soldier, a Captain, a Sea-Captain, and a Courtier, which are all Places of Wickedneſs and Vice; that God (I ſay) would forgive me, and caſt away my Sins from me, and that he would receive me into everlaſting Life. So I take my Leave of you all, making my Peace with God.

ORDERS

ORDERS

To be Obſerved by

The Commanders of the Fleet and Land Companies, under the Charge and Conduct of Sir WALTER RALEGH Knight, bound for the *South* Parts of *America* or elſewhere. Given at *Plymouth* in *Devon* the Third of *May*, 1617.

FIRST, Becauſe no Action nor Enterprize can proſper (be it by Sea or Land) without the Favour and Aſſiſtance of Almighty God, the Lord and Strength of Hoſts and Armies, you ſhall not fail to cauſe Divine Service to be read in your Ship Morning and Evening, in the Morning before Dinner, and at Night before Supper, or at leaſt (if there be Interruption by foul Weather) once the Day, praiſing God every Night with ſinging of a Pſalm at the ſetting of the Watch.

Secondly, You ſhall take eſpecial Care that God be not blaſphemed in your Ship, but that after Admonition given, if the Offenders do not refrain themſelves, you ſhall cauſe them of the better Sort to be fined out of their Adventures, by which Courſe, if no Amendment be found, you ſhall acquaint me withal. For if it be threatened in the Scriptures, that

The Curſe ſhall not depart from the Houſe of the Swearer, much leſs from the Ship of the Swearer.

Thirdly, No Man ſhall refuſe to obey his Officer in all that he is commanded, for the Benefit of the Journey : No Man (being in Health) ſhall refuſe to wait his Turn as he ſhall be directed; the Sailors by the Maſter and Boatſwain; the Landmen by their Captain, Lieutenant, and others.

You ſhall make in every Ship two Captains of the Watch, who ſhall make choice of two Soldiers every Night to ſearch between the Decks, that no Fire nor Candle-light be carried about the Ship, after the Watch ſet; nor that any Candles be burning in any Cabbin without a Lanthorn, and that neither but while they are to make themſelves unready. For there is no Danger ſo inevitable as the Ship's Firing, which may as well happen by taking of Tobacco between the Decks, and therefore forbidden to all Men but aloft the upper Deck.

You ſhall cauſe the Landmen to learn the Names and Places of the Ropes, that they may aſſiſt the Sailors in their Labours upon the Decks, though they cannot go up to the Tops and Yards.

You ſhall train and inſtruct your Sailors (ſo many as ſhall be found fit) as you do your Landmen, and regiſter their Names in the Liſts of your Companies, making no Difference of Profeſſions; but that all be eſteemed Sailors and all Soldiers : For your Troops will be very weak when you come to Land, without the Aſſiſtance of your ſea-faring Men.

You ſhall not give chace, or ſend aboard any Ship, but by Order from the General : And if you come near any Ship in your Courſe, if ſhe be belonging to Prince or State in League or Amity with his Majeſty, you ſhall not take any thing from them by Force, upon pain of Puniſhment as a Pirate; although

though in manifeſt extremity or Want you may (agreeing for the Price) relieve yourſelves with Things neceſſary, giving Bond for the ſame, provided that it be not to the diſfurniſhing of any ſuch Ship, whereby the Owner or Merchants be endangered for the Ship or Goods.

You ſhall every Night fall a-ſtern the General's Ship, and follow his Light, receiving Inſtructions in the Morning what Courſe to hold; and if you ſhall at any time be ſeparated by foul Weather, you ſhall receive certain Billettes ſealed up, the firſt to be opened on this ſide the *North* Cape, if there be Cauſe; the ſecond to be opened at the *South* Cape; the third, after you ſhall paſs twenty-three Degrees; and the fourth from the Height of Cape *de Verd*.

If you diſcover any Sail at Sea, either to windward or to leeward of the Admiral, or if any two or three of our Fleet ſhall diſcover any ſuch Sail which the Admiral cannot diſcern; if ſhe be a great Ship, and but one, you ſhall ſtrike your Main-top-ſail, and hoiſt it again ſo often as you ſhall judge it to be an hundred Tuns of Burthen; as if you judge her to be two hundred Tuns to ſtrike and hoiſt twice, if three hundred, thrice; and ſo anſwerable to her Greatneſs.

If you diſcern a ſmall Ship, you ſhall do the like with your Fore-top-ſail; but if you diſcover many great Ships, you ſhall not only ſtrike your Main-top-ſail often, but put out your Enſign in the Main-top; and if ſuch Ships or Fleet go large before the Wind, you ſhall alſo (after your Signs given) go large, and ſtand as any of the Fleet doth, I mean no longer than that you may judge the Admiral and the reſt have ſeen your Signs and your ſo ſtanding. And if you went large at the Time of the Diſcovery, you ſhall hale oft your Sheets for a little Time, and then go large again, that the reſt may know that you go large,

to ſhew us that the Ships or Fleet diſcovered keep that Courſe; ſo you ſhall do if the Ships or Fleet diſcovered have their Tacks aboard, namely, if you had alſo your Tacks aboard at the Time of the Diſcovery, you ſhall bear up for a little Time, and after hale your Sheet oft again, to ſhew us what Courſe the Ship or Fleet holds.

If you diſcover any Ship or Fleet by Night, if the Ship or Fleet be to windward of you, and you to windward of the Admiral, you ſhall preſently bear up to give us Knowledge; but if you think you might ſpeak with her, then you ſhall keep your loof and ſhoot off a Piece of Ordnance to give us Knowledge thereby.

For a general Rule, let no Man preſume to ſhoot off any Piece of Ordnance but in diſcovering a Ship or Fleet by Night, or by being in Danger of the Enemy, or in Danger of Fire, or in Danger of ſinking, it may be unto us all a moſt certain Intelligence of ſome Matter of Importance, and you ſhall make us know the Difference by this; for if you give chace, and being near a Ship, you ſhoot to make her ſtrike, we ſhall ſee and know you ſhoot to that End, (if it be by Day,) if by Night, we ſhall then know that you have ſeen a Ship or Fleet more than our own, and if you ſuſpect we do not hear the firſt Piece, then you may ſhoot a ſecond, but not otherwiſe, and you muſt take almoſt a Quarter of an Hour between your two Pieces: If you be in Danger by a Leak, (I mean in preſent Danger) you ſhall ſhoot two Pieces preſently one after another; and if in Danger of Fire, three Pieces preſently one after another.

In foul Weather every Man ſhall fit his Sails to keep Company with the reſt of the Fleet, and not run ſo far a-head by Day, but that he may fall a-ſtern the Admiral before Night. In caſe we ſhould

be

be ſet upon by Sea, the Captain ſhall appoint ſufficient Company to aſſiſt the Gunners, after which, if the Fight require it, the Cabbins between the Decks ſhall be taken down, and all Beds and Sacks employed for Bulwarks; the Muſketteers of every Ship ſhall be divided under Captains, or other Officers, ſome for the Fore-caſtle, others for the Waſt, the reſt for the Poop, where they ſhall abide, if they be not otherwiſe directed. The Gunners ſhall not ſhoot any great Ordnance at other Diſtance than point-blank. An Officer or two ſhall be appointed to take care that no looſe Powder be carried between the Decks, or near any Linſtock or Match in Hand. You ſhall ſaw divers Hogſheads in two Parts, and filled with Water, ſet them aloft the Decks. You ſhall divide your Carpenters, ſome in the Hold, if any Shot come between Wind and Water, and the reſt between the Decks, with Plates of Lead, Plugs, and all Things neceſſary laid by them. You ſhall alſo lay by your Tubs of Water certain wet Blankets to caſt upon and choke any Fire. The Maſter and Boatſwain ſhall appoint a certain Number of Sailors to every Sail, and to every ſuch Company a Maſter's Mate, Boatſwain's Mate, or Quarter Maſter, ſo as when every Man knows his Charge and Place, Things may be done without Noiſe or Confuſion, and no Man to ſpeak but the Officers; As for Example, if the Maſter or his Mate bid heave out the Main-top-ſail, the Maſter's Mate, Boatſwain's Mate, or Quarter Maſter which hath Charge of that Sail, ſhall with his Company perform it without calling out to others; and ſo for the Fore-ſail, Fore-top-ſail, Sprit-ſail, and the reſt; the Boatſwain himſelf taking no particular Charge of any Sail, but overlooking all, and ſeeing every one do his Duty.

No Man ſhall board a Ship of the Enemy without Order, becauſe the Loſs of a Ship to us is of more importance than of ten to the Enemy; as alſo by one Man's boarding all our Fleet may be engaged, it being a great Diſhonour to loſe the leaſt of our Fleet. Every Ship being under the Lee of the Enemy, ſhall labour to recover the Wind, if the Admiral endeavour it, and we find an Enemy to leeward of us, the whole Fleet ſhall follow the Admiral, Vice Admiral, or other leading Ships within Muſket-ſhot of the Enemy, giving ſo much Liberty to the leading Ships after her Broad-ſide diſcovered, as ſhe may ſtay and trim her Sails, then is the ſecond Ship to give her Side, and the third and fourth, which done they ſhall all take as the firſt Ship, and giving the Enemy the other Side, ſhall keep him under a perpetual Volley: Thus muſt you do to the windermoſt Ship of the Enemy, which you ſhall batter in pieces, or force her to bear up and intangle the reſt falling foul one of another to their great Confuſion.

If the Admiral give chace and be headmoſt Man, the next Ship ſhall take up his Boat if other Order be not given: Or if any other Ship be appointed to give chace, the next Ship, if the chacing Ship have a Boat at her Stern, ſhall take her up. If any make a Ship to ſtrike, he ſhall not enter her till the Admiral come up.

The Muſketeers, divided into certain Quarters of the Ship, ſhall not deliver their Shot but at ſuch Diſtances as their Commander ſhall direct them. You ſhall take a ſpecial Care for the keeping of the Ship clean between the Decks, to have your Ordnance in Order, and not cloy'd with Trunks and Cheſts. Let thoſe that have Proviſion of Victuals, deliver it to the Steward; and every Man put his Apparel in Canvas Cloakbags, except ſome few

Cheſts

Chefts which do not peſter the Ship. Every one that uſeth any Weapon of Fire, be it Muſket or other Piece, ſhall keep it clean, and if he be not able to amend it, being out of Order, he ſhall preſently acquaint his Officer therewith, who ſhall command the Armourer to amend it.

No Man ſhall keep any Feaſting or Drinking between Meals, nor drink any Healths on the Ship's Proviſion. Every Captain, by his Purſer, Steward, or other Officer, ſhall take a weekly Account how the Victuals waſte. The Steward ſhall not deliver any Candles to any private Man, or to any private Uſe.

Whoſoever ſhall ſteal from his Fellows either Apparel or any thing elſe, ſhall be puniſhed as a Thief; or if any one ſteal any Victuals, either by breaking into the Hold, or otherwiſe, he ſhall receive the Puniſhment of a Thief and the Murderer of his Fellows.

There is no Man ſhall ſtrike any Officer, be he Captain, Lieutenant, Enſign, Serjeant, Corporal of the Field, a Quarter Maſter, nor the Maſter of any Ship, Maſter's Mate, Boatſwain, or Quarter Maſter; I ſay, no Man ſhall offer any Violence to any of theſe, but the ſupreme Officer to the inferior, in Time of Service, upon pain of Death. No private Man ſhall ſtrike one another, upon pain of receiving ſuch Puniſhment as a Martial Court ſhall think him worthy of.

No Man ſhall play at Cards or Dice, either for his Apparel or Arms, upon pain of being diſarmed, and made a Swabber. And whoever ſhall ſhew himſelf a Coward upon any Landing or otherwiſe, he ſhall be diſarmed, and made a Labourer and Carrier of Victuals for the reſt.

No Man ſhall land any Men in any foreign Parts, without Order from the General, the Serjeant Major, or other chief Officer, upon pain of Death: And

whereſoever we ſhall have cauſe to land, no Man ſhall force any Woman, be ſhe Chriſtian or Heathen, upon pain of Death. And you ſhall take eſpecial Care, when God ſhall ſuffer us to land in the *Indies*, not to eat any Fruits unknown; ſuch Fruits as you do not find eaten by Birds on the Tree, or Beaſts under the Tree, you ſhall avoid.

You ſhall not ſleep on the Ground, nor eat any new Fleſh till it be ſalted two or three Hours, which otherwiſe will breed a moſt dangerous Flux; ſo will the eating of over-fat Hogs or Turkies. You ſhall alſo have a great care that you ſwim not in any Rivers but where you ſee the *Indians* ſwim, becauſe moſt of the Rivers are full of Alligators. You ſhall not take any thing from any *Indian* by Force, for from thenceforth we ſhall never be relieved; but you muſt uſe them with all Courteſy. And for trading or exchanging with them, it muſt be done by one or two of every Ship for all the reſt, and the Price to be directed by the Cape Merchant, for otherwiſe all our Commodities will be of ſmall Price, and greatly to our Hindrance.

For other Orders on the Land we will eſtabliſh them (when God ſhall ſend us thither) by general Conſent: In the mean time I will value every Man's Honour according to their Degree and Valour, and taking care for the Service of God and Proſperity of our Enterprize.

When the Admiral ſhall hang out a Flag or Enſign on the Mizen Shrouds, you ſhall know it to be a Flag of Counſel to come aboard.

THE

* THE DUTIFUL

ADVICE

OF A

LOVING SON

TO HIS

AGED FATHER.

SIR,

I Humbly beſeech you, both in reſpect of the Honour of God, your Duty to his Church, and the Comfort of your own Soul, that you ſeriouſly conſider in what Terms you ſtand, and weigh yourſelf in a Chriſtian Ballance; taking for your Counterpoiſe, the Judgments of God: Take heed in time, that the Word *Tekel*, written of old againſt *Belſhazzar*, and interpreted by *Daniel*, be not verified in you, whoſe Expoſition was, *You have been poiſed in the Scale, and found of too light Weight.*

Remem-

* This Piece has always paſſed among Sir *Walter Ralegh*'s Remains, as written by himſelf; but it appears, rather, to be a Libel againſt him, written by ſome of his Enemies. For this Reaſon it is taken from his Works, and added here, for the Satisfaction of thoſe who may be of another Opinion.

Remember that you are now in the waining, and the Date of your Pilgrimage well nigh expired, and now that it behoveth you to look towards your Country, your Force languiſheth, your Senſes impair, your Body droops, and on every Side the ruinous Cottage of your faint and feeble Fleſh threateneth the Fall: And having ſo many Harbingers of Death to premoniſh you of your End, how can you but prepare for ſo dreadful a Stranger? The young Man may die quickly, but the old Man cannot live long: The young Man's Life by Caſualty may be abridged, but the old Man's by no Phyſick can be long adjourned; and therefore, if green Years ſhould ſometimes think of the Grave, the Thoughts of old Age ſhould continually dwell in the ſame.

The Prerogative of Infancy is Innocency; of Childhood, Reverence; of Manhood, Maturity; and of old Age, Wiſdom.

And ſeeing then that the chiefeſt Properties of Wiſdom are to be mindful of Things paſt, careful for Things preſent, and provident for Things to come; uſe now the Privilege of Nature's Talent, to the Benefit of your own Soul, and procure hereafter to be wiſe in well-doing, and watchful in the Foreſight of future Harms. To ſerve the World you are now unable; and though you were able, yet you have little Cauſe to be willing, ſeeing that it never gave you but an unhappy Welcome, a hurtful Entertainment, and now doth abandon you with an unfortunate Farewell.

You have long ſowed in a Field of Flint, which could bring nothing forth but a Crop of Cares, and Afflictions of Spirit, rewarding your Labours with Remorſe, and affording for your Gain, eternal Danger.

It is now more than a ſeaſonable Time to alter the Courſe of ſo unthriving a Huſbandry, and to enter into

into the Field of God's Church, in which, ſowing the Seed of repentant Sorrow, and watering them with the Tears of humble Contrition, you may hereafter reap a more beneficial Harveſt, and gather the Fruits of everlaſting Comfort.

Remember, I pray you, that your Spring is ſpent, your Summer over-paſt, you are now arrived at the Fall of the Leaf; yea, and Winter Colours have long ſince ſtained your hoary Head.

Be not careleſs (ſaith St. *Auguſtine*) *though our loving Lord bear long with Offenders; for the longer he ſtays, not finding Amendment, the ſorer he will ſcourge, when he comes to Judgment: And his Patience in ſo ſtrong forbearing, is only to lend us Reſpite to repent, and not in any wiſe to enlarge us Leiſure to ſin.*

He that is toſſed with Variety of Storms, and cannot come to his deſired Port, maketh not much Way, but is much turmoiled. So, he that hath paſſed many Years, and purchaſed little Profit, hath a long Being, but a ſhort Life: For, Life is more to be meaſured by well-doing than by Number of Years; ſeeing that moſt Men by many Days do but procure many Deaths, and others in ſhort Space attain to the Life of infinite Ages. What is the Body without the Soul, but a corrupt Carcaſe? And what is the Soul without God, but a Sepulchre of Sin?

If God be the Way, the Life, and the Truth, he that goeth without him, ſtrayeth; and he that liveth without him, dieth; and he that is not taught by him, erreth.

Well ſaith St. *Auguſtine*, *God is our true and chiefeſt Life, from whom to revolt, is to fall; to whom to return, is to riſe; and in whom to ſtay, is to ſtand ſure.*

God is he, from whom to depart, is to die; to whom to repair, is to revive; and in whom to dwell, is Life for ever. Be not then of the Number of thoſe that begin not to live, till they be ready to die: And

then

then after a Foe's Desert, come to crave of God a Friend's Entertainment.

Some there be that think to snatch Heaven in a Moment, which the best can scarce attain unto in the Maintenance of many Years, and when they have glutted themselves with worldly Delights, would jump from *Dives*'s Diet to *Lazarus*'s Crown, from the Service of Satan to the Solace of a Saint.

But be you well assured, that God is not so penurious of Friends, as to hold himself and his Kingdom saleable for the Refuse and Reversions of their Lives, who have sacrificed the principal thereof to his Enemies, and their own brutish Lust; then only ceasing to offend, when the Ability of offending is taken from them.

True it is that a Thief may be saved upon the Cross, and Mercy found at the last Gasp: But well saith St. *Augustine*, *Though it be possible, yet it is scarce credible, that he in Death should find Favour, whose whole Life deserved Death; and that the Repentance should be more accepted, that more for Fear of Hell and Love of himself, than for the Love of God, and Loathsomness of Sin, cryeth for Mercy.*

Wherefore, good Sir, make no longer Delays; but being so near the breaking-up of your mortal House, take time before Extremity, to pacify God's Anger.

Though you suffered the Bud to be blasted, though you permitted the Fruits to be perished, and the Leaves to dry up; yea, though you let the Boughs to wither, and the Body of your Tree to grow to decay, yet, (alas!) keep Life in the Root, for fear left the whole Tree become Fewel for Hell-Fire. For surely where the Tree falleth, there it shall lie, whether towards the South, or to the North, to Heaven or to Hell; and such Sap as it bringeth forth, such Fruit shall it ever bear.

Death

Death hath already filed from you the better Part of your natural Forces, and left you now to the Lees, and Remiſſals of your wearyiſh and dying Days.

The Remainder whereof, as it cannot be long, ſo doth it warn you ſpeedily to ranſom your former Loſſes; for what is Age but the Calends of Death? And what importeth your preſent Weakneſs, but an Earneſt of your approaching Diſſolution? You are now embarked in your final Voyage, and not far from the Stint and Period of your Courſe.

Be not therefore unprovided of ſuch Appurtenances as are behoveful in ſo perplexed and perilous a Journey; Death itſelf is very fearful, but much more terrible in reſpect of the Judgment it ſummoneth us unto.

If you were now laid upon your departing Bed, burthened with the heavy Load of your former Treſpaſſes, and gored with the Sting and Prick of a feſtered Conſcience; if you felt the Cramp of Death wreſting your Heart-ſtrings, and ready to make the rueful Divorce between Body and Soul; if you lay panting for Breath, and ſwimming in a cold and pale Sweat, wearied with ſtruggling againſt your deadly Pangs, O! what would you give for an Hour's Repentance; at what a Rate would you value a Day's Contrition? Then Worlds would be worthleſs in reſpect of a little Reſpite; a ſhort Truce would ſeem more precious than the Treaſures of an Empire; nothing would be ſo much eſteemed as a ſhort Time of Truce, which now by Days, and Months, and Years, is moſt laviſhly miſ-ſpent.

Oh how deeply would it wound your woful Heart, when looking back into your former Life, you conſidered many heinous and horrible Offences committed, many pious Works and godly Deeds omitted, and neither of both repented, your Service to God promiſed, and not performed!

Oh

Oh how inconſolable were your Caſe, your Friends being fled, your Senſes affrighted, your Thoughts amazed, your Memory decayed, and your whole Mind aghaſt, and no Part able to perform what it ſhould; but only your guilty Conſcience peſtered with Sin, that would continually upbraid you with many bitter Accuſations!

Oh, what would you think then, being ſtripped out of this mortal Weed, and turned both out of Service and Houſe-room of this wicked World, you are forced to enter into uncouth and ſtrange Paths, and with unknown and ugly Company, to be convented before a moſt ſevere Judge, carrying in your Conſcience your Indictment, written in a perfect Regiſter of all your Miſdeeds, when you ſhall ſee him prepared to give Sentence upon you, againſt whom you have ſo often tranſgreſſed, and the ſame to be your Umpire, whom by ſo many Offences you have made your Enemy, when not only the Devil, but even the Angels would plead againſt you, and your own ſelf, in Deſpight of yourſelf, be your own moſt ſharp Impeacher!

Oh, what would you do in theſe dreadful Exigents, when you ſaw the ghaſtly Dragon, and huge Gulph of Hell, breaking out with moſt fearful Flames, when you heard the weeping, wailing and gnaſhing of Teeth, the Rage of thoſe helliſh Monſters, the Horror of the Place, the Terror of the Company, and the Eternity of all thoſe Torments!

Would you then think them wiſe that ſhould delay in ſo weighty Matters, and idly play away the Time allotted, to prevent theſe intolerable Calamities? Would you then count it ſecure, to nurſe in your own Boſom ſo many Serpents as Sins, and to foſter in your Soul ſo many malicious Accuſers, as mortal and horrible Offences? Would you not think one Life too little to repent in for ſo many, and ſo great Iniquities, every

one

one whereof were enough to throw you into thoſe unſpeakable and intolerable Torments?

And why then (alas!) do you not at the leaſt devote that ſmall Remnant, and Surpluſage of theſe your latter Days, procuring to make an Attonement with God; and to free your Soul and Conſcience from that Corruption which by your Fall hath crept into it? Thoſe very Eyes that behold, and read this Diſcourſe, thoſe very Ears that are attentive to hear it, and that very Underſtanding that conſidereth and conceiveth it, ſhall be cited as certain Witneſſes of theſe rehearſed Things. In your own Body ſhall you experience theſe deadly Agonies, and in your Soul ſhall you feelingly find theſe terrible Fears; yea, and your preſent Eſtate is in Danger of the deepeſt Harms, if you do not the ſooner recover yourſelf into that Fold and Family of God's faithful Servants.

What have you got by being ſo long a Cuſtomer to the World, but falſe Ware, ſuitable to the Shop of ſuch a Merchant, whoſe Traffic is Toil, whoſe Wealth is Traſh, and whoſe Gain is Miſery? What Intereſt have you reaped, that might equal your Detriment in Grace and Virtue? Or what could you find in the Vale of Tears, that was anſwerable to the Favour of God, with Loſs whereof you were contented to buy it?

You cannot now be inveigled with the Paſſions of Youth, which making a Partiality of Things, ſets no Diſtance between counterfeit and current; for theſe are now worn out of Force, by Tract of Time are fallen into Reproof, by Trial of their Folly.

Oh let not the crazy Cowardice of Fleſh and Blood, daunt the Proweſs of an intelligent Perſon, who by his Wiſdom cannot but diſcern how much more Cauſe there is, and how much more needful it is, to ſerve God, than this wicked World.

But if it be the ungrounded Preſumption of the Mercy of God, and the Hope of his Aſſiſtance at the laſt Plunge,

(which

(which indeed is the ordinary Lure of the Devil to reclaim Sinners from the Purſuit of Repentance:) Alas! that is too palpable a Colluſion to miſlead a ſound and ſenſible Man, howſoever it may prevail with ſick and ill-affected Judgments. Who would rely in eternal Affairs, upon the gliding Slipperineſs, and running Streams of our uncertain Life? Who, but one of diſtemper'd Wits, would offer Fraud to the Decypherer of all Thoughts; with whom diſſemble we may to our Coſt, but to deceive him is impoſſible?

Shall we eſteem it cunning to rob the Time from him, and beſtow it on his Enemies, who keepeth Tale of the leaſt Minutes, and will examine in the End how every Moment hath been employ'd? It is a prepoſterous kind of Policy, in any wiſe Conceit to fight againſt God, till our Weapons be blunted, our Forces conſumed, our Limbs impotent, and our beſt Time ſpent; and then when we fall for Faintneſs, and have fought ourſelves almoſt dead, to preſume on his Mercy.

Oh! no, no, the Wounds of his moſt ſacred Body, ſo often rubbed and renewed by our Sins, and every Part and Parcel of our Bodies ſo divers and ſundry ways abuſed, will be then as ſo many Whet-ſtones and Incentives, to edge and exaſperate his moſt juſt Revenge againſt us.

It is a ſtrange Piece of Art, and a very exorbitant Courſe, when the Ship is ſound, the Pilot well, the Mariners ſtrong, the Gale favourable, and the Sea calm, to lie idly in the Road, during ſo ſeaſonable Weather: And when the Ship leaketh, the Pilot ſick, the Mariners faint, the Storms boiſterous, and the Seas a Turmoil of outrageous Surges, then to launch forth, hoiſt up Sail, and ſet out for a long Voyage into a far Country.

Yet ſuch is the Skill of theſe Evening Repenters, who though in the Soundneſs of their Health, and perfect Uſe of their Reaſon, they cannot reſolve to cut the Cables,

Cables, and weigh the Anchor that withholds them from God.

Nevertheleſs they feed themſelves with a ſtrong Perſuaſion, that when they are aſtoniſhed, their Wits diſtracted, the Underſtanding duſked, and their Bodies and Souls racked and tormented with the Throbs and Gripes of a mortal Sickneſs; then, forſooth, they will begin to think of their weightieſt Matters, and become ſudden Saints, when they are ſcarce able to behave themſelves like reaſonable Creatures.

No, no, if neither the Canon, Civil, nor the Common Law, will allow that Man (periſhed in Judgment) ſhould make any Teſtament of his temporal Subſtance, how can he that is animated with inward Garboils of an unſettled Conſcience, diſtrained with the wringing Fits of his dying Fleſh, maimed in all his Ability, and circled in on every Side with many and ſtrange Incumbrances, be thought of due Diſcretion to diſpoſe of his chieſeſt Jewel, which is his Soul; and to diſpatch the whole Manage of all Eternity, and of the Treaſures of Heaven, in ſo ſhort a Spurt?

No, no, they that will loiter in Seed-time, and begin to ſow when others reap; they that will riot out their Health, and begin to caſt their Accounts when they are ſcarce able to ſpeak; they that will ſlumber out the Day, and enter upon their Journey when the Light doth fail them, let them blame their own Folly, if they die in Debt, and be eternal Beggars, and fall headlong into the Lap of endleſs Perdition.

Let ſuch liſten to St. *Cyprian*'s Leſſon: *Let*, ſaith he, *the Grievouſneſs of our Sore be the Meaſure of our Sorrow; let a deep Wound have a deep and diligent Cure; let no Man's Contrition be leſs than his Crime.*

A brief Relation of Sir Walter Ralegh's *Troubles: With the taking away the Lands and Caſtle of* Sherburn *in* Dorſet *from him and his Heirs, being his indubitable Inheritance.*

To the Right Honourable the Commons of *England*, aſſembled in Parliament; the humble Petition of *Carew Ralegh*, Eſq; only Son of Sir *Walter Ralegh*, late deceaſed,

Humbly Sheweth,

THAT whereas your Petitioner conceiveth, that his late Father, Sir Walter Ralegh, *was moſt unjuſtly and illegally condemned and executed; and his Lands and Caſtle of* Sherburn *wrongfully taken from him and his, as may more at large appear by this brief Narrative hereunto annexed; the Particulars whereof your Petitioner is, upon due Proofs, ready to make good: Your Petitioner therefore, humbly ſubmitting to the great Juſtice and Integrity of this Houſe, (which is no way more manifeſted, than by relieving the Oppreſſed) humbly craveth, that he may receive ſuch Satisfaction, for theſe his great Oppreſſions and Loſſes, as to the Wiſdom and Clemency of this honourable Houſe ſhall ſeem fit.*

And your Petitioner ſhall humbly pray, *&c.*

WHEN King *James* came into *England*, he found Sir *Walter Ralegh* (by the Favour of his late Miſtreſs Queen *Elizabeth*) Lord Warden of the *Stannaries*, Lord Lieutenant of *Devonſhire* and *Cornwall*, Captain

Captain of the Guard, and Governor of the Iſle of *Jerſey*; with a large Poſſeſſion of Lands both in *England* and *Ireland*. The King for ſome Weeks uſed him with great Kindneſs, and was pleaſed to acknowledge divers Preſents, which he had received from him being in *Scotland*, for which he gave him Thanks. But finding him (as he ſaid himſelf) a martial Man, addicted to foreign Affairs and great Actions, he feared leſt he ſhould engage him in a War, a Thing moſt hated, and contrary to the King's Nature; wherefore he began to look upon him with a jealous Eye, eſpecially after he had preſented him with a Book, wherein, with great Animoſity, he oppoſed the Peace with *Spain*, then in treaty, perſuading the King rather vigorouſly to proſecute the War with that Prince, then in hand; promiſing, and that with great Probability, within few Years to reduce the *Weſt Indies* to his Obedience. But Sir *Walter Ralegh*'s Enemies, ſoon diſcovering the King's Humour, reſolved at once to rid the King of this Doubt and Trouble, and to inrich themſelves with the Lands and Offices of Sir *Walter Ralegh*. Wherefore they plotted to accuſe him, and the Lord *Cobham*, a ſimple paſſionate Man, but of a very noble Birth and great Poſſeſſions, of High Treaſon. The Particulars of their Accuſation I am utterly ignorant of, and I think all Men, both then and now living; only I find in general Terms, they were accuſed for plotting with the *Spaniard*, to bring in a foreign Army, and proclaim the Infanta of *Spain*, Queen of *England*; but without any Proofs, and the Thing itſelf as ridiculous as impoſſible. However, Sir *Walter Ralegh* was condemned without any Witneſs brought in againſt him, and the Lord *Cobham*, who was pretended to have accuſed him barely in a Letter, in another Letter to Sir *Walter Ralegh*, upon his Salvation cleared him of all Treaſon, or treaſonable Actions, either againſt King or State, to his Knowledge; which original Letter is now in the Hands of Mr. *Ca-*

rew Ralegh, Son of Sir *Walter*, to be produced at any Time. Upon this Condemnation, all his Lands and Offices were ſeized, and himſelf committed cloſe Priſoner to the *Tower*; but they found his Caſtle of *Sherburn*, and the Lands thereunto belonging, to be long before entailed on his Children, ſo that he could not forfeit it, but during his own Life. And the King, finding in himſelf the Iniquity of Sir *Walter*'s Condemnation, gave him all what he had forfeited again, but ſtill kept him cloſe Priſoner; ſeven Years after his Impriſonment, he enjoyed *Sherburn*; at which Time it fell out, that one Mr. *Robert Car*, a young *Scotch* Gentleman, grew in great Favour with the King; and having no Fortune, they contrived to lay the Foundation of his future Greatneſs upon the Ruins of Sir *Walter Ralegh*. Whereupon they called the Conveyance of *Sherburn* in Queſtion, in the *Exchequer* Chamber, and for want of one ſingle Word (which Word was found notwithſtanding in the Paper-book, and was only the Overſight of a Clerk) they pronounced the Conveyance invalid, and *Sherburn* forfeited to the Crown; a Judgment eaſily to be foreſeen without Witchcraft, ſince his chiefeſt Judge was his greateſt Enemy, and the Caſe argued between a poor friendleſs Priſoner and a King of *England*.

Thus was *Sherburn* given to Sir *Robert Car* (after Earl of *Somerſet*;) the Lady *Ralegh* * with her Children, humbly and earneſtly petitioning the King for Compaſſion on her, and her's, could obtain no other Anſwer from him, but that he mun have the Land, he mun have it for *Car*. She being a Woman of a very high Spirit, and noble Birth and Breeding, fell down upon her Knees, with her Hands heaved up to Heaven, and in the Bitterneſs of Spirit beſeeched God Almighty

* She was the only Daughter of Sir *Nicholas Throgmorton*, who was arraigned in Queen *Mary*'s Time, and acquitted. *See* Fox's *Acts and Monuments*.

mighty to look upon the Juſtneſs of her Cauſe, and puniſh thoſe who had ſo wrongfully expoſed her, and her poor Children, to Ruin and Beggary. What hath happened ſince to that Royal Family, is too ſad and diſaſtrous for me to repeat, and yet too viſible not to be diſcerned. But to proceed: Prince *Henry*, hearing the King had given *Sherburn* to Sir *Robert Car*, came with ſome Anger to his Father, deſiring he would be pleaſed to beſtow *Sherburn* upon him, alledging that it was a Place of great Strength and Beauty, which he much liked, but indeed, with an Intention to give it back to Sir *Walter Ralegh*, whom he much eſteemed.

The King, who was unwilling to refuſe any of that Prince's Deſires (for, indeed, they were moſt commonly delivered in ſuch Language, as ſounded rather like a Demand than an Intreaty) granted his Requeſt; and to ſatisfy his Favourite, gave him twenty-five thouſand Pounds in Money, ſo far was the King or Crown from gaining by this Purchaſe. But that excellent Prince, within a few Months, was taken away; how and by what Means is ſuſpected by all, and I fear was then too well known by many. After his Death, the King gave *Sherburn* again to Sir *Robert Car*, who not many Years after, by the Name of Earl of *Somerſet*, was arraigned and condemned for poiſoning Sir *Thomas Overbury*, and loſt all his Lands. Then Sir *John Digby*, now Earl of *Briſtol*, begged *Sherburn* of the King, and had it. Sir *Walter Ralegh* being of a vigorous Conſtitution, and perfect Health, had now worn out ſixteen Years Impriſonment, and had ſeen the diſaſtrous End of all his greateſt Enemies; ſo that, new Perſons and new Intereſts now ſpringing up in Court, he found Means to obtain his Liberty, but upon Condition, to go a Voyage to *Guiana*, in Diſcovery of a Gold Mine; that unhappy Voyage is well known, almoſt to all Men, and how he was betrayed from the very Beginning, his Letters and Deſigns being diſcovered to *Gondamore*,

damore, the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſador, whereby he found ſuch Oppoſition upon the Place, that though he took and fired the Town of St. *Thoma*, yet he loſt his eldeſt Son in that Service, and being deſperately ſick himſelf, was made fruſtrate of all his Hopes.

Immediately upon his Return home, he was made Priſoner, and by the violent Purſuit of *Gondamore*, and ſome others, who could not think their Eſtates ſafe, while his Head was upon his Shoulders, the King reſolved to take Advantage of his former Condemnation ſixteen Years paſt, being not able to take away his Life for any new Action; and, though he had given him a Commiſſion under the Broad-Seal to execute martial Law upon his own Soldiers, which was conceived, by the beſt Lawyers, a full Pardon for any Offence committed before that Time, without any further Trouble of the Law, cut off his Head.

Here Juſtice was indeed blind, blindly executing one and the ſame Perſon upon one and the ſame Condemnation, for Things contradictory; for Sir *Walter Ralegh* was condemned for being a Friend to the *Spaniard*, and loſt his Life for being their utter Enemy. Thus Kings, when they will do what they pleaſe, pleaſe not him they ſhould, God; and, having made their Power ſubſervient to their Will, deprive themſelves of that juſt Power whereby others are ſubſervient to them. To proceed: Mr. *Carew Ralegh*, only Son of Sir *Walter*, being at this Time a Youth of about Thirteen, bred at *Oxford*, after Five Years, came to Court; and, by the Favour of the Right Honourable *William* Earl of *Pembroke*, his noble Kinſman, hoped to obtain ſome Redreſs in his Misfortunes; but the King, not liking his Countenance, ſaid, he appeared to him like the Ghoſt of his Father; whereupon the Earl adviſed him to travel, which he did until the Death of King *James*, which happened about a Year after. Then coming over, and a Parliament ſitting,

he,

he, according to the Cuſtom of this Land, addreſſed himſelf to them by Petition to be reſtored in Blood, thereby to enable him to inherit ſuch Lands, as might come unto him either as Heir to his Father, or any other way; but, his Petition having been twice read in the Lords Houſe, King *Charles* ſent Sir *James Fullerton* (then of the Bed-chamber) unto Mr. *Ralegh*, to command him to come unto him; and, being brought into the King's Chamber by the ſaid Sir *James*, the King, after uſing him with great Civility, notwithſtanding told him plainly, that, when he was Prince, he had promiſed the Earl of *Briſtol* to ſecure his Title to *Sherburn*, againſt the Heirs of Sir *Walter Ralegh*; whereupon the Earl had given him, then Prince, ten thouſand Pounds; that now he was bound to make good his Promiſe, being King; that therefore, unleſs he would quit all his Right and Title to *Sherburn*, he neither could nor would paſs his Bill of Reſtoration. Mr. *Ralegh* urged the Juſtneſs of his Cauſe; that he deſired only the Liberty of a Subject, and to be left to the Law, which was never denied any Freeman. Notwithſtanding all which Allegations, the King was reſolute in his Denial, and ſo left him. After which Sir *James Fullerton* uſed many Arguments to perſuade Submiſſion to the King's Will; as, the Impoſſibility of conteſting with kingly Power; the not being reſtored in Blood, which brought along with it ſo many Inconveniencies, that it was not poſſible without it to poſſeſs or enjoy any Lands or Eſtate in this Kingdom; the not being in a Condition, if his Cloak were taken from his Back, or Hat from his Head, to ſue for Reſtitution. All which Things being conſidered, together with ſplendid Promiſes of great Preferment in Court, and particular Favours from the King not improbable, wrought much in the Mind of young Mr. *Ralegh*, being a Perſon not full twenty Years old, left friendleſs and fortuneleſs, and prevailed ſo far, that he ſubmitted to the King's Will.

Where-

Whereupon there was an Act paſſed for his Reſtoration, and, together with it, a Settlement of *Sherburn* to the Earl of *Briſtol*; and, in ſhew of ſome kind of Recompence, four hundred Pounds a Year Penſion, during his Life, granted to Mr. *Ralegh* after the Death of his Mother, who had that Sum paid unto her, during Life, in lieu of Jointure.

Thus have I, with as much Brevity, Humility, and Candour (as the Nature of the Caſe will permit) related the Preſſures, Force, and Injuſtice committed upon a poor oppreſſed, though not undeſerving †, Family; and have forborne to ſpecify the Names of thoſe, who were Inſtruments of this Evil, leſt I ſhould be thought to have an Inclination to ſcandalize particular, and perchance noble Families.

Upon the Conſideration of all which, I humbly ſubmit myſelf to the Commons of *England*, now repreſented in Parliament; deſiring, according to their great Wiſdom and Juſtice, that they will right me and my Poſterity, according to their own beſt liking; having, in my own Perſon, (though bred at Court) never oppoſed any of their juſt Rights and Privileges, and, for the future, being reſolved to range myſelf under the Banner of the Commons of *England*; and, ſo far forth as Education and fatherly Inſtruction can prevail, promiſe the ſame for two Sons whom God hath ſent me.

† Sir *Walter Ralegh* diſcovered *Virginia* at his own Charge, which coſt him forty thouſand Pounds. He was the firſt, of all the *Engliſh*, that diſcovered *Guiana* in the *Weſt-Indies*. He took the Iſlands of *Fayall* from the *Spaniard*, and did moſt ſignal and eminent Service at the taking of *Cadiz*. He took from the *Spaniard* the greateſt and richeſt Carick, that ever came into *England*: Another Ship likewiſe laden with nothing but Gold, Pearls, and Cochineal.

MAXIMS

MAXIMS OF STATE.

Of GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is of two ſorts.

1. *Private*, Of a Man's ſelf, *Sobriety*; of his Family, called *Oeconomy*.

2. *Publick*, Of the Commonwealth, called *Policy*. A Man muſt firſt govern himſelf, e're he be fit to govern a Family: And his Family, e're he be fit to bear a Part in the Government of the Commonwealth.

Of POLICY.

POLICY is an Art of Government of a Commonwealth, and ſome part of it, according to that State, or Form of Government, wherein it is ſettled for the publick Good.

State, is the Frame or ſet Order of a Commonwealth, or of the Governors that rule the ſame, eſpecially of the chief and ſovereign Governor that commandeth the reſt.

The State of Sovereignty conſiſteth in five Points.

1. Making or annulling of Laws.
2. Creating and diſpoſing of Magiſtrates.
3. Power over Life and Death.
4. Making of War, or Peace.
5. Higheſt or laſt Appeal.

Where theſe five are, either in one or in more, there is the State.

Theſe five Points of State reſt either in

1. One; *Monarchy* or Kingdom.
2. Some few chief Men for Virtue and Wiſdom, called *Ariſtocracy*.
3. Many, called a *Free State*, or *Popular State*.

Theſe three ſorts of Government have reſpect to the common Good, and therefore are juſt and lawful *States*.

Theſe three degenerate into three other Governments, *viz.*

1. *Monarchy* into *Tyranny*.
2. *Ariſtocracy* into *Oligarchy*.
3. *Popular Eſtate* into *Commonwealth* or Government of all the common and baſer ſort, and therefore called a *Commonwealth* by an uſurped *Nick-name*.

Theſe all reſpect their own, and not the publick Good, and therefore are called Baſtard *Governments*.

I. MONARCHY.

A *Monarchy*, or Kingdom, is the *Government* of a *State* by one Head, or Chief, tending to the common Benefit of all.

Monarchies, or *Kingdoms*, are of three ſorts, touching the Right or Poſſeſſion of them, *viz.*

1. *Hereditary*, by Deſcent, as the *Engliſh*, *French*, &c.
2. *Elective*, by Suffrage of the other *Orders*, or ſome of them, as the *Polonian*.

Mixt, or of both Kinds, *viz.* by Deſcent, yet not tied to the next of Blood, as the ancient *Jewiſh State*.

Monarchies are of two Sorts, touching their Power or Authority, *viz.*

1. *Intire*,

1. *Intire*, Where the whole Power of ordering all State Matters both in Peace and War, doth by Law and Cuſtom appertain to the Prince, as in the *Engliſh* Kingdom, where the Prince hath Power to make Laws, Leagues, and War; to create Magiſtrates; to pardon Life, of Appeal, *&c.* Though to give a Contentment to the other Degrees, they have a Suffrage in making Laws, yet ever ſubject to the Prince's Pleaſure, or negative Will.

2. *Limited* or *reſtrained*, that hath no full Power in all the Points or Matters of *State*; as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of Peace, as to the making of Laws, *&c.* but in War only, as the *Polonian* Kings.

II. ARISTOCRACY, *or* SENATORY STATE.

AN *Ariſtocracy* is the Government of a Commonwealth by ſome competent Number of the better Sort, preferr'd for their Wiſdom and other Virtues for the public Good.

Ariſtocracies are of three Sorts, *viz.* Where the *Senators* are choſen, for,

1. *Virtue*, *Riches*, and the Common Good, as the *Venetian*.

2. *Virtue*, and the publick Good, without reſpect of Wealth; as ſometimes the *Roman*, when ſome of the *Senators* were fetched from the Plough, and ſome from the Schools.

3. *Virtue* and Wealth, more reſpecting their private than the public Good, which inclineth towards an *Oligarchy*, or the Government of the richer or nobler Sort, as in *Rome* towards the End.

III. FREE STATE, *or* POPULAR STATE.

THE *Popular State* is the Government of a *State* by the choicer Sort of People, tending to the publick Good of all Sorts, *viz.* with due Reſpect of the better, nobler, and richer Sort.

In every *Juſt State*, ſome part of the Government is, or ought to be imparted to the People; as in a Kingdom, a Voice or Suffrage in making Laws; and ſometimes alſo, in levying of Arms (if the Charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow Help of his Subjects) the Matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the Tax may ſeem to have proceeded from themſelves; ſo Conſultations, and ſome Proceedings in judicial Matters, may in part be referred to them. The Reaſon, leſt ſeeing themſelves to be in no Number, nor of Reckoning, they miſlike the State, or kind of Government: And where the Multitude is diſcontented, there muſt needs be many Enemies to the preſent *State*. For which Cauſe, Tyrants (which allow the People no manner of Dealing in *State* Matters) are forced to bereave them of their Wealth and Weapons, and all other Means wherein they may reſiſt, or amend themſelves, as in *Ruſhland*, *Turkey*, &c.

IV. TYRANNY.

A *Tyranny* is the ſwerving, or diſtorting of a *Monarchy*; or the *Government* of one tending not to the publick Good, but the private Benefit of himſelf and his Followers. As in the *Ruſſen* and *Turkiſh Government*, where the *State* and *Wealth* of other Orders are employed only to the upholding of the Greatneſs of the King or Emperor. This is the worſt of all the Baſtard *States*, becauſe it is the perverting of the beſt Regiment, to wit, of a *Monarchy*, which reſembleth the ſovereign Government of God himſelf.

V. OLIGARCHY, *or the* GOVERNMENT *of a few.*

AN *Oligarchy* is the ſwerving, or the Corruption of an *Ariſtocracy*, or the *Government* of ſome few, that are of the wealthier or nobler Sort, without any Reſpect of the publick Good. The chief End of theſe *Governors*, is their own Greatneſs and enriching.

ing. And therefore their Manner is to prepare fit Means to uphold their Eſtates. This *State* is not altogether ſo bad, as is the *Tyranny*, and yet worſe than the *Commonwealth*, becauſe it reſpecteth only the Good of a few.

VI. COMMONWEALTH.

A *Commonwealth* is the ſwerving or Depravation of a free, or *popular State*, or the Government of the whole Multitude of the baſe and poorer Sort, without reſpect of the other Orders.

Theſe two *States*, to wit, the *Oligarchy*, and *Commonwealth*, are very adverſe the one to the other, and have many Bickerings between them. For that the richer or nobler Sort ſuppoſe a Right or Superiority to appertain unto them in every Reſpect, becauſe they are ſuperior, but in ſome Reſpects only, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage, *&c.* On the other Side, the *Common People* ſuppoſe, there ought to be an Equality in all other Things, and in ſome *State Matters*; becauſe they are equal with the Rich or Noble, touching their *Liberty*. Whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are ſimply equal or ſuperior, as touching *Government* and Fitneſs thereunto, becauſe they are ſuch, to wit, becauſe they are rich, noble, free, *&c.* but becauſe they are *wiſe*, *virtuous*, *valiant*, &c. and ſo have fit Parts to *govern a State*.

The ſeveral *States* are ſometimes mixed, and interwrought one with the other, yet ever ſo, as that the one hath the Pre-eminence or Predomination over the other, as in the Humors and Complexions of the Body. So in the *Roman State*, the People had their *Plebiſcita*, and gave the Suffrage in the Election of Magiſtrates: Yet the *Senate* (as the *State* ſtood) for the moſt Part ſwayed the *State*, and bare the chief Rule. So in the *Venetian* State, the Duke ſeemeth to repreſent a *Monarch*, and the *Senate* to be his Council: Yet the *Duke* hath no Power in *State Matters*,

but is like a Head fet on by Art, that beareth no Brain. And fo that *State* is *Senatorical* or *Ariſtocratical.*

Cauſes of States and Commonwealths in general.

Cauſes of *States*, or of *Common-wealths* are of three Sorts, *viz.*
- 1. *Founding*, or fettling a *State* where are to be conſidered.
  - 1. *Meaſure.*
  - 2. *Parts*, and their *Qualities.*
- 2. *Preſerving* a *State.*
- 3. *Changing* and *Altering* a *State.*

FOUNDING A STATE.

IN *Founding a State* are to be conſidered two Things, 1. *Proportion.* 2. *Parts.*

1. *Proportion* is a juſt Meaſure or *Mediocrity* of the *State*, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his Kind, to wit, ſo that a Monarch be not too Monarchical, ſtrict, or abſolute, as the *Ruſſe* Kings; nor *Ariſtocratical*, that is, over-mated, or eclipſed by the Nobility, as the *Scottiſh* Kingdom, but ever reſpective to the other Degrees. That *Ariſtocracy* be not too magnificent nor intire to itſelf, but communicate with the People ſome Commodities of *State* or *Government*, as the *Venetians*, and ſometimes the *Romans* allowed the People to elect certain Magiſtrates out of themſelves, to have a Tribune, to make *Plebiſcita*, *&c.* So a *Free State* or *Commonwealth*, that it be not over popular, *viz.* That it depreſs not too much the richer, wiſer, nor learned Sort; but admit them to Offices with a *Caution* out of the Rules and Myſteries of that *State*, that they ſeek no Alteration of the preſent *State.* The Reaſon, becauſe the *moderate States* in their ſeveral Kinds, (as all other Things that obſerve the mean) are beſt framed for their Continuance, becauſe they give leſs Cauſe of Grudge, Envy, and affecting the *Wealth*, *Honour*, and *Liberty*, which they

they ſee in others that *govern* the *State*; and ſo are leſs ſubject to Stirs and Commotions, and eaſieſt kept in their preſent *State* wherein they are ſet.

2. The *Parts* of the *State*, or thoſe *Magiſtrates* that bear Place or Sway in the publick *Government*.

Parts or *Partakers* of *Publick Government*, are,

1. *Council* or *Senate*, which conſulteth of all Matters pertaining to War and Peace, Magiſtrates, *&c.* in admitting of whom there ought to be more ſpecial Care, that they may be Men expert in *Matter of Policy*, becauſe it is their *Trade* and *Vocation*, as Men uſe to chuſe for Pilots and Maſters of Ships, ſuch as know the Art of *Navigation*, and not Huſband-men, *&c.* And ſo the contrary.

2. *Magiſtrates* and *Officers*, which are to be Executioners of that which is conſulted, and found to be expedient for the *Commonwealth*, wherein are to be obſerved the kinds of Magiſtrates, that they be ſuch as fit that kind of *Government*; the Time of their Continuance, and the Manner of their Election or Appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be choſen.

3. *Judges*, to determine in *Civil* and *Criminal Matters*, where are to be obſerved, out of whom they are to be choſen; what Kinds are neceſſary, and the Manner of *Judgment* and *Judicial* Proceeding.

In *Magistracies* are to be observed, their *Kinds*; as

1. *Civil.*

1. *Superiors*, which are to be such, and of that kind, as agree with the *State*, as *Consuls* for a Year, and not perpetual *Dictators in a Senatory State*. *Prætors*, and *Censors*, that oversee Manners and Orders of the People.

For a Kingdom, *Lieutenants* of Shires, *Marshals*, *Masters of Horse*, *Admirals*, &c.

Inferiors, as *Conservators of Peace*, *Constables*, &c.

Overseers of Youth, that take Care of their Education for civil and warlike Exercise.

Clerks of the Market, that provide for the Quantity, and Price of Victual.

Ædiles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

Questors, or *Treasurers*, to keep and dispense the publick Treasury.

Actuaries, or *Recorders*, which keep the publick *Records*.

Goalers to keep *Prisons* and *Prisoners*.

Surveyors of Woods and Fields, *&c.*

2. *Ecclesiastical.*

1. As *Bishops* or *Pastors*, *Elders*, *Wardens*.

2. *Time of Magistrates*, whereof some are perpetual, some for a Time, *viz.* for more Years, a Year, half a Year, according to the Necessity of the *Commonwealth*, and not perpetual; or at least not *Hereditary* in a Kingdom. Yearly in an *Aristocracy*, or half Yearly in a *Free State*.

3. *Manner* of Choice, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by Suffrage, and not by Lot.

Causes

Causes of preserving a State, or Commonwealth.

In preserving of *States* two Things required:
- 1. *Mysteries*, or *Sophisms*.
  - 1. *General*, to all States.
  - 2. *Particular*, for every several State.
- 2. *Rules*, or *Actions*.
  - 1. *General*, for all States.
  - 2. *Particular*, for every State.

MYSTERIES, *or* SOPHISMS.

MYsteries, or *Sophisms* of *State*, are certain secret Practices, either for the avoiding of Danger, or averting such Effects as tend not to the Preservation of the present *State*, as it is set or founded.

State Mysteries are of two Sorts.

1. *General:* That pertain to all *States*; as first to provide by all Means, that the same Degree or Part of the *Commonwealth*, do not exceed both in *Quantity* and *Quality*. In *Quantity*, as that the Number of the *Nobility*, or of great Persons, be not more than the *State* or *Commonwealth* can bear. In *Quality*, as that none grow in Wealth, Liberty, Honours, *&c.* more than it is meet for that Degree; for as in Weights, the heavier Weights bear down the Scale: So in Commonwealths, that Part or Degree that excelleth the rest in *Quality*, and *Quantity*, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow Alterations, and Conversions of *State*. Secondly, to provide by all Means, that the middle Sort of People exceed both the Extreams, *(viz.)* of *Nobility* and *Gentry*, and the base Rascal, and beggarly Sort. For this maketh the *State* constant and firm, when both the *Extreams* are tied together by a middle Sort, as it were with a Band; as for any Conspiracy of the rich and beggarly Sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two Points, the *particular* Rules in *Sophisms* of every *Commonwealth*, are to be applied.

2. *Particular:* That serve for Preservation of every *Commonwealth*, in that Form of *State*, wherein it is settled.

ſettled. As in a Kingdom; that the *Nobility* may be accuſtomed to bear the *Government* of the Prince, eſpecially ſuch as have their Dwelling in remote Places from the *Prince's* Eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain Times to the *Prince's Court*, under Pretence of doing them Honour, or being deſirous to ſee, and enjoy their Preſence, and to have their Children, eſpecially their Eldeſt, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of ſpecial Favour towards them and theirs, that ſo they may be trained up in Duty and Obedience towards the Prince, and be as *Hoſtages* for the good Behaviour, and faithful Dealing of their Parents, eſpecially if they be of any ſuſpected Note. To that End ſerves the *Perſian* Practice, in having a Band, or Train of the *Satrapa*'s Children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imitated by our Train of † *Henchmen*, if they were of the nobler Sort. Again, ſometimes to borrow ſmall Sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow greater Sums and never pay: So in an *Oligarchy*, leſt it decline to a *Popular State*, they deceive the People with this and the like *Sophiſms*, *(viz.)* they compel their own Sort, to wit, the rich Men, by great Penalties, to frequent their Aſſemblies for chooſing of Magiſtrates, for Proviſion of Armour, Warlike Exerciſes, making and Execution of Laws, *&c.* By that Means ſeeming to bear a hard Hand over the richer, but to ſuffer the poorer and meaner Sort to be abſent, and to neglect theſe Aſſemblies, under Pretence, that they will not draw them from their Buſineſs, and private Earnings: Yet withal to cite thither ſome few of them, *(viz.)* ſo many as are eaſily over-matched by the richer Sort, to make a Shew that they would have the People, or poorer Sort, Partakers likewiſe of thoſe Matters, yet terrifying thoſe that come to their Aſſemblies, with the Tediouſneſs of Conſultations, Greatneſs of Fines, if they

† Pages.

they ſhould miſ-do, to the End, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with thoſe *Conſultations*; by which Means the richer Sort do ſtill *govern* the *State*, with the People's Liking, and good Contentment.

Axioms or *Rules* of preſerving the *State*, are

I. *General*, that ſerve for all *Commonwealths*.
II. *Particular*, that ſerve for every *ſeveral State*.

General Rules.

THE firſt and principal *Rule* of *Policy* to be obſerved in all *States*, is to profeſs and practiſe, and maintain the true Worſhip and *Religion* of Almighty God preſcribed unto us in his Word, which is the chief End of all *Government*. The *Axiom*, that God be obeyed ſimply without Exception, though he command that which ſeemeth unreaſonable and abſurd to *Human Policy*; as in the *Jews Commonwealth*: That all the Men ſhould repair Yearly to one Place to worſhip God four Times, leaving none to defend their Coaſt, though being beſet with many Enemies: Nor to ſow the ſeventh Year, but to ſuffer the Ground to reſt untilled without reſpect or fear of Famine, *&c.*

2. To avoid the Cauſes of *Converſion*, whereby States are overthrown, that are ſet down in the Title of Converſions: For that *Commonwealths* (as natural Bodies) are preſerved by avoiding that which hurteth the Health and *State* thereof, and are alſo cured by contrary Medicines.

3. To take heed that no *Magiſtrate* be created or continued contrary to the Laws and Policy of that *State*. As that in a *Senate*, there be not created a perpetual *Dictator*, as *Cæſar* in *Rome*. In a Kingdom, that there be no *Senate*, or *Convention* of *equal Power* with the Prince in *State* Matters, as in *Poland*.

4. To create ſuch *Magiſtrates* as love the *State* as it is ſettled; and take heed of the contrary Practices,

as

as to advance popular Perſons in a Kingdom or *Ariſtocracy*. And ſecondly, to advance ſuch as have Skill to diſcern what doth preſerve, and what hurteth or altereth the preſent *State*.

5. To that End to have certain Officers to pry abroad, and to obſerve ſuch as do not live and behave themſelves in fit Sort agreeable to the preſent *State*, but deſire rather to be under ſome other Form, or Kind of *Government*.

6. To take heed that Magiſtracies be not ſold for Money, nor Magiſtrates take Bribes in their Offices, which is eſpecially to be obſerved in that *Commonwealth*, which is governed by a few of the richer Sort; for if the Magiſtrate gain nothing but his *Common Fees*, the common Sort, and ſuch as want Honour, take in good Part that they be not preferred; and are glad rather that themſeves are ſuffered to intend private Buſineſs. But if the *Magiſtrate* buy and ſell Matters, the common People are doubly grieved, both becauſe they are debarred of thoſe Preferments, and of that they ſee to grow by them; which is the Cauſe that the *German Oligarchies* continue ſo firm, for they both ſuffer the poorer Sort to grow into Wealth, and the richer Sort are by that Means freed, and ſecured from being under the Poor.

7. To take heed that the *State*, as it is ſettled and maintained, be not over-ſtrict, nor exceed in his Kind; *(viz.)* that a Kingdom be not too Monarchical, nor a *popular State* too *popular*: For which Cauſe it is good, that the Magiſtrates ſometimes yield of their Right touching Honour, and behave themſelves familiarly with thoſe that are equal unto them in other Parts, though inferior for Place and Office; and ſometimes popularly with the common People, which is the Cauſe that ſome *Commonwealths*, though they be very ſimply, and unſkilfully ſet, yet continue firm, becauſe the Magiſtrates behave themſelves wiſely, and with due Reſpect towards the reſt that are without Honour;

Honour; and therefore ſome kind of *moderate Popularity* is to be uſed in every *Commonwealth*.

8. To take heed of ſmall Beginnings, and to meet with them even at the firſt, as well touching the breaking and altering of Laws, as of other Rules which concern the Continuance of every ſeveral State. For the Diſeaſe and Alteration of a *Commonwealth*, doth not happen all at once, but grows by Degrees, which every common Wit cannot diſcern, but Men expert in POLICY.

9. To provide that that Part be ever the greater in Number and Power, which favours the State as now it ſtands. This is to be obſerved as a very Oracle in all Commonwealths.

10. To obſerve a mean in all the Degrees, and to ſuffer no Part to exceed, or decay over-much. As firſt, for Preferments, to provide that they be rather ſmall and ſhort, than great and long; and if any be grown to over-much Greatneſs, to withdraw or diminiſh ſome Part of his Honour. Where theſe *Sophiſms* are to be practiſed, obſerve, to do it by Parts and Degrees; to do it by Occaſion or Colour of Law, and not all at once. And if that Way ſerve not, to advance ſome other, of whoſe Virtue and Faithfulneſs, we are fully aſſured, to as high a Degree, or to a greater Honour, and to be the Friends and Followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching Wealth, to provide, that thoſe of the middle Sort (as before was ſaid) be more in Number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with Wealth, to uſe the *Sophiſms* of a *popular State*, *viz.* to ſend him on Embaſſages, and foreign Negociations, or employ him in ſome Office that hath great Charges, and little Honour, *&c.* To which End, the *Edileſhip* ſerved in ſome Commonwealths.

11. To ſuppreſs the Factions, and Quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep others that are yet free, from joining with them in their Partakings and Factions.

12. To

12. To increaſe or remit the common Taxes and Contributions, according to the Wealth, or Want of the People and *Commonwealth*. If the People be increaſed in Wealth, the Taxes and Subſidies may be increaſed. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminiſh, eſpecially by Dearth, Want of Traffick, *&c.* to forbear Taxes and Impoſitions, or to take little. Otherwiſe Grudge and Diſcontentments muſt needs follow. The *Sophiſms* that ſerve for Impoſitions, are theſe, and other of like Sort: to pretend Buſineſs of great Charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Havens, Caſtles, Fortifications, *&c.* for the common Defence; ſometimes by Lotteries, and like Devices, wherein ſome Part may be beſtowed, the reſt reſerved for other Expences; but Princely Dealings need no Pretences.

13. To provide that the *Diſcipline* and *Training* of Youth of the better Sort be ſuch as agreeth with that *Commonwealth*: As that in a Kingdom, the Sons of Noblemen be attendant on the Court, that they may be accuſtomed to Obedience towards the Prince. In the *Senatory State*, that the Sons of the *Senators* be not idly, nor over-daintily brought up, but well inſtructed and trained up in *Learning*, *Tongues*, and *Martial Exerciſe*; that they may be able to bear that Place in the Commonwealth, which their Father held; and contrariwiſe in a *popular State*.

14. To take heed, leſt their *Sophiſms* or ſecret Practices for the Continuance and Maintenance of the *State* be not diſcovered; leſt by that Means they refuſe and diſappoint themſelves, but be wiſely uſed, and with great Secrecy.

PARTICULAR RULES.

Rules and Axioms *for preſerving of a Kingdom,* Hereditary *or* Conquered.

KIngdoms Hereditary, are preſerved at Home by the Prince's ordering.

1. *Himſelf,*

1. *Himself*, *viz.* By the Tempering and Moderation of the Princely *Power* and *Prerogative*. For the leſs and more temperate their *Power* and *State* is, the more firm and ſtable is their Kingdom and Government; becauſe they ſeem to be farther off from a Maſter-like, and *Tyrannical Empire*; and leſs unequal in Condition to the next Degree, to wit, the *Nobility*, and ſo leſs ſubject to Grudge and Envy.

2. *His Nobility*, *&c.* By keeping that Degree and due *Proportion*, that neither they exceed in Number more than the Realm or State can bear, as the *Scottiſh* Kingdom, and ſometimes the *Engliſh*, when the Realm was overcharged with the Number of *Dukes*, *Earls*, and other *Nobles*; whereby the *Authority of the Prince* was eclipſed, and the Realm troubled with their *Factions* and *Ambitions*. Nor that any one ſo excell in Honour, Power, or Wealth, as that he reſembles another King within the Kingdom, as the Houſe of *Lancaſter* within this Realm. To that End, not to load any with too much Honour or Preferment, becauſe it is hard even for the beſt and worthieſt Men, to bear their Greatneſs and high Fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite Examples in all *States*. The *Sophiſms* for preventing, or reforming this Inconvenience, are to be uſed with great Caution and Wiſdom. If any great Perſon be to be abated, not to deal with him by *Calumniation* or *forged Matter*, and ſo to cut him off without Deſert, eſpecially if he be gracious among the People; which beſides the Injuſtice, is an Occaſion many times of great Danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a deſperate *Diſcontentment* in the Party, and a Commiſeration in the People, and ſo begetteth greater Love towards him, if he be already gracious for his Virtue, and publick Service. Nor to baniſh him into foreign Countries, where he may have Opportunity of practiſing with *Foreign States*, whereof great Danger may enſue, as in the Example

Example of *Coriolanus*, *Henry* IV. and ſuch like. But to uſe theſe, and the like *Sophiſms*, *viz.* To abate their Greatneſs by Degrees, as *David*, *Joab*, *Juſtinian*, *Beliſarius*, &c. To advance ſome other Men to as great, or greater Honour, to ſhadow, or over-mate the Greatneſs of the other. To draw from him by Degrees his Friends and Followers, by *Preferments*, *Rewards*, and other good and lawful Means; eſpecially, to be provided that theſe great Men be not employed in great and powerful Affairs of the *Commonwealth*, whereby they may have more Opportunity to ſway the *State*.

3. *His People*, *viz.* So to order and behave himſelf, that he be loved and reverenced of the *People*. For the Prince need not greatly fear home Conſpiracies, or foreign Invaſion, if he be firmly loved of his own People. The Reaſon, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any Forces for ſo great Enterpriſe, nor any Refuge, being diſcovered and put to flight, if the Multitude affect their Prince: But the common People being once offended, he hath Cauſe to fear every Moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he uſe Means and Art of getting the Favour of the People, and avoid thoſe Things that breed Hatred and Contempt, *viz.* if he ſeem as a *Tutor*, or a *Father*, to love the People, and to protect them; if he maintain the Peace of his Kingdom, for that nothing is more popular, nor more pleaſing to the People, than is Peace.

4. If he ſhew himſelf oftentimes graciouſly, yet with *State* and *Majeſty*, to his People; and receive Complaints of his Suppliants, and ſuch like.

5. If he ſit himſelf in open *Courts*, and Place of *Juſtice*, that he may ſeem to have a Care of Juſtice among his People. If he beſtow many Benefits and Graces upon that City, which he maketh the *Seat of his Empire*, and ſo make it ſure and faithful unto him: which is fit to be in the Middle of his Kingdom,

dom, as the Heart in the middle of the Body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven; both to divide himſelf more eaſily into all the Parts of his Dominions, and leſt the furtheſt Parts at one end move, whilſt the Prince is in the other. If he go in Progreſs many Times to ſee his Provinces, eſpecially thoſe that are remote.

6. If he gratify his *Courtiers* and *Attendants* in that Sort, and by ſuch Means, as that he may ſeem not to pleaſure them with the Hurt and Injury of his People, as with *Monopolies*, and ſuch like.

7. If he commit the handling of ſuch things as procure Envy, or ſeem grievous, to his Miniſters; but reſerve thoſe things which are grateful, and well pleaſing, to himſelf; as the *French* Kings, who for that Purpoſe, as may ſeem, have erected their *Court* at *Paris*, which acquitteth the Prince from Grudge and Envy, both with the *Nobles* and the *People*.

8. If he borrows ſometimes Sums of Money of his People, though he have no Need, and pay the ſame juſtly without *Defalcation* of any Part of his Exchequer, or other Officer.

9. If he avoid all ſuch things as may breed *Hatred* or *Contempt* of his Perſon; which may be done, if he ſhew himſelf not too *light*, *inconſtant*, *hard*, *cruel*, *effeminate*, *fearful*, and *daſtardly*, &c. But contrariwiſe *religious*, *grave*, *juſt*, *valiant*, &c. Whereby appeareth the falſe Doctrine of the *Machiavelian Policy*; for what better Means to keep the People in Obedience, than Love, and Reverence of the People towards the Prince?

10. If the Prince be well furniſhed with warlike Proviſion, which is to be rumoured, and made known Abroad; if it be known, that he is reverenced, and obeyed by his People at home.

11. If he provide ſo much as lieth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over-much in Power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to

join ſpeedily with other Princes, which are in like Danger, to abate that Greatneſs, and to ſtrengthen himſelf and the reſt againſt it. An Overſight of the Chriſtian Princes towards the King of *Spain*.

12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward or other Means, to detect or hinder the Deſigns of that Prince, with whom he hath Differences, if any thing be intended againſt his *State*. Or at leaſt have ſome of his own lodging Abroad about that Prince's *Court*, under colour of *Embaſſage*, or ſome other *Pretence*; which muſt be Men of *Skill* and *Dexterity* to ſerve for that Turn.

13. To obſerve the Laws of his Country, and not to encounter them with his *Prerogative*, nor to uſe it at all where there is a *Law*, for that it maketh a ſecret and juſt Grudge in the Peoples Hearts, eſpecially if it tend to take from them *their Commodities*, and to beſtow them upon other of his COURTIERS and *Miniſters*.

14. To provide eſpecially, that that Part, *which favoureth the State*, as it ſtandeth, be more potent than the other which *favoureth it not*, or deſireth a Change.

15. To make ſpecial Choice of good and ſound Men to bear the Place of *Magiſtrates*, eſpecially ſuch as aſſiſt the *Prince in his Counſels, and Policies*, and not lean overmuch to his own Advice; contrary to the Rule of *Machiavel*, who teacheth, *That a Prince can have no good Counſel, except it be in himſelf*; his Reaſon, *becauſe if he uſe the Counſel of ſome one, he is in Danger to be over-wrought, and ſupplanted by him*; and if he counſel with more, *Then he ſhall be Diſtracted with the Differences in Opinions*. As if a Prince of great, or mean Wiſdom, could not take the *Judgment of all his Counſellors* in any Point of *Policy*, or of ſo many as he himſelf thinketh good, and to take it either by Word, or in Writing; and himſelf then in private peruſe them all, and ſo *after good and mature*

mature Deliberation, make Choice of the beſt, without any Diſtraction, or binding himſelf to the *Direction of any One*. For the Proverb is true, *that two Heads are better than one*; and therefore the *Advices*, and *Conſultations* of *a Senatory of State*, is compared by ſome *to a Feaſt, or Dinner, where many contribute towards the Shot, by which means they have more variety of Diſhes, and ſo better Fare: And yet every Man may make choice of that Diſh that ſerveth him beſt for his Health and Appetite.*

16. The Prince himſelf is to ſit ſometimes in Place of publick Juſtice, and to give an Experiment of his Wiſdom and Equity, whereby great Reverence and Eſtimation is gotten; as in the example of *Solomon*, which may ſeem the Reaſon, why our Kings of *England* had their Kings-Bench in place of publick Juſtice, after the manner of the antient Kings that ſate in the Gate; where, for better performing of this princely Duty, ſome ſpecial Cauſes may be ſelected, which may thoroughly be debated and conſidered upon by the Prince in private, with the Help and Advice of his learned Council, and ſo be decided publickly, as before is ſaid, by the Prince himſelf; at leaſt, the Prince is to take account of every Miniſter of publick Juſtice, that it may be known that he hath a Care of Juſtice, and doing right to his People, which makes the Juſtices alſo to be more careful in performing of their Duties.

17. To be moderate in his Taxes, and Impoſitions; and when need doth require to uſe the Subjects Purſe, to do it by Parliament, and with their Conſents, making the Cauſe apparent to them, and ſhewing his Unwillingneſs in charging them. Finally ſo to uſe it, that it may ſeem rather an Offer from his Subjects, than an Exaction by him.

18. To ſtop ſmall Beginnings; unto this End, to compound the Diſſentions that riſe amongſt the Nobles, with Caution, that ſuch as are free be not

drawn into Parties, whereby many Times the Prince is endangered, and the whole *Commonwealth* ſet in a *Combuſtion*; as in the Example of the *Barons War*, and the late Wars of *France*, which grew from a Quarrel betwixt the *Guiſian Faction*, and the other *Nobility*.

19. To ſtir up the People, if they grow ſecure, *and negligent of Armour*, and *other Proviſion for the Commonwealth*, by ſome Rumour or Fear of Danger at Home, to make them more ready when Occaſion requireth. But this ſeldom to be uſed, leſt it be ſuppoſed a falſe Alarm, when there is need indeed.

20. To have ſpecial Care, that his Children, eſpecially the Heir apparent, have ſuch bringing up as is meet for a King, *viz.* in Learning, eſpecially of Matters pertaining to State, and in Martial Exerciſe; contrary to the Practice of many Princes, who ſuffer their Children to be brought up in Pleaſure, and to ſpend their Time in hunting, *&c.* which by reaſon of their Defects, afterwards is a Cauſe of Miſgovernment and Alteration of State.

II. *Kingdoms new gotten, or purchaſed by Force, are preſerved by theſe Means.*

FIRST, if they have been Subjects before to his Anceſtors, or have the ſame Tongue, Manners or Faſhions, as have his own Country, it is an eaſy Matter to retain ſuch Countries, within their Obedience, in caſe the Prince's Blood of the ſaid Country be wholly extinct. For Men of the ſame *Quality*, *Tongue*, and *Condition*, do eaſily *ſhole*, and *combine themſelves together*, ſo much the rather, if the People of that Country have ſerved before, and were not accuſtomed to their *own Liberty*; wherein eſpecially is to be obſerved, that the Laws and Cuſtoms of that purchaſed Country be not altered nor innovated, or at leaſt it be done by little and little. So the *Burgundians* and *Acquitans* were annexed

nexed to *France*. The Reaſon, becauſe *partly they have been accuſtomed to ſerve, and partly, for that they will not eaſily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the Blood Royal be once extinguiſhed.* As for the invaſion of a Foreign Country, whereunto the Prince hath no Right, or whereof the right Heir is living, it is not the Part of a juſt Civil Prince, much leſs a Chriſtian Prince, to enforce ſuch a Country; and therefore, the *Machiavilian* Practices in this Caſe, to make ſure Work by extinguiſhing the *Blood Royal*, is lewd and impertinent: The like is to be ſaid of murthering the Natives, or the greateſt Part of them, to the end he may hold the reſt in ſure Poſſeſſion. A thing not only againſt *Chriſtian Religion*, but it is inhumane, unjuſt, cruel, and barbarous.

2. The ſafeſt way is, (ſuppoſing a Right) that ſome good Part of the Natives be tranſplanted into ſome other Place, and our Colonies, conſiſting of ſo many as ſhall be thought meet, be planted there in ſome Part of the Province; *Caſtles*, *Forts*, and *Havens*, ſeized upon, and more provided in fit Places, as the manner was of the *Babylonian Monarch*, which *tranſplanted Ten Tribes of the Jews*: And of the *Romans* in *France*, *Germany*, *Britany*, and other Places. The Reaſon:

1. For that otherwiſe Forces of Horſe and Foot, are to be maintained within the *Province*, which cannot be done without great Charge.
2. For that the whole *Province* is troubled and grieved with removing and ſupplying the Army with Victuals, Carriages, *&c.*
2. For that Colonies are more ſure and faithful, than the reſt.

As for the Natives that are removed from their former Seats, they have no means to hurt, and the reſt of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themſelves may

be ſo ſerved if they attempt any Thing raſhly, are content to be quiet.

The *Turks* practice in *Aſia*, where the chief Grounds and Dwellings are poſſeſſed by the Soldiers, whom they call *Timariatæ*.

3. That the Prince have his Seat and his Reſidence, in his new Purchaſe, eſpecially, for a Time, till Things be well ſettled; eſpecially if the *Province* be great and large, as the *Turks* in *Greece*: The Reaſons:

1. Becauſe the preſence of the Prince availeth much to keep Things in order, and get the good-will of his new Subjects.
2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Prince's preſence, if they be oppreſſed by the Lieutenants, and inferior Governors: Where it will be convenient for the winning the People's Hearts, that ſome Example be made of puniſhing of ſuch as have committed any Violence or Oppreſſion.
3. Becauſe being preſent, he ſeeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and ſo may quickly give Remedy to it, which being abſent, he cannot do, or not do in time.

4. If the Prince himſelf cannot be preſent to reſide, then, to take heed that the Charge of Governing, or new Purchaſe, be committed to ſuch as be ſure Men, and of other meet Quality, that depend wholly upon the Prince's favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious for their *Nobility*, or *Virtue*; eſpecially, if the *Province* be great, and ſomewhat far diſtant, which may ſoon ſeduce the unſettled Affections of thoſe new Subjects: As for ſuch *Governors*, as depend wholly upon the Prince's Favour, being not born, but created *Noble*, they will not ſo eaſily ſuffer themſelves to be won from their Duty; and in caſe they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great

great Strength, for that the People obey them but as Inſtruments and Miniſters, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any Ill-will.

5. To have the Children of the chief Noblemen, and of greateſt Authority, Hoſtages with theſe in Safe-keeping, the more the better: For that no Bond is Stronger, than that of Nature, to contain the Parents and Allies in Obedience, and they the reſt.

6. To alter the Laws but by Degrees one after another, and to make others that are more behooveful for the eſtabliſhing of the preſent Government.

7. To keep the People quiet and peaceable, and well affected ſo much as may be, that they may ſeem by being conquered, to have gotten a Protector, rather than a Tyrant; for the *Common People*, if they enjoy Peace, and be not diſtracted nor drawn from their Buſineſs, nor exacted upon beyond Meaſure, are eaſily contained under Obedience; yet notwithſtanding, they are to be diſuſed from the Practice of Arms, and other Exerciſes which increaſe Courage, and be weakened of Armour, that they have neither Spirit, nor Will to rebel.

8. If there be any Faction in the Country, to take to him the Defence of the better and ſtronger Part, and to combine with it, as *Cæſar* in *France*.

9. To look well to the *Borders*, and confining *Provinces*, and if any rule there of great, and equal Power to himſelf, to join League with ſome other *Borderers*, though of leſs Strength, to hinder the Attempts (if any ſhould be) by ſuch neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Country infeſted by one neighbour Prince, calleth in another, of as great, or greater Power, to aſſiſt and reſcue it from the other that invadeth it: So the *Romans* were called into *Greece*, by the *Ætolians*; the *Saxons*, by the *Britains*; the *Danes*, by the *Saxons*.

10. To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Natives, but the Command and Authority, wholly to his own.

11. Not to put much Truſt, nor to practice too often the *Sophiſms* of Policy, eſpecially thoſe that appertain to a Tyrannical State, which are ſoon detected by Men of Judgment, and ſo bring Diſcredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiſer, and better ſort of his Subjects, whereof muſt needs follow very ill Effects.

The *Sophiſms* of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practiſed, (which are for the ſupporting of their Tyrannical States) by wiſe and good Princes, and are theſe, and ſuch like as follow.

RULES OF POLITICK TYRANTS.

RULES practiſed by *Tyrants* are of two Sorts, *viz.*

1. *Barbarous* and *Profeſſed*, which is proper to thoſe that have got Head, and have Power ſufficient of themſelves, without others Help, as in the *Turkiſh* and *Ruſſe* Government.

2. *Sophiſtical*, and *Diſſembled*; as in ſome States that are reputed for good and lawful *Monarchies*, but inclining to Tyrannies; proper to thoſe which are not yet ſettled, nor have Power ſufficient of themſelves, but muſt uſe the Power and Help of others, and ſo are forced to be Politick *Sophiſters*.

I. *Sophiſms of a Barbarous and Profeſſed Tyranny.*

TO expel and baniſh out of his Country all honeſt Means, whereby his People may attain to Learning, Wiſdom, Valour, and other Virtues, that they might be fit for that Eſtate, and ſervile Condition. For that theſe two, Learning and martial Exerciſe, effect two Things moſt dangerous to a Tyranny: *viz.* Wiſdom and Valour. For that Men

Men of Spirit and Underſtanding, can hardly endure a ſervile State. To this End, to forbid learning of liberal Arts, and martial Exerciſe; as in the *Ruſſe Government*. So *Julian* the *Apoſtate* dealt with the *Chriſtians*. Contrariwiſe, to uſe his People to baſe Occupations, and mechanical Arts, to keep them from Idleneſs, and to put away from them all high Thoughts, and manly Conceits; and to give them a Liberty of drinking till drunk, and of other baſe and lewd Conditions, that they may be ſotted, and ſo made unfit for other Enterpriſes. So the *Egyptian* Kings dealt with the *Hebrews*; ſo the *Ruſſe* Emperor with his *Ruſſe* People; and *Charles* the Fifth with the *Netherlands*, when he purpoſed to encloſe their privileges, and to bring them under his abſolute Government.

2. To make ſure to him, and his State, his *Military* Men by Reward, Liberty, and other Means, eſpecially, his Guard, or *Prætorian Band*; that being Partakers of the Spoil and Benefit, they may like that *State* and continue firm to it; as the *Turk*, his *Janiſaries*; the *Ruſſe*, his *Boyarens*, &c.

3. To unarm his People of Weapons, Money, and all Means, whereby they may reſiſt his Power; and to that End, to have his ſet and ordinary Exactions, *&c.* once in two, three, or four Years, and ſometimes yearly, as the *Turk* and *Ruſſe*; who is wont to ſay, *That his People muſt be uſed as his Flock of Sheep*, viz. *Their Fleece taken from them, leſt it overlade them, and grow too heavy; that they are like to his Beard, that the more it was ſhaven, the thicker it would grow.* And if there be any of extraordinary Wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or upon ſome deviſed Matter, to confiſcate their Goods, as the common Practice is of the *Ruſſe* and *Turk*.

4. To be ſtill in Wars, to the End his People may need a Captain; and that his Forces may be kept

kept in Practice, as the *Ruſſe* doth yearly againſt the *Tartar*, *Polonian*, and *Sweden*, &c.

5. To cut off ſuch as excel the reſt in Wealth, Favour or Nobility; or be of a pregnant, or aſpiring Wit, and ſo are fearful to a Tyrant; and to ſuffer none to hold Office, or any Honour, but only of him; as the *Turk* his *Baſhaes*, and the *Ruſſe* his *Ruzzes*.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feaſtings, and other Aſſemblies among the People, that they have no Means or Opportunity to conſpire, or confer together of public Matters, or to maintain Love amongſt themſelves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant: the *Ruſſe*'s Practice.

7. To have their Beagles, or Liſtners in every Corner, and all Parts of the Realm, eſpecially in Places that are moſt ſuſpected; to learn what every Man ſaith, or thinketh; that they may prevent all Attempts, and take away ſuch as miſlike their *State*.

8. To make Schiſm and Diviſion among his Subjects, *viz.* To ſet one Nobleman againſt another, and one rich Man againſt another, that through Faction and Diſagreement among themſelves, they may be weakened, and attempt nothing againſt him; and by this Means entertaining Whiſperings, and Complaints, he may know the Secrets of both Parties, and have Matter againſt them both, when Need requireth. So the *Ruſſe* made the Faction of the *Zemſky*, and the *Oppreſſiony*.

9. To have Strangers for his Guard, and to entertain *Paraſites*, and other baſe and ſervile Fellows, not too wiſe, and yet ſubtle; that will be ready for Reward to do and execute what he commandeth, though never ſo wicked and unjuſt. For that good Men cannot flatter, and wiſe Men cannot ſerve a Tyrant.

All

All theſe Practices, and ſuch like, may be contracted into one or two, *viz.* To bereave his Subjects of Will and Power to do him Hurt, or to alter the preſent State. The Uſe is Caution, not Imitation.

II. *Sophiſms of the Sophiſtical, or ſubtle Tyrant, to hold up his State.*

1. TO make Shew of a good King, by obſerving a Temper and Mediocrity in his Government, and whole Courſe of Life; to which End, it is neceſſary, that this ſubtle Tyrant, be a cunning Politician, or a *Machiavilian* at the leaſt; and that he be taken ſo to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and he is thought thereby not unworthy to govern others.

2. To make Shew not of Severity, but of Gravity; by ſeeming reverend, and not terrible in his Speech and Geſture, and Habit, and other Demeanor.

3. To pretend Care of the Commonwealth; and to that End, to ſeem loth to exact Tributes, and other Charges; and yet to make Neceſſity of it, where none is: To that End to procure ſuch War as can bring no Danger towards his State, and that might eaſily be compounded, or ſome other chargeable Buſineſs; and to continue it on, that he may continue his Exaction and Contribution ſo long as he liſt. And therefore to employ ſome in his publick Service, the reſt to hoard up in his Treaſury, which is ſometimes practiſed even by lawful Princes, as *Edward* the IVth in his Wars againſt *France*, when having levied a great Sum of Money throughout his Realm, eſpecially of the *Londoners*, he went over Seas, and returned without doing any thing.

4. Sometimes to give an Account by open Speech, and publick Writing, of the Expence of ſuch Taxes and

and Impoſitions, as he hath received of his Subjects, that he may ſeem to be a good Huſband and frugal, and not a Robber of the Commonwealth.

5. To that End, to beſtow ſome Coſt upon publick Buildings, or ſome other Work for the common Good, eſpecially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that ſo he may ſeem a Benefactor, and have a Delight in the adorning of his Country, or doing ſome Good for it.

6. To forbid Feaſtings, and other Meetings, which increaſe Love, and give Opportunity to confer together of public Matters, under Pretence of ſparing Coſt for better Uſes. To that End the Curfieu Bell was firſt ordained by *William the Conqueror*, to give Men Warning to repair Home at a certain Hour.

7. To take Heed that no one grow to be over great, but rather, many equally great, that they may envy and contend one with another; if he reſolve to weaken any of this Sort, to do it warily and by Degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his Life, yet to give him a lawful Trial, after the Manner of his Country: And if he proceed ſo far with any of great Power and Eſtimation, as to do him Contumely, or Diſgrace, not to ſuffer him to eſcape, becauſe Contumely and Diſgrace are Things contrary unto Honour, which great Spirits do moſt deſire, and ſo are moved rather to a Revenge for their Diſgrace, than to any Thankfulneſs, or acknowledging the Prince's Favour for their Pardon or Diſmiſſion: True in *Atheiſts*, but not in true *Chriſtian Nobility*.

8. To unarm his People, and ſtore up their Weapons, under Pretence of keeping them ſafe, and having them ready when Service requireth, and then to arm them with ſuch, and as many as he ſhall think meet, and to commit them to ſuch as are ſure Men.

9. To

9. To make Schiſm and Diviſion underhand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the People, and to ſet one rich Man againſt another, that they combine not together, and that himſelf by hearing the Griefs and Complaints, may know the Secrets of both Parties, and ſo have Matter againſt them both, when it liſteth him to call them to an Account.

10. To offer no Man any Contumely or Wrong, eſpecially, about Womens Matters, by attempting the Chaſtity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been the Ruin of many Tyrants, and Converſion of their States. As of *Tarquinius*, by *Brutus*; *Appius*, by *Virginius*; *Piſiſtratus*, by *Harmodius*; *Alexander Medices*, Duke of *Florence*, *Aloiſus* of *Placentia*, *Rodericus* King of *Spain*, &c.

11. To that End, to be moderate in his Pleaſures, or to uſe them cloſely that he be not ſeen; For that Men ſober, or watchful, or ſuch as ſeem ſo, are not likely ſubject to Contempt, or Conſpiracies of their own.

12. To reward ſuch as atchieve ſome great or commendable Enterprize; or do any ſpecial Action for the Commonwealth, in that Manner as it may ſeem, they could not be better regarded, in caſe they lived in a *Free State*.

13. All Rewards and Things grateful, to come from himſelf; but all Puniſhments, Exactions, and Things ungrateful, to come from his Officers, and public Miniſters; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he ſee his People diſcontented withal, to make them a Sacrifice to pacify his Subjects.

14. To pretend great Care of Religion, and of ſerving God, (which hath been the Manner of the wickedeſt Tyrants) for that People do leſs fear any Hurt from thoſe, whom they do think virtuous

and

and religious; nor attempt lightly to do them Hurt, for that they think that God protects them.

15. To have a ſtrong and ſure Guard of foreign Soldiers, and to bind them by good Turns, that they having at leaſt Profit, may depend upon him and the preſent State; As *Caligula*, the *German* Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like practiſed by lawful Kings, as by the *French* King.

16. To procure that other great Perſons be in the ſame Fault, or Caſe with them, that for that Cauſe they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own Safety.

17. To take Part, and to join himſelf with the ſtronger Part; if the Common People, and mean Degree be the ſtronger, to join with them; if the Rich and Noble, to join with them. For ſo that Part, with his own own Strength, will be ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his Manners and whole Behaviour, as that he may ſeem if not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil; or ſomewhat good, ſomewhat bad.

Theſe Rules of hypocritical Tyrants are to be known, that they may be avoided, and met withal; and not drawn into Imitation.

PRESERVATION OF AN ARISTOCRACY.

RULES to preſerve a *Senatory State*, are partly taken from the common Axioms, and partly from thoſe that preſerve a Kingdom.

PRESERVING OF AN OLIGARCHY, by Sophiſms. Rules.

1. IN Conſultations and Aſſemblies about public Affairs, to order the Matter, that all may have Liberty to frequent their common Aſſemblies, and

and Councils; but to impoſe a Fine upon the richer Sort, if they omit that Duty. On the other Side, to pardon the Common People, if they abſent themſelves, and to bear with them under Pretence, that they may the better attend their Occupations, and not be hindred in their Trades, and Earnings.

2. In Election of Magiſtrates, and Officers: To ſuffer the poorer Sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under Colour of ſparing them, or to enjoin ſome great Charge as incident to the Office, which the Poor cannot bear. But to impoſe ſome great Fine upon thoſe that be rich, if they refuſe to bear Office, being Elect unto it.

3. In judicial Matters: In like Manner to order, that the People may be abſent from public Trials, under Pretence of following their Buſineſs. But the Richer to be preſent, and to compel them by Fines, to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike Exerciſe and Arms: That the Poor be not forced to have Armour, Horſe, *&c.* under Pretence of ſparing their Coſt, nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exerciſes; but to compel the richer Sort to keep their Proportion of Armour, Horſe, *&c.* by exceſſive Fines, and to exerciſe themſelves in Warlike Matters, *&c.*

5. To have ſpecial Care of inſtructing their Children in liberal Arts, Policy, and Warlike Exerciſe, and to obſerve good Order and Diſcipline. For as *Popular States* are preſerved by the Frequency, and Liberty of the People, ſo this Government of the Richer, is preſerved by Diſcipline, and *good Order* of *Governors.*

6. To provide good Store of Warlike Furniture, eſpecially of *Horſe* and *Horſemen*, and of *Armed-men*, viz. *Pike*, &c. which are proper to the Gentry; as *Shot*, and light Furniture are for a *Popular Company.*

7. To put in Practice ſome Points of a *Popular State*; *viz.* To lade no one Man with too much Prefer-

Preferment; to make yearly or half Year's Magiſtrates, *&c.* For that the People are pleaſed with ſuch Things, and they are better ſecured by this Means from the Rule of one. And if any grow to too much Greatneſs, to abate him by the *Sophiſms* fit for this State.

8. To commit the Offices and Magiſtracies, to thoſe that are beſt able to bear the greateſt Charges for public Matters, which both tendeth to the Conſervation of this State, and pleaſeth the People, for that they reap ſome Relief and Benefit by it.

9. To the ſame End, to contract Marriages among themſelves; the Rich with the Rich, *&c.*

10. In ſome Things which concern not the *Points*, and *Matters of State*, as electing Magiſtrates, making Laws, *&c.* to give an Equality, or ſometimes a Preferment to the Common People, and not to do, as in ſome *Oligarchies* they were wont; *viz.* To ſwear againſt the People, to ſuppreſs and bridle them; but rather contrary, to miniſter an Oath at their Admiſſion, *That they ſhall do no Wrong to any of the People*; and if any of the Richer offer *Wrong* to any of the *Commons*, to ſhew ſome Example of ſevere Puniſhment.

For other *Axioms* that preſerve this State, they are to be borrowed from thoſe other Rules that tend to the preſerving of a *Popular*, and *Tyrannical State*; for the ſtrict Kind of *Oligarchy* is kin to a Tyranny.

PRESERVATION OF A POPULAR STATE.

Sophiſms. *Rules* or *Axioms.*

1. IN public Aſſemblies and Conſultations about Matters of State, creating of Magiſtrates, public Juſtice, and Exerciſe of Arms, to practiſe the contrary to the former Kind of Government, to wit, an *Oligarchy*. For in Popular States, the Commo[illegible]

Commons and meaner Sort are to be drawn to thoſe Aſſemblies, Magiſtrates, Officers, Warlike Exerciſe, *&c.* by Mulcts and Rewards, and the richer Sort are to be ſpared, and not to be forced by Fine, or otherwiſe, to frequent theſe Exerciſes.

2. To make Shew of honouring and reverencing the richer Men, and not to ſwear againſt them, as the Manner hath been in ſome Popular States, but rather to prefer them in all other Matters that concern not the State and public Government.

3. To elect Magiſtrates from among the Commons by Lot, or Ballotting, and not to chuſe any for their Wealth's Sake.

4. To take Heed that no Man bear Office twice, except it be Military, where the Pay, and Salary, *&c.* is to be reſerved into their own Hands, to be diſpoſed of by a Common Council, *&c.* And to ſee that no Man be too highly preferred.

5. That no Magiſtracy be perpetual, but as ſhort as may be, to wit, for a Year, half a Year, *&c.*

6. To compel Magiſtrates, when their Time expireth, to give an Account of their Behaviour and Government, and that publicly before the Commons.

7. To have public Salaries and Allowance of their Magiſtrates, Judges, *&c.* and yearly Dividends for the common People, and ſuch as have moſt Need among them.

8. To make Judges of all Matters out of all Sorts, ſo they have ſome Aptneſs to perform that Duty.

9. To provide that public Judgments and Trials be not frequent; and to that End to inflict great Fines and other Puniſhments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators, as the Law of Requital, *&c.* Becauſe for the moſt part the Richer and Nobler, and not the Commons, are indicted and accuſed in this Commonwealth, which cauſeth the Rich to conſpire

againſt the State; whereby many times the Popular State is turned into an *Oligarchy*, or ſome other Government. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law, made againſt Accuſers and Calumniators: *Ad Senatus-conſultum Turpilianum*, l. 1. *de Calumniatoribus.*

10. In ſuch free States as are popular, and have no Revenue, to provide that public Aſſemblies be not too often: becauſe they want Salaries for Pleaders and Orators; and if they be rich, yet to be wary, that all the Revenue be not divided amongſt the Commons. For that this Diſtribution of the common Revenue among the Multitude, is like a Purſe or Barrel without a Bottom. But to provide, that a ſufficient Part of the Revenue be ſtored up for the public Affairs.

11. If the Number of the Poor increaſe too much in this kind of State, to ſend ſome abroad out of the Cities, into the next Country-places, and to provide above all, that none do live idly, but be ſet to their Trades. To this End, to provide that the richer Men place in their Farms and Copyholds, ſuch decayed Citizens.

12. To be well adviſed what is good for this State, and not to ſuppoſe that to be fit for a popular State, that ſeemeth moſt popular; but that which is beſt for the Continuance thereof: And to that End, not to lay into the *Exchequer* or *Common Treaſury*, ſuch Goods as are confiſcate, but to ſtore them up as holy and conſecrate Things, which except it be practiſed, Confiſcations and Fines of the common People would be frequent, and ſo this State would decay by weakening the People.

CONVERSION OF STATES IN GENERAL.

CONverſion of a State, is the Declining of the Commonwealth, either to ſome other Form of Government, or to its full and laſt Period appointed by God.

Cauſes

Cauſes of Converſions of States are of two Sorts: General and Particular.

GENERAL, *(viz.)* 1. Want of Religion: *viz.* of the true Knowledge and Worſhip of God, preſcribed in his Word; and notable Sins that proceed from thence in Prince and People, as in the Examples of *Saul*, *Uzziah*, the *Jewiſh* State, the four Monarchies, and all other.

2. Want of Wiſdom and good Counſel to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles, and People in good Temper, and due Proportion, according to their ſeveral Orders and Degrees.

3. Want of Juſtice either in Adminiſtration, (as ill Laws, or ill Magiſtrates) or in the Execution, as Rewards not given where they ſhould be, or there beſtowed where they ſhould not be, or Puniſhments not inflicted where they ſhould be.

4. Want of Power and Sufficiency to maintain and defend itſelf, *viz.* Of Proviſion, as Armour, Money, Captains, Soldiers, *&c.* Execution, when the Means or Proviſion is not uſed, or ill uſed.

5. *Particular*: To be noted and collected out of the Contraries of thoſe Rules, that are preſcribed for the Preſervation of the Commonwealth.

Particular Cauſes of Converſion of States, are of two Sorts.

1. FOreign: By the Over-greatneſs of Invaſion of ſome Foreign Kingdom, or other State of meaner Power, having a Part within our own, which are to be prevented by the Providence of the Chief, and Rules of Policy for the preſerving of every State: This falleth out very ſeldom, for the Great Difficulty to overthrow a foreign State.

2. *Domeſtic*: Sedition or open Violence by the ſtronger Part. Alteration without Violence.

Sedition.

SEdition is a Power of Inferiors, oppoſing itſelf with Force of Arms againſt the Superior Power. *Quaſi ditio ſecedens.*

Cauſes of Sedition are of two Sorts.

1. *General.*

Liberty. WHEN they that are of equal Quality in a *Commonwealth*, or do take themſelves ſo to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of theſe Three.

Riches. Or, when they that are higher in Quality, or take themſelves ſo to be, are regarded but equally, or with leſs Reſpect than thoſe that be of leſs Degree in theſe three Things, or in any of them.

Honour.

1. COvetouſneſs or Oppreſſion, by the Magiſtrate or higher Power, *viz.* when the Magiſtrates, eſpecially the Chief, encreaſeth his Subſtance and Revenue beyond Meaſure, (either with the public or private Calamity, whereby the Governors grow to quarrel among themſelves as in *Oligarchies*) or the other Degrees conſpire together, and make Quarrel againſt the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The Examples of *Wat Tyler*, *Jack Straw*, &c.

2. Injury, when great Spirits, and of great Power, are greatly wronged and diſhonoured, or take themſelves ſo to be; as *Coriolanus*, *Cirus minor*, Earl of *Warwick*. In which Cauſes, the beſt Way is to decide the Wrong.

3. Preferment, or Want of Preferment; wherein ſome have over-much, and ſo wax proud, and aſpire higher: Or have leſs than they deſerve, as they ſuppoſe, and ſo in Envy and Diſdain, ſeek Innovation by open Faction; ſo *Cæſar*, *&c.*

4. Some

4. Some great Neceſſity or Calamity: So *Xerxes* after the Foil of his great Army. And *Senacherib* after the Loſs of 185000 in one Night.

2. *Particular.*

1. *ENvy*, when the Chief exceeds the Mediocrity beforementioned, and ſo provoketh the Nobility and other Degrees, to conſpire againſt him, as *Brutus*, *Caſſius*, *&c.* againſt *Cæſar*.

2. *Fear*, *viz.* Of Danger, when one or more diſpatch the Prince by ſecret Practice or Force, to prevent his own Danger, as *Artabanus* did *Xerxes*.

3. *Luſt* or *Lechery*, as *Tarquinius Superbus* by *Brutus*, *Piſiſtratidæ* by *Armodius*, *Appius* by *Virginius*.

4. *Contempt*; For vile Quality and baſe Behaviour, as *Sardanapalus* by *Arbaces*, *Dionyſius* the younger by *Dion*.

5. *Contumely*; When ſome great Diſgrace is done to ſome great Spirit, who ſtandeth upon his Honour and Reputation, as *Caligula* by *Chæreas*.

6. *Hope* of *Advancement*, or ſome great Profit, as *Mithridates*, *Anobarſanes*.

Alteration without Violence.

CAuſes of Alteration without Violence are; 1. *Exceſs* of the State; when by Degrees the State groweth from that Temper and Mediocrity wherein it was, or ſhould have been ſettled, and exceedeth in Power, Riches, and Abſoluteneſs in his Kind, by the Ambition and Covetouſneſs of the Chief, immoderate Taxes, and Impoſitions, *&c.* applying all to his own Benefit, without Reſpect of other Degrees, and ſo in the End changeth itſelf

into another State or Form of Government, as a Kingdom into a Tyranny, an *Oligarchy* into an *Ariſtocracy*.

2. *Exceſs*, of ſome one or more in the Commonwealth; *viz.* When ſome one or more in a Commonwealth grow to an Excellency or Exceſs above the reſt, either in Honour, Wealth, or Virtue; and ſo by Permiſſion and popular Favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty; by which Means, popular States grow into *Oligarchies*; and *Oligarchies* and *Ariſtocracies* into *Monarchies*. For which Cauſe, the *Athenians*, and ſome other free States, made their Laws of *Oſtraciſmos*, to baniſh any for a Time that ſhould excel, tho' it were in Virtue, to prevent the Alteration of their State; which becauſe it is an unjuſt Law, 'tis better to take Heed at the Beginning to prevent the Means, that none ſhould grow to that Height and Excellency, than to uſe ſo ſharp and unjuſt a Remedy.

THE

THE

Cabinet-Council:

Containing the Chief ARTS

OF

EMPIRE,

And MYSTERIES of

STATE;

DISCABINETED

In *Political* and *Polemical Aphorisms*,
grounded on *Authority*, and *Experience*;

And illuſtrated with the choiceſt Examples
and Hiſtorical Obſervations.

Publiſhed by *JOHN MILTON.*

Quis Martem tunicâ tectum Adamantinâ dignè ſcripſerit?

To the READER.

HAVING had the *Manuſcript* of this *Treatiſe*, written by Sir *Walter Raleigh*, many Years in my Hands, and finding it lately by Chance among other Books and Papers, upon reading thereof, I thought it a Kind of Injury to withhold longer the Work of ſo eminent an Author from the Public; it being both anſwerable in Stile to other Works of his already extant, as far as the Subject will permit, and given me for a true Copy by a Learned Man at his Death, who had collected ſeveral ſuch Pieces.

John Milton.

THE CABINET-COUNCIL:

Containing the

Chief ARTS of EMPIRE,

AND

Myſteries *of* State.

CHAP. I.

The Definition and Diviſion of Public Weals and Sovereign States, according to their ſeveral Species or Kinds.

A Commonwealth is a certain Sovereign Government of many Families, with thoſe things that are common among them.

All Commonwealths are either

Monarchies, Ariſtocracies, Democracies.

A Monarchy is that State where the Sovereignty reſteth in the Perſon of one only Prince.

An Ariſtocracy, is where ſome ſmall Part of the People have in them as a body Corporate, the Sovereignty and ſupreme Power of the whole State.

A Democracy, is where all the People have Power and Authority Sovereign.

So

So doth it appear, that the Place and Perſon where the Sovereignty reſteth, doth cauſe the State to be either a Monarchy, an Ariſtocracy, or Popular Government.

CHAP. II.

Of Sovereign or Monarchical Government, with its eſſential Marks, and ſpecifical Differences.

SOvereignty is an abſolute and perpetual Power in every public State; and he is properly and only a Sovereign, that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, Perſon or Power, but God and his own Sword.

The Firſt Mark of Sovereignty is abſolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general, and every of them in particular, without Conſent of any other Perſon or Perſons, either greater or inferior to Himſelf.

The Second Mark of Majeſty is Authority to make War, and conclude Peace, at his Pleaſure.

The Third is Power to beſtow all Honours and chief Offices at his Pleaſure.

The Fourth Mark of Sovereignty is Appellation.

The Fifth Mark and laſt, is Power to pardon all Subjects by Rigour of Law or otherwiſe condemned in Life, Lands, Goods, or Honours.

Theſe Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magiſtrate, but in the Prince's Abſence, and for ſome urgent Occaſion.

Monarchies are of three Sorts:

Signioril, Royal, Tyrannical.

The Diverſity of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State, but the divers Proceedings of thoſe Princes that govern; for great Difference there may be between the Nature of the Commonwealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that

that giveth the Magiſtracy, Honours, and Offices without reſpect of Nobility, Riches or Virtue, may be ſaid to govern Popularly. And that Monarchy may be ſaid to be governed Ariſtocratically, when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honours and Offices to the noble and rich Men only.

The ſame Difference there is to be found in States Ariſtocratical and Popular; for the one and the other may be both Signioril, or Tyrannical.

A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and juſt War, is made Owner of Mens Bodies and Goods, aud governeth them as a Maſter of a Family governeth baſe Servants and Slaves.

A Monarch Royal, is he whoſe Subjects are Obedient unto his Laws, and the Monarch himſelf obeyeth the Laws of God and Nature, ſuffering every Subject to enjoy Liberty Natural, with Property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father governeth his Children.

A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Freemen as Slaves, and uſeth their Lands and Goods as his own.

CHAP. III.

Of Monarchy Signioril, exemplified in the Turkiſh *and* Weſt-Indian *Empire.*

ALL People ſubject to Princes, are governed as Free-men by their Prince and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Prince's Commiſſion but by antient Laws or Cuſtom have Inheritance and Tenements; or elſe they are by one Prince and his Miniſters commanded, which Miniſters have not by Law, or Ordinance, any Authority or Intereſt of themſelves, but being like to the People (baſe Men and Slaves) they

they command only by Commiſſion in the Prince's Name; and the Authority of thoſe Miniſters doth ceaſe at the Prince's Pleaſure, ſo that the People do not acknowledge any Superior but the Prince, nor owe any Service to other mean Lords: So as all the People ſtand without Property in Lands or Goods; for Example, the Empire of *Turkey* and the *Weſt-Indies*.

The Provinces of this Monarchy are allotted to ſundry Magiſtrates or Miniſters, and they altered and removed at the Prince's Pleaſure; but it is otherwiſe in a Monarchy Royal, becauſe the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords. And albeit thoſe mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Tenants who may not without juſt Cauſe be diſpoſſeſſed by the Prince; and thoſe People having had Dependency of their Lords and their Anceſtors, do ever bear unto them a certain natural Love and dutiful Reſpect: Whoſo therefore compareth theſe Principalities, ſhall perceive, that to conquer a State Signioril there is great Difficulty; but being conquered, it may eaſily be maintained; for the Difficulty to conquer ſuch a State, proceedeth from the Lack of mean Lords to call in and aſſiſt the Prince that doth invade: Who therefore deſireth to ſubdue a Nation thus governed, muſt of Force aſſault all the People, and rather truſt in his own Strength then the Aid of the Country. But if he can prevail, then one only Fear remaineth, which is the Prince's Poſterity, which neceſſarily muſt be extinguiſhed, becauſe the Prince's Race only hath Intereſt both in the People and Soldiers. But to enter a Monarchy Royal, is an Enterprize of no great Difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the Friendſhip and Aid of ſome mean Lords to take his Part, and prepare the Place where he is to arrive.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Monarchies Royal, with the Means to maintain them.

MOnarchies Royal, are for the moſt Part antient and hereditary, and conſequently eaſy to be governed. For it is ſufficient for the Prince to maintain the old Laws, and on Occaſion temporize with thoſe Accidents that happen: ſuch a State cannot be taken from the Prince without exceſſive Force; and if it be, it ſhall be ſoon recovered. Example, *England* and *France*.

But if a Monarchy newly conquered, be annexed unto an old, and not properly antient, then is it with much more Difficulty maintained.

Firſt, for that Men naturally inclined to Variation are eaſily induced to take Arms againſt him that newly governeth.

Secondly, every new Prince is forced to exact as well upon thoſe Subjects that joined with him as thoſe that did reſiſt him, and therefore ſhall offend both. Example, *Ireland annexed to the Crown of England: Sicily and Naples to Spain.*

The Means to maintain ſuch a Monarchy is,

Firſt, to extinguiſh the Race of him that was antiently Prince.

Secondly, to continue all Laws and Cuſtoms in the former Force; for ſo ſhall the Subject find nothing altered but the Prince, and therefore will ſoon reſt contented: and the rather if that new Monarchy and the antient Dominion of the Prince be of one Language: But if the People be of a contrary Language and Humour, then to hold it, there needeth great Induſtry and Fortune: In that Caſe the beſt Way is that the Prince ſhould inhabit there, as well to encounter all Inconveniencies proceeding from the Subject, as to preſerve the People

from

from Oppreſſion of his own Miniſters. Another Way is to ſend thither certain Colonies, and plant them in fit Places, or elſe to ſettle ſome Garriſons both of Horſe and Foot; but Colonies are leſs chargeable to the Prince: As for the People inhabitant (who muſt neceſſarily remove, they being a ſmall Number and diſpoſſeſſed) they cannot have Power to offend: for in that Caſe, this Rule or Maxim ſhall be found true, that Men muſt be either kindly intreated, or with all Extremity oppreſſed; becauſe of light Injuries they may be revenged, but of utter Oppreſſion they cannot.

A third Way to hold a conquered Dominion, is, to cheriſh and defend the Neighbours of little Power, and oppreſs or keep under thoſe that are moſt potent; and above all to take Order that no foreign Prince or Power do enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that ſo many of the Nation as are diſcontented, either for Ambition or Fear, will be ever ready to bring in Strangers; and to conclude this Matter of Principality annexed, I ſay it behoveth every Prince poſſeſſed of ſuch a State, never to increaſe the Power of any potent Neighbour, never to oppreſs thoſe that are of ſmall Power, never to permit any foreign Potentate to enter, but ever to plant Colonies and Garriſons, or elſe to make that Dominion his chief Habitation.

CHAP. V.

Of Monarchies Tyrannical.

TYrannical Princes are not advanced by Favour, neither do they truſt unto Fortune, but by Degrees of War, or elſe by ſome other indirect Means do aſpire unto Greatneſs; and therein do maintain themſelves by all Ways either honeſt or diſhoneſt, without Reſpect of Juſtice, Conſcience,

Or

or Law either of Nations or Nature: A Prince by ſuch impious Means aſpired, and deſiring to hold that he hath gained, will take Order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, ſuddenly, and as it were at an Inſtant; For if they be executed at Leiſure and by Piece-meal, then will the Prince's Fears continue long, and the Terror in Subjects take deeper Impreſſion, whoſe Nature is ſuch that either they muſt be bound by Benefits, or by Cruelty made ſure from offending. Example, *Dionyſius* and *Agathocles.*

CHAP. VI.

Of new-found Monarchies and Principalities, with the Means to perpetuate them.

SOME other Princes there are, that from private Eſtate have aſpired to Sovereignty, not by unnatural or impious Proceedings as the former, but by Virtue and Fortune, and being aſpired have found no great Difficulty to be maintained; for ſuch a Prince having no other Dominion, is forced to ſettle himſelf where he is become a Prince. But here is to be noted, that albeit ſuch a Man be virtuous, yet wanting Fortune, his Virtue proveth to ſmall Purpoſe, and Fortune without Virtue doth ſeldom work any great Effect. Howſoever it be, a Prince being aſpired, both by the Aid of the one and of the other, ſhall notwithſtanding find ſome Difficulty to hold what he hath gotten: becauſe he is forced to introduce new Laws and new Orders of Government differing from the old, as well for his own Security, as Confirmation of the Government: for avoiding of which Dangers, he is to conſider whether he be of himſelf able to compel his Subjects to obey, or muſt pray in Aid of others: If he can do the firſt, he needeth not doubt; but being

driven

driven to the other, his Greatneſs cannot long continue; for albeit a Matter of no Difficulty it is to perſuade a People, yet to make them conſtant, is a Work well near impoſſible. Example, *Theſeus*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*. The ſecond Sort of new Princes are ſuch as be aſpired by Favour or Corruption, or by the Virtue or Greatneſs of Fortune or Friends: A Prince by any or all theſe Means advanced, and deſirous to hold his Eſtate, muſt endeavour by his own Virtue to maintain himſelf without depending upon any other: which may be done by this Means; Firſt, to aſſure all Enemies from offending; Secondly, to win the Love and Friendſhip of ſo many Neighbours as poſſibly he may; Thirdly, to compaſs all Deſigns tending to his Honour or Profit, and bring them to paſs either by Fraud or Force; Fourthly, to make himſelf honoured and followed of Captains and Solders; Fifthly, to oppreſs all thoſe that would or can offend; Sixthly, to be obſequious and liberal to Friends, magnanimous and terrible to Foes; Seventhly, to caſſe all old and unfaithful Bands, and entertain new; Eighthly, to hold ſuch Amity with Kings and Princes, as they ought reaſonably to favour him; or if they would offend, eaſily they cannot. Example, *Giovannic*, *Torrigiani*, *Cæſar Borgia*.

The third and laſt Means whereby private Perſons do aſpire to Principalities, is not Force and Violence, but meer Good-will and Favour of Men. The Cauſe or Occaſion thereof, is only Virtue, or Fortune, or at leaſt a certain fortunate Craft and Wittineſs; becauſe he aſpireth either by Favour of the People, or by Favour of the Nobility; for theſe contrary Humours are in all Commonwealths to be found. And the Reaſon thereof is, that the great Men do ever endeavour to oppreſs the People, and the People do labour not to be oppreſſed by them. Of theſe divers Appetites one of theſe three Effects do

do proceed, *viz.* Principality, Liberty, or licentious Life. Principality may come either by Love of the Multitude, or of the great Men; for when any of theſe Factions do find themſelves oppreſſed, then do they ſoon conſent to make one a Prince, hoping by his Virtue and Valour to be defended. Example, *Franceſco Sforza*, *Aleſſandro de Medici*.

A Prince in this Sort aſpired, to maintain his Eſtate, muſt firſt conſider well by which of theſe Factions aforeſaid he is advanced; for if by Favour of great Men he be aſpired, then muſt he meet with many Difficulties; for having about him divers Perſons of great Quality, and ſuch as were but lately his Equals, hardly ſhall he command them in ſuch Sort as it behoveth: But if the Prince be advanced by the People, few or none ſhall hardly diſobey him. So it appeareth that a Prince made by the Multitude is much more ſecure than he whom the Nobility preferreth; for common People do not deſire to enjoy more than their own, and to be defended from Oppreſſion; but great Men do ſtudy not only to hold their own, but alſo to command and inſult upon Inferiors.

Note, that all Monarchies are Principalities,
But all Principalities are not Monarchies.

CHAP. VII.

Of Councils, and Counſellors in general.

A Senate or Council is a certain lawful Aſſembly of Counſellors to give Advice to him or them that have in the Common-weal Power Sovereign.

A Counſellor is called in the Latin *Senator*; which Word ſignifieth in effect an old Man. The *Grecians* and *Romans* alſo moſt commonly compoſed their Councils of antient and expert Perſons; for if they or the greater Part of them had been young Men,

then might the Council have more properly been called a Juvenate then a Senate.

The chief and moſt neceſſary Note required in a Counſellor, is to have no Dependance on any other Prince or Common-weal; either Oath, Homage, natural Obligation, Penſion, or Reward: In this Point the *Venetians* have been ever moſt preciſe, and for that Reaſon, do not admit any Cardinal or other Clergyman to be either of or at their Councils; therefore when the *Venetian* Senate is aſſembled, the Uſher being ready to ſhut the Door crieth aloud, *Fuora Preti*, depart Prieſt. Note alſo, that in every State of what Quality ſoever, a Secret or Cabinet-council is mainly neceſſary.

CHAP. VIII

Of Councils in ſome particular Monarchies, Ariſtocracies, and Democracies.

THE King of *Spain*, for the Government of his Dominions hath ſeven Councils, *viz.* the Council of the *Indies*, the Council of *Spain*, the Council of *Italy* and the *Low-Countries*, the Council of *War*, the Council of *Orders*, the Council of *Inquiſition*, and the Council Royal.

In *France* are three Councils, *viz.* the Council-Privy, the Council of Judges, which they call Preſidents *et Conceliers de Parliament*, and the great Council, which they call *Aſſemblei du troys Eſtates*.

Of Councils in Ariſtocracies.

In *Venice*, beſides the Senate and great Council, are four Councils, *viz.* the Sages of the Sea, the Sages of the Land, the Council of Ten, the three Preſidents of Quarantia, and the Senate: All which Councils do amount to an Hundred and Twenty Perſons, with the Magiſtrates.

The

The great Council of *Raguſa* conſiſteth of ſixty Perſons, and hath another Privy-council of Twelve.

Of Councils in Democracies.

Genoa hath three Councils; the great Council of Two-hundred, the Senate which conſiſteth of Sixty, and the Privy-council which hath Twenty-ſix Counſellors; ſo it doth appear that in all Commonwealths, be they Monarchies, Ariſtocracies, or Popular States, the Council-privy is moſt neceſſary and often uſed; alſo this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies, and the Councils in *Ariſtocracies* and States Popular; that is to ſay, that all Deliberations fit to be publiſhed, are in a Monarchy conſulted and reſolved upon in the Council-privy, and after ratified by Common-council: But in Optimacies or popular Government the Cuſtom is contrary.

Here alſo is to be noted, that albeit the Uſe and Authority of every Senate and Privy-council is moſt needful, yet hath it no Authority to command but in the Name of thoſe in whom the Sovereignty reſteth; for if Counſellors had Power to command abſolutely, then ſhould they be Sovereigns, and conſequently all Execution at their Pleaſure; which may not be without detracting from Majeſty, which is a thing ſo ſovereign and ſacred, as no Citizen or Subject of what Quality ſoever, may touch or approach thereunto.

CHAP. IX.

Of Officers and Commiſſioners, with their reſpective Diſtinctions.

AN Officer is a Perſon Publick, that hath Charge ordinary and limited by Law.

A Commiſſioner is alſo a Perſon Publick, but his Charge is extraordinary and limited by Commiſſion.

Officers are of two Sorts, and ſo be Commiſſioners; the one hath Power to command, and are called Magiſtrates; the other hath Authority to execute: ſo the one and the other are Perſons Publick; yet are not all publick Perſons either Officers or Commiſſioners.

Commiſſioners are ordained to govern in Provinces, in War, in Juſtice, in diſpoſing the Treaſure, or ſome other Function concerning the State; but all Commiſſions do ſpring and proceed from the Sovereign, Magiſtrates, and Commiſſioners. And here is to be noted that every Commiſſion ceaſeth if he that granted the Commiſſion doth die, or revoke it, or if the Commiſſioners during his Commiſſion ſhall aſpire to Office and Authority equal to his that made it.

CHAP. X.

Of Magiſtrates, their Qualifications and Elections.

A Magiſtrate is an Officer having Power to command in the State; and albeit that every Magiſtrate to be an Officer, yet every Officer is not a Magiſtrate, but they only that have Power to command.

Alſo in making of Officers and Magiſtrates in every Commonweal, three things are ſpecially to be obſerved, *viz.* who doth make them, what Men they are that ſhould be made, and the Form and Manner how they are made.

The Firſt appertaineth to him or them in whom the Sovereignty reſteth; the Second alſo belongeth to Majeſty; yet therein the Laws are commonly followed, eſpecially in *Ariſtocracies* and States popular: In the one the Magiſtrates are choſen out of the moſt Wealthy or moſt Noble: In the other, elected out of the whole Multitude.

The

The form and manner of chooſing Magiſtrates in *Ariſtocracies* and ſtates Popular, is either by Election, by Lot, or by both, and their Office is to compel thoſe that do not obey what Sovereignty commandeth; for all Force of Commandment lieth in Compulſion.

Commandment likewiſe is of two Sorts: The one may be called Sovereign and Abſolute, above Laws, above Magiſtrates, and above People. In Monarchies ſuch Command is proper to the Prince only; in *Ariſtocracies* it reſteth in the Nobility; and in *Democracies* the People have that Power.

The ſecond Commandments are ſubject both to Sovereignty and Law.

Here is to be noted, that every Magiſtrate may recall his own Commandment, and forbid what he did command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged.

Alſo in Preſence of the Sovereign, all Authority of Magiſtrates ceaſeth; and in Preſence of great Magiſtrates the inferior have no Power; and Magiſtrates equal cannot do any thing but by Conſent, if his Collegues or Fellow-Magiſtrates be preſent.

CHAP. XI.

Obſervations intrinſically concerning every publick State in Points of Juſtice, Treaſure, and War.

THE Firſt concern Matter Intrinſick.
The Second touch Matter Extrinſick.

Matters Intrinſick are three.

The Adminiſtration of Juſtice.
The Managing of the Treaſure.
The Diſpoſing of things appertaining to War.

Matters Extrinſick are alſo there.

The Skill how to deal with Neighbours.

The Diligence to vent their Deſigns.

The Way how to win ſo much Confidence with ſome of them, as to be made Partaker of whatſoever they mean to enterprize.

Touching Adminiſtration of Juſtice.

The good and direct Adminiſtration of Juſtice, is in all Places a principal Part of Government; for ſeldom or never ſhall we ſee any People diſcontented and deſirous of Alteration, where Juſtice is equally adminiſtred without reſpect of Perſons; and in every State this Conſideration is required, but moſt of all in Countries that do front upon other Princes, or were lately conquered: Hereunto the Prince's Vigilancy and the Magiſtrates Uprightneſs are eſpecially required; for oftentimes the Prince is deceived, and the Magiſtrates corrupted. It behoveth alſo the Prince to maintain the Judges and Miniſters of Juſtice in their Reputation, and yet to have a vigilant Eye upon their Proceedings, and the rather if their Authority do include Equity, and from their Cenſure be no Appeal; and if their Office be during Life, and they are Men born and dwelling in the ſame Country; all theſe Things are duly to be conſidered of the Prince: for as to call the Judges into queſtion, is as it were to diſgrace the judicial Seat; ſo to wink at their Corruptions were matter of juſt Diſcontent to the Subject. In this Caſe therefore the Prince cannot do more than by his Wiſdom to make choice of good Men; and being choſen, to hold them in good Reputation, ſo as the ordinary Courſe of Juſtice may proceed; for otherwiſe great Diſorder, Contempt, and general Confuſion will enſue thereof. Secondly, he is to keep his Eye upon their Proceedings; and laſtly, to reſerve unto himſelf a ſupreme Power of Appellation.

Touching

Touching the Treaſure.

The want of Money is in all States very perilous, and moſt of all in thoſe which are of leaſt Strength, and do confine upon Nations with whom they have commonly War, or unaſſured Peace, but moſt perilous of all to thoſe Governments which are remote from the Prince, or Place where they are to be relieved.

The means to levy Treaſure are four.

Firſt, the Cuſtoms and Impoſitions upon all ſorts of Merchandize and Traffick is to be looked into and advanced.

Secondly, the exceſſive Eating of Uſury muſt be ſuppreſſed.

Thirdly, all ſuperfluous Charges and Expences are to be taken away.

Laſtly, the Doings and Accounts of Miniſters are ſeverally to be examined.

Touching the Matter of Cuſtom and Impoſt, thereof aſſuredly a great Profit is in every State to be raiſed; chiefly where Peace hath long continued, and where the Country affordeth much Plenty of Commodities to be carried out, and where Ports are to receive Shipping.

The moderating of Intereſt is ever neceſſary, and chiefly in this Age, by reaſon that Money aboundeth in *Europe*, ſince the Traffick into the *Indies*; for ſuch Men as have Money in their Hands in great Plenty, would in no wiſe employ the ſame in Merchandize, if lawful it were to receive the utmoſt Uſury, being a courſe of moſt Profit and greateſt Security.

The taking away of ſuperfluous Expences is no other thing than a certain wiſe and laudable Parſimony; which the *Romans* and other well-governed States did uſe. Theſe Expences conſiſt in Fees, Allowances, and Wages granted to Miniſters of little or no Neceſſity; alſo in Penſions, Rewards, Enter-

tainments and Donaries, with ſmall Difficulty to be moderated, or eaſily to be ſuppreſſed.

By abridging or taking away of theſe needleſs Expences a marvellous Profit will be ſaved for the Prince; but if he continue them, and by impoſing upon the People do think to increaſe his Treaſure or Revenue, beſides the Loſs of their Love, he may alſo hazard their Obedience, with many other Inconveniencies.

Touching War.

Whatſoever Prince or Commonweal is Neighbour to any People which can, will, or were wont to offend, it is neceſſary to have not only all things prepared for a Defence of his Perſon and Country, but alſo to forecaſt and uſe every Caution and other Diligence; for the Inconveniencies which happen to Government, are ſudden and unlook'd for; yea the Providence and Proviſion required in this Caſe ought to be ſuch, as the Expences all other Ways employed muſt ſtay to ſupply the Neceſſity of War.

CHAP. XII.

Extrinſick Obſervation, ſhewing how to deal with Neighbour Princes and Provinces reſpectively, how to prevent their Deſigns, and decypher their Intendments.

THIS firſt Point of Matter Extrinſick is of ſuch Quality as being well handled procureth great Good, but otherwiſe becometh dangerous; for the Proceeding muſt be diverſe according to the Diverſity of Ends which the Prince or Governor intendeth; for if he deſire to continue Peace with his Neighbours, one Way is to be taken; but otherwiſe he

he is to work that ſeeketh Occaſion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbours. If he do deſire to live peaceably with all, then he is to obſerve theſe Rules, *viz.*

Firſt, to hold and continue firmly all Contracts and Capitulations.

Secondly, to ſhew himſelf reſolved neither to offer nor take the leaſt touch of Wrong or Injury.

Thirdly, with all care and favour to further Commerce and reciproke Traffick for the Profit of the Subject, and Increaſe of the Prince's Revenue.

Fourthly, covertly to win ſo great Confidence with Neighbours, as in all Actions of Unkindneſs among them he may be made Umpire.

Fifthly, to become ſo well believed with them as he may remove ſuch Diffidences as grow to his own Diſadvantage.

Sixthly, not to deny Protection or Aid to them that are the Weakeſt, and chiefly ſuch as do and will endure his Fortune.

Laſtly, in Favouring, Aiding, and Protecting (unleſs Neceſſity ſhall otherwiſe ſo require) to do it moderately, ſo as they who are to be aided, become not jealous, and conſequently ſeek Adherency elſewhere, which oftentimes hath opened way to other Neighbours that deſire a like Occaſion.

How to prevent their Deſigns.

This Point in time of War is with great Diligence to be looked unto; alſo in Time of Peace to prevent all Occaſions that may kindle War is behoveful; for to foreſee what may happen to the Prejudice of a Prince's Profit or Reputation, is a Part of great Wiſdom. The Means to attain the Intelligence of theſe Things are two.

The firſt is by Friends, the next by Eſpials; the one for the moſt part faithful, the other not ſo aſſured.

Theſe Matters are well to be conſidered; for albeit the Nature of Man deſireth nothing more than curiouſly to know the Doings of others, yet are thoſe things to be handled with ſo great Secrecy and Diſſimulation as the Prince's Intent be not in any wiſe ſuſpected, nor the Miniſters made odious; for theſe ſometimes to win themſelves Reputation, do deviſe Cauſes of Difference where no need is, divining of things future which prove to the Prejudice of their own Prince.

To win Confidence with Neighbours.

This is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honoured; for theſe things do work ſo many good Effects, as dailyExperience ſufficeth, without any expreſs Example to prove them of great Force.

The Ways to win Love and Truſt, is in all Actions to proceed juſtly, and ſometimes to wink at Wrongs, or ſet aſide unneceſſary Revenges; and if any thing be done not juſtifiable, or unfit to be allowed, as oftentimes it happeneth, there to lay the blame upon the Miniſter, which muſt be performed with ſo great ſhow of Revenge and Diſſimulation by reproving and puniſhing the Miniſter, as the Princes offended may be ſatisfied, and believe that the Cauſe of Unkindneſs proceeded from thence.

Now only it reſteth that ſomewhat ſhould be ſaid touching Proviſion, to the end the People may not be drawn into Deſpair by Famine or extreme Dearth of Victual, and chiefly for want of Corn, which is one principal Conſideration to be regarded, according to the *Italian* Proverb, *Pane in Piazza, Giuſtitia in Palazzo, ſivcrezza per tutto:* Whereunto I could wiſh every Prince or ſupreme Governor to be thus qualified, *viz.* *Facile de audienza; non facilede credenza, deſioſo de ſpedition, eſſemplare in coſtunii proprii, & inquei de ſua caſa tale chevorra governare, e non eſſer governato da altro; he della raggione.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Obſervations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities, characſtering an excellent Prince or Governor.

EVery good and lawful Principality is either Elective or Succeſſive: Of them, Election ſeemeth the more Antient; but Succeſſion in divers reſpects the better: *Minore diſcrimine ſumitur Princeps quam quæritur.* Tacit.

The chief and only Endeavour of every good Prince, ought to be the Commodity and Security of the Subjects; as contrarywiſe the Tyrant ſeeketh his own private Profit with the Oppreſſion of his People: *Civium non ſervitus ſed tutela tradita eſt.* Sal.

To the Perfection of every good Prince, two things are neceſſarily required, *viz.* Prudence and Virtue; the one to direct his Doings, the other to govern his Life: *Rex eris ſi recte feceris.* Hor.

The ſecond Care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himſelf; for thereby he is not only honoured, but they alſo the better governed: *Facile imperium in bonos.* Plaut.

Subjects are made good by two Means, *viz.* by Conſtraint of Law, and the Prince's Example; for in all Eſtates, the People do imitate thoſe Conditions whereunto they ſee the Prince inclined: *Qui quid faciunt principes, præcipere videantur.* Quintil.

All Virtues be required in a Prince, but Juſtice and Clemency are moſt neceſſary; for Juſtice is a Habit of doing things juſtly, as well to himſelf as others, and giving to every one ſo much as to him appertaineth. This is that Virtue that preſerveth Concord among Men, and whereof they be called Good: *Jus & æquitas vincula civitatum.* Cic.

* It is the quality of this Virtue alſo to proceed equally and temperately; it informeth the Prince not to ſurcharge the Subjects with infinite Laws; for thereof proceedeth the Impoveriſhment of the Subjects and the Inriching of Lawyers, a kind of Men which in Ages more antient, did ſeem of no Neceſſity: *Sine cauſidicis ſatis fælices olim fuere futuræque ſunt urbes.* Sal.

The next Virtue required in Princes is Clemency, being an Inclination of the Mind to Lenity and Compaſſion, yet tempered with Severity and Judgment; this quality is fit for all great Perſonages, but chiefly Princes, becauſe their Occaſion to uſe it is moſt; by it alſo the Love of Men is gained: *Quid vult regnare, languida regnet manu.* Sen.

After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain Performance and Obſervation of Word and Promiſe; this Virtue ſeemeth to accompany Juſtice, or is as it were the ſame, and therefore moſt fit for Princes: *Sanctiſſimum generis humani bonum.* Liv.

As Fidelity followeth Juſtice, ſo doth Modeſty accompany Clemency; Modeſty is a Temperature of Reaſon, whereby the Mind of Man is ſo governed, as neither in Action or Opinion he over-deemeth of himſelf, or any thing that is his; a Quality not common in fortunate Folk; and moſt rare in Princes: *Superbia commune nobilitatis malum.* Sal.

This Virtue doth alſo moderate all external Demonſtration of Inſolence, Pride, and Arrogance, and therefore neceſſary to be known of Princes, and all others whom Favour or Fortune have advanced: *Impone fælicitati tuæ frænos, facilius illam reges.* Curt.

But

* The Author of the Epiſtle Dedicatory to the Dutcheſs of *Suffolk*, prefixed to Mr. *Latimer*'s Sermon, ſaith that Lawyers Covetouſneſs hath almoſt devoured *England*.

But as Princes are to obſerve the Bounds of Modeſty, ſo may they not forget the Majeſty appertaining to their ſupreme Honour, being a certain reverend Greatneſs due to princely Virtue and royal State: A Grace and Gravity no leſs beſeeming a Prince then Virtue itſelf; for neither over-much Familiarity, nor too great Auſterity, ought to be uſed by Princes: *Facilitas auctoritatem, ſeveritas amorem minuit.* Tac.

To theſe Virtues we may apply Liberality, which doth not only adorn, but highly advance the Honour due to Princes; thereby alſo the Good-will of Men is gained; for nothing is more fitting a Prince's Nature then Bounty, the ſame being accompanied with Judgment, and performed according to the Laws of Liberality: *Perdere multi ſciunt, donare neſciunt.* Tac.

It ſeemeth alſo that Prudence is not only fit, but alſo among other Virtues neceſſary in a Prince; for the daily Uſe thereof is in all human Actions required, and chiefly in Matters of State and Government: *Prudentia imperantis propria et unica virtus.* Ariſt.

The Succeſs of all worldly Proceedings doth ſhew that Prudence hath compaſſed the proſperous Event of human Actions, more than Force of Arms or other Power: *Mens una ſapiens plurium vincit manus.* Eurip.

Prudence is either natural, or received from others; for whoſo can counſel himſelf what is fit to be done, needeth not the Advice of others: But they that want ſuch Perfection, and are nevertheleſs capable, and are willing to know what others inform, ought to be accounted wiſe enough: *Laudatiſſimus eſt qui cuncta videbit, ſed laudandus eſt is qui paret rectè monenti.* Heſiod.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Prince's intimate Counſellors and Miniſters of State, with their ſeveral Requiſites.

ALBEIT the excellent Spirit of ſome Princes be ſuch as doth juſtly deſerve the higheſt Commendation; yet for that every Courſe of Life needeth the Aid of Men, and the Mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite Care appertaining to publick Affairs; it behoveth Princes to be aſſiſted: *Magna negotia adjutoribus egent.* Tac.

Theſe Aſſiſtants may be properly divided into Counſellors and Miniſters; the one to adviſe, the other to execute: without Counſel, no Kingdom, no State, no private Houſe can ſtand; for Experience hath proved that Common-weals have proſpered ſo long as good Counſel did govern; but when Favour, Fear, or Voluptuouſneſs entered, thoſe Nations became diſordered, and in the End ſubject to Slavery: *Quiddam ſacrum profecto eſt conſultatio.* Plato.

Counſellors are Men ſpecially ſelected to give Advice to Princes or Common-wealths, as well in Peace as in War: The chief Qualities required in ſuch Men, are Fidelity and Knowledge, which two concurring do make them both good and wiſe, and conſequently fit for Counſel: *Prudentis proprium munus rectè conſulere.* Ariſt.

The Election of Counſellors is, and ought to be chiefly among Men of long Experience, and grave Years: for as Youth is fitteſt for Action in reſpect of corporal Strength; ſo elder Folk having felt the Force of every Fortune, and obſerved the Courſe of worldly Proceedings, do ſeem moſt meet for Conſultation: *Conſilia ſenum, facta juvenum.* Plato.

Albeit we ſay, that the Excellency of Wiſdom ſhould be in Counſellors; yet do we not require

ſo

ſo quick and fiery a Conceit as is more apt for Innovation than orderly Government: *Hebetiores quàm acutiores meliùs Remp. adminiſtrant.* Thucyd.

To Fidelity and Experience we wiſh that our Counſellors ſhould be endued with Piety, Liberty, Conſtancy, Modeſty, and Silence; for as the Aid and Aſſiſtance of God, is that which governeth all good Counſels, ſo Liberty of Speech, and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit, is neceſſary in Counſellors. Likewiſe to be conſtant and not to vary in Opinion, either for Fear or Favour, is very commendable: Alſo, as Modeſty in giving Counſel eſcheweth all Offences, and gaineth Good-will; ſo Secrecy is the beſt and moſt ſecure Means to govern all publick Affairs: *Res magnæ ſuſtineri non poſſunt ab eo qui tacere nequit.* Curt.

The firſt Obſtacle to good Counſel is Pertinacy, or Opiniativeneſs, a Condition far unfit for Counſellors; yet ſome Men are ſo far in love with their own opiniaſtre Conceits, as that they cannot patiently endure Oppoſition; Secondly, Diſcord muſt from Counſellors be removed, becauſe private Offence many times impeacheth publick Proceedings; Thirdly, Affection is an Enemy to Counſel, the ſame being commonly accompanied with Anger, wherewith nothing can be rightly or conſiderately done; Laſtly, Avarice ſeemeth a Vice worthy to be abhorred of all Counſellors, becauſe it driveth away both Fidelity and Honeſty, the principal Pillars of all good Counſel: *Peſſimum veri affectus & judicii venenum, utilitas.* Tac.

To good Counſel other Impediments there are, which ſquare not with Wiſdom; for all crafty and hazarding Counſels do ſeem in the Beginning likely to ſucceed; but afterwards, and chiefly in the End, do prove hard and of evil Event. It therefore ſeemeth behoveful to be wary in reſolving, and bold in execut-

executing: *Animus vereri qui ſcit, ſcit tutò aggredi.* Pub.

Another Let to good Conſultation is immoderate Deſire, which every wiſe Man muſt endeavour to reſtrain: *Cupiditate pauca rectè fiunt, circumſpectione plurima.* Thucyd.

Thirdly, Haſte is an Enemy to good Deliberation, for whoſo greedily deſireth any thing, proceedeth raſhly, and raſh Proceeding endeth ever in Repentance: *Scelera impetu, bona conſilia morâ valeſcunt.* Tac.

Of MINISTERS OF STATE.

Having already ſpoken of Counſellors, ſomewhat is to be ſpoken of Miniſters; I mean thoſe that either publickly or privately ſerve the Prince in any Function. In choice of which Men, Care muſt be had; Firſt, that they be Perſons honeſtly born, for no Man deſcended of baſe Parentage may be admitted, unleſs in him be found ſome noble and excellent Vertue: *Optimus quiſque Nobiliſſimus.* Plato.

Secondly, they ought to be of honeſt Condition, and of good Fame; for that Commonweal is better and more ſecure, where the Prince is not good, than is that where his Miniſters are evil. It ſeemeth therefore that Miniſters ſhould be Men of good Quality and blameleſs: *Emitur ſola virtute poteſtas.* Claud.

Thirdly, Conſideration is to be had of their Capacity and Fitneſs for that Function wherein they are to be uſed; for as ſome Men are apt for Learning, ſo others are naturally diſpoſed to Arms. Alſo, it is neceſſary that every one ſquare with the Office whereunto he is appointed, in which Matter ſome Princes have uſed great Caution; for as they little liked of Men excellent, ſo they utterly deteſted the Vicious; the one they doubted to truſt in regard

regard of themſelves, the other were thought a publick Indignity to the State. Wiſe Men have therefore reſolved that thoſe Wits which are neither over-haughty and ſingular, nor they which be baſe or dull, are fitteſt for Princes Secrets and Services; howſoever we may ſay with *Tacitus: Neſcio quomodo Aulica hæc comitia affectus dirigit, & fato quodam ac ſorte naſcendi, ut cætera, ita principium inclinatio in hos, offenſio in illos eſt.* Tac.

And becauſe the Courſe and Quality of Men's Lives ſerving in Court, is of all other the moſt uncertain and dangerous, great Heed and Circumſpection ought therein to be uſed; for whoſo ſerveth negligently, forgetting the dutiful Endeavours appertaining to the Place, ſeemeth to take a Way of no good Speed. *Quanto quis obſequio promptior, tanto honoribus & epibus extollitur.* Tac.

It ſhall alſo become ſuch a Man to look well unto his own Profit, and behave himſelf rather boldly than baſhfully: *Malus miniſter Regii imperii pudor.* Sen.

To be modeſt, and cloſely to handle all Actions, is alſo a Courſe well beſeeming a Courtier; neither ſhall he do well to attribute any good Succeſs to his own Virtue or Merit, but acknowledge all to proceed from the Prince's Bounty and Goodneſs, by which means, Envy is eſchewed, and the Prince not robbed of his Honour: *Hæc eſt conditio Regum, caſus tantum adverſos hominibus tribuant, ſecundos virtuti ſuæ.* Prov. Emped.

And to conclude theſe Precepts ſummarily, I ſay it behoveth all Miniſters and Servants in Court to be patient, wary, and of few Words: *Fraudum ſedes Aula.* Sen.

CHAP. XV.

The Art of Ruling, or Myſtery of Regiment.

TO govern, is a certain Skill how to command and continue Subjects in due Obedience, ſo as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two ſpecial Things are to be conſidered, *viz.* the Nature of Men, and the Nature of the State; but firſt the Condition of the Vulgar muſt be well conceived: *Noſcenda natura vulgi, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur.* Tac.

The Diſpoſition of Men is divers; ſome are apt to Anger, ſome are hardy, ſome fearful; it therefore behoveth the Prince to accommodate his Government to the Humour of the People whom he governeth: *Principis eſt virtus maxima noſſe ſuos.* Mart.

Likewiſe the Nature of Commonweals is mutable and ſubject to change, and Kings are not only accompanied with Fortune, but alſo followed with Hate, which breedeth a continual Diffidence, chiefly towards thoſe that are neareſt to Majeſty: *Suſpectus ſemper invi-ſuſque dominantibus quiſquis proximus deſtinatur.* Tac.

Moreover the vulgar Sort is generally variable, raſh, hardy, and void of Judgment: *Ex opinione, multa ex veritate pauca judicat.* Cic.

To confirm a Government, Force and Arms are of greateſt Neceſſity; by Force, I mean the Guards and Arms which Princes uſe for their Defence or Ornament: *Miles in foro, Miles in curia principem comitari debet.* Tac.

To this may be added Fortification and ſtrong Buildings, in theſe Days much uſed by new Princes, and others alſo to whom People yield not willing Obedience. In ancient Times, Princes planted Colonies, as well to ſuppreſs Rebellion in conquered Countries, as to front ſuſpected Neighbours: *Coloniæ vera ſedes ſervitutis.* Tac.

The

The Government of Princes is alſo greatly increaſed by a Virtue, which I call a commendable Affection in Subjects, proceeding of Love and Authority: Theſe Effects do grow from the Prince's own Merit, but their Being liveth in the Mind of the People; this Love is gained by Lenity, Liberality, and Mercy; yet is every of them to be tempered: *Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem humilitate captabis.* Plin.

Affection is alſo no way ſooner won than by Liberality, the ſame being uſed with Judgment and Moderation: *Bellorum ſociis, periculorum conſortibus, ſive de te benè ac fortiter——meritis.* Sen.

By Indulgence likewiſe, and Princely Affability, the Love of Men is gained; for the Multitude deſire no more than neceſſary Food, and Liberty to uſe ordinary Recreations: *Vulgo, ſicut pueris, omne ludicrum in pretio eſt.* Sen.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Princely Authority; wherein it conſiſts, and how far to be extended and delegated.

AUthority is a certain reverend Impreſſion in the Minds of Subjects and others touching the Prince's Virtue and Government; it reſteth chiefly in Admiration and Fear: *Ingenita quibuſdam gentibus erga reges ſuos veneratio.* Curt.

Authority conſiſteth in three Things; *viz.* the Form of Government, the Strength of the Kingdom, and the Condition of the Prince; for in them all Reputation and Security reſteth: *Majeſtas imperii, ſalutis tutela.* Curt.

Whoſo deſireth to govern well, it behoveth him to uſe Severity, Conſtancy, and Reſtraint; for overmuch Lenity introduceth Contempt, and certain Hope of Impunity; the Condition of Men being ſuch as cannot be reſtrained by Shame, yet it is to be com-

manded by Fear: *Salutaris ſeveritas vincit inanem ſpeciem clementiæ.* Cic.

Yet ought Severity to be uſed with great Reſpect and ſparingly, becauſe over-great Terror breedeth Deſperation: *Pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat.* Cic.

To govern conſtantly, is nothing elſe but to continue the old and ancient Laws in Force without Change or Innovation, unleſs exceeding great Commodity or urgent Neceſſity ſhall ſo require; for where extreme Puniſhments are uſed, Reformation is always needful: *Nocet interdum priſcus rigor & nimia ſeveritas.* Tac.

Alſo to reſtrain Authority is a Matter of great Neceſſity, and worthy a wiſe Prince; elſe he maketh others Partakers of the Honour and Power to himſelf only due, the ſame being alſo dangerous: *Periculoſum privati hominis nomen ſupra (immò & juxta) principes extolli.* Tac.

It ſeemeth alſo perilous that great Authority given to private Men ſhould be long; for thereby oftentimes they are made inſolent and apt to Innovation: *Libertatis ſive principatus magna cuſtodia eſt, ſi magna imperia diuturna eſſe non ſinas.* Liv.

Authority is alſo reinforced and enlarged by Power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: *Parum tuta ſine viribus majeſtas.* Liv.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Power and Force, and how to be raiſed and maintained.

POWER and Strength is attained by theſe five Ways: Money, Arms, Counſel, Friends, and Fortune; but of theſe the firſt and moſt forcible is Money:

Money: *Nihil tam munitum quod non expugnari pecuniâ poſſit.* Cic.

Next to Money, Arms are of moſt uſe, as well to defend as to offend; to keep, as to conquer; for oftentimes Occaſion is to be offered as well to take from others, as to hold what is our own: *Sua retinere privatæ eſt domus, de alienis certare Regia laus eſt.* Tac.

Alſo of great and neceſſary Uſe is Counſel, to deviſe how Arms ought to be employed or enforced: *Arma concilio temperanda.* Tac.

Likewiſe, Friends and Confederates do greatly increaſe the Virtue of Power, the ſame being ſuch as have both Wit and Ability to aid: *In caducum parietem ne inclina.* Adr.

The laſt, yet not the leaſt Part of Power, conſiſteth in Fortune; whereof daily Experience may be ſeen: for the Succeſs of all human Actions ſeem rather to proceed from Fortune than Virtue: *Omni ratione potentior fortuna.* Curt.

To theſe Particularities concerning Power, we may add the Qualities of the Prince, which greatly grace his Authority; theſe are partly internal, and partly external: By the one I mean the Virtues of the Mind, by the other a certain ſeemly Behaviour and comely Geſture of the Body; of the firſt Kind I do ſuppoſe Piety and Providence to be the chief, for Piety maketh a Prince venerable, and like unto God: *Oportet principem res divinas videri curare ſeriò & ante omnia.* Ariſt.

Providence is a Forecaſt, and likely Conjecture of Things to come, ſuppoſed to be in thoſe Princes that in their Actions proceed ſlowly and circumſpectly; it ſeemeth alſo a Courſe of princely Diſcretion to be retired, and not ordinarily to converſe with many: *Auctoritatem abſentiâ tueare.* Suet.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Conſpiracy and Treaſon; with the Cauſes and Ways of Prevention or Diſcovery.

CONſpiracy is commonly addreſſed to the Prince's Perſon; Treaſons are addreſſed againſt his Government, Authority, Country, Subjects, or Places of Strength. Theſe Miſchiefs are eaſily feared, but hardly eſchewed; for albeit open Enemies are openly encountered, yet Fraud and Subtlety are ſecret Foes, and conſequently not to be avoided: *Occulta pericula neque prævidere neque vitare in promptu eſt.* Salluſt.

The Danger of Conſpiracy proceedeth of divers Cauſes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and Corruption in Soldiers, therefore with great Difficulty to be avoided: *Vitæ tuæ dominus eſt, quiſquis ſuam contempſit.* Sen.

Notwithſtanding it ſeemeth that either by Inquiſition, Puniſhment, Innocency, or Deſtiny, the evil Affection of Men may be oftentimes diſcovered:

1. For whoſo will curiouſly inquire and conſider the Actions and ordinary Speeches of Men (I mean thoſe that be Perſons of Honour and Reputation) may oftentimes vent the Mine that lurketh in the Minds. *Quoniam rarò niſi male loquuti male faciunt.* Lipſ.

2. Puniſhment is likewiſe a thing ſo terrible, that the Conſideration thereof, with the Hope of Reward, doth often diſcover thoſe dangerous Intentions: *Cruciatu aut præmio cuncta pervia ſunt.* Tac.

But as it is Wiſdom in Princes to give Ear to Informers, ſo are they not always to be believed; for Hope, Envy, Hate, or ſome other Paſſion, oftentimes draw them to ſpeak untruly: *Quis innocens eſſe poteſt ſi accuſare ſufficit?* Tac.

3. The third and likelieſt Defence againſt Conſpiracy, is the Prince's own Innocency; for never having injured

injured any Man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject ſo lewd as will endeavour to hurt him: *Fideliſſima cuſtodia principis ipſius innocentia.* Plin.

4. The laſt and beſt Bulwark to withſtand the Force of this Miſchief, we call Deſtiny; which proceeding from the Fountain of divine Providence, may be truly called the Will of God; in whoſe Power it reſteth to protect and defend good Princes: *Ille erit à latere tuo, & cuſtodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris.* Pſal.

Treaſons are moſt commonly enterprized by covetous Perſons, who preferring private Profit before Fame or Fidelity, do not fear to enter into any impious Action: To this Humour ambitious Men, diſſentious, and all ſuch as be deſirous of Innovation, are inclined: *Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava ſtruentes.* Hom.

To theſe Offenders no Puniſhment equal to their impious Merit, can be deviſed, being Perſons odious as well to Friends as Foes: *Preditores etiam in quos anteponunt, inviſi ſunt.* Tac.

CHAP. XIX.

Of publick Hate and Contempt, with the Occaſions and Means to redreſs and avoid it.

HAving briefly touched the Virtues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honour, let ſomething be ſaid of the Cauſes from whence their Ruin doth proceed; the chief whereof ſeemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Fear, which the more common it is, the more dangerous. *Nulla vis imperii tanta eſt, quæ premente metu poſſit eſſe diuturna.* Cic.

The Cauſes of Fear are Puniſhments, Impoſitions, and Rigour; and therefore it behoveth a Prince not only to ſhun them, but to eſchew thoſe Actions where-

by he may reaſonably incur their Suſpicion: *Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint, non minus opinione & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri.* Cic.

Yet Puniſhment, Impoſition, and Cenſure, are in all States neceſſary, although they ſhew and ſeem terrible, and conſequently breed a certain Deſperation in Subjects, unleſs they be diſcreetly and modeſtly uſed; for extreme and frequent Puniſhments taſte of Cruelty; great and many Impoſts ſavour of Covetouſneſs; Cenſure of Manners, when it exceedeth the quality of Offences, doth ſeem Rigour in theſe Matters; therefore it behoveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous, chiefly in capital Puniſhment, which muſt be confined within the Bounds of Juſtice: *Sit apud principem parſimonia etiam viliſſimi ſanguinis.* Sen.

But if for Security ſake the Prince be forced to puniſh, let the ſame be done with ſhew of great Sorrow and Lothneſs: *Tanquam invitus, & magno cum tormento ad caſtigandum veniat.* Sen.

Let all Puniſhments alſo be ſlowly executed; for they that are haſtily puniſhed do ſeem to have been willingly condemned; neither ought any capital Puniſhment to be inflicted, but only that which is profitable to the Commonweal, and for Example ſake. *Non tam ut ipſi pereant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant.* Sen.

In puniſhing alſo, a ſpecial Reſpect muſt be had, that no Shew of Content or Pleaſure be taken therein. *Forma rabiei eſt ſanguine & vulneribus gaudere.* Sen.

Alſo in puniſhing, Equality muſt be obſerved, and the Nature of the Puniſhment according to the Cuſtom. *Nec eiſdem de cauſis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem.* Cic.

But in puniſhing public Offences, wherein a Multitude have part, the Execution ought to be otherwiſe, and as it were at an Inſtant, which may haply ſeem terrible; but in effect is not. *Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit, omnium irritat.* Sen.

Another

Another Means to ſatisfy a People offended, is to puniſh the Miniſters of Cruelty, and with their Blood to waſh away the common Hatred. *Piaculares publici odii victimæ.* Plin. By this King *David* did appeaſe the *Gibeonites.*

The next Cauſe of Diſcontent cometh of Impoſitions, under which Word is comprehended all Levies of Money, a Matter nothing pleaſing to People, as that which they eſteem equal to their own Lives. *Pecunia anima & ſanguis eſt mortalibus.* Plaut.

Firſt, to remove Hate conceived of this Cauſe, there is nothing better than publick Expoſtulation of Neceſſity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? *Nulla quies gentium ſine armis, nec arma ſine ſtipendiis, nec ſtipendia ſine tributis haberi queunt.* Tac.

The ſecond Remedy againſt Hate for Impoſitions, is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as *Tiberius* the Emperor was wont to ſay, a Sheep ſhould be fleeced, not flead. *Qui nimis emungit, elicit ſanguinem.* Tac.

Thirdly, alſo to eſchew the Offence of People, it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant Eye on Informers, Promoters, and ſuch fiſcal Miniſters, whoſe Cruelty and covetous Proceedings do oftentimes occaſion great Hate; but this Miſchief may be, though hardly, encountered, either by chuſing honeſt Officers, or (proving otherwiſe) not only to remove them, but to uſe them as Spunges. *Exprimendi poſtquam biberint.* Suet.

In all Impoſitions or Taxations, no Cruelty or Force ought to be uſed, the ſecond Cauſe to kindle Hate, and to meet with that Miſchief; nothing is better than to proceed moderately, and without Extremity. *Ne boves ipſos, mox agros, poſtremò corpora ſervitio aut pœnæ tradant.* Tac.

The fourth Remedy is the Prince's own Parſimony, not giving ſo largely to private Perſons, as thereby to be

be forced to take from the Multitude. *Magnæ opes non tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, quæruntur.* Mæcenas.

The laſt Help againſt Hate, is in Taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without Favour or Reſpect; and that the Aſſeſſors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner ſort of People. *Populus maximam fidem rerum ſuarum habet.* Tac.

Touching Cenſure, which we numbered amongſt the Cauſes whereof Hate is conceived, much needeth not to be ſpoken, becauſe the ſame is diſcontinued, or rather utterly forgotten; yet doth it ſeem a Thing neceſſary, being a certain Obſervation and Controulment of ſuch evil Manners, and Diſorders, as were not by Law corrigible; theſe Officers were by the *Romans* called *Magiſtri pudoris & modeſtiæ.* Liv.

To the Function of Cenſures, theſe two Things were anciently ſubject, Manners and Exceſs; under Manners I comprehend Wantonneſs, Drunkenneſs, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all ſuch Lewdneſs as Modeſty condemneth. Theſe Diſorders were anciently puniſhed by the Diſcretion of Cenſors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleneſs might be generally avoided. *Univerſa plebs habeat negotia ſua, quibus à malo publico detineatur.* Salluſt.

Exceſs includeth Riotouſneſs, Expence of Money, prodigal Houſe-keeping, Banqueting, and Superfluity in Apparel, which Things are the Mothers of many Miſchiefs. It alſo ſeemeth in ſome ſort perilous to the Prince, that the Subject ſhould exceed either in Coveting or Conſuming. *Nemo nimis excedat, ſive amicorum copiâ, ſive opum.* Ariſt.

The Puniſhment inflicted upon theſe ſorts of Offenders, were either Ignominy, or pecuniary Puniſhments. *Cenſoris judicium damnato nihil affert niſi ruborum.* Tac.

The firſt and chiefeſt Means to remove theſe Inconveniencies, is the Prince's own Example, whoſe Life being

being well cenſured, eaſily reduceth others to Order. *Vita principis cenſura perpetua.* Plin.

Secondly, Thoſe Diſorders may be taken away without Danger, if the Cenſures do proceed by degrees and leiſurely; for the Nature of Man may not ſuddenly be altered. *Vitia quædam tollit facilius princeps, ſi eorum ſit patiens.* Sen.

Theſe are the chiefeſt Rules whereby to eſchew Hate; but impoſſible it is for any Prince or Miniſter utterly to avoid it; for being himſelf good, he incurreth the Offence of all bad Folk: if he be evil, good Men will hate him; this Danger therefore wiſe and virtuous Princes have little regarded; becauſe Hate may be gained as well by good as evil Doing. *Odia qui nimium timet, regnare neſcit.* Sen.

One other Means to remove this Error is, to reward the good and well-deſerving Subjects; for no Man can think him cruel, that for Love to Virtue uſeth Auſterity; which will appear when he beſtoweth bountifully to the good. *Præmio & pœna Reſpublica continetur.* Solon.

The other Vice which endangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt; being a certain baſe and vile Conceit, which entereth into the Subjects, Strangers, or Servants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be reſembled to the Powers of Man's Mind, whereunto the Hands, the Feet, the Eyes, do by Conſent obey. *Vires imperii in conſenſu obedientium ſunt.* Liv.

The Cauſes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the Form of Government, Fortune, or the Prince's Manners; the Form of Government becometh contemptible, when the Prince deſiring to be thought merciful, ruleth rather pitifully than juſtly: which manner of Proceeding, taketh away all Reverence in the People, and in lieu thereof entereth Liberty, or at leaſt a certain Boldneſs to offend. *Facultas faciendi*

quod

quod cuilibet viſum, non poteſt comprimere ingenitam ſingulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.

Alſo to be mutable, irreſolute, light and inconſiderate in beſtowing the Honours and Offices of State, maketh the Prince contemptible. *Qui præſentibus fruitur, nec in longius conſultat.* Ariſt.

But if Contempt be cauſed by Fortune, or as may be ſaid more reaſonably, by Deſtiny, and that thoſe Friends do fail, who ought in Duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there ſmall Hope to eſchew Contempt. *Fato obnoxia virtus.* Plaut.

The Prince's Manners do breed Contempt, when he yieldeth his Affections to Senſuality and Sloth, or if he incur the Suſpicion of Simplicity, Cowardice, or any ſuch Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth: Common People do ſometimes alſo diſeſteem the Prince for external and light Cauſes, as Deformity of Perſon, Sickneſs, or ſuch like. *Mos vulgi eſt, fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere.* Tac.

CHAP. XX.

Of Diffidence and Diſſimulation in the Management of State Affairs.

ALbeit Roundneſs and Plain-dealing be moſt worthy Praiſe, chiefly in private Perſons; yet becauſe all Men in their Actions do not ſo proceed, it behoveth wiſe Men and Princes above others, at occaſions to ſemble and diſſemble; for as in all Actions a Prince ought to be ſlow and adviſed; ſo in Conſent and Believing, Haſte and Facility is moſt dangerous; and though Credulity be rather an Error than a Fault, yet for Princes it is both unfit and perilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this Caution, *Nihil credendo, atque omnia cavendo.* Cic.

Not-

Notwithſtanding he muſt not ſhew himſelf diffident or diſtruſtful utterly; but as I wiſh he ſhould not over-ſlightly believe all Men, ſo ought he not for ſmall Cauſes diſtruſt every Man: *Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli.* Sen.

Diſſimulation is as it were begotten by Diffidence, a Quality in Princes of ſo great Neceſſity, as moved the Emperor *Tiberius* to ſay, *Neſcit regnare, qui neſcit diſſimulare.*

The Neceſſity of Diſſimulation, is chiefly to be uſed with Strangers and Enemies: it alſo ſheweth a certain Diſcretion in Magiſtrates, ſometimes to diſguiſe with Friends when no Offence doth thereof follow: *Doli non ſunt doli, niſi æſtu colas.* Plaut.

This kind of Craft albeit in every Man's Conceit not praiſable, is nevertheleſs tolerable; and for Princes and Magiſtrates (the ſame being uſed to good Ends) very neceſſary. But thoſe Cunnings which are contrary to Virtue, ought not of honeſt Men to be uſed; neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption, though they be often uſed in Court, and are of ſome learned Writers allowed: *Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia eſt.* Plin.

By great Subtilty and Frauds contrary to Virtue and Piety, I mean Perjury and Injuſtice, which though all Men in Words deteſt, yet in Deeds are uſed of many, perſuading themſelves by Civillations and Sophiſtications to excuſe the Impiety of their falſe Oaths: as it is written of *Lyſander: Pueros talis, viros juramentis circumvenire ſolebat.* Plut.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of War Defenſive and Invaſive: with Inſtructions touching Laws of Arms, Soldiers, and Military Diſcipline.

THE Art Military is of all other Qualities moſt neceſſary for Princes; for without it they cannot be defended; Force of Men only ſufficeth not, unleſs the ſame be governed by Council, and martial Wiſdom: *Duo ſunt quibus reſp. ſervatur; in hoſtes fortitudo, & domi concordia.* Tac.

Military Knowledge concerneth War, and every War is either Foreign or Domeſtical: Touching Foreign, it muſt be conſidered when it muſt be begun, how to continue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is to take heed that the Cauſe be juſt, and the Enterprize adviſedly entered into: *Sunt enim & belli ſicut pacis jura, juſteque ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes.* Liv.

The Laws of Arms, are in all Commonweals to be duly obſerved: for to enter Fight raſhly and without Reſpect to Reaſon, were beaſtly; alſo to kill or ſlay would work no better Effect, than that all Nations ſhould without Mercy murther one another: *Barbaro ritu cædem cæde, & ſanguinem ſanguine expiare.* Sal.

No War therefore is to be made, but ſuch as is juſt. And in every juſt War theſe three Things are to be looked into, *(viz)* that the Author be of Authority, that the Cauſe be good, and the End juſt; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the Sovereignty reſteth, are the juſt Authors of War: others have no ſuch Authority: *Si quis privatim ſine publico ſcito, pacem bellumve fecerit, capitale eſto.* Plato.

Wars are of two ſorts: Defenſive and Offenſive; the one to reſiſt, the other to invade; againſt Defence nothing can be ſaid, becauſe it is natural and neceſſary:

Eſt

Eſt non modo juſtum ſed etiam neceſſarium cum vi vis illata defenditur. Cic.

Defenſive War is of two ſorts, either to defend thine own, or thy Friends; for it is Reaſon that every one ſhould keep ſecurely that which to him appertaineth: and therewith alſo by Arms to defend the Liberty of Country, Parents, and Friends: *Nullum bellum à civitate ſuſcipitur, niſi aut pro fide aut pro ſalute.* Cic.

The like Reaſon leadeth us to aſſiſt and protect Friends; for the common Obligation of human Society doth ſo require: *Qui enim non obſiſtit, ſi poteſt, injuriæ, tam eſt in vitio, quam ſi parentes aut patriam, aut ſocios deſerat.* Cic.

Invaſion is alſo juſt and allowable, but not ever; for whoſo hath been robbed, or ſpoiled of his Lands or Goods, may lawfully ſeek Repoſſeſſion by Force: yet ſo, as before any Force be uſed, he firſt civilly ſeek Reſtitution, wherein if Juſtice be denied, then is the uſe of Arms neceſſary: *Juſtum bellum quibus neceſſarium; & pia arma quibus nulla niſi in armis relinquitur ſpes.* Liv.

Likewiſe Invaſion is lawful againſt Barbarians, whoſe Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred, chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend; for the Cauſe of ſuch War is Compulſion and Suppreſſion of Evil: *Cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur.* Auguſt.

Finally, To conclude this Matter of Invaſion, I ſay, that no Revenge, no Deſire of Honour or Empire, are any lawful Cauſes of War; but the Intent thereof ought to be directed only to Defence and Security: For wiſe Men do take Arms to win Peace, and in Hope of Reſt they endure Travel: *Ita bellum ſuſcipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quæſita videatur.* Cic.

Having ſaid ſomewhat againſt unjuſt War, let us ſpeak of Temerity and unadviſed War, an Enterprize worthy Diſcommendation: *Omnes bellum ſumunt facile, ægerrimè*

egerrimè desinunt; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est. Sal.

A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful Invasion, nor without sober and mature Deliberation enter into any War, as he that is unwilling to offend, yet of Courage enough to defend: *Nec provoces bellum, nec timeas.* Plin.

To make War, three Things are required; Money, Men, and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council are needful: Therefore a wise Prince, before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what Forces and Charge thereunto belongeth: *Diu apparandum est bellum, ut vincas melius.* Pub.

Above all other Provisions, Care must be had, that Bread be not wanting; for without it, neither Victory nor Life can be looked for: *Qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non præparat, vincitur sine ferro.* Vegetius.

Lastly, it behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readiness, I mean Harness, Horses, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder, and every other Thing necessary either for Service on Horse or Foot: We may add hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all sorts, with every Furniture of Offence or Defence: For these Preparations make a Prince formidable, because no Man dare do, or attempt Injury to that King or People, where Preparation is ever ready to revenge: *Qui desiderat pacem, præparat bellum.* Cass.

By Men we mean a Multitude of Subjects armed, trained to defend or offend: These are of two sorts, Captains and Soldiers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horsemen; the one of great use in the Champain, the other in mountainous Places; also for Defence or Assault of Towns, or Grounds fortified most necessary, and consequently meet for Service in all Places, which moved *Tacitus* to say, *Omne in pedite robur.* Tac.

For sudden Service, Horses do seem most meet, and the Execution of any Enterprize is by them most speedily

ſpeedily performed: Nevertheleſs the Actions of Footmen do ſeem more certainly executed, chiefly if they be well armed, and ſkilfully led; for ſo Experience hath of late time proved; beſides, that they are of leſs Expence and of greater Number: *In univerſum æſtimanti plus in pedite robur.* Tac.

Having thus proved, that both Horſe and Foot be neceſſary; let us remember, that unleſs they be ſerviceable, great Numbers are to ſmall Purpoſe: *Manibus opus eſt bello, non multis nominibus.* Liv.

To make Soldiers ſerviceable, conſiſteth in good Choice and good Diſcipline; the one at this Day little regarded: *Emunt militem, non legunt.* Liv.

Soldiers ought to be elected out of the moſt honeſt and able Number of Bodies; and every Company compoſed of Men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more confident: But hereof is ſmall heed taken; for commonly they are *Purgamenta urbium ſuarum.* Curt.

Touching Diſcipline, it ſeemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Subſtance is obſerved: For as in former Ages, Soldiers endeavoured to be virtuous and modeſt, ſo now they rather ſtudy to excel in Riot, than in martial Knowledge: *Exercitus lingua quam manu promptior, prædator eſt ſociis, & ipſe præda hoſtium.* Sal.

For as much as Soldiers are made good by Election and Choice, it ſeemeth that the Foundation and Ground of Service, conſiſteth in the Diſcretion and Judgment of thoſe that have Authority to make Election; yet will we add, that they muſt be choſen of natural Subjects, for Strangers are covetous, and conſequently corruptible; they are alſo mutinous and cowardly: Their Cuſtom likewiſe is to rob, burn, and ſpoil both Friends and Foes, and to conſume the Prince's Treaſure: *Oſſa vides regum vacuis exſucta medullis.* Juven.

But the Native Soldier is faithful and obedient, reſolute in Fight, loving to his Country, and loyal to his Prince: *Gentes quæ ſub regibus ſunt, pro Deo colunt.* Curt.

Native Soldiers are of two ſorts, *viz.* They that be in continual Pay, and they that are trained ready to ſerve, but do notwithſtanding attend their own private Affairs, until they be called: The firſt are for all Princes neceſſary: *In pace decus, in bello præſidium.* Tac.

Of this ſort no great Number ought to be, as well to eſchew Diſorder, as alſo to ſave Expences. The ſecond kind of Foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as People more patient of Pains, and fit for the Wars; yet ſo judiciouſly diſpoſed as the Citizens: *Odio præſentium & non cupidine mutationis.* Tac.

Touching the Number of theſe extraordinary Soldiers, that muſt be referred to Diſcretion: *Bellum parare, ſimul & ærario parcere.*

To conclude, I ſay theſe Numbers of ordinary and extraordinary Foot, ought to be according to the number of the People, not inſerting any Gentlemen; for Service on Horſeback is to them only proper: *Alas ruſticis non tribuo; in nobilitatem & in divites hæc à pauperibus onera inclines.* Liv.

The moſt certain Notes whereby to conceive the Diſpoſition of Men fit to become Soldiers, are theſe five: The Country where they are born, their Age, proportion of Body, their Quality of Mind, and their Faculty. Touching

Firſt, The Country, it is a Thing apparently proved, that mountainous Regions, or barren Places, and Northern Habitations do breed Wits well diſpoſed to the War: *Locorum aſperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat.* Curt.

Secondly, The Age moſt apt for the War, was anciently obſerved to be about eighteen Years, and ſo the

the *Romans* uſed: *Facilius eſt ad virtutem inſtruere novos milites, quàm revocare præteritos.* Veget.

Thirdly, The Stature of a Soldier ought to be obſerved: *Marius* liked beſt the longeſt Bodies; *Pyrrhus* preferred large and well proportioned Men; but *Vegetius* in his Choice, rather eſteems Strength than Stature: *Utilius eſt fortes milites eſſe quàm grandes.* Veget.

Fourthly, the Mind or Spirit of a Soldier ought to be conſidered, for that Mind which is quick, nimble, bold, and confident, ſeemeth apt for War: He is alſo of good Hope, that loveth Honour more than Eaſe or Profit: In brief, *Is qui nihil metuit niſi turpem famam.* Sal.

Laſtly, it is to be marked in what Art or Faculty a Man hath been bred: for it may be preſumed that Fiſhers, Fowlers, Cooks, and others, trained up in effeminate Arts, are unfit for martial Endeavour. And as theſe Men were in reſpect of their Trade, thought unmeet; ſo in old time, Slaves, and maſterleſs Men were repulſed from Arms, as Perſons infamous: *Sed nunc tales ſociantur armis quales Domini habere faſtidiunt.* Veget.

How Soldiers ought to be choſen, theſe few Words we have ſpoken, may ſuffice. Let us therefore ſay ſomewhat of Diſcipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Diſcipline doth make and continue them fit for Service: *Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, bona inſtitutione plures reddat induſtria.* Veget.

Diſcipline is a certain ſevere Confirmation of Soldiers in their Valour and Virtue, and is performed by four Means, Exerciſe, Order, Compulſion, and Example. The two firſt appertain to Valour, the third to Virtue, the laſt to both: But of Exerciſe, firſt, I ſay, that a Soldier being choſen, ought to be informed in Arms, and uſed in Exerciſe and Action; the Word *Exercitium* importeth nothing elſe: *Exercitus dicitur, quod melius fit exercitando.* Varro.

Order conſiſteth in dividing, diſpoſing, and placing of Men aptly at all Occaſions to be commanded, as the Leaders ſhall direct: This Matter requireth a large Diſcourſe, and therefore I refer it to ſkilful Captains and Writers, as *Polybius*, *Vegetius*, *De la Nonne*, and others.

Compulſion and Correction, is that which bridleth and governeth the Manners of Soldiers: For no Order can be obſerved amongſt them, unleſs they be continent, modeſt, and abſtinent; for Continency is chiefly to be ſhewed in their Diet, and moderate Deſires: *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles aſſuetudine voluptatum.* Tac.

The Modeſty of a Soldier is perceived by his Words, Apparel, and Actions: For to be a Vaunter, or vainglorious Boaſter, is far unfit in him that profeſſeth Honour or Arms, ſeeing true Virtue is ſilent: *Viri militiæ nati, factis magni, ad verborum linguæque certamina, rudes.* Tac.

The Apparel of a Soldier ſheweth Modeſty, if therein he doth not exceed; for albeit it fitteth well the Profeſſion of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all Superfluity ſavoureth of Ignorance or Vanity: *Horridum militem eſſe decet, non cælatum auro argentoque, ſed ferro.* Liv.

Abſtinence is alſo fit for all Soldiers, for thereby guided, they refrain from Violence, and Inſolency; by that Rule alſo they are informed to govern themſelves civilly in the Country where they ſerve, and likewiſe in their Lodgings: Never taking any thing from the Owner, nor committing any Outrage: *Vivant cum provincialibus jure civili, nec inſoleſcat animus qui ſe ſenſit armatum.*

The laſt Mark of Diſcipline we called Example, under which Word is comprehended Reward and Puniſhment: For Men are rewarded whenſoever they receive for any excellent or ſingular Service, Honour, or Riches: And for Evil they have their due when they taſte the Puniſh-

Puniſhment thereunto belonging : *Neceſſarium eſt acrius ille dimicet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiæ & imperatoris judicium conſuevit evehere.* Veget.

Likewiſe as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deſerving Soldiers ; ſo Puniſhment is due to thoſe that be vicious and cowardly ; for nothing holdeth Soldiers in Obedience ſo much as the Severity of Diſcipline : *Milites imperatorem potius quam hoſtem metuere debent.* Veg.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Generals and Commanders, and their requiſite Abilities in martial Enterpriſes and Expeditions.

OF Soldiers let this little ſuffice; we will now ſpeak of what Quality Chieftains and Leaders ought to be ; for upon them dependeth the Welfare of whole Armies : *Militaris turba ſine duce, corpus ſine ſpiritu.* Curt.

A Chief or General in War, is either of his own Authority Chief, or a General that commandeth in the Name of another. Of the firſt Sort are Emperors, Kings, and Princes ; of the other, be their Deputies, Lieutenants, Colonels, and indeed all general Commanders in the War : Now whether it be more expedient that the Prince ſhould command in Perſon or by Deputy, divers wiſe Men have diverſly thought, therefore it may be thus diſtinguiſhed ; if the War do then only concern ſome particular Part or Province, then may the ſame be performed by a Lieutenant ; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own Perſon, and not otherwiſe : *Dubiis bellorum exemplis ſummæ rerum & imperii ſeipſum reſervat.* Tac.

It therefore importeth the Prince ſometimes by his own Preſence, ſometimes by his Deputation, to per-

form that Office: but however occaſion ſhall require, it ever behoveth that one only Commander ought to be; (for Plurality of Chieftains doth rarely or never work any good Effect) yet with this Caution, that he be of Experience and wiſe: *In bellica præfectura major aſpectus habendus peritiæ quam virtutis aut morum.* Ariſt.

The Qualities required in a Chieftain, are theſe: Skill, Virtue, Providence, Authority, and Fortune. By Skill, we mean he ſhould be of great Knowledge, and long Experience; for to make a ſufficient Captain, the Information of others, or his own reading is not enough: *Qui norit quis ordo agminis, quæ cura exploandi, quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus.* Cic.

Military Virtue is a certain Vigour or Force both of Body and Mind, to exerciſe Soldiers as well in feigned War as to fight with the Enemy; and ſummarily a Captain ought to be *Laborioſus in negotio, fortis in periculo, induſtrius in agendo, celeris in conficiendo.* Cic.

Next to Virtue we placed Providence as neceſſary in great Captains; for being of ſuch Wiſdom they will not hazard nor commit more to Fortune than Neceſſity ſhall inforce; yet true it is, Fools and vulgar Folks that commend or diſcommend Actions according to Succeſs, were wont to ſay: *Cunctatio ſervilis; ſtatim exequi, Regium eſt.* But adviſed and provident Captains do think: *Temeritas præterquam quod ſtulta, eſt etiam infelix.* Liv.

Albeit Providence be the beſt Means of good Speed, yet ſome Captains of that Quality and in Skill excelling, have been in their Actions unlucky; when others of leſs Sufficiency have marvellouſly prevailed; we may therefore reaſonably ſay with *Cicero, Quod olim Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario & ceteris magnis Imperatoribus, non ſolum propter virtutem, ſed etiam propter fortunam ſæpius imperia mandata, atque exercitus eſſe commiſſos.* Cic.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, we wiſhed Authority to be in Chieftains; for it greatly importeth what Opinion or Conceit the Enemy hath of ſuch a Governor, and likewiſe how much his Friends and Confederates do eſteem him: but the chief and only Means to maintain Authority, is Auſterity and Terror: *Dux autoritatem maximam ſeveritate ſumat, omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet, nulli errantium credatur ignoſcere.* Veget.

Alſo, Experience hath proved that ſuch Chieftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they incur a Contempt: but on the other ſide thoſe that commanded ſeverely and terribly, although they gained no Good-will, yet were they ever obeyed: *Dux facilis inutilis.* App.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Councils in War, and Directions tactic and ſtratagematic, with Advice how to make an honourable Peace.

AFter Men found and framed fit for the War, to ſmall or no Purpoſe ſhall they ſerve, unleſs they be employed by Wiſdom or good Council: *Non minus eſt Imperatoris conſilio quam vi perficere.* Tac.

Council in War is of two Sorts; direct Council and indirect; the firſt ſheweth a plain and orderly Courſe for proceeding, as to lay hold on Occaſion: for as in all other human Actions, Occaſion is of great Force: *Occaſio in bello ſolet amplius juvare quam virtus.* Veget.

As Occaſions preſented are Means of good Succeſs; ſo Fame worketh great Effects in the Wars; therefore it behoveth a Captain to be conſtant, and not apt to believe the vain Rumours and Reports of Men: *Male imperatur, cum regit vulgus duces ſuos.* Sen.

Confidence is alſo to be eſchewed, for no Man is ſooner ſurpriſed, than he who feareth leaſt; alſo, Contempt of the Enemy hath been occaſion of great

Diſcomfitures; therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, ſo ſhould he not contemn his Enemy: *Nimia fiducia ſemper obnoxia.* Æmil.

As Security, and over-much Eſtimation of our own Virtue or Valour is hurtful; ſo doth it import every good Captain to be well informed, not only of his own Forces, but alſo of what Strength the Enemy is: Likewiſe, it behoveth him to know the Situation of the Country and the Quality of the People, with every other Circumſtance. Moreover, the General's Honour and Capacity ought to be known with the Condition and Nature of the Enemy: *Impetus acres cunctatione langueſcunt, aut in perfidiam mutantur.* Tac.

Temerity in War is alſo dangerous; for wiſe Captains were wont not to enterpriſe any thing without Deliberation and good Opportunity, unleſs they were thereunto by Neceſſity inforced: *In rebus aſperis & tenui ſpe, fortiſſima quaque conſilia tutiſſima ſunt.* Liv.

Some wiſe Men, not ſuperſtitiouſly but diſcreetly, do think prodigious Signs from Heaven or on Earth are not to be neglected, neither are Dreams in time of War to be contemned: *Nam amat benignitas numinis, ſeu quod merentur homines, ſeu quod tangitur eorum affectione, his quoque rationibus prodere quæ impendent.* Æmil.

A wiſe Captain will alſo wait Opportunities, and ſpy out fit Time when the Enemy is wearied; or pretending Fear, draw him into Danger; which Advantages, with many other, are gained chiefly by obſerving of Time: *Quia ſi in occaſionis momento, cujus prætervolat opportunitas cunctatus paulum fueris, nequicquam mox omiſſam quærere.* Liv.

Next the Obſervation of Time, the Place is to be well conſidered, whether it be for thine Advantage or thine Enemy's: *Amplius prodeſt locus ſæpè quam virtus.* Veget.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, It importeth much, that Men be well ordered, trained, and prepared for the Fight; for the want of Art is cauſe of many Diſadventures, and many times a ſmall Supply of choice Soldiers on Horſe-back or Foot, doth ſeem to the Enemy very terrible: Likewiſe, a ſudden Shout or Conceit hath amazed a whole Army: *Milites vanis & inanibus, magis quam juſtis formidinis cauſis moventur.* Curt.

Fourthly, It were to good Purpoſe, that in ordering of Men for Fight, Soldiers of one Country or Nation, ſhould be ranged together, and above all to foreſee, that the leaſt Loſs of Blood be among the natural Subjects, and ſo handle the Matter, that the chief Slaughter light upon Strangers and Mercenaries: *Ingens victoriæ decus, citra domeſticum ſanguinem bellanti.* Tac.

The General's own Courage and lively Diſpoſition to fight, will greatly animate the Multitude of Soldiers; as a contrary Countenance or Appearance of Fear, will exceedingly maze and daunt: *Neceſſe eſt ad fugam parati ſint, qui ducem ſuum ſentiunt deſperare.* Veget.

It were alſo for thy great Advantage, that the Forces ſhould be ordered for the Fight before the Enemy be prepared.

Firſt, For that thou may'ſt the better perform what thou thinkeſt fit to be done.

Secondly, That thereby thine own Forces will thereof receive great Courage, being readieſt to aſſail the Enemy, and to begin the Fight: *Plus animi eſt inferenti periculum, quam propulſanti.* Liv.

After Victory, it is not the beſt Policy to execute the Enemies with extreme Cruelty, but proceed moderately; for it ſhall ſuffice the Victory is thine: *Clauſis ex deſperatione creſcit audacia, & cum ſpei nihil eſt, ſumit arma formido.* Veget.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, I would adviſe that the General ſhould be wary in his Actions, and in every Enterprize to fruſtrate the Soldiers from Spoils and Pillage: *Sæpe obſtitit vincentibus pravum inter ipſos certamen, omiſſo hoſte ſpolia conſectandi.* Tac.

Of direct Councils, let that we have ſaid ſuffice. We will now ſpeak of Councils indirect, commonly called by the *Greek* Word *Stratagems* or *Subtile Practices:* Which manner of Proceeding, hath been in times paſt of divers grave Writers condemned: *Vir nemo mentis altæ clanculum velit occidere hoſtem.* Eurip.

Notwithſtanding the Opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy Credit, it ſeemeth reaſonable, and in Piety allowable, that Stratagems and Subtilties may be uſed in the War, yet with ſuch Caution as the ſame may ſtand with Fidelity and Honour: for Fraud being uſed contrary to Contracts and Agreements made with the Enemy, is mere Treachery: As to poiſon him or her, a Murtherer to kill him, were plain Impiety: *Fœderatum injuſtè fallere impium.* Liv.

Alſo, out of the War covertly to kill a particular Enemy by ſecret Aſſault or Practice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honour; yet to uſe all Craft, Cunning, and Subtilty in open War, is both allowable and praiſable; and ſo is thought by Chriſtian Writers: *Cum juſtum bellum ſuſcipitur, ut apertè pugnet quis aut ex inſidiis, nihil ad juſtitiam intereſt.* Aug.

The ſame is alſo approved by divers Authors of good Credit: *Confiſce ſive dolo ſeu ſtricto comminus enſe.* The ſame is alſo affirmed by *Xenophon, Reipſa nihil utilius in bello dolis.*

Thus having briefly touched what Councils are required in War, let us conſider how Victory is to be uſed; for the End of every good War is Peace: To the enjoying whereof, three Things are required, Warineſs, Mercy, and Modeſty; becauſe over-great Confidence may happily impeach the End of good Succeſs. *Res ſecundæ negligentiam creant.* Liv.

I alſo

I alſo wiſh the Victory to be handled mercifully, becauſe all Conqueſts are in their own Nature cruel enough. And the Ire of inſolent Soldiers, forces the Conquered to become deſperate: *Graviſſime morſus irritatæ neceſſitatis.* Curt.

To proceed modeſtly, is alſo an honourable Quality in him that conquereth: For in proſperous Fortunes, Men do hardly refrain covetous and proud Doings; yea, ſome good and great Captains have in like Caſes forgotten what did beſt become them: *In rebus ſecundis etiam egregii duces inſoleſcunt.* Tac.

After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Government could ſtand: Therefore how great, or how long ſoever the War be, the end muſt be Peace; the Name whereof is not only ſweet, but alſo comfortable: *Pax una triumphis innumeris potior.*

Peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious, but alſo to thoſe that are victored: *Pacem reduci velle victori, expedit, victo neceſſe eſt.* Tac.

Nevertheleſs until good and honourable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid aſide: Wherein I wiſh *Tully*'s Advice to be followed: *Bellum gerendum eſt; ſi bellum omittemus, pace nunquam fruemur.* Liv.

In Treaty of Peace, two Things muſt be conſidered: Firſt, that the Conditions be honourable. To condeſcend to any baſe Conditions, is unto a princely Mind not only great Indignity, but alſo intolerable: *Cum dignitate potius cadendum, quam cum ignominia ſerviendum.* Plut.

It alſo importeth, the Peace ſhould be ſimple, true, and unfeigned; for all feigned and diſſembling Amity is to be doubted: *Pace ſuſpecta tutius eſt bellum.* Mith.

The fitteſt Seaſon to ſpeak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or during the Time that the Enemies be of equal Force; for if the War continueth, it muſt behove the weaker to yield to Neceſſity: Not unlike

like the Shipmaſter, who to ſave himſelf doth caſt the greateſt Part of his Loading into the Sea: *Neceſſitati pare, quam ne dii quidem ſuperant.* Liv.

Finally, having generouſly defended thy ſelf, and performed all Things required in a magnanimous Captain, and finding nevertheleſs thy Force inſufficient, it cannot be diſhonourable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aſide Hatred and Hope, which are but weak Supporters, thou may'ſt recommend thee and thine to the approved Diſcretion of an honourable Enemy: *Victores ſecundæ res in miſerationem ex ira vertunt.* Liv.

Now for as much as every Peace promiſeth Reſt and Quiet, as well to the Victorious as to the Victored; we may add thereunto, that the Prince victorious receiveth thereby Honour, Profit, and Security. For although his Happineſs may occaſion Hope of greater Succeſs; yet in reſpect of Fortune's Mutability, it ſhall be good and glorious to liſten to Peace: *Decorum principi eſt cum victoriam propè in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere, ut ſciant omnes te & ſuſcipere juſtè bellum & finire.* Liv.

It ſeemeth alſo the more honourable; for whoſo is victorious, doth give Peace and not take it: He alſo ſheweth himſelf diſcreet by uſing a Moderation in Victory, and no Extremity in ſpoiling, which our wiſe and godly Writers have commended: *Pacem contemnentes, & gloriam appetentes, pacem perdunt & gloriam.* Bern.

Peace is alſo profitable for the Victorious, becauſe continual War breedeth Wearineſs, and of violent Proceeding Deſperation and Peril cometh: *Maximi & mortiferi morſus eſſe ſolent morientium beſtiarum.* Sen.

Likewiſe Peace is more aſſured than any Victory: Hope of the one is in thine own Power; the other in the hand of God: Add thereunto the Force of Fortune, which hath great Power in all human Actions: *In rebus ſecundis nihil in quenquam ſuperbè ac violenter conſulere decet, nec præſenti credere fortunæ, cum quid veſper ferat, incertus ſis.* Sen.

Alſo

Alſo Conditions of Peace ought to be reaſonable and freely beſtowed: For no People can live contented under ſuch a Law as forceth them to loath the State wherein they are: *Miſera pax bello benè mutatur.* Sen.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Civil War, with the Cauſes and Remedies thereof.

THE greateſt and moſt grievous Calamity that can come to any State, is Civil War; for therein Subjects take Arms againſt their Prince, or among themſelves, whereof followeth a Miſery more lamentable than can be deſcribed: *Non ætas, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus ſtupra cædibus, & cædes ſtupris miſceantur.* Tac.

The firſt Cauſe of Civil War proceedeth of Deſtiny, for God in his own divine Providence, foreſeeth many Years before, that great and mighty Empires ſhall be ruined.

In ſe magna ruunt: lætis hinc numina rebus
Creſcendi poſuere modum ——— Lucan.

The ſecond Cauſe is Exceſs, Riot, and diſſolute Life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury ſo ſoon as over-great Happineſs; alſo pompous Apparel, Banqueting, and prodigal Spending, conſumeth Riches, and Plenty is turned into Poverty; for by theſe means are Men brought into Deſperation: *Rapaciſſimo cuique ac perditiſſimo, non agri aut fœnus, ſed ſola inſtrumenta vitiorum manebunt.* Tac.

Now to conſider how Deſtiny might be eſchewed, were in vain: For ſuch a Remedy no Wit or Wiſdom can deviſe; being the Decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable: *Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem ſemper loco ſtare fortunam.* Sen.

There is nothing exempt from the Peril of Mutation; the Earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto ſubject:

ſubject: *Certis eunt cuncta temporibus; naſci debent, creſcere, extingui.* Sen.

Touching the ſecond Cauſes of Civil War, ſome Remedies may be uſed, becauſe it proceedeth of Faction, Sedition, or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain Aſſociation of divers Perſons, combined to the Offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or public Diſpleaſure, and more often of Ambition: *Nemo eorum qui in Rep. verſantur, quos vincat, ſed à quibus vincatur, aſpicit.* Sen.

1. Factions are of two ſorts; for either they conſiſt of many or of few Perſons: both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take Arms; and that Party which proveth weakeſt, prayeth Arms of foreign Forces.

2. The other Faction wherein are fewer Partakers, be commonly great Perſonages, or Men of more Importance than ordinary People; and that proveth moſt perilous and bloody: *Nobilium factiones trahunt ad ſe, & in partes, univerſum etiam populum.* Ariſt.

Albeit ſome wiſe Men have held Opinion that Factions are neceſſary, yet cannot that Conceit be reaſonably maintained, unleſs it be upon Confines, and in ſuch Places where Conſpiracy is feared, which *Cato* in his private Family uſed: *Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut diſſenſum inter ſervos callidè ſerebat, ſuſpectam habens nimiam concordiam eorum, metuenſque.* Plut.

Factions amongſt the Nobility, are ſometimes ſuppreſſed by forbidding Colours, or unknown Badges to be worn; alſo to inhibit Names or Watch-words of Mutinies is neceſſary, which was *Mecænas'* Counſel to *Auguſtus*; and *Ariſtotle* thinketh it fit, that Laws ſhould be made againſt the Factions of Noblemen: *Nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari.* Ariſt.

Another Cauſe of Civil War, we call Sedition, which is a ſudden Commotion or Aſſembly of common People, againſt their Prince or his Magiſtrates; the Origi-

nal

nal of which Diſorders may proceed of divers Cauſes, but chiefly of Oppreſſion: *Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipſa pericula arbitrari.* Ariſt.

Again, Fear may be the Occaſion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done Injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is deſirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed alſo of over-great Mildneſs in Government: *Non miſeriis ſed licentia, tantum concitum turbarum, laſcivire magis plebem quàm ſævire.* Liv.

Sedition many times ariſeth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whoſe Arts are grown out of uſe, and conſequently no means whereof they can live: *Semper in civitate, quibus opes nullæ ſunt, bonis invident, vetera odêre, nova expetunt, odia rerum ſuarum mutari omnia ſtudent.* Sab.

Laſtly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Inſolency, or mutinous Diſpoſition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ringleaders of the People: For albeit the Multitude is apt to Innovation, yet doth it ſtand firm, until ſome firſt Mover taketh the Matter in hand: *Multitudo omnis, ſicut mare, per ſe immobilis.* Liv.

Of theſe Movers ſome are ambitious, who wanting other Means to aſpire, hope by Practice of Sedition, to compaſs their Deſigns; or elſe they are Unthrifts, who having conſumed their own, ſeek by Violence to poſſeſs themſelves of other Men's: Or elſe they are vain and light Perſons, that without Cauſe or Reaſon attempt Innovation, themſelves know not for what: *Non tam præmiis periculorum, quàm ipſis periculis læti, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambigua, ancipitia malunt.*

Thus having told the Cauſes of Sedition, I wiſh the Remedies were prepared: *Omne malum naſcens facilè opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robuſtius.* Cic.

The firſt way to ſuppreſs Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent Perſuaſion, which oftentimes worketh great Effects among the Multitude; chiefly when it proceed-

eth

eth from ſome reverend and grave Perſon, for his Wiſdom and Integrity of Life honoured: For the Prince himſelf is not to take this Office in hand, unleſs Neceſſity ſo inforce: *Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis ſervetur.* Tac.

If Perſuaſion cannot prevail, then Force muſt compel: But before ſuch violent Proceedings, uſe Art and Cunning either to appeaſe the People, or at leaſt to diſunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and promiſe plauſibly: *Verba apud populum plurimum valent.* Tac,

It is lawful alſo in ſuch Caſes for Princes to uſe Subtilty; and the ſame not prevailing, to waſh away the Stain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms are laid down, and every one yielded, general Puniſhment were needleſs: *Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum ſit pœna.* Tac.

The laſt Cauſe of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceeding the Laws of God and Nature. The Difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one employeth Arms in Defence of Peace, the other uſeth them to terrify thoſe of whom his Cruelty hath deſerved Hate: *Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falſis nominibus imperium, atque ubi ſolitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant.* Tac.

The Quality of Tyrants is to eſteem Promoters more than good Miniſters, becauſe thoſe Men are the Scourge of infinite others. They are alſo Protectors of impious Perſons, and ſtand in daily doubt of noble and virtuous Men: *Nobilitas, opes, amiſſi geſtique honores, pro crimine: et ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium.* Tac.

Tyrants do alſo endeavour to ſuppreſs the Knowledge of Letters and civil Life, to the End all good Arts ſhall be exiled, and Barbariſm introduced: *Pellunt ſapientiæ profeſſores, & omnes bonas artes in exilium agunt.* Tac.

Theſe and ſuch like, be the Conditions of Tyrants, who for the moſt part are depoſed and ſlain; for as

Kings

Kings live long, and deliver their Dominions to their Children and Poſterity, ſo Tyrants being feared and hated of all Men, cannot continue in their Eſtate.

Ad generum Cereris ſine cæde & vulnere pauci
Deſcendunt reges & ſicca morte Tyranni. Juven.

The Remedies of theſe Miſchiefs which proceed from the Violence of ſuch a Prince, are Perſecution or Patience. Many generous Spirits have uſed the firſt; perſuading themſelves rather to die, than endure the Sight of a Tyrant. Alſo the *Grecians* did think it a Service acceptable, to murder the Perſon of ſuch an impious Prince: *Græci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt.* Cic.

Nevertheleſs, in Chriſtian Conſideration the other Courſe is to be taken: Let Patience therefore encounter this Miſchief; for ſeeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good, be ſent by God, they muſt be endured: *Res eſt gravis occidere regalem ſtirpem.* Homer.

Perſecution is not only perilous, but for the moſt part unfortunate: For thereof preſent Revenge is taken by that Prince that ſucceedeth: *Facinoris ejus ultor eſt, quiſquis ſucceſſerit.* Tac.

The Murder of Tyrants is alſo followed with many Inconveniencies, worſe than Civil War itſelf: *Principes boni, votis expetendi, qualeſcunque tolerandi.* Tac.

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are neceſſarily to be ſuffered: So evil Princes in their Covetouſneſs and Cruelty, ought to be patiently endured, becauſe their Office is to command, and Subjects muſt obey: *Indigna, digna habenda ſunt, Rex quæ facit.* Sen.

And as it is the uſe of vulgar People to find Faults in the long Reign of Princes; ſo the Ambition of great Subjects is deſirous of Novelty: *Præſens imperium ſubditis ſemper grave.* Thucyd.

To conclude, we ſay that the beſt Remedy againſt Tyranny, is Patience: For ſo long as Men are, ſo long will Vices be: *Regum ingenia toleranda, neque uſui crebræ mutationes.* Tac.

CHAP. XXV.

A Collection of Political Obſervations, (confirmed by Reaſon and Experience) adverti ſing Princes, Stateſmen, and private Perſons, how to demean themſelves in all Fortunes and Events.

TO the Perfections of Men, three Things are neceſſarily required; Nature, Nurture, and Uſe: The firſt giveth Capacity, Aptneſs, and Underſtanding, which are Graces from above. Nurture, is Learning, Knowledge, Art or Order. Uſe, is Practice, Experience, and orderly Obſervation; whereof may be conceived, that Nature alone ſufficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good Effect, where natural Aptneſs wanteth; and they can frame no Perfection, unleſs Experience be alſo conjoined: *Nemo naſcitur ſapiens, ſed fit.* Sen.

Ambaſſadors, Negotiants, and generally all other Miniſters of mean Fortune, in converſation with Princes and Superiors, muſt uſe great Reſpect, ſhewing themſelves rather ceremonious than preſumptuous, and acknowledge their Obligation great, for the Favour and Grace they find in thoſe which might command them.

It is no Wiſdom ever to commend or diſcommend the Actions of Men by their Succeſs; for oftentimes ſome Enterprizes attempted by good Counſel, end unfortunately; and others unadviſedly taken in hand, have happy Succeſs. Whoſo then commendeth inconſiderate Counſels, for their fortunate Event, thereby encourageth Men to jar, and diſcomfort the wiſer Sort

to

to ſpeak what they know, and by Experienoe have proved.

In Actions public, and every other Matter of great moment, the Beginning is well to be conſidered: For afterwards it lieth not in our Power, without diſhonour to abandon what was begun.

The Time doth not always ſerve, nor is apt Occaſion always offered to enterprize what we would; yet whoſo doth expect every Opportunity, ſhall either attempt nothing at all, or if he do, the ſame for the moſt part turneth to his own Diſadvantage.

When any Reſolution is taken, either with over great Haſte, or too much Affection, ſeldom it receiveth good Succeſs: For he that doth the one, hath no leiſure to conſider; the other tranſporteth the Mind, ſo as it cannot conceive more than that which preſently preſſeth.

To theſe we add others, I mean ſome of them that have leiſure, and are void of Affection, yet for want of natural Capacity, or for continual Negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to paſs.

Whoſo deſireth to be beloved in a Commonwealth, muſt reſt content with that which Men do give, and the Laws allow him to take; ſo ſhall he neither incur Danger nor Envy: For indeed, that which is take nor extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make Men hated.

Arms, Laws, and Religion, may not in any well govern'd State be diſ-joined; for every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united.

In Actions of War, Courage and Conduct are of great neceſſity; yet all good Government conſiſteth in uſing the Virtues moral; and in handling the Matter of martial Policy, it is fit to imitate the Proceedings of antient and approved Captains.

Among mortal Men, there is nothing more common than to believe the Eſtate of one Man to be better than another; for hereof it cometh, that every one endea-

voureth rather to take from others with Travel, than to enjoy his own with Reſt.

The State of Princes is good, being well uſed; ſo is the Fortune of private Men, if therewith they be contented. The rich Man liveth happily, ſo long as he uſeth his Riches temperately; and the poor Man that patiently endureth his Wants, is rich enough.

Whenſoever a Man is ſo dangerouſly diſtreſſed, as either proceeding or ſtanding, he liveth in like Peril, then doth it behove him in any wiſe to reſolve upon Action. The Reaſon is, that ſo long as nothing is done, the ſame Accidents that cauſed his Dangers, do ſtill remain in their former Force; but if he endeavour to enterprize ſomewhat, either he may meet with Means to make him ſecure, or at the hardeſt, ſhew himſelf of ſo great Courage and Wit, as he dare and can attempt a Way to do it.

It ſeemeth a Thing of great Difficulty, or rather impoſſible for any Prince or Magiſtrate to eſchew the evil Speech, and bad Report of Men; for if they be good and virtuous, then they incur the back-biting of lewd Perſons; if evil, then will all good Men exclaim againſt them.

All Commonwealths ought to deſire Peace, yet it is neceſſary ever to be prepared for War; becauſe Peace diſarmed is weak, and without Reputation: Therefore the Poets feign, that *Pallas* the Goddeſs of Wiſdom, did always appear armed.

Every Prince (well adviſed) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in ſuch ſort, that by his Affability and Virtue they may be induced rather to ſerve voluntarily, than for Pay or Hope of Preferment. For otherwiſe doing, whenſoever the Prince ſhall want Means to pay, the Subjects likewiſe will fail of Goodwill to ſerve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in Proſperity become arrogant, nor in contrary Fortune retire, or complain of the ſmall Favour he findeth;

findeth: For (till Death) Love and Life remain at the Prince's Commandment.

Where poor Men find Juſtice, evil Men are puniſhed, Meaſures and Weights be juſt, Youth well nurtured, and old Folk free from Avarice, there is the Commonwealth good and perfect.

In War between Neighbours, Neutrality is commendable; for by that means we eſchew many Troubles and great Expences, ſo long as the Forces of either Side be ſo equal in Strength, as we need not fear the Victory of any: For ſo long their Diſcord is our Security, and oftentimes offereth us means to increaſe our State and Reputation,

The chief Reaſons to move War, are, the Juſtice of the Cauſe, the Facility of Succeſs, and the Profit of the Victory.

In all human Actions it behoveth to accommodate the Counſel of Men unto preſent Neceſſity, and never to expoſe Security to manifeſt Peril; nor hope of that which without great Difficulty or Impoſſibility cannot be obtained.

It is the Nature of Men having eſcaped one Extreme, which by Force they were conſtrained long to endure, to run headlong into the other Extreme, forgetting that Virtue doth always conſiſt in the Mean.

The Multitude is inclined to Innovation, and eaſily induced by falſe Perſuaſion, and conſequently eaſily tranſported by ſeditious Leaders.

Men are naturally diſpoſed to fear thoſe Things which threaten Danger and Terror: yet unleſs theſe Perils by ſome new Accident be daily revived, that Fear by little and little vaniſheth, and Security recovereth the Place.

Whoſo findeth himſelf contemned, or not reſpected, becometh diſcontent; which Humour in generous Minds, breedeth oftentimes adventurous Imaginations, whereof audacious Attempts have followed, chiefly in

Perſons of Authority and Reputation; for he that hopeth no Good, feareth no Evil: Yet true it is, that dangerous Enterpriſes, the more they be thought upon, the leſs Hope they give of good Succeſs, for which reaſon Conſpiracies not ſuddenly executed, are for the moſt part revealed or abandoned.

All People do naturally imitate the Manners of their Prince, and obſerving his Proceedings, reſolve to hate or love him: But if they happen once to hate the Prince, then his Doings, good or evil, are afterwards not good; but if at the Beginning he gained the Love of the People, then every bad Action is reputed a Virtue; as though he could not be induced to do amiſs, without good Cauſe or Reaſon.

Greatly are Princes deceived, if in the Election of Miniſters they more reſpect their own particular Affection, than the Sufficiency of the Perſon elected.

A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incumbered than ſtrengthened, unleſs the ſame be after well governed; and ſeldom is it ſeen, that a Principality by ill means gotten, hath been long enjoyed.

As to the Perfection of the whole Body, Soundneſs of Head only ſufficeth not, unleſs the other Members alſo do their Office; even ſo it is not enough that a Prince be faultleſs, but it behoveth alſo that the Magiſtrates and Miniſters ſhould perform their Duty.

Great Princes rarely reſiſt their Appetites, as for the moſt Part private Men can; for they being always honoured and obeyed, do ſeldom with Patience endure the want of any thing reaſonable, as being perſuaded that what they deſire is juſt, and that their Commandment hath Power to remove all Difficulties.

All Men are naturally good, when no reſpect of Profit or Pleaſure draws them to become evil. But this World's Corruption, and our Frailty is ſuch, as eaſily and often for our particular Intereſt we incline

makers

to the worſt; which was the Cauſe that wiſe Law-makers found out Reward and Puniſhment: The one to incite Men to good, the other to fear them from being evil.

A Tyrant endeavoureth to maintain his Eſtate by three Means. Firſt, he practiſeth to hold all Subjects in extream awe, and to be baſely minded, to the end they ſhould want Courage to take Arms againſt him. Secondly, he kindleth Diffidence and Diſcord among the great Men; thereby to remove occaſion of Conſpiracy and Combination. Laſtly, he holdeth them diſarmed and idle, ſo as they neither know, nor can attempt any thing againſt him.

To govern, is nothing elſe but to hold Subjects in Love and Obedience; for in reſpect of the End they ought not, and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the Governor's Will, and their Duty.

The Laws and Ordinances of a Common-weal, made at the Beginning thereof when Men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil; and therefore new Laws are made according to the Accidents which happen.

The Diſcontent or Diſorder of People is ever occaſioned by the Inequality of their Goods, becauſe the poorer Sort would be made equal with the rich; but the Offence that grows among great Men, is the Deſire of Honour; for they being equal, do endeavour to aſpire to equal Authority.

A Prince that deſireth by means of his Ambaſſador to deceive another Prince, muſt firſt abuſe his own Ambaſſador, to the End he ſhould do and ſpeak with more Earneſtneſs, being indeed perſuaded that the Intent and Meaning of his Maſter is ſimple, which haply would not, were he privy that his Prince's Meaning were to diſſemble. This Courſe is alſo commonly holden by thoſe that by Employment of a third Perſon would perſuade any thing feigned or falſe.

For the Performance of Conditions in Treaty of Peace, or League of Amity, the Promiſes, Vows, and Oaths of Princes, are of great Effect; yet becauſe Fidelity in a Man is not ever certain, and Time doth daily offer Occaſions of Variation; there is no Aſſurance ſo ſecure and good, as to ſtand ſo prepared as the Enemy may want able Means how to offend.

To reſolve in Matters doubtful, or anſwer Requeſts which we are not willing to grant, the leaſt offenſive Way is not to uſe direct Denial, but by Delays prolong the Time, and ſo in place of Effect, afford good Expectation.

The old Proverb ſaith; *Magiſtratus virum oſtendit*: which is no leſs true than antient: for Men in ſuch Fortune, are occaſioned not only to make Proof of their Sufficiency, but alſo to diſcover their Affections; and the more their Greatneſs is, the leſs reſpect they have to contain thoſe Paſſions which are natural.

Albeit great Troubles and continual Adverſity ſeem inſupportable; yet is there nothing more dangerous, than over-much Proſperity; and being preſſed by new Appetites, they diſturb their own Security.

In ſpeaking of Occurrents doubtful, it is always Wiſdom to feign Ignorance, or at leaſt alledge that we believe them not: for moſt commonly they are utterly untrue, or far other than vulgarly is believed.

The Actions of Men are commonly liked or diſallowed, according to the bad or good Succeſs; attributing that to Counſel which ſometimes is due to Fortune.

The Multitude of Men were wont to be more pleaſed with ſudden than ſlow Reſolutions, and many times account thoſe Enterprizes generous, which are raſhly and inconſiderately attempted.

Great Difference there is between Subjects deſperate, and others which are only diſcontented: For the one deſire nothing but preſent Alteration, which they endeavour with all Hazard; the other wiſh for Innova-

tion,

tion, inciting any Motion or Practice, becauſe their Intent is to attend Time, and that Occaſion may preſent itſelf.

A Benefit beſtowed on him who thinketh himſelf greatly injured, doth not ſuffice to raſe the ſame out of his Memory, chiefly if the Benefit be given at ſuch time, as no mere Motion, but Neceſſity, may ſeem the Occaſion thereof.

That Peace ought to be deſired which removeth Suſpicion, which aſſureth us from Peril, which bringeth Quiet certain, and acquitteth us of Expences: But when it worketh contrary Effects, it may be called a dangerous War, covered with the Name of deceitful Truſt, not unlike a perilous Poiſon miniſtred in lieu of a wholſome Medicine.

The Effect of Things, and not external Shew or ſeeming, ought to be regarded; yet it is incredible what great Grace is gained by courteous Speech and Affability: the Reaſon whereof is, as I ſuppoſe, that every Man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy, and conſequently holdeth himſelf injured, whenſoever he findeth Men not to afford him like Eſtimation.

Men ought in any wiſe, to refrain to do or ſay any thing which may offend, for which reſpect it were great Folly either in Preſence or Abſence, to utter diſpleaſing Speech, unleſs Neceſſity inforceth.

The Matters whereof Counſellors are chiefly to conſider, be five: The Prince's Revenue, Peace and War, Defence, Traffic, and what Laws are to be made.

In giving Counſel, divers Things are to be obſerved; but amongſt them are two of more Importance: Firſt, it behoveth, that he who is counſelled, ſhould be wiſe: for ſeeing Counſel is nothing elſe but a certain conſiderate Diſcourſe of Things, to be done or not done; if he who is to take Counſel be not of Diſcretion, then will he refuſe all good Advice offered, and rather incline to that which his own Fancy affecteth,

fecteth, becauſe the Want of Judgment draweth him to take Pleaſure in vain Things. And as one incapable of what is good and true, will follow that which is evil and falſe: So on the other Side, if he that giveth Counſel be not faithful, then will he a thouſand Ways diſguiſe and diſſemble the Truth, and conſequently miſcarry the Mind of him that is counſelled; yea in the End utterly abuſe him.

The Affairs and Proceedings of the World are ſo variable, and accompanied with ſo many Chances and Changes, as impoſſible it ſeemeth to judge what is beſt: Therefore Experience informeth, that the Conjectures of the moſt wiſe, prove vain and uncertain. I therefore miſlike the Judgment of thoſe Men, that will let ſlip Opportunity of preſent Good, (though it be ſmall) for fear of a future Evil, notwithſtanding it be greater, unleſs the Evil be very near at hand, or certain. For if that do not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was deſired.

Whenſoever a general Opinion is conceived, of the ſingular Virtue and Knowledge of any Man, although he be indeed ignorant, and far unworthy that account, yet it is hard to remove ſuch a ſettled Conceit; the Reaſon is, that Men having at the firſt given Credit to common Report, do make thereof ſo deep an Impreſſion, as afterwards without great Difficulty cannot be removed.

The Bodies of Men, Munition and Money, may juſtly be called the Sinews of War, yet of them the two firſt are more neceſſary, for Men and Arms have means to find Money and Meat; but Money and Meat cannot ſo eaſily find Soldiers and Swords.

One wiſe General having but a thouſand Men, is more to be feared and eſteemed, than twenty Commanders of equal Authority; for they being commonly of divers Humours, or judging diverſly, do never, or very rarely, what is to be done, and conſequently loſe much Time before any Reſolution can be taken.

A Prince

A Prince of mean Force, ought not in any wiſe to adventure his Eſtate upon one Day's Fight; for if he be victorious, he gaineth nothing but Glory; but if he loſe, he is utterly ruined.

The moſt Part of Men are delighted with Hiſtories, for the Variety of Accidents therein contained; yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and find done by others; being perſuaded that Imitation is not only hard, but impoſſible; as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their Motion or Order, and Power, which they anciently had.

The Nature of Men is ſuch, as will not endeavour any Thing good, unleſs they be forced thereunto: for where Liberty aboundeth, there Confuſion and Diſorder follow. It is therefore ſuppoſed, that Hunger and Poverty make Men induſtrious; but good Laws inforce them to be honeſt: For if Men were of themſelves good, then Laws were needleſs.

There are two Kinds of Adulation: The firſt proceedeth from a ſubtle Malice, the ſecond cometh by an ordinary Uſe of Converſation; the one tendeth to Profit and Deceiving, the other hath no further Deſign than a Reſpect or Fear to offend; whereunto the moſt honeſt are in ſome ſort bound. Whoſo bindeth himſelf to Flattery, doth thereby bewray his Intent, either to gain, or not to loſe that he hath; for the Perſon flattered, is always ſuperior to him that doth flatter; or at leaſt one, as may in ſome ſort ſtand him in ſtead. It may therefore be inferred, that only Men of baſe and miſerable Condition, and ſuch as cannot help or hurt, be free from Flatterers. And contrarywiſe, magnanimous and fortunate Folk, proud Men, and ſuch as content themſelves with their preſent Eſtate, are ſeldom found to be Flatterers.

Every wiſe Prince doth pre-ſuppoſe that Times of Trouble may come, and that on all ſuch Occaſions he ſhall be forced to uſe the Service of Men diverſly qualified. His Study therefore is in the mean time ſo

to

to entertain them, as when thoſe Storms ariſe he may reſt aſſured to command them; for whoſoever perſuades himſelf by preſent Benefits to gain the Good-will of Men, when Perils are at hand, ſhall be deceived.

In ancient Times Princes and Governors were wont, when Peace and Security were moſt like to continue, to find or feign Occaſions to draw their Subjects to Fear, to the End that Doubt might move them to be more careful of their own Well-doing; for well they knew it a general Defect in Men to be reachleſs, and never willing to uſe Induſtry, unleſs by Neceſſity they were conſtrained.

All Hiſtories do ſhew, and wiſe Politicians do hold it neceſſary, that for the well-governing of every Commonweal, it behoveth to pre-ſuppoſe that all Men are evil, and will declare themſelves ſo to be when Occaſion is offered; for albeit ſome Inconvenience doth lie hid for a Time, it proceedeth from a covert Occaſion, which for want of Experience was not found until Time, the Mother of Truth, diſcover it.

Neutrality is always a Thing dangerous and diſallowable, becauſe it offendeth all Parties: He that is ſtrong looketh to be aſſiſted in his Greatneſs; and he that is weak not being defended, holdeth himſelf offended: the one is not aſſured from Foes, and the other holdeth no Friends.

Albeit, Neutrality procure preſent Quiet and Security, during the Troubles of others; yet after the ſame falleth out a Diſadvantage, becauſe it entertaineth a certain Falſeneſs, and ſo in ſhort Space will be perceived, not unlike thoſe Men that borrow upon Uſury; for albeit they enjoy a certain Time, without Trouble or Charge, yet the ſame being ſpent, and the Day of Payment come, they then feel the great Danger which their ſhort Pleaſure hath purchaſed.

Whoſo examineth all human Actions, ſhall find that in eſchewing one Inconvenience, we preſently incur another.

another. As for Example, if we endeavour to make our Dominions mighty, it behoveth to have the ſame fully repleniſhed with People, and well armed, and ſo being, they are not eaſily governed. On the other ſide, if our Country be not well-peopled, or diſarm'd, then it is eaſily holden in Obedience; yet therewith ſo weak, that it can neither increaſe the Bounds thereof, nor defend itſelf. It is therefore neceſſary in all our Deliberations, to conſider what Inconvenience is leaſt, and chooſe that, as the beſt: for to find all perfect, void and ſecure of Suſpect or Imperfection, is impoſſible.

A Prince being inſtantly required to take Part with other Princes, the one being in Arms againſt the other, if he deny both, incurreth the Suſpicion of both, and may be thought to have ſecret Intelligences with one or both of them; ſo as either of them ſhall account him an Enemy, and conſequently he that proves victorious will be revenged; and the other holding him ſuſpected, will not acknowledge his Friendſhip.

It is the uſe of Men to preſume much upon their own Merit, and ſeeing the Succeſs of ſome others to be ſuch, as without Cauſe or Deſert are aſpired to Dignity, thereby encouraged they promiſed to themſelves the like: Nevertheleſs being entered into the Courſe of their Deſign, and finding many Croſſes and Impeachments, they do not a little repent their Over-weening and Preſumption, but alſo many times utterly abandon their raſh and unadviſed Enterprize; neither can I think that the Virtue or Sufficiency of any Man, without the Favour of the Heavens, can advance him; for as the Poet ſaith, *Nec velle juvat, potiúſve nocet, ſi fata repugnant.*

Whoſo ſerveth a Prince far from his Preſence, ſhall with great Difficulty content him. For if he commit any Error, it ſhall be aggravated: beſides that the Inſtructions ſent unto him cannot be particularly conceived, becauſe the State of worldly Things doth

doth daily alter. Alſo, to ſerve aloof, is a Thing full of Danger and far from Reward; which Inconvenience may, for the moſt part, be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Prince's Perſon.

Let no Man that cometh to ſerve in Court, aſſure himſelf by his Wiſdom to be advanced, or eſchew all Encounters. Neither is he to bear himſelf ſo careleſs as to commit all to Fortune, but be perſwaded that this worldly Life is like to a Voyage at Sea; wherein albeit Art, with the Favour of the Wind, may do much; yet can we not aſſure ourſelves to arrive ſafe in the Haven appointed; for daily Experience doth ſhew, that ſome ſtrong Ships in the calmeſt Weather are drowned or impeached by the Way, when others much weaker and diſarmed paſs ſecurely.

Among Men worthy of Commendation, thoſe have merited beſt that firſt planted true Religion: next, they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths; the third Place is due to ſuch as have augmented or enlarged their Dominions; laſtly, learned Men deſerve Fame and Memory: And as every of theſe are worthy of Fame and Honour, ſo ought they to be accounted infamous that introduce Atheiſm, or the Subverſion of Kingdoms, or are become Enemies to Learning and Virtue.

Whoſoever taketh in hand to govern a Multitude, either by way of Liberty or Principality, and cannot aſſure himſelf of thoſe Perſons that are Enemies to that Enterprize, doth frame a State of ſhort Perſeverance; yet it is true that ſuch Princes be unfortunate, as for their own Security, are inforced to hold a Courſe extraordinary, and have the Multitude their Enemy; for he that hath few Foes, may with ſmall Diſhonour be aſſured; but he that is generally hated can by no Means live aſſured; and the more Cruelty he uſeth, the weaker his Principality proveth.

In commending another Man, great Moderation is to be uſed; for as Contumely offendeth him againſt whom it

it is uſed; ſo great Praiſe, beſides that it is uttered with Danger to his Judgment that ſpeaketh it, the ſame doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it. For Self-love which commonly poſſeſſeth Men, cauſes the Good or Evil we hear, to be meaſured with our own. And conſequently every Man that is touched with like Deſerts and Defects, doth grow offended that his Commendation is not ſet forth, and feareth leſt his Imperfection ſhould be diſcovered.

It is often, or rather ever ſeen, that the Force of Leagues not uſed in their firſt Heat, becomes cold; becauſe Suſpicion ſoon entereth, which in ſhort Space will deſtroy whatſoever was concluded, and may not without long Time be rejoined.

The Power of Ambition, which poſſeſſeth the Minds of Men, is ſuch, as rarely or never ſuffereth them to reſt: The Reaſon thereof is, that Nature hath framed in them a certain Diſpoſition to deſire all Things, but not power to obtain them; ſo as our Deſires being greater than our Power, thereof followeth Diſcontent and evil Satisfaction. Hereof alſo proceedeth the Variation of Fortune; for ſome Men deſiring to get, and others fearing to loſe that they have gotten, do occaſion one Man to injure another, and conſequently public Wars do follow; by Means whereof, one Country is ruined, and another enlarged.

Princes of great Power, and chiefly thoſe that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to be much inclined to the Wars, as well to win unto themſelves Honour, as alſo to get Poſſeſſions for their Sons; which manner of Proceedings did oftentimes remove ſuch Diſturbance as the Plurality of Brethren bringeth. Theſe, and other Reaſons, induced Princes to attempt War againſt thoſe Kingdoms, which in their Opinion ſeemed eaſily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend Title; for by Colour thereof, they may the rather juſtify their Proceedings.

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When a Prince deferreth to anſwer an Ambaſſador, it proceedeth from ſome of theſe Reſpects; either becauſe he will take Time to reſolve himſelf of ſomewhat whereof he doubteth, or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded, or that he eſteemeth not the Prince that doth demand, or that he diſdaineth the Perſon by whom the Demand is made, or elſe that he intendeth to hear from his own Miniſters to be better reſolved. Wherefore a diſcreet Negociator ought in ſuch Caſes, to conſider which of theſe Reaſons move the Prince where he is employed, to entertain him with Delays, and make his Diſpatch accordingly.

The Sufficiency of good Counſellors conſiſteth in four Things:

Firſt, They ought to be wiſe and ſkilful how to handle their Affairs, directing all Doings to public Commodity.

Secondly, To be juſt in their Proceedings, giving to every one that which to him appertaineth.

Thirdly, To be ſtout, and void both of partial Reſpects and Fear.

And laſtly, To be temperate and moderate in their Deſires.

Whoſo deſireth to govern well and ſecurely, it behoveth him to have a vigilant Eye to the Proceedings of great Princes, and to conſider ſeriouſly of their Deſigns: For it is a Matter of ſmall Difficulty to live in Peace with him who deſirth our Amity, and provideth for others that endeavour to offend us.

The Intelligences that Princes ſtudy to attain, are procured by divers Means: Some are brought by Report, ſome vented by Converſation and Sounding, ſome by means of Eſpials; but the moſt ſure and credible Occurrents, are thoſe which come from Ambaſſadors, chiefly thoſe, that either for the Greatneſs of their Prince, or their own Virtue, be of moſt Reputation. For thoſe Men converſing daily with great Perſo-

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nages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wiſdom, and the Order of each Man's Proceedings, yea of the Prince himſelf, may with Commodity attain unto Matters of Importance ſooner than they that are Writers of Rumours, or that take upon them to conjecture of Things to come.

Whenſoever a People is induced to commit ſo great an Error, as to give Reputation to one only Man, to the End he ſhould oppreſs all thoſe great Men whom they hate, they thereby give him Opportunity to become their Prince; and ſo being aſſiſted with their Favour and Aid, he may likewiſe extinguiſh all the reſt of the Nobility; and they being extirpated, he will alſo endeavour to tyrannize over the People, by whoſe Help he aſpired.

So many as are not conſenting to the Tyranny, reſt Enemies to the Perſon of the Tyrant, who can by no Means gain the Love of all. For impoſſible it is, that the Riches of any Tyrant ſhould be ſo great, and the Honours he can give ſo many, as may ſatisfy all. Hereof it cometh, that thoſe Tyrants that are favoured of the People, and diſfavoured of the Nobles, are moſt ſecure; becauſe their Tyranny is ſupported with a greater Strength (having the Multitude their Friends) than is the Tyrant whom the Humour of the Nobles only hath advanced.

A dangerous Thing it is in all Commonwealths, by continual puniſhing, to hold the Minds of Subjects in Suſpicion; for Men, ever fearing their Ruin, will (without Reſpect) determine to ſave themſelves, and as Men deſperate, attempt Innovation. All capital Executions ought therefore to be executed ſuddenly, and as it were at one Inſtant, ſo to aſſure the Minds of Men from further Moleſtations.

The Intent of every wiſe Prince that maketh War, either by Election or Ambition, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Alſo, to uſe the Matter ſo as there-

by he may inrich himſelf, and not impoveriſh his own People or Country.

He that inlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increaſe his Power; but he that increaſeth in Force as well as in Dominion, ſhall thereby grow great; otherwiſe he gaineth no more than is ſhortly to be loſt, and conſequently he ruineth himſelf: for he who ſpends more in the War, than he gains by Victory, loſeth both Labour and Coſt.

Every Prince and Commonwealth, muſt above all Things, take heed that no Neceſſity, how great ſoever, do perſuade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers; becauſe the hardeſt Conditions the Enemy can offer, are more eaſy than is ſuch a Reſolution.

A Prince ſheweth his Ruin at Hand, whenſoever he beginneth to break the Laws and Cuſtoms, which are ancient, and have been long Time obeyed by the People of his Dominion.

That Prince which careth to keep himſelf ſecure from Conſpiracy, ought rather to fear thoſe to whom he hath done over-great Favours, than them whom he hath much injured: For theſe want Opportunities, the other do not, and both their Deſires are as one, becauſe the Appetite of commanding, is always as much or more than the Deſire of Revenge.

Whenſoever a Prince diſcovers a Conſpiracy, he muſt well conſider the Quality thereof, meaſuring the Force of the Conſpirators with his own; and finding them many and mighty, the Knowledge thereof is to be diſſembled, until the Prince's Power be prepared to oppoſe them; otherwiſe he hazardeth his own Security.

It hath been by long Experience found better to ſend one General to an Army, though he be of mean Sufficiency, than to give the ſame Authority to two or more excellent Perſonages with equal Commiſſion.

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He that coveteth to be over-much loved, oftentimes becomes contemptible; and he that endeavoureth to be over-much feared, is ever hated: And to hold the Mean between them, cannot be exactly done, becauſe Nature will not ſo permit.

Whoſo aſpireth to any Dignity, muſt reſolve himſelf to endure the Envy of Men, and never to be moved for any Offence conceived againſt him, tho' they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither ſhall he for the firſt Affront or Encounter, relinquiſh his Hope; for he that conſtantly maketh Head againſt the Aſſault of Fortune, ſhall after with Facility arrive where he deſigned.

In giving Counſel to a Prince or Commonwealth, and therewith deſiring to eſchew Danger and Offence, no other Mean is to be taken than that the Counſellor ſhall without Paſſion or Perſuaſion pronounce his Opinion, an dnever to affirm any thing as a Reſolution, but with Modeſty to defend that he ſpeaketh; ſo as the Prince which follows his Advice, may ſeem to do it voluntarily, and not forced by the Importunity of him that gave the Counſel.

A diſcreet Captain being in the Field againſt the Enemy, of whoſe Virtue he hath had no Proof, ought firſt by light Skirmiſhes to feel of what Virtue he is, and not to enterprize any general Adventure, to the End that Terror or Fame ſhould not daunt nor diſcourage his own Soldiers.

Albeit Fraud be in all Actions deteſted, yet is the ſame in martial Enterprizes commendable and glorious: For that Captain who compaſſeth his Deſigns by Wit or Stratagem, is no leſs commended than he that vanquiſheth the Enemy by Violence and Force.

In Times of Extremity, when Reſolution muſt be taken for the ſaving or utter Loſs of the State, then no Regard is to be had of Juſtice or Injuſtice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honour, or Ignominy, but rather ſetting

aſide all Reſpects, that Courſe is to be followed which defends the Lives and Liberties of Men.

Whoſo deſireth to know what will be hereafter, let him think of what is paſt, for the World hath ever been in a circular Revolution; whatſoever is now, was heretofore; and Things paſt or preſent, are no other than ſuch as ſhall be again: *Redit orbis in orbem.*

A Prince that deſireth to obtain any thing at the Hand of another, muſt, if it be poſſible, urge a ſudden Anſwer, and lay before him that is moved, a Neceſſity to reſolve preſently, giving him to underſtand that Denial or Delays may breed a perilous and ſudden Indignation.

There is nothing more difficult, doubtful, and dangerous, than to attempt Innovation; for he that taketh in Hand an Enterprize of ſuch Quality, maketh all thoſe his Enemies which lived well under the old Order, and findeth them cold Defenders that affect his Novelties, which Coldneſs proceedeth chiefly of Incredulity; for Men are not eaſily induced to believe a new Thing, till Experience hath proved it to be good.

There is no Art or other Knowledge, ſo ſeemly and neceſſary for a Prince as the Art Military, with the Ordinances and Diſcipline thereof; for that is the only Skill required in him that commandeth, and ſuch a Virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes, but often advanceth private Men to that Dignity.

The deep Impreſſions which old Injuries make in the Minds of great Men, cannot with new Benefits be razed out; it is alſo to be remembered that Injuries be done all together, for they offend the leſs and will be forgotten the ſooner; but Benefits ſhould by little and little be beſtowed, ſo ſhall the Memory of them long continue.

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A ſmall Pleaſure or Diſpleaſure, preſently done, doth move more than a great good Turn beſtowed in times paſt; for the Taſte of Things preſent, doth make a deeper Impreſſion in the Minds of Men than doth the Memory of Things paſt, or Expectation of Things to come.

It is a matter of ſmall Difficulty, to ſound the Diſcontentment of other Men; for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill-deſerving of Friends, and likewiſe how much or how little Foes can do, if we have Patience to hear; which Patience is the Beginning of all good Speed: but he that delighteth to ſpeak much, and hear little, ſhall ever inform others more than he himſelf can learn.

Among other Dangers which a Prince incurreth by being diſarmed, the greateſt is, that thereby he becometh contemptible; for no Compariſon there is between Men armed and them that are diſarmed; and no Reaſon there is, that he that is armed ſhould yield Obedience to him that is diſarmed; neither is it likely that a Prince diſarmed can be ſecure from his own Subjects armed.

A Prince ignorant of martial Knowledge, among other Misfortunes, cannot be eſteemed or truſted of his own Soldiers; it behoveth him therefore as well in Time of Peace as War, to exerciſe Arms; which may be done by two Means, the one by Action of Body, the other by Contemplation of Mind. The Body may be exerciſed in hunting, hawking, and ſuch like Paſtimes, thereby to be made apt to endure Travel: His Mind likewiſe may be informed by reading of Hiſtories, and the Conſideration of Actions performed by excellent Captains, obſerving the Occaſion of their Victories or Loſſes, to the End he may imitate the one, and eſchew the other.

He that doth not as other Men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, ſhall thereby rather incur Peril than Preſervation; for whoſo labourcth to

be ſincerely perfect and good, ſhall neceſſarily periſh, living among Men that are generally evil.

A Prince that uſeth Liberality to his Prejudice, ought not to regard the Infamy of Miſerable, becauſe his Parſimony will in time enable him to be liberal, and ſo may declare himſelf to be, having by Parſimony increaſed his Power, and therefore without impoſing upon the People, may defend himſelf from all ſuch as will make War; ſo ſhall he uſe Liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing, who are infinite, and uſe Miſerlineſs to thoſe only to whom he giveth, who are but few.

There is nothing that conſumeth itſelf like to Liberality, for if it be long uſed, it taketh away the Means to continue it, and conſequently doth make Men poor and baſely minded, or elſe to eſchew Poverty they ſhall be forced to Extortion and become odious.

It is better to incur the Name of Covetous (which is a Scandal without Hate) than with Deſire to be accounted liberal, deſerve the Infamy of Oppreſſion (an Ignominy accompanied with Hatred.)

A Prince ought to be ſlow in believing, and adviſed in proceeding; he ſhould alſo beware not to make himſelf over-much feared, but in all his Actions ſhew great Wiſdom tempered with Courteſy; ſo ſhall not over-much Confidence induce him to be careleſs, nor over-much Diffidence render him intolerable.

Whoſo obſerveth, ſhall ſee that Men offended leſs reſpect him whom they love, than him whom they fear. For Love is maintained by a certain reciproque Obligation, which becauſe Men are evil, uſeth to be by every occaſion of Profit broken. But Fear is continued by a certain Dread of Puniſhment which never faileth.

A Prince that holdeth in the Field an Army wherein are great Numbers of Soldiers, ought not to care though he be accounted cruel; for without ſuch an

Opinion

Opinion conceived, he cannot keep his Forces united, nor apt to attempt any Enterprize.

Men for the moſt, do uſe rather to judge by their Eyes, than by their Hands, for every one may ſee, but few can certainly know. Every one ſeeth what thou ſeemeſt to be, but few can underſtand what thou art indeed; and theſe few dare not oppoſe themſelves to the Opinion of many, which have the Majeſty of Eſtate to defend them. Alſo in the Actions of all Men, and chiefly Princes, from whom is no Appellation, the End is ever obſerved. *Machiavel.*

A Prince being forced to uſe the Condition of Beaſts, muſt among them make choice of the Fox and the Lion; for the Lion cannot take heed of Snares, and the Fox is eaſily overcome by the Wolves: it behoveth him therefore to be a Fox to diſcover the Snares, and a Lion to terrify the Wolves.

A Prince newly advanced cannot obſerve thoſe Rules which are the Cauſe that Men be accounted good, he being many times conſtrained for Defence of his State, to proceed contrary to Promiſe, contrary to Charity, and all Virtue; and conſequently it behoveth him to have a Mind apt to Alteration, as the Wind, and Variation of Fortune ſhall direct; yet ought he not to abandon the good, if ſo he can, but be ready to uſe what is evil, if ſo he ſhall be inforced.

Every Prince ought to have two Ears, the one intrinſic in reſpect of Subjects, the other extrinſic in reſpect of foreign Potentates, from whom he may be defended with good Arms, and good Friends: Alſo Matters intrinſic will ever ſtand well, ſo long as all Things abroad reſt firm.

A Prince that is favoured of the Multitude, need not to doubt Conſpiracy; but contrarywiſe, where the People is generally diſcontented, and hateth the Prince, then may he reaſonably doubt every thing, and every Perſon; for no Man is ſo poor, that wanteth a Weapon wherewith to offend.

When any Occaſion is preſented to have that thou deſireſt, fail not to lay hold thereof: For theſe worldly Things do vary, and that ſo ſuddenly, as hard it is to aſſure ourſelves of any thing, unleſs the ſame be already in hand: On the other Side, if any Trouble threaten thee, defer it ſo long as thou may'ſt; for Time may occaſion ſome Accident to remove all Dangers.

The Prince that doubteth the Fidelity of his Subjects, muſt of Force build Fortreſſes; but he that feareth foreign Force more than his own People, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howſoever it be, that Prince that deſireth generally to be reſpected and eſteemed, muſt perform ſome notable Enterprize, and give Teſtimony of great Virtue and Valour.

A Prince ſhall do well at all Times to be counſelled, ſo as no Man do preſume to give Counſel, but when the Prince doth aſk it. It is alſo to be noted, that he who is not of himſelf wiſe, cannot be well counſelled of others, unleſs happily he yield to ſome wiſe Men the Government of his whole Affairs. For good Counſels, from whomſoever they proceed, ſhall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the Wiſdom of the Prince to proceed from the Counſel of others.

He that taketh delight to be employed in public Affairs, muſt by all means endeavour to continue in ſuch Services: For oft one Buſineſs dependeth on another, whereunto the *Florentine* Proverb may be applied, *Di coſa, naſæ coſa, & il tempole governa.*

Some Men have not only deſired, but alſo compaſſed Honour and Profit; yet being in Poſſeſſion of both, were not therewith ſo ſatisfied as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguiſh the immeaſurable Ambition, wherewith many Men are poſſeſſed.

By Experience I have learned, that great Folly it is to account that ours that we have not, or ſpend preſently in hope of future gain. Therefore Merchants during

during the Adventure of their Goods, do not increaſe domeſtic Expences, but fearing the worſt, aſſure what is in hand.

For ſuch Men as have gained unto themſelves Reputation, and are accounted virtuous, to maintain that Conceit, and eſchew Envy, there is nothing better than a Life retired from daily Converſation, and chiefly of the Multitude. *Fugiat ſapiens commercia vulgi.*

The End that moveth a Prince to make War, is to enrich himſelf, and impoveriſh the Enemy; neither is Victory deſired for other Purpoſe than thereby to become the more mighty, and make the Enemy weak; conſequently whereſoever thy Victory doth impoveriſh thee, or thy Gain therein doth weaken thee, it followeth, that thou either paſs or undergo that Mark whereunto the Intention of War was directed; and that Prince is by Victory enriched, that can oppreſs the Enemy's Power, and become Maſter of his Goods and Poſſeſſions; and that Prince is by Victory impoveriſhed, when the Enemy, notwithſtanding he be victored, can ſtill maintain himſelf, and the Spoils and Poſſeſſions are not taken to the Uſe of the Prince victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own Loſing unfortunate, and in Victory unhappy; for if he be vanquiſhed, then muſt he endure the Offence by Foes; and being victorious, ſhall be forced to abide the Wrong offered by Friends; which as they be leſs reaſonable, ſo are they alſo leſs ſupportable; becauſe he is ſtill by Impoſitions forced to burthen the Subjects: whereof may be inferred, that the Prince having in him any Generoſity, cannot juſtly rejoice at that Victory, which cauſeth the Subjects to lament.

Whoſo deſireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compaſs his Deſire, either by Intreaty, Preſents, or Threatning; for ſo ſhall he to whom the Requeſt is made, be moved either with Compaſſion, Profit, or Fear: Nevertheleſs with covetous and cruel Men,

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and ſuch as are in their Opinion mighty, none of theſe can prevail; and conſequently in vain do they labour, that go about by Suit to ſtir them to Pity, by Gifts to gain them, or by Threats to fear them.

Whoſo is perſuaded that any Common-weal can continue diſunited, doth greatly deceive himſelf: True it is, that ſome Diviſions do maintain the Eſtate, but others do indamage the ſame. They which do harm, are ſuch as with Sects and Partakings be accompanied; they which help, without Sects and Partakings be maintained. A wiſe Governor therefore, albeit he cannot ſo exactly foreſee, but ſome Enemies will ariſe in the State, yet may he take Order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens of every Eſtate may aſpire to Reputation, either by private or public Means. Reputation by public Means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining Victory in ſome Battle, or ſurprizing of ſome City; or elſe by performing ſome Ambaſſage diligently, proſperouſly: But private Reputation is gotten by doing Favour to this or that Man, and protecting them from Magiſtrates, giving them Money, advancing them unworthily to Honour and Office, and by great Feaſts, entertaining the Multitude; of which manner of Proceeding, Sects, Factions, and Partakings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, ſo the other without Faction is profitable; becauſe the ſame is founded on common Welfare, and no private Profit: And albeit among Citizens of this ſort, will oft ariſe great Hate, yet wanting Followers for their particular Profit, the State ſhall not be endangered, but rather ſtrengthened; for every Man endeavouring to deſerve well, will hold himſelf within the Bounds of civil Life, and by virtuous Merits labour to be advanced.

To perſuade or diſſuade particular Perſons, is a Matter of no Difficulty; for if Words ſuffice not, yet Authority will prevail: But hard and perilous it is to remove

remove a falſe Opinion conceived by a whole Multitude, for therein fair Speech and no Compulſion muſt be uſed.

The beſt Means which wiſe Captains can uſe to make their Soldiers reſolute, is to take from them all Hope; which Reſolution may alſo be increaſed with the Love of our Country, and Confidence in the Captain: for Confidence groweth by the Valour of Men, and Diſcipline in former Victories, and Truſt repoſed in the Leader. The Love of our Country is natural, but the Affection we bear to the Captain proceedeth rather from his Virtue, than the Benefits he hath beſtowed. Neceſſity alſo may do much, and chiefly that where no Choice is left, but either overcome by Arms, or die in Deſperation.

There is nothing of ſo great Force to hold an Army united, as the Reputation of the Captain, which proceedeth only from his Virtue; for neither Dignity nor Authority without Valour can work that Effect.

The firſt Care that a Captain muſt have, is to hold his Soldiers well puniſhed, and payed; for where Payment faileth, Puniſhment ought not to be inflicted; and conſequently no Reaſon it is to puniſh him for Robbery, whom Want of Pay enforceth to ſhift; but where the Soldier is payed and not puniſhed, (offending) then will he without reſpect become inſolent towards his Captain, whereof enſue Mutinies, Diſcord, and utter Ruin.

It is a Cuſtom very honourable, not to promiſe more than thou wilt aſſuredly perform; yet true it is, that whoſoever is denied (though juſtly) doth reſt ill contented, for Men indeed are not governed by Reaſon: otherwiſe it is for him that promiſeth; and ſo good Promiſes ſhall ſtand in ſtead of Performance. Beſides that, he may find Excuſe enough, becauſe the moſt Part of Men are ſo ſimple, that fair Words alone have Power to abuſe them, chiefly when they proceed from a Perſon of Reputation and Authority. The beſt way

therefore is not to promiſe preciſely, but entertain the Suitors with Anſwers general, and full of good Hope; yet not ſuch as ſhall directly and abſolutely bind.

The greateſt and moſt material Diſpleaſures that uſe to ariſe between the Nobility and People, are cauſed by the Diverſity of Humours, the one labouring to command, the other endeavouring not to obey; ſo as all Troubles and Diſorders in every Commonweal do thereof receive Nutriment.

The City which is maintained rather by Factions than Laws, ſo ſoon as one Faction is become ſtrong and without Oppoſition, the ſame of Neceſſity muſt be divided in itſelf; for thoſe particular Cauſes which were at the firſt taken, are not of Force enough to maintain it.

It is the Nature of Men not to endure any Diſcommodity, unleſs Neceſſity do thereunto enforce them: which may apparently be perceived by their Habitations; for as the Fear of War draweth them to Places of Strength, (for their Defence) ſo that Peril being paſt, they do for the moſt part remove themſelves to inhabit Countries of more Commodity and Profit.

It may ſeem ſtrange, and no even Meaſure (yet approved by Experience) that where many offend, few are puniſhed. Alſo petty Errors are ſeverely corrected, but great and grievous Crimes be rewarded. In like manner, where many receive Wrong, few ſeek Revenge: For Injuries univerſal, are with more Patience than particular Offences endured.

All, or the greateſt Part of Men that have aſpired to Riches or Power, have attained thereunto either by Force or Fraud, and what they have by Craft or Cruelty gained, to cover the Foulneſs of their Fact, they call Purchaſe, as a Name more honeſt. Howſoever, he that for Want of Will or Wit uſeth not thoſe Means, muſt reſt in Servitude and Poverty. The Reaſon thereof is, that as Nature hath laid before Men the chief of all Fortunes, ſo ſhe diſpoſes them rather

rather to Rapine than honeſt Induſtry, and more ſubject to bad than good Endeavours: Hereof it cometh, that one Man eateth another, and he that is weakeſt muſt always go to the worſt.

Where Neceſſity forceth, Boldneſs is reputed Wiſdom, and in great Enterprizes, Peril is not to be made account of; for thoſe Attempts that begin with Danger, always end with Honour, or Reward; alſo from one Peril there is no way to eſcape, but by entering into another.

A wiſe Man ought not to deſire to inhabit that Country where Men have more Authority than Laws. For indeed that Country deſerves to be deſired where every one may ſecurely enjoy his own; not that, where with Facility it may be taken away; and that Friends for fear to loſe their own, are enforced to forſake them.

Some Magiſtrates either by over-great Zeal, or Ignorance, take a Courſe of Rigour, which being for the preſent favoured, they are ever the more employed, as Men meet to extirpate Inconveniences.

But thereby the Subjects are often drawn into Deſperation, and conſequently have recourſe unto Arms, as their uttermoſt Refuge. In this Caſe, a wiſe Prince, for appeaſing the People, is forced to diſallow his Miniſters, and ſometimes alſo to inflict public Puniſhment.

A Prince naturally ſuſpicious, and having about him Perſons inclined to Envy, is eaſily induced to miſtruſt thoſe Men that have ſerved him with moſt Sufficiency, which Danger they cannot eſchew, becauſe they who are worthieſt Commendation, are oftentimes envied by ſuch Perſons as have Acceſs unto the Prince.

Whoſo cannot endure both Envy and Hate, muſt refrain to enterprize great Matters: For great Honours being deſired of many, it behoveth him that aſpireth unto them, to be for his Dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority albeit the ſame be well

well uſed, yet they who hate or envy (perſuading themſelves it might be better handled) endeavour to oppreſs that Power, as fearing it will be worſe.

Among other Things which worketh the Inconveniences of Commonweals, Ambition and Deſperation are chief; of both, Deſperation is worſt: For Ambition may attend Occaſion, Deſperation will not, as that cannot endure Delays. Hiſtorians deſiring to write the Actions of Men, ought to ſet down the ſimple Truth, and not ſay any thing for Love or Hatred; alſo to chuſe ſuch an Opportunity for writing, as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare Happineſs of the Time.

In commending or diſallowing the Actions of Men, it is a Courſe very requiſite to conſider the Beginning, the Proceeding, and the End: ſo ſhall we ſee the Reaſons and Cauſes of Things, and not their bare Events only, which for the moſt part are governed by Fortune.

It is a Matter of much Neceſſity, that every Man, and chiefly a Prince, ſhould in his firſt Actions give ſome Teſtimony of Virtue; for falling at firſt into Obloquy, do he well or ill, all is ill taken.

The Cuſtom of the common People, is to judge rather by their Eyes than by their Ears; which is the Cauſe they allow more of external Shew, than inward Virtue: And true it is, where Excellency of Mind, and Beauty of Body concur, the Commendation due to ſuch a Perſon is far the greater. *Gratior eſt pulchro veniens è corpore virtus.*

A Prince or great Perſonage that conſtantly endureth Adverſity, deſerveth great Praiſe: yet greater Commendation is due to him that beareth himſelf modeſtly in his Happineſs; for Miſeries are oft born with Patience, but Felicity corrupteth.

To be deſcended of Princes or great Perſonages, is a matter of mere Fortune, and ſo to be eſteemed; but

Adop-

Adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of Men; therefore ſeemeth incorrupt, and ſeldom abuſed.

It hath been long obſerved, and is a Rule which rarely faileth, that he ſhall be ever ſuſpected of the Prince in Poſſeſſion, whom Men account worthy to be a Prince in Reverſion.

It hath been a Uſe very ancient, to give credit to Aſtrologers, and other ſuch Perſons, who by their Star-learning, or blind Divination, take upon them to tell of Things to come. The Reaſon thereof is, that the moſt Part of Men believe that ſooneſt which they leaſt underſtand; and if they ſee the Event of a Prediction, though it happeneth by mere Chance to fall out according to that was premiſed, thereupon they ſettle ſo firm an Impreſſion, as albeit many other fail, yet the good Conceit of their Cunning cannot be removed.

Liberality is a Virtue which gaineth Love, but much are they deceived whom Riot in lieu thereof abuſeth. To caſt away and conſume is ſoon learned, but to give in good Order few have the Skill.

In Time of ſudden Mutiny, Conſpiracy and Offence of People, the wiſeſt Reſolution is not to oppoſe Force, to prevent Fury, but rather give Space for the Bad to amend, and the Good to conſent: for Reaſons prevail on the ſudden, but good Counſel gathers Forces by leiſure.

Mature Deliberation ought ever to be uſed; but when Arms are to determine, ſpeedy Execution is the beſt; becauſe no Delay in that Enterprize is fit, which cannot be commended before it be ended.

Whoſo is pleaſed to obſerve the Proceedings of Men in Authority, ſhall obſerve that ſome of them hold a plain Courſe without Reſpect; others projecting for Time to come, do forecaſt how to hold their preſent good Fortune, or at leaſt to eſcape Danger: for they miſtruſting preſent Proſperity, and fearing a Change, prepare beforehand ſome private Friends to oppoſe againſt

againſt public Hatred: whereof may be inferred, that no Care is taken of Innocency, but every one ſtudieth how to paſs without Puniſhment.

In Captains, and all military Commanders, three Things are required, Virtue, Diſcipline, and Authority; but in private Soldiers, Obedience and Courage only ſufficeth; for by due obeying, and no curious ſcanning, the Leader's Directions are maintained, and the Army in Danger is always moſt valiant, which before the Danger is moſt quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed, and valiantly minded. To adviſe and direct, muſt be the Captain's Care.

It is a Matter of no great Moment, yet always worthy the noting, that any exterior Behaviour, or Garment preſenting Pride or Greatneſs, chiefly in Perſons lately advanced, though no Man be thereby intereſted or injured, doth move in others a certain Offence: For the Nature of Man is ſuch, as beholdeth the new Proſperity of others with an envious Eye, and wiſheth a Moderation of Fortune no where ſo much as in thoſe we have known in equal Degree with ourſelves.

In all Enterprizes of War, (if preſent Neceſſity doth not otherwiſe require) Leiſure and Deliberation ought to be uſed; for often it ſufficeth in lieu of Wiſdom, to take the Advantage of other Men's Folly.

All Men that are to conſider of great Actions, ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken, be profitable for the Commonweal, honourable to themſelves, and eaſy to be affected: or at leaſt not greatly difficult. Alſo, he that perſuadeth, is to be examined whether beſides bare Words and Counſel, he will join his own Peril; and if Fortune favour the Attempt, to whom the principal Glory ſhall redound.

The Perils which accompany private Enterprizes, are far unlike to thoſe which he doth enter, that aſpireth to Principality. For in private Attempts, a Man may pauſe or proceed as he will; but to him that aſpires to Empire, there remains no middle Courſe, but either by

by Victory to triumph as a Prince, or being vanquiſhed to endure Death as a Traytor.

Let no Man in his Proſperity, give much Credit to common Applauſe, or Service aſſured by any, of whom in meaner Fortune he hath had no Experience: for the baſe People are learned in no Leſſon, only without difference of Truth or Falſhood to flatter Men in Authority, and with Shouts and Words of great Rejoicing, to make Shew of great Affection.

As overmuch Haſte is dangerous, ſo too great Delay oftentimes proveth diſadvantageous: for albeit Conſultation ought to forego Action, yet to diſpute long, and in the End reject the Advice of either Side, or take a middle Courſe (which in Caſes of Doubt and Danger is worſt) was ever accounted great Diſcretion.

There is no Courſe more comely, nor any Reſolution ſo well beſeeming a wiſe Man, having made Proof of his own Virtue (and finding in Age no Fortune due to ſuch Effect) as to retire himſelf from the Court and Company; for ſo ſhall he ſhun the Inconveniencies of Contempt, and the Diſcommodity of Travel, (*Jucunda ſenectuti otia*) yet true it is, that whoſo hath lived a Prince, or governed as a public Perſon, cannot expect Security in a private Eſtate.

Whenſoever Danger draweth near, and Terror is at hand, all Men look about, but none willingly adventure: For in ſuch Caſes, every Man will give Counſel, but few will take part of the Peril.

In Commonwealths where Sects or Partialities be, the Leader of any Side is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he unable to moderate the Victory: For to ſtir up Diſſenſions and Troubles, the worſt Man moſt commonly bears the Stroke; but Peace and Quietneſs are not eſtabliſhed but by Men of rare Gifts, and excellent Virtue.

It may ſeem ſtrange and contrary both to Courteſy and Chriſtian Profeſſion, that Men are far more mindful of Injuries done unto them, than of Benefits receiv-

ed by them. The Reaſon thereof is, that Thankfulneſs is accounted a Burthen, but Revenge is ſweet, and reckoned a great Gain.

Of reconciled Foes, and ſuch as know that our Harms were cauſed by their Means, we oft-times expect Favour, as perſuaded that new Friendſhip will repair the Loſs of old Diſpleaſure: But the Matter doth ſeldom ſo fall out; for the Quality of Man's Nature, is ever to hate thoſe whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made beholding: *Quos læſerunt oderunt.* Tac.

To common Perſons, and ſuch as are ignorant in Matters of State, every Taxation and Impoſition ſeemeth heavy, or ſuperfluous; yet the wiſer Sort know, that the End of all public Endeavour, is to confirm People in Peace; and Peace cannot be maintained without Arms, nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Impoſitions.

As fortunate Folk are envied, ſo are the Poor contemned; which Rule reacheth alſo to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For ſeldom is it ſeen, that thoſe People are aſſaulted, where nothing is to be gained, and whoſe baſe Beings afford no other Spoils than Blood and Beggary.

Wiſe Men have obſerved, that in Matter of State, and the managing thereof, three Things are eſpecially to be looked unto: The firſt is Occaſion; the ſecond, the Intentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that ſlippeth away ſo ſoon as Occaſion; nothing ſo difficult as to judge what another Man intendeth; nor any thing more nocent than our own immoderate Deſires.

It hath been ever a Courſe obſerved by wiſe Princes, but much more by *Ariſtocracies* and *Popular States*, againſt Force and Fury of the Multitude, to defend themſelves with Silver and Gold.

How

How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a virtuous Life, and give daily Example of Piety and Juſtice, appears apparently in the Proceedings of the *Roman* Biſhops, who by the Well-doing of ſome few of them at the firſt, became greatly honoured; but afterwards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which Men did bear to the Sanctity of their Lives failing, it was impoſſible of ſo contrary Manners and Examples to look for like Effects.

The Succeſs of War chiefly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince, which declining, the Virtue alſo of the Soldiers faileth; likewiſe the Fidelity of the People decayeth, and their Money to maintain the War ceaſeth: contrarywiſe, the Courage of the Enemy is increaſed, they that ſtood doubtful become reſolved, and every Difficulty augmenteth.

The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in Reſpect of Wiſdom and Valour: Yet true it is, that for the moſt part, they acconut them the wiſeſt Men, that can beſt accommodate themſelves to their Humour.

The greateſt Diſtreſs and Difficulty which can come to any Army, doth proceed of theſe Cauſes: Want of Money, Scarcity of Victuals, Hatred of People, Diſcord of Captains, Diſobedience of Soldiers, and their flying to the Enemy, either of Neceſſity or Free-will.

A Prince or great Magiſtrate, having long maintained the Reputation of Wiſdom and Virtue, muſt take heed that no raſh or dangerous Reſolution do taint the honourable Fame of his former Life: For to be tranſported with Anger againſt his own Profit, is Lightneſs; and to eſteem ſmall Dangers more than great, is want of Judgment.

A Prince or Perſon of great Eſtate, muſt be wary not to incur the Conceit of Double-dealing: For little Sincerity and Truſt is looked for in his Actions, of whom there is an Opinion of Craft and Falſhood conceived.

Experience hath always proved, that whatſoever the moſt part of Men deſire, rarely cometh to paſs: The Reaſon hereof is, that the Effects of human Actions commonly depend on the Will of a few; and their Intentions ever differing from the greater Number, the End and Suceeſs cannot be other than as pleaſeth the Few that are to direct them.

There is nothing more dangerous than to enterprize a War, or other Actions of Importance upon popular Perſuaſion; for ſuch Expectations are vain, and ſuch Deſigns fallible: Alſo the Fury of the Multitude is great, when Danger is little or far off; but Perils growing great and near, their Courage quaileth, as they whoſe Paſſions have no Rule or Meaſure.

It is ſtrange to ſee how apt Men are to doubt Diſpleaſure threatened by Enemies, chiefly when they draw near; for the People do naturally over-much fear Dangers at hand, and eſteem leſs than is fit of Things preſent: Alſo to make ſmall account of thoſe that are far from them, becauſe divers Remedies may be hoped as well by Time, as other Accidents.

The offenſive Words or Anſwers of Indignation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit Diſpleaſure into the Minds of them againſt whom they are ſpoken: For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the Edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more eaſily appeaſed: Such is the Condition of noble and generous Spirits.

To judge right of other Men's Merit, ſeems of great Difficulty; for Time and Tryal is thereto required; alſo it is not eaſy to anſwer the Expectation of Men, but oft-times inconſiderate, and not meaſured in due Proportion.

It is a part of great Diſcretion, to divide the Seaſons of Affairs and Vacations: For as it fitteth well a Prince or Perſon of Dignity, in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedful, and auſtere: So thoſe Offices performed, all ſhew of Authority, and ſad Looks

ought

ought to be ſet apart; for by that Means, neither courteous Behaviour ſhall detract from the Reverence due to his Place, nor Severity diminiſh the Love which to his Behaviour appertaineth.

Magiſtrates muſt look into all Things, but not exact all Things to Rigour. Light Faults may be pardoned, but great Offences ſeverely corrected; yet not always proceeding to Puniſhment, but oft contented with Repentance. To be bitter in rebuking, is alſo fit for a Magiſtrate, ſhewing himſelf ſour to the Bad, and ſweet to the Good; framing both Countenance and Condition according to the Merit of Men; and be perſuaded that it is more honeſt to offend, than to hate.

Soldiers muſt be encouraged in all Fortunes to ſtand reſolved, and not to be daunted with any paſſing Miſadventure, ever attending a Time and Opportunity of Revenge, which commonly cometh to paſs, where Men's Minds are united: for common Danger muſt be repelled with Union and Concord.

Among other Reaſons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged, Neceſſity and Diſtreſs doth oft inforce them: For as Men of Virtue perform the Actions of Arms for Honour, ſo the Coward muſt do them for his Security.

All Enterprizes attempted by Arms, are honourable; but thoſe that are done in Countries remote, are more praiſable; for the leſs they be in Knowledge, the greater is the Glory to atchieve them.

To be truly and faithfully loved, is a Thing greatly to be deſired; for Terror and Fear are weak Works of Affection; for they being taken away, he that ceaſeth to fear, will ſoon begin to hate: and as they that by Force are kept under, obey with Ill-will; ſo they that govern without Line juſtly, rule againſt Right.

Some Men either deſerving to be accounted of excellent Wiſdom, or ſingular in that Skill whereof they

make Profeſſion, do ordinarily love the Proceedings of others, taking that Advantage of their ill Succeſs; yet ſure it is, that Diſaſter and unhappy Event of ſome Actions, proceed not of Diſorder, nor human Imperfection, but from a certain fatal Fury, which neither Counſel nor Conſtancy of Men can withſtand.

It is a Matter of much Difficulty, or rather impoſſible for any Prince to maintain the Law, Civil or Military, without Severity: For where Men hope to be eaſily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily, where Men's Actions are preciſely fitted, there do they live in over great Awe, and Hatred doth always accompany ſuch Severity. The beſt Courſe therefore is to puniſh Offences ſeverely, and reward virtuous Merits liberally; ſo ſhall Fear be converted to reverend Reſpect, and none have cauſe to complain; for as it lies in each Man's Power to ſhun offending, ſo is it in their Power alſo to deſerve well, and merit Reward.

Whoſoever after mature Deliberation, hath reſolved what Courſe to hold in the Action he hath in Hand, muſt not after repent or fear any Difficulty, for ſuch Thoughts would break the Vigour of the Mind, and impeach the Proceedings of that which was reſolved; and albeit ſome Differences do haply ariſe, yet muſt he believe that every other Courſe would have been accompanied with the ſame, or greater Impediments.

Young Men for the Warmneſs of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more willingly enterprize Actions rather honourable than ſevere. But old Men, as well for that their Heat is cooled, as alſo for having attempted many Things in vain, make choice of Enterprizes ſevere, rather than thoſe that are followed with Fame and Glory.

The Greatneſs of one Prince, is nothing elſe but the Ruin and Diſtreſs of another: Likewiſe his Strength is the Weakneſs and Oppreſſion of others.

Some

Some Conqueſts are of ſuch quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honour; yet a modeſt Refuſal, becomes his greater Glory.

The Dignity of Magiſtrates is not aſſured without Arms; for when Obedience faileth, no other Means is left to continue a People united.

As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Prince's Strength, ſo is the ſame their own Security; for as by the Prince's Authority the People are governed, ſo by their Conſent he is maintained.

Three Things Men covet with immoderate Deſire, Lands, Riches, and Honours; but as ſeldom they compaſs their full Content, ſo are they for the moſt part to endure a Deſtiny far other than they wiſhed.

Strange it is, yet by Experience proved true, that in time of Danger, Fortune, or rather Deſtiny, ſo much amazeth the Judgment of wiſe Men, as ſeldom they conceive what Reſolution is beſt to be taken.

No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unleſs the ſame be uſed to foreign Aſſaults; for wanting Foes without, ſome inward Enmity will ariſe, not unlike to ſtrange Bodies of Men, which being ſecure from external Injury, are nevertheleſs by their own Poiſe oppreſſed.

As every Pilot of ordinary Skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the Courſe of his Ship, ſo every Governor of Capacity doth underſtand how the Affairs of State are in peaceable Times to be handled: But when Tempeſts are, and Subjects bent to Sedition, the one requires an excellent Sailor, the other the Aid of ſome excellent Wiſdom.

It oft happens, that public Duty is oppoſite to private Friendſhip; ſo as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Country, or draw our deareſt Friends into Danger: In which Caſe we are to prefer public Reſpect, before particular Obligation.

The Nature of baſe People is ſuch, as either they obey ſlaviſhly, or command inſolently; for Liberty being the Mark whereat they aim, is by them of that Quality, neither moderately deſired, nor diſcreetly continued; and always there are ſome ſeditious Leaders to be found, who out of Diſorder are inclined to kindle the Ire and Offence of ignorant People: *Dux rebus motis, facile invenitur.* Salluſt.

Experience hath oft proved, that Men in beſt Fortune, and ſuch as eſteem themſelves moſt ſecure, even then fall ſooneſt into Diſadventure, becauſe thoſe Dangers unfeared, be as it were contemned, and not regarded.

To enter needleſs Dangers, was ever accounted Madneſs, yet in Times of extreme Peril, and apparent Diſtreſs, bold and hazardous Attempts are greateſt Security.

The divers Adventures which happen to Men, may well inform that much better it is, chiefly in Arms, to be governed by Reaſon than by Fortune.

A certain Peace is ever accounted better Security than Victory hoped or expected: *Melior tutiorque certa pax quàm ſperata victoria.* Liv.

If to our Proſperity, God were pleaſed to add the Grace of Wiſdom, we ſhould thereby judge not only of what is paſt, but alſo of all that can ſucceed hereafter.

Rarely or never can we conſider truly of worldly Proceedings, unleſs firſt we have felt the Deceits of Fortune. Diſcord or Diſſenſion in any State or City, offers Opportunity to ſuch Men as are ambitious to work their Will; for the Humour of Sects and Partialities is ſuch, as the weaker Faction doth ever chuſe rather to call for Aid of Strangers, than yield to the Dominion of an adverſe Party.

Ancient Cuſtoms may not violently and ſuddenly be taken away: Fortune which altereth all Things, will by little and little wear them out of Uſe.

To

To be oft in Fight, and converſe much with Men, breedeth a kind of Satiety; therefore it behoveth Perſons of great Eſtate and Authority to be retired, leſt over-much Familiarity ſhould detract from the Reverence due to honourable Eſtate.

The Natures of Men, not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others moſt prone to Envy; becauſe they hate the Virtue and Welfare of all ſuch as are in Eſtimation above them.

Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen or Subject be ſuffered to aſpire to ſuch Greatneſs, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no Order there is of more Neceſſity, than that every Man, of what Quality ſoever, may be without Reſpect accuſed and judged.

For Conſervation of particular Greatneſs and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, than to have felt the Force of every Fortune.

It is the Quality of wiſe Men only, to know how to uſe Proſperity, and never to truſt too much to the Favours of preſent Happineſs. A Man well adviſed in his Proſperity, beareth not himſelf towards others either proud or violent; nor muſt he believe in his own preſent Felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He only is to be reputed a Man, whoſe Mind cannot be puft up by Proſperity, nor dejected by any adverſe Fortune.

Men of choleric Humour are eaſily moved with inſolent Speeches; but wiſe Men laugh them to ſcorn.

The way whereby a Prince eſchews the Hate of Subjects, is, not to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the Blood of ſome few be tainted, unleſs the ſame be accompanied with Confiſcation, (which a Prince is rarely forced to uſe) it ſeldom cauſeth him to become odious.

A Rule moſt certain it is, that he who commands any thing unpleaſing, muſt by ſevere Means cauſe it to be obſerved; and who deſireth to be obeyed, muſt know how to command; and he only knows how to command,

command, that doth compare his own Force with thoſe that are to obey; wherein finding a Proportion, then he may boldly proceed, otherwiſe forbear.

In Actions of Difficulty, great Courage is to be uſed, and whoſo compaſſeth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by Mildneſs, nor command by Affability: He therefore that is of Nature ſoft, ſhould do beſt to refrain all extraordinary Commands, and in Matters ordinary, employ the Virtue of his mild Spirit, becauſe ordinary Puniſhments are not imputed to the Prince, or his Magiſtrates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.

When Neceſſity preſſeth, Deſperation is deemed Wiſdom, and generous Minds do not account of Danger, becauſe thoſe Attempts which begin with Peril, do for the moſt part end with glory.

He that endeavours to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which thoſe labour to pull down, of Force worketh his own undoing. All Commonwealths alter from Order to Diſorder, from Diſorder to Order again; for Nature having made all worldly Things variable, ſo ſoon as they have attained their utmoſt Perfection and Height, they muſt deſcend; ſo from good they fall back to evil, and from evil they return to good. War begets Quiet, Quiet Idleneſs, Idleneſs Diſorder, Diſorder Ruin; likewiſe Ruin Order, Order Virtue, Virtue Glory, and good Fortune.

Wiſe Men have obſerved, that Arms were before Learning, and Captains before Philoſophers: for good and well-regulated Armies having gained Victory, eſtabliſhed Reſt and Security, whereof the Study of Letters and liberal Sciences enſued.

That Country deſerveth to be loved of all Men, which loves all Men indifferently, and not that Country which reſpecting the beſt Part, advanced a few: No Man therefore is to be blamed, if for ſuch Cauſe he deſire rather to abandon than embrace his Country.

Com-

Commonwealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies ſimple ſome Reſemblance: And as in theſe, many Infirmities grow, which without violent Medicines cannot be cured; ſo in the other many Miſchiefs ariſe, which a good and godly Patient ſhould offend to leave uncured, though therein he uſe both Force and Fire.

Thoſe Wars be moſt juſt which are moſt neceſſary; and thoſe Arms are moſt merciful, where no Hope of Help remains but in them only.

In Actions which promiſe either public glory, or private Honour, Men may be reaſonably perſuaded to adventure Life and Living, becauſe great Hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to recover that Peace which War hath conſumed: But where Men are no leſs oppreſſed by Inſolency of Commanders, than by Inſolency of Foes, there is the Calamity doubled, and of two Evils, the Danger of War ſeemeth leaſt; for that hath End, the other is infinite.

Whoſo perſuades himſelf to be no leſs eſteemed in Evil than good Fortune, is deceived: For Promiſes made during Diſtreſs, are rarely performed, unleſs the ſame Neceſſity continue.

The Intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to enrich himſelf, and impoveriſh the Enemy: Neither is Victory for other Occaſions ſought, nor the Poſſeſſions of the Enemy to other End deſired, than to make themſelves mighty, and their Enemy weak. It follows then, that ſo oft as the Victory impoveriſhes them, or the Gains weaken them, either they paſs, or come ſhort of that Mark whereat the War was aimed.

Ancient and well-governed Commonwealths were wont by their Conqueſts to fill the Treaſuries with Gold and Silver, to give Reward to Soldiers, to ſpare the People from Tributes, to make Triumphs and public Feaſts: But in later Times the Wars have uſed, firſt, to conſume the Treaſure, and after impoveriſh the People, without aſſuring them from their Enemies.

A Prince or State that leaves Promiſes unperformed, by reaſon of unexpected Impediments, and for no ill Intent, ought not to be blamed: Neither are ſuch Accidents any juſt Cauſe or Colour, why Friends ſhould abandon their Confederates.

Where Magiſtrates govern juſtly, Subjects obey dutifully; where private Perſons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Empire, there is the Commonwealth bleſſed, and the People fortunate.

CHAP. XXVI.

Maxims of State, or prudential Grounds, and polemical Precepts, concerning all Eſtates, and Forms of Policy, in Times of Peace or War, &c. confirmed by ſelect Narrations, and hiſtorical Parallels.

ALL Cities and Towns of State, are builded either by People dwelling in, or about the Place where they are builded, or elſe they are made by Strangers: Of the firſt are *Athens* and *Venice*, of the other *Alexandria* and *Florence*.

The Fortune of every City builded, and Virtue of the Builder, appeareth by Choice of the Place, and Quality of Laws; for as fertile Places occaſion Men to be ſlothful, unleſs by good Laws they be forced to Labour, ſo Barrenneſs compels them to Induſtry; which reaſon induceth wiſe Men to plant Habitations in either: Examples of the firſt are *Ferrara* and *Rome*, of the ſecond *Raguſa* and *Genoa*.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed, were either made by ſome one excellent Man, and at an Inſtant; or elſe they were ordained at ſundry Times, according to ſuch Accidents as befel. Example the Laws of *Sparta*, made at the beginning by *Lycurgus*, the Laws of *Rome* at ſundry times.

The Government of every City, in time becomes corrupt; Principality changeth into Tyranny; the Op-

Optimacy is made the Government of the People, and the popular Eſtate turns to licentious Diſorder; which Inſtability or Alteration moved ſome Law-makers to take Order, that in the Government of their City, there ſhould be a mixture of all three, and was the Cauſe that the Policy of *Sparta* continued eight hundred Years, when the popular State of *Athens* endured not one hundred. Example, the Laws of *Sparta* made by *Lycurgus*, and the Laws of *Athens* by *Solon*.

Whoſo taketh in hand to frame any State or Government, ought to preſuppoſe that all Men are evil, and at Occaſions will ſhew themſelves ſo to be. Example, the Envy of the People of *Rome* to the Nobles, and their Inſolency towards them, appeared not ſo long as the Kings governed; but the *Tarquins* being baniſhed, Opportunity was thereby offered, and the Malice of the one and the other became diſcovered.

The divers Honours of the Nobility and People, the one deſiring to command, the other not to obey, are the Cauſe of continual Troubles, unleſs ſome third Mean there be, of more Authority than either, to bridle the Force of both. Example, the Kings in *Rome* expulſed, forthwith aroſe much Mutiny, and could not be ſuppreſs'd, till the *Tribum Plebis* were created, whoſe Authority wrought the ſame Effect which the Kings had done.

Some States endeavour to enlarge their Dominions, and ſome others labour only to maintain that Eſtate they anciently poſſeſs'd. Example of the firſt, was the City of *Rome*, of the ſecond *Sparta*.

All States deſiring to live at Liberty, think fit that every Man ſhould be permitted to accuſe any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of Proceeding, works two excellent Effects: Firſt, that the People ſhould not dare for fear of accuſing to attempt ought againſt the State; or if they do, they ſhall be preſently and without Reſpect puniſhed. Secondly, by Liberty of accuſing, every Man hath Means to utter the Offence

wherewith he can charge others, which he could not unleſs it were lawful to take ſuch an ordinary Courſe, and conſequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular Revenge, or calling foreign Forces. Example, *Coriolanus* and *Appius*, *Claudius* at *Rome*, *Lucannone* at *Chinſi*, *Franciſco Valeri* in *Florence*.

As Accuſations are in every State neceſſary, ſo Slanders are dangerous, and worthy of Puniſhment; the Difference betwixt Accuſations and Slanders, is, that the one is publicly performed before Magiſtrates, with good Proofs and Witneſſes to maintain the Truth of the Accuſation; but Slanders are as well publicly performed, as diſperſed in ſecret, and Places of Repair without Witneſs and Juſtification, ſo as every Man may be ſlandered, but few are orderly accuſed. Example, *Appius Claudius* accuſed by *L. Virginius*; *Furius Camillus*, ſlandered by *Manlius Capitoliuus*.

The only Means to ſuppreſs Slander is, to give Authority to ſome Perſons of Repute, to compel every Slanderer to become an Accuſer; and if the Accuſation prove true, then to reward the Accuſer, or at leaſt not to puniſh him. Example, *Manlius* the Slanderer of *Camillus*, for his untrue Information puniſhed.

A Rule moſt certain and aſſured it is, that every Kingdom and State at the firſt well framed, or after well informed, doth take the Perfection thereof from the Wiſdom of ſome excellent Man, who ought not to be blind, though in a Matter of great Moment, he haply uſeth ſome extraordinary Violence or Proceedings; for he that employeth Force to mend and not to mar, deſerves Commendation. Example, *Romulus*, *Lycurgus*, *Cleomenes*.

There lives no Man ſo ſimple or wiſe, ſo wicked or well diſpoſed, but prefers thoſe Perſons that are praiſeable, before thoſe that are blameable; notwithſtanding for that, well near all Men are beguiled in diſcerning what indeed is good, deeming that honourable, which in Truth is otherwiſe; they ſuffer themſelves either

either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a Courſe, which merits rather Infamy than Commendation. Example, every Man wiſheth himſelf *Timoleon* or *Ageſilaus*, rather than *Dionyſius* or *Phalaris*; rather a *Titus* or *Trajan*, then *Caligula* or *Vitellius*.

Who reads Hiſtories treating of great Actions, ſhall perceive that good Princes indeed are more ſecure, and better defended by the Love of the People, and Fidelity of Counſellors, than were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. Example, of all thoſe Emperors which reigned after *Cæſar* until *Maximinus*, the greateſt Number were for their Vices taken and ſlain; only *Galba* and *Pertinax* excepted, who were good Emperors.

A Prince of great Knowledge both in Arms and Wiſdom, ſo firmly ſettles the Foundation of Government, as albeit his Succeſſor be of the leſs Virtue, yet may he be maintained even by the Memory of his Predeceſſor: But if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the firſt, than the ſecond, then all that is paſt goeth to Ruin. Example, the martial Valour of *Romulus* was the Cauſe that *Numa* might govern ſafely in Peace; which *Tullus* could not have done, had he been unlike to *Romulus*: nor ſhould *Bajazet* Emperor of *Turkey*, have enjoyed the State of his Father *Mahomet*, and left the fame to his Poſterity, if *Selim* his Son had not been more like to his Grandfather, than to *Bajazet* his Father.

The Succeſſion of two excellent Princes, chiefly if they be of long Life, works wonderous Effects: the like is ſeen in Optimacies or popular States, where the Governors ſucceſſively elected, be Men of great Virtue and Underſtanding. Example, the firſt appeared in *Philip* of *Macedon*, and *Alexander* his Son; the ſecond in the Conſuls of *Rome*.

In every State where Soldiers are not, the Fault thereof proceeds from the Governors. Wiſe Princes were therefore wont (even in times of Peace) to cauſe warlike

warlike Exercises to be used; for without them the most warlike Nations become not only ignorant in martial Knowledge, but also effeminate. Example, *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas* in *Thebes*, and King *Tullus* in *Rome*, as well in peaceable as troublelome Times, used Exercise of Arms.

No Prince or State well advised, hazards his whole Estate upon the Valour of some few Persons, nor ought to the Strength of streight Places where the Enemy is to pass. Example, *Tullus* King of *Rome*, and *Metius* King of *Alba*, condescended that three of their Nobility for either Side chosen, should enter Combat, and that Nation which were victorious, should command the other. *Francis* the French King going to recover *Lombardy*, was by the *Switzers* attended into two or three Places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulse him, but the King taking another way, passed securely and prevailed.

Every State well governed, doth reward Men of good Merit, and punish all Offenders; and if any Person of good Desert shall wilfully be a Delinquent, the same Man ought, notwithstanding his former Service, be punish'd. Example, the same *Horatio* that in Combat gained the Victory against the *Albani*, having insolently slain his own Sister, was notwithstanding his egregious Act, and the fresh Memory thereof, called into Trial of his Life, and with great Difficulty obtained Pardon; and *Manlius* who had with great Glory saved the Capitol, for moving Sedition in *Rome*, was after from the same cast down headlong.

Every wise Man having performed any great Service to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with such Recompence as it shall please the Prince or Country to bestow; measuring the same according to the Power of the Giver, and not the Merit of him that receiveth. Example, *Horatius Cocles*, for having lost his Hand in Defence of the Bridge of *Rome*, and *Mutius Scævola* suffering his Hand to be burnt for his

Attempt

Attempt to kill King *Porſenna*, were rewarded with a ſmall Portion of Land; and *Manlius* that defended the *Capitol* from the *Galleys*, had no greater Reward than a little Meaſure of Meal.

Ingratitude is a Vice ſo natural and common, as not only private Perſons, but Princes and States alſo either, through Covetouſneſs or Suſpicion, are therewith infected. Example, *Veſpaſian* proclaimed Emperor, was chiefly aided by *Antonius Primus*, and by his help prevailed againſt *Vitellius*; in reward of which Service, *Veſpaſian* removed him from the Command of his Army, and gave that Honour to *Mutianus*. *Gonſalvo Ferranoe* having taken the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, was firſt remov'd from his Command of the Caſtles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into *Spain*, where in Diſgrace he ended his Life. *Collatinus Tarquinius*, who with the aid of *Brutus* ſuppreſſed the *Tarquins* of *Rome*, and with him *Publius Valerius* were baniſh'd for no other Cauſe, but one for being of the Name of *Tarquin*, the other, becauſe he built a Houſe upon mount *Cœlio*.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilful or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which Offenders, to uſe greater Lenity than the quality of their Offences deſerves, ſeemeth neceſſary; for Men of Honour ſuffer nought by the Infamy which evil Service doth bring. It is alſo to be conſidered, that a great Captain being cumbred with many Cares, cannot proceed in his Actions courageouſly, if he ſtand in daily Doubt to be puniſh'd for every Error that happeneth. Example, *Sergius* and *Virginius* were before *Veio*, the one part of the Army on the one Side of the City, the other not far from the Place. *Sergius* being aſſaulted by the *Faliſci*, was not aided by *Virginius*, neither would he require his Help, ſuch was the Envy the one bore to the other, and conſequently their Offence is wilful, and worthy of capital Puniſhment. Likewiſe when *Varro* by his Ignorance, receiv-

ed an Overthrow by *Hannibal* at *Cannæ*, he was nevertheleſs pardoned, and honourably welcomed home by the whole Senate.

Whenſoever an Inconvenience ariſeth within or without the State, it ſeems a Reſolution more ſure to diſſemble the knowing thereof, than to ſeek by ſudden Violence to ſuppreſs it. Example, *Coſmo de Medicis* having gained extraordinary Reputation in *Florence*, the Citizens imagined, that to ſuffer the ſame to increaſe, was dangerous, and therefore they baniſhed him: Which extreme Proceeding ſo offended the Friends of *Coſmo*, being the ſtronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like happened in *Rome*, where *Cæſar* for his Virtue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared; and they that feared, not conſidering their Force to be inferior to the Power of *Cæſar*, endeavouring to oppreſs him, were the Occaſion of his greater Glory.

In every Republic, an exceſſive Authority given to one or two Perſons for long time, proveth dangerous, chiefly when the ſame is not reſtrained. Example, The Dictatorſhip given to *Cæſar* for Life, was an occaſion to oppreſs the Liberties of the *Romans*. The ſame Effect was before that time like to follow the *Decemvirate*, by ſuffering *Appius Claudius* to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is ſuch, as rarely they will obey, when formerly they have commanded; neither do they willingly accept of mean Office, having before ſat in higher Place: Yet the Citizens of well-governed States, did not refuſe as well to obey as command. Example, In the Victory the *Romans* obtained againſt the *Veienti*, *Q. Fabius* was ſlain, having the Year before been Conſul: Nevertheleſs he then ſerved in meaner Place under *C. Manilius*, and *M. Fabius* his own Brother then Conſul.

There

There is nothing more ſtrange, yet by Experience proved true, that Men in adverſe Fortune be much grieved, and in Proſperity alſo diſcontented; which is the Reaſon, that not being forced to fight for Neceſſity, they will nevertheleſs contend for Ambition; and that Humour doth as well poſſeſs thoſe that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The People of *Rome* having by the Authority of the *Tribunes* obtained to make themſelves ſecure from Oppreſſion of the Nobility, forthwith required, that the Honour and Office of State might be alſo imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have their Part of Lands by Force of *Lex Agraria*, which was at laſt the Overthrow of the *Roman* Liberty.

It ſeemeth that People diſpleaſed with ſome Innovations happened in the State, do ſometime without juſt Reaſons complain of thoſe that govern. Not unlike to a ſick Man, who deemeth that the Phyſician, not the Fever, is the Cauſe of his Grief. Example, The People of *Rome* were perſuaded that the Ambition of Conſuls was the Cauſe of continual War, therefore required that no more Conſuls ſhould be; yet were they content that certain *Tribunes* ſhould command with like Authority, ſo was nothing altered in the Government but the Governor's Title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the Nature of Man ſo much, or ſo ſoon, as the immoderate Deſire of Honour; in ſo much as Men of honeſt Minds and virtuous Inclinations, are ſometimes by Ambition drawn to abuſe that Goodneſs whereunto they are inclined. Example, *Appius Claudius* having lived long an Enemy to the Multitude, hoping by their Aid to continue his Authority of the *Decemviri* in *Rome*, became their Friend, and disfavoured the Factions of great Men. Likewiſe *Q. Fabius* a Man of ſingular Virtue, being alſo called

to that Dignity by *Appius* himſelf, adulterated his Nature and became like unto him.

Seldom or never is any People diſcontented without juſt Cauſe; yet if haply they be aſked whereof their Offence proceedeth, many times for want of ſome fit Man to pronounce their Grief, they ſtand ſilent. Example, the *Romans* at the Death of *Virginia*, were gathered together armed upon Mount *Sacro*, and being aſked by the Senate, for what Cauſe they did ſo? No Anſwer was made, until *Virginius*, Father of the Virgin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as Head of the People, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather mere Madneſs it ſeemeth to deſire any thing, and tell beforehand that the End and Purpoſe of the Deſire is Evil; for thereby he ſheweth Reaſon why it ought not to be granted. Example, The *Romans* required of the Senate that *Appius* and the Reſt of the *Decemviri* ſhould be delivered into their Hands, being determined to burn them all alive.

The firſt Part of their Requeſt ſeemed reaſonable, but the End thereof unreaſonable.

A Courſe very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accuſing and puniſhing, to hold the Subject in Doubt and daily Fear: For he that ſtands always looking for ſome Trouble, becometh careleſs and apt to attempt Innovation. Example, The *Decemviri* being oppreſs'd, the Tribunes authoriſed in their Place, endeavoured daily to call in Queſtion the moſt Part of the *Decemviri*, and many other Citizens alſo; whereof great Inconveniences aroſe, snd much Danger would have enſued, had not a Decree propounded by *M. Duillius* been made, that for one Year no *Roman* Citizen ſhould be accuſed.

Strange it is to ſee how Men in ſeeking their own Security, lay the Injuries which they fear upon other Men, as though it were neceſſary, either to offend or be offended. Example, The *Romans* among themſelves

ſelves, united and ſtrong, always endeavoured to offend the Nobles, and the Nobles likewiſe being perſuaded they were ſtrong, laboured to oppreſs the People: Which Humours were the Cauſe of continual Troubles.

To make Eſtimation and Choice of Men fit to govern, the beſt Courſe is to conſider in particular; otherwiſe it might be imagined, that among the Multitude or meaner People, they being the greateſt Number, might be found ſome Perſons of more Perfection. Example, The People of *Rome* deſiring that the Conſulſhip might be given among them as Men of moſt Merit, did by all Means endeavour to obtain that Honour; but being come to Election, and every Man's Virtue particularly conſidered, there could not be among the Multitude only one found fit for ſo great a Place; and therefore the People themſelves conſented, that the Dignity ſhould ſtill remain as itwas.

To perſuade a Multitude to any Enterprize, is eaſy, if that which is perſuaded, doth promiſe either Profit or Honour; yet oft under that external Appearance lies hid Loſs or Diſadvantage. Example, The *Romans* perſuading themſelves that the ſlow Proceeding of *Fabius Maximus* in the War, were both chargeable and cowardly, required, that the General of the Horſe might direct the War; which Courſe had ruined *Rome*, if the Wiſdom of *Fabius* had not been. Likewiſe when *Hannibal* had divers Years reigned in *Italy*, one *M. Centenius Penula*, a Man of a baſe Birth, yet a Soldier of ſome Repute, undertook that if he with ſuch Voluntiers as would follow him, might have Authority to fight, he would within a few Days deliver *Hannibal* either alive or dead: which Offer was by the Senate accounted raſh, yet for Fear to offend the People, granted; and *Penula* with his Soldiers was cut in Pieces.

To appeaſe a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no Means more ſpeedy or ſucceſsful,

than if ſome Perſon of great Quality and Reſpect, preſent himſelf to the People, and by his Wiſdom lay before them the Damage of their Diſcords, perſuading them to Peace and Patience, Example, The Faction of the *Frateſchi* and *Arratiati* in *Florence*; the one ready to aſſault the other. *Franciſco Soderini*, Biſhop of *Voterra*, in his epiſcopal Habit went between the Parties and appeaſed them: Alſo, Count *Egremont* by the Authority of his Wiſdom and Preſence, ſuppreſs'd a great Mutiny in *Antwerp*, between the Martiniſts and Papiſts.

A People corrupted, do rarely or never obſerve any Order or Ordinance, unleſs by Force of ſome Prince's Power they be thereto inforced; but where the Multitude is incorrupt and religious, all Things are done juſtly, and without Compulſion. Example, *Camillus* at the Victory againſt the *Urienti*, vowed that the tenth Part of the Pillage ſhould be offered to *Apollo*; but the Senate ſuppoſing that the People would not conſent to ſo great a Contribution, ſtudied to diſpence with that Vow, and to pleaſe *Apollo* and the People alſo by ſome other Means: Whereat the People ſhewed themſelves openly offended, and willingly gave no leſs than the Sum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of *Germany* are occaſioned to make Money for any public Service, the Magiſtrates impoſe one or two in the Hundred on every City, which done, every one is ſworn to lay down ſo much as in his own Conſcience he is able; and he with his own hand, no other Witneſs being preſent, caſting the Money into a Coffer prepared for the purpoſe; which he would not, if his own Conſcience did not inforce him.

When any extraordinary Occaſion happens to a City or Province, ſome prodigious Voice is heard, or ſome marvellous Sights are ſeen. Before *T. Gracchus*, General of the *Roman* Army, was betray'd by *Flavius Lucanus*, the *Aruſpices* diſcovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beaſts ſacrificed; which done, they vaniſhed:

niſhed; which Viſion, as they divined, prognoſticated the General's Death. Likewiſe, *F. Savanarola* foretold the coming of King *Charles* VIII into *Italy*. And *M. Sedigitus* when the *Gauls* firſt came towards *Rome*, informed the Senate he heard a Voice much louder than any Man's, crying aloud, *Galli veniunt*.

The Multitude of baſe People is naturally audacious and apt to Innovation; yet unleſs they be directed by ſome Perſons of Reputation and Wiſdom, rarely do they join in any Action of great Import. Example, The *Romans* when their City was taken and ſack'd by the *Gauls*, went to *Veio* with Determination to dwell there: The Senate informed thereof, commanded that upon great Pain, every Citizen ſhould return to *Rome*, whereat the People at firſt mocked; but when every Man particularly within himſelf conſidered his own Peril, all in general determined to obey the Magiſtrates.

In the Employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought ſo much to be regarded as Virtue; for young Men having made Tryal of their Valour, ſoon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to ſerve: therefore well-governed Commonwealths, preferred military Virtue beyond any other Reſpect. Example, *Valerius Corvinus* with others made Conſul the three and twentieth Year of his Age, and *Pompey* triumphed in his Youth.

No wiſe or well-adviſed Prince or other State will undertake, without exceſſive Forces, to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unleſs he aſſure himſelf of ſome Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his Paſſage. Example, The *Romans* by aid of the *Saguntines* entered *Spain*, the *Ætoli* called them into *Greece*, the *Hediai* into *France*: Likewiſe, the *Palæologi* incited the *Turk* to come into *Thrace*; and *Ludovicus Sforza* occaſioned *Charles* the *French* King to come into *Italy*.

A Republic deſirous to extend the Bounds thereof, muſt endeavour to be fully furniſhed with Inhabi-

tants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by ſuffering Strangers to inhabit the City ſecurely; and Force compels People to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at Hand be demoliſhed or defaced; and impoſſible it is without this Order of Proceeding, to enlarge any City, or make the ſame of greater Power. Example, The *Romans* to enlarge their City demoliſhed *Alba*, and many other Towns, and therewith alſo entertained all Strangers courteouſly: So as *Rome* grew to ſuch Greatneſs, that the City could arm ſix hundred and forty thouſand Men; but *Sparta* or *Athens* could never exceed twenty thouſand, for that *Lycurgus* had inhibited the Acceſs of Strangers.

A Commonwealth that conſumes more Treaſure in the War, then it profits in Victory, ſeems to have rather hindered than honoured or inriched the State. A wiſe Captain therefore in his Actions, ought as well to profit the Republic, as to gain himſelf Glory. Example, The Conſuls of *Rome* did ſeldom deſire Triumph, unleſs they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver, and other rich Spoils, fit to be delivered into the common Treaſury.

All foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambition or Deſire of Glory, or elſe for Neceſſity. Examples, The *Romans* for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with Intent only to have the Obedience of the People; yet did they ſuffer them to hold Poſſeſſion of their Houſes, and ſometimes they were permitted to live only with their old Laws. Likewiſe, *Alexander* the Great endeavoured to ſuppreſs many Princes for his Glory, but did not diſpoſſeſs the People, nor kill them.

Otherwiſe it is where a whole Nation, inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon their own Dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elſewhere. Example, The *Goths* and other People of the North invaded the *Roman* Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their

their Alteration of Names did enſue; as *Illyria* now called *Slavonia*, *England* formerly named *Britain*.

A common Conceit, and Saying it is, that Money makes the War ſtrong, and is the Force and Sinews thereof; as though he who hath moſt Treaſure, be alſo moſt mighty; but Experience hath apparently ſhewed the contrary. Example, After the Death of *Alexander* King of *Macedon*, a Multitude of *Gauls* went into *Greece*, and being there arrived, ſent certain Ambaſſadors to the King, who ſuppoſing to make them afraid of his Power, ſhewed them his Treaſure, which wrought a contrary Effect; for the *Gauls* being deſirous of Peace, reſolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty Maſs of Money. Likewiſe *Darius* ſhould have vanquiſhed *Alexander*, and the *Greeks* might have conquered the *Romans*, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Republic remote, is weak, and rather aideth us with Fame than Effect, and conſequently deceiveth all thoſe that in ſuch Amity repoſe Confidence. Example, The *Florentines* being aſſaulted by the King of *Naples* and the Pope, prayed the Aid of the *French* King, who being far diſtant, could not in time ſuccour them; and the *Cedicini* deſiring aid of the *Capuani* againſt the *Samnites*, a People of no Force, were deceived.

A Prince whoſe People is well armed and trained, ſhall do better to attend his Enemy at home, than by Invaſion to aſſault his Country: But ſuch Princes whoſe Subjects are diſarmed, had need to hold the Enemy aloof. Example, The *Romans*, and in this Age the *Swiſſes*, being well armed, may attend the War at home; but the *Carthaginians* and *Italians* being not ſo well furniſhed, did ever uſe to ſeek the Enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the moſt Part Occaſion of ſlow Proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one time in *Rome* created four *Tribuni Militares*, with Authority of Conſuls,

viz.

viz. T. Quintus, after his Conſulſhip, *Caius Furius*, *M. Poſthumus*, and *A. Cornellus Caſſus*, among whom aroſe ſo much Diverſity, and Contrariety of Opinion, as nothing could be done till their Authority ceaſed, and *M. Æmylius* was made Dictator.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain with the Authority of his Prince's Commiſſion, Counſel, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the Wiſdom of the Prince, than the Valour of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of *Rome* to permit no Captains (how great ſoever his Victories were) to triumph, as before that Time the Conſuls had done; and even in thoſe Days a modeſt Refuſal of Triumph was commended. Example, *M. Fulvius* having gained a great Victory againſt the *Tuſcans*, was both by the Conſent of the Senate and People of *Rome*, admitted to triumph; but the Refuſal of that Honour, proved his greater Glory.

All they that from private Eſtate have aſpired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud be come thereunto, unleſs the ſame be given, or by Inheritance deſcended: Yet it is rarely ſeen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft-times ſufficeth. Example, *Agathocles* by ſuch Means became Prince of *Syracuſa*; *John Galleazzo* by abuſing his Uncle *Barnabas*, gained the Dominion of *Lombardy*; and *Cyrus* circumvented *Cyaxares* his Mother's Brother, and by that Craft aſpired to Greatneſs.

Sudden Reſolutions are always dangerous, and no leſs Peril enſueth of ſlow and doubtful Delays. Example, When *Hieron* Prince of *Syracuſa* died, the War even then being in great Heat between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, they of *Syracuſa* conſulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of *Rome*, or *Carthage*. In which Doubt they continued, until *Apollonides* a chief Captain of *Syracuſa* laid before them, that ſo long Delay would make them hated both of *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. Likewiſe the *Florentines* being by

Lewis

Lewis the twelfth required to give his Army Paſſage towards *Naples*, muſed ſo long upon Anſwer, that he became their Enemy, and they forced to recover his Favour full dearly.

To govern a State, is nothing elſe but to take ſuch Order as the Subjects may not, or ought not offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all Means to diſobey, or by affording them ſo great Favours, as reaſonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean Courſe proveth dangerous. Example, The *Latins* being by the Valour of *Camillus* overcome, yielded themſelves to endure what Puniſhment it pleaſed the *Romans* to inflict.

An ingenious and magnanimous Anſwer being made unto wiſe Magiſtrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Example, When the *Privernates* had rebelled, and were by Force conſtrained to return to theObedience of the *Romans*, they ſent certain of the City unto *Rome* to deſire Pardon; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators aſked the *Privernates*, what Puniſhment themſelves did think they had deſerved: The ſame, quoth they, which Men living in Freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Conſul thus replied, *Quid ſi pœnam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiſcum habituros ſperemus?* The *Privernates* anſwered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam: Si malam, haud diuturnam.* Which Anſwer was thought to proceed from generous Men, and therefore they were not only pardoned, but alſo honoured and received into the Number of the *Roman* Citizens.

All Caſtles, Fortreſſes, and Places of Strength, be made for the Defence either againſt the Enemy or Subject: In the firſt Caſe, they are not neceſſary, in the ſecond dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his Pleaſure take occaſion to inſult upon the Subject, when much more ſeemly he might ſettle his Eſtate upon the Love and good Affection of Men. Example, The

Caſtle

Caſtle of *Milan*, made by Duke *Franciſco Sforza*, incited his Heirs to become inſolent, and conſequently they became odious; which was alſo the Cauſe that ſo ſoon as that City was aſſaulted, the Enemy with Facility did poſſeſs it.

That Prince or Potentate, which builds his Severity rather upon the Truſt he hath in Fortreſſes, than the Love of Men, ſhall be deceived: For no Place is ſo ſtrong, as can long defend itſelf, unleſs by the Love and Aid of Men, it be in time of Neceſſity ſuccoured. Example, Pope *Julio* having drawn the *Bentivoli* out of *Bologna*, built there a ſtrong Caſtle; the Governor thereof robbed the People, and they therewith grieved, in a ſhort Time took the Caſtle from him. So after the revolt of *Genoa*, *Lewis* the twelfth came to the recovery thereof, and builded there the ſtrongeſt Fortification of *Italy*, as well for Site, as the Circumſtances inexpugnable. Nevertheleſs the Citizens rebelled, and within ſixteen Months, the *French* were forced to yield the Caſtle and Government to *Octavio Fragoſa*.

To build Forts upon Places of Strength, either for Defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to ſmall Purpoſe. Example, The *Romans* having ſuppreſs'd the Rebellion of the *Latins* and *Privernates*; albeit they were People warlike, and Lovers of Liberty; yet to keep them ſubject, built there no Caſtles, nor other Places fortified: And the *Lacedemonians* did not only forbear to fortify the Towns they conquered, but alſo left their chief City of *Sparta* unwalled,

The Neceſſity or Uſe of Fortification, is only upon Frontiers, or ſuch principal Places where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the Fury of ſudden Aſſaults may be ſtaid, and time for Succour entertained. otherwiſe. Example, The Caſtle of *Milan* being made to hold the State in Obedience, could not ſo do, either for the Houſe of *Sforza* or *France*. *Guido Ubaldo*, Duke of *Velin*, driven from his Dominion by *Cæſar Borgia*,

Borgia, ſo ſoon as he recovered his Country, cauſed all the Forts to be demoliſhed: For by Experience, he found the Love of Men was the ſureſt Defence, and that Fortifications prevailed no leſs againſt him than for him.

The Cauſes of Diviſion and Faction in every Commonweal, proceed moſt commonly of Idleneſs and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. Example, The *Veienti* and *Elinſci* having intelligence of great Contention between the Nobility and Peop' of *Rome*, thought that a fit Opportunity to oppre.. the one and the other: But the *Romans* informed of ſuch an Intention, appeaſed all domeſtic Anger, and by the Valour of their Arms, conducted by *Gn. Manlius* and *M. Fabius*, defeated the Enemies Forces.

The Means to uſurp an Eſtate disjointed, is firſt, before Arms be taken, to become as it were an Arbitrator, or a Friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to ſend moderate Aid to the weak Side, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as alſo to conſume the Strength both of the one and the other, yet in no wiſe to employ any great Forces, for thereby either Party may diſcover the Intents to ſuppreſs them. Example, The City of *Piſtoia* fallen into Diviſion, the *Florentines* took occaſion ſometimes to favour the one, and ſometimes the other, that in the end both Sides weary of the War, voluntarily yielded to their Devotion. *Philippo Viſcount*, hoping ſundry times by occaſion of Faction to oppreſs the *Florentines*, did often aſſault them with great Forces, which was the Cauſe that they became reunited; and conſequently the Duke deceived of his Expectation.

A great Wiſdom it is to refrain opprobrious and injurious Speech: for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decreaſe the Enemy's Force, ſo doth it move him to greater Hate, and more Deſire to offend. Example, *Gabides* a General of the *Perſians*, having long beſieged *Amida*, became weary, and preparing to

abandon

abandon the Enterprize, raiſed his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the *Perſians*, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowardice; which indiſcreet Words ſo highly offended *Gabides*, as thereupon he reſolved to continue the Siege, and within few Days won the City. *Tiberius Gracchus*, appointed Captain of certain Bands of Men, whom for want of other Soldiers the *Romans* entertained, proclaimed in his Camp, that no Man upon pain of Death, ſhould contumelioufly call any Soldier Slave, either in earneſt or jeſt. *Nam facetiæ aſperæ quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquant.* Likewiſe *Alexander* the great, having conquered well near all the Eaſt, brought his Forces before *Tyre*; they fearing *Alexander*'s Fury, offered upon honourable Conditions, to yield him Obedience, only requiring, that neither he, nor any of his Forces ſhould enter the City, which Motion, after four Months *Alexander* accepted, and ſo ſignified by his Ambaſſador, who arriving in *Tyre*, was by the proud Citizens ſlain; whereat *Alexander* grew into Choler, and being ready to forſake the Siege, ſtaid his Forces, and in the End ſacked the City, and put the People to the Sword.

A Prince, or any other State, being aſſaulted by an Enemy of far more Puiſſance than himſelf, ought not to refuſe any honourable Compoſitions, chiefly when they are offered; for no Conditions can be ſo baſe, but ſhall in ſome ſort turn to the Advantage and Honour of him that accepts them. Example, *Anno* 1512, certain *Florentines* procured great Forces of *Spaniards* to come thither, as well to repoſſeſs the *Medici* then baniſh'd, as alſo to ſack the City; promiſing that ſo ſoon as the Army of *Spain* did come into the *Florentine* Dominions, the Faction of *Medici* would be ready armed to receive them: But the *Spaniards* being come, found no Forces at all to join with them, and therefore wanting Victuals, offered Compoſition. The *Florentines* finding the Enemy diſtreſſed, grew inſolent and refuſed Peace,

Peace, whereof followed the loſs of *Prato*, and many other Inconveniencies. The like happened to them of *Tyre*, as before.

The Denial or Delay of Juſtice deſired in Revenge of Injuries, either public or privately offered, is a Thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State, for that the Party injured doth oft by indirect Means, though with hazard of his Country and himſelf, ſeek Satisfaction. Example, The Complaint which the *Galli* made againſt the *Fabii*, who ſent Ambaſſadors in favour of the *Toſſani*, not being heard, nor any Puniſhment inflicted upon them for fighting againſt the Law of Nations, was the Cauſe that the *Galli* were offended with the States, whereof followed the Sack of *Rome*; and the Delay of Juſtice in *Philip* of *Macedon*, for not revenging the inceſtuous Oppreſſion of *Attalus* to *Pauſanias*, was the Motive to murder that King.

Whoſo endeavours the Alteration of any State, muſt of Neceſſity proceed with all Severity, and leave ſome memorable Example to thoſe that ſhall impugn the Ordinance of Government newly ſettled. Example, When *Junius Brutus* had by his great Valour baniſh'd the *Tarquins*, and ſworn the People that no King ſhould ever reign in *Rome*; within ſhort Time after, many young Nobles, among whom was *Brutus*'s Son, impatient of the Equality of the new Government, conſpired to recall the *Tarquins*; but *Brutus* thereof informed, cauſed his own Son not only to be condemned to Death, but was himſelf preſent at the Execution.

As Health and Soundneſs of the Hands, Legs, and other outward Members cannot continue Life, unleſs the Heart and vital Spirits within be ſtrong and firm; ſo Fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail, unleſs the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed: Example, When the Emperor came into *Italy*, and had with ſome Difficulty paſt the Confines of the *Venetians*, well near without Reſiſtance; his Army

march'd

march'd to *Venice*, and might doubtleſs have poſſeſs'd the City, had it not been defended with Water. Likewiſe the *Engliſh* in their Aſſault of *France*, excepting a few Encounters on the Frontiers, found no puiſſant Reſiſtance within the Realm. And *Anno* 1513, they forced all that State, and the King himſelf to tremble, as oft before they had done; but contrariwiſe the *Romans* knowing that Life lay in the Heart, ever held the Body of their State ſtrongeſt: for the nearer the Enemy approach'd *Rome*, the better they found the Country armed and defended.

The Deſire to command ſovereignly is of ſo great Force, as doth not only work in thoſe that are in Expectation of Principality, but alſo in them that have no Title at all. Example, This Appetite moved the Wife of *Tarquinius Priſcus*, contrary to all natural Duty, to incite her Huſband to murder her own Father *Servius*, and poſſeſs his Kingdom, as being perſuaded it were much more honourable to be a Queen, than to be the Daughter of a King.

The Violation of ancient Laws, Orders, and Cuſtoms, under which People have long time lived, is the chief and only Cauſe whereby Princes hazard their Eſtate and royal Dignity. Example, Albeit the Deflowering of *Lucrece* was the Occaſion, yet was it not the Cauſe that moved the *Romans* to take Arms againſt *Tarquin*; for he having before that Fact of *Sextus* his Son, governed tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility and People, who finding themſelves well governed, never ſeek or wiſh any other Liberty or Alteration.

A Prince that deſires to live ſecure from Conſpiracy, hath Cauſe rather to fear thoſe on whom he hath beſtowed over-great Riches and Honours, than thoſe whom he hath greatly injured; becauſe they want Means to offend; the others have many Opportunities to do it. Example, *Perennius* the prime Favourite

vourite of *Commodus* the Emperor, conſpired his Death, *Plautianus* did the like to *Severus*, and *Sejanus* to *Tiberius*; for being advanced to ſo great Honours, Riches, and Offices, as nothing remained deſirable but the Imperial Title, they conſpired againſt the Perſons of their Sovereigns, in hope of the Dignity; but in the End they endured that Puniſhment, which to ſuch Diſloyalty and Ingratitude appertaineth.

An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared; neither ought an Army of well trained Soldiers to be much eſteemed, whoſe Captain is ignorant. Example, *Cæſar* going into *Africa* againſt *Afranius* and *Petræus* whoſe Army was full of old Soldiers, ſaid he feared them little: *Quia ibat ad exercitum ſine duce.* Contrariwiſe, when he went to *Pharſalia* to encounter *Pompey*, he ſaid, *Ibo ad ducem ſine exercitu.*

A Captain-General commanding an Army, ought rather ro govern with Courteſy and Mildneſs, than with over-much Auſterity and Severity. Example, *Q.* and *Appius Claudius* being Conſuls, were appointed to govern the War. To *Q.* was allotted one Army which ſerved very dutifully; but *Appius* commanding the other with great Cruelty, was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheleſs *Tacitus* ſeems of a contrary Opinion, ſaying, *Plus pœna quam obſequium valet.*

Therefore to reconcile theſe different Conceits, I ſay, that a General having Power to command Men, either they are Confederates or Subjects: If Confederates or Voluntaries, he may not proceed to extreme Puniſhment; if Subjects, and his Power abſolute, they may be governed otherwiſe; yet with ſuch Reſpect, as the Inſolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honour may ſometime be got as well by the Loſs as Gaining of Victory. Every Man knoweth Glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the ſame Privilege

to the Vanquiſhed, being able to make Proof that the Loſs proceeded not from his Default. Neither is it diſhonourable to violate thoſe Promiſes whereto the Neceſſity or Diſadvantage of War inforceth. And forced Promiſes which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or never kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive Diſgrace. Example, *Poſthumus* the Conſul, having made a diſhonourable Peace with the *Samnites*, was by them with his whole Army ſent Home diſarmed. Being arrived at *Rome*, the Conſul informed the People they were not bound to perform the baſe Conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and thoſe few that promiſed, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon concluded to ſend him Priſoner to *Samno*, where he conſtantly proteſted the Fault to be only his own; wherefore the People by that Peace incurred no Diſhonour at all: And Fortune ſo much favoured *Poſthumus*, as the *Samnites* were content preſently to return him to *Rome*; where he became more glorious for loſing the Victory, than was *Pontius* at *Samno*, for having won the Victory.

Wiſe Men have long obſerved, that whoſo will know what ſhall be, muſt conſider what is paſt; for all worldly Things hold the ſame Courſe they had at firſt. The Reaſon is, that as long as Men are poſſeſs'd with the ſame Paſſions with former Ages, conſequently of theſe Doings the ſame Effects enſue. Example, The *Almains* and *French* have ever been noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury, and Infidelity, and ſo in divers Ages, Experience hath proved even to this preſent: For perfidious Dealing, the *French* have given ſufficient Proof, not only in ancient Times, but alſo in the time of *Charles* the Eighth, who promiſed to render to the *Florentines* the Forts of *Piſa*, but having divers times received Money, held them notwithſtanding in Poſſeſſion. The *Florentines* found the like in the *Almains*; for in the Wars of the *Viſconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, they prayed Aid of the Emperor, who promiſed them great Forces;

Forces; in conſideration whereof, he was to receive of the *Florentines* One hundred thouſand Crowns in hand, and as much more when his Army was arrived in *Italy*, both which Payments were performed; but as ſoon as the Emperor came to *Verona*, he deviſed Cavillations of Unkindneſs, whereupon he returned home.

A Prince deſirous to obtain any thing of another, muſt, if Occaſion ſo permit, urge his Demand ſo earneſtly, and preſs for ſo ſudden and preſent Anſwer, as he who is preſt may not have Leiſure to conſider how to excuſe himſelf in Denial. Example, Pope *Julio* endeavoured to drive out of *Bologna* all the *Bentivoli*, in which Action he thought the aid of the *French* neceſſary, and that the *Venetians* ſhould ſtand neutral; and by divers Meſſengers did ſolicit them to that Effect; but not receiving any reſolute Anſwer, he thought fit with thoſe few Forces he had, to take his Journey to *Bologna*, whereupon the *Venetians* advertiſed him they would remain neutral, and the *French* King forthwith ſent him Forces, as fearing the Pope's Indignation: Likewiſe the *Tuſcans* having formerly deſired Aid of the *Sammites* againſt the *Romans*, took Arms ſuddenly and obtained their Requeſt, which the *Sammites* had before denied.

When a Multitude offendeth, all may not be puniſh'd, becauſe they are too many; to puniſh Part and leave the reſt unpuniſh'd, were Injury to the Sufferers; and to thoſe that eſcape, an Encouragement to offend again; therefore to eſchew all Extremity, mean Courſes have been anciently uſed. Example, When all the Wives of the *Romans* conſpired to poiſon their Huſbands, a convenient Number of them were puniſh'd, and the reſt ſuffered to paſs: Likewiſe at the Conſpiracy of the *Bacchanals*, in the Time of the *Macedonian* War, wherein many thouſands Men and Women had part, every tenth Perſon only was put to Death by Lot, although the Offence were general, by

which manner of puniſhing, he that ſuffered complain'd of his Fortune; and he that eſcaped, was put in fear that offending again, the ſame Puniſhment might light upon himſelf, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battle or great Action in Arms, ought not to be enterprized without ſpecial Commiſſion or Command from the Prince; otherwiſe the General incurs great Danger. Example, *Papyrius* the Dictator puniſh'd the General of the Horſe in the *Roman* Army, for having fought without his Conſent, although he had in Battle ſlain twenty thouſand Enemies, without loſs of two hundred of his own: And *Cæſar* commended his Captain *Silanus* for having refrained to fight, though with great Advantage he might. Alſo Count *Egmont* hazarded the Favour of the King his Maſter, for giving Battle to Marſhal *de Thermes*, albeit he were victorious: for upon the Succeſs of that Action, the Loſs or Safety of all the Low Countries depended.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in *Ariſtocracies* and popular States, but unto independant Princes an Occaſion of utter Ruin. Example, *Hieron* the firſt King of *Sicily*, in all his Proceedings uſed the Advice of Counſels, and lived fifty Years proſperouſly in Peace; but his Grand-child ſucceeding, refuſing all Counſel, loſt his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly ſlain.

In all Monarchies, the Senate or Privy-Council is, or ought to be, compoſed of Perſons of great Dignity, or Men of approved Wiſdom or Underſtanding. Example, In *Polonia* no Man is Counſellor unleſs he be a *Palatine*, a *Biſhop*, a *Caſtellan*, a *Captain*, or ſuch a one as hath been Ambaſſador: And in *Turkey*, the Title of Counſellor is not given but only to the four *Baſſas*, the two *Cadeleſquires*, the twelve *Beglerbegs*, and King's Son, who in his Father's Abſence, is as it were a Preſident of the *Divan* or *Senate*.

Many

Many Princes ancient and modern, have uſed to ſelect out of their Council, two or three, or four at moſt, to whom only they did impart their Affairs. Example, The Emperor *Auguſtus* had *Mæcenas* and *Agrippa*; *Julius Cæſar*, *Q. Pædius* and *Cor. Balbus*, whom he only truſted with his Cypher and Secrets, being Counſellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The Alteration of old Laws, or Introduction of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithſtanding any appearance of Profit or public Utility; which moved wiſe Governors to decree, that ancient Laws once eſtabliſhed, might never be call'd in Queſtion. Example, The *Athenians* decreed that no Law ſhould be propounded to the People without the Conſent of the Senate: The like Uſe is obſerved in *Venice*, where no Petition is preferred to the Senate, but by Advice of the Sages: And among the *Locrians*, the Cuſtom was, that whoſoever preſented any new Law to be confirmed, ſhould come with a Halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his Requeſt were rejected: Alſo *Lycurgus*, to prevent the Alteration of his Laws, did ſwear the People of *Sparta* to obſerve them until his Return, and thereupon retired himſelf into voluntary Exile, with intent never to return.

When Neceſſity or good Reaſon moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a Courſe more ſecure it is to do it rather by degrees than ſuddenly. Example, The *Romans* finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, ſuffered them to be obſerved or neglected at Diſcretion, but would not publicly ſuppreſs them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt; ſo did they continue ſeven hundred Years, and were then caſſed by *Ebutius* the *Tribune*. But *Agis* King of *Lacedemon*, deſirous to revive the Laws of *Lycurgus*, long diſcontinued, enforced all Men to bring in their Evidence and Writings to be cancelled, to the end a new Partition of Lands and Goods might be made; which ſudden and violent Proceeding proved ſo fatal, that it

moved a dangerous Sedition, wherein he was depoſed and with his Mother and Friends put to Death: Which Example haply moved the *Venetians* not to attempt any thing againſt the Authority of *Auguſtino Barberino* their Duke; but after his Death, and before the Election of *Lovedono*, the Signiory publiſh'd new Ordinances detractive from the *Ducal* Authority,

Whoſo hath won to himſelf ſo great Love and Affection, as thereby to become Maſter of the Forces, and at his Pleaſure commands the Subjects apt for Arms, may alſo without Right or Title aſſure himſelf of the whole Eſtate. Example, *Hugh Capet*, a Subject to the Crown of *France*, being greatly honoured by the Soldiers, found Means thereby to prevent *Charles* Duke of *Lorraine* of the Crown, being right Heir by Deſcent from *Charlemaine*. And albeit the Families of the *Paleologi*, *Ebrami* and *Turcani* be of the Blood Royal and right Heirs to the *Turkiſh* Empire, when the *Ottoman* Line ſhall fail; yet it is like that the chief Baſſa having the Love of the *Janiſaries* will uſurp the State, becauſe the *Paleologi* and other Competitors be far from the *Turk*'s Perſon, poor, and without Means to purchaſe the Soldiers Favour.

A Commander General in Arms, ought upon Pain of great Puniſhment be enjoined, not to employ or retain any Forces longer than the Time of his Commiſſion. Example, The Dictators of *Rome* were in this Point ſo preciſe, as never any of them dared to trangreſs the Time prefixed, till *Cæſar* obtained that Dignity ſhould continue in him for Life, which was the Cauſe of his Uſurpation of the State. Alſo the *Thebans* commanded, that if the General of their Army did hold his Forces one Day longer than the Time prefix'd, he ſhould thereby incur Danger of Death, which Juſtice was executed upon *Epaminondas* and *Pelopidas*.

Baniſhment of great Lords, or Citizens of great Reputation, hath been in divers Places diverſly uſed;

for

for in the one, they were inforced only to abſent themſelves without further Inflict̃ion; in the other, Baniſhment was accompanied with Confiſcation, a Courſe of great Danger. Example, In *Argos*, *Athens*, *Epheſus*, and other Cities of *Greece*, the Citizens puiſſant in Friends, Virtue or Riches, were many times baniſh'd for Envy or Fear, but never or very rarely forced to abſent themſelves longer than ten Years; and that without Loſs of Goods, which was the Cauſe that never any of them warred againſt the Country. But *Dion* being baniſh'd *Syracuſa* by *Dionyſius Junior*, and *Coriolanus* from *Rome*, did make mighty Wars againſt their own Country. The like was done by the *Medici* in *France*.

Honourable and magnanimous Men were wont not only to enterprize great Acts, but alſo to ſuffer patiently all Injuries which Foes or Fortune could expoſe them to; as reſolved, that no Calamity was ſo great as to make their Minds abject, or to forget the Dignity appertaining to Perſons virtuous. Example, After the Defeat of the *Roman* Army upon the River *Allia*, the *Galli* purſued the Victory even to *Rome*'s Walls; whither being come, and finding the Gates open, without any Figure of Reſiſtance, they entered the Streets, where all honourable Palaces were alſo unſhut, which cauſed the *Galli* greatly to doubt. Nevertheleſs looking into the Houſes, they found in every of them a Senator ſet in a Chair of State, and in his Hand a Rod of Ivory; his Perſon was alſo veſted with Robes of Dignity: which majeſtic Spectacle did marvellouſly amaze the *Galli*, not having before that Time ſeen any ſuch reverend Sight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer Violence, but highly admired the *Roman* Courage, chiefly in that Fortune. Nevertheleſs at length a rude *Gaul* happened with his Hand to touch the white Beard of *M. Papyrius*, whereat he taking great Diſdain, ſtruck him with his Rod, in requital whereof the *Barbarian* ſlew *Papyrius*, and by

that Example all the other Senators and Perſons of Dignity were alſo ſlain.

Albeit the Knowledge and Study of Letters be both commendable and neceſſary in all well regulated States; yet if under ſo honeſt Pretence, Idleneſs enter, ſuch Abuſes muſt ſeaſonably be foreſeen and removed. Example, When *Diogenes* and *Carneades*, two excellent Philoſophers, were ſent Ambaſſadors from *Athens* to the *Romans*, many of the Nobility that before diſpoſed themſelves to Arms, allured with their Eloquence and marvellous Wiſdom, began with great Admiration to follow them; and in lieu of Arms, turned their Endeavours to the Study of Letters; which the wiſe *Cato* diſcerning, procured the Senate to decree, that (to eſchew all Inconveniences which ſo honeſt Idleneſs might breed) no Philoſophers ſhould from thenceforth be received into *Rome*.

The Honour due to Magiſtrates was anciently much regarded, and contrariwiſe all irreverent and undutiful Behaviour with great Severity puniſh'd. Example, The Cenſors of *Rome* degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their Preſence; and another called *Victius* was ſlain in the Field for not doing due Reverence to a Tribune when he paſt by him. It is alſo obſerved, that the Son of *Fabius Maximus*, when he was Cenſor, meeting his Father on Horſeback, and ſeeing the Serjeants afraid to ſpeak to him to diſmount, did himſelf command him ſo to do, which Command the Father cheerfully and willingly obeyed, ſaying, Domeſtic Power muſt give Place to public Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the univerſal Hate of People, found no Means ſo meet to preſerve them from popular Fury, as to execute or deliver into their Hands their own chief Minions and intimate Counſellors. Example, *Tiberius* delivered to the People his Favourite *Sejanus*; *Nero*, *Tigellinus*; *Henry* King of

Sweden

Sweden committed to their Fury his beſt beloved Servant *George Preſton*; *Caracalla* cauſed all his Flatterers to be ſlain that had perſuaded him to kill his Brother. The like was done by *Caligula*, whereby he eſcaped himſelf.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a Perſon that kills another Prince, albeit by that Means he is aſpired to Sovereignty, ſhall thereby both incur great Danger and Hate, and encourage Men therein to attempt the like againſt himſelf. Therefore wiſe Princes have not only left ſuch Services quite unrecompenſed, but alſo moſt ſeverely puniſhed them. Example, The Emperor *Severus* put all thoſe to Death that conſented to the Murder of *Pertinax*: And *Alexander* the Great executed him that ſlew *Darius*, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent Hands on his Prince, notwithſtanding he were an Enemy. Likewiſe *Vitellius* put to Death all the Murderers and Conſpirators againſt *Galba*; and *Domitian* executed his Secretary *Epaphroditus* for the Murder of *Nero*, altho' he inſtantly deſired his Aid.

The virtuous and vicious Examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the ſame Qualities; which Rule never or very rarely fails. Example, *Francis* the Firſt, King of *France*, and other Princes in divers Ages and Places, had great Eſteem of learned Men, and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility, and Clergy, diſpoſed themſelves ſo earneſtly to Study, as before that Time had not been ſeen ſo many and ſo great a number of learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwiſe, *Alexander* the Great, otherwiſe a Prince of great Virtue, by his immoderate uſe of drinking, did draw the greateſt Number of his Court and People alſo to delight in Drunkenneſs. The like Effect followed the exceſſive Intemperance of *Mithridates*, King of *Amaſia*.

The

The laſt and not the leaſt conſiderable, is to obſerve how great Effects Devotion and Contempt of human Glory worketh in the Minds not only of private Perſons, but of Kings and Princes alſo, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit, Honour, and Pleaſure, to embrace the contemplative retired Life. Example, *Ramirus* King of *Arragon*, *Verecundus* King of *Spain*, *Charlemain* Son of *Carolus Martellus*, *Matilda* Queen of *France*, *Amurath* King of *Turbay*, with many others. *Imperio Maximus*, *exemplo Major*.

THE

THE PREROGATIVE OF PARLIAMENTS IN *ENGLAND.*

Proved in a

DIALOGUE

BETWEEN

A COUNSELLOR of STATE,

AND

A JUSTICE of PEACE.

Dedicated to the KING's moſt Excellent Majeſty.

TO THE

KING.

Moſt Gracious Sovereign,

THOSE that are ſuppreſs'd and helpleſs are commonly ſilent, wiſhing that the common Ill in all Sort might be with their particular Misfortunes, which Diſpoſition, as it is uncharitable in all Men, ſo it would be in me more Dog-like than Man-like, to bite the Stone that ſtruck me: (to wit) the borrowed Authority of my Sovereign miſinformed, ſeeing their Arms and Hands that flung it, are moſt of them already rotten. For I muſt confeſs it ever that they are Debts, and not Diſcontentments, that your Majeſty hath laid upon me; the Debts and Obligations of a friendleſs Adverſity, far more payable in all Kinds, than thoſe of the Proſperous: All which, nor the leaſt of them, though I cannot diſcharge, I may yet endeavour it. And notwithſtanding my Reſtraint hath retrenched all Ways, as well the Ways of Labour and Will, as of all other Employments, yet hath it left with me my Cogitations, than which I have nothing elſe to offer on the Altar of my Love.

Of theſe (moſt gracious Sovereign) I have uſed ſome Part in the following Diſpute, between a Counſellor of State and a Juſtice of Peace, the one diſſuading, the other perſuading, the Calling of Parliament. In all which, ſince the Norman *Conqueſt (at the leaſt ſo many as Hiſtories have gathered) I have in ſome Things in the*

the following Dialogue, presented your Majesty with the Contents and Successes.

Some Things there are, and those of the greatest, which because they ought to be resolved on, I thought fit to range them in the Front of the rest, to the End your Majesty may be pleased to examine your own great and princely Heart of their Acceptance or Refusal.

The first is, that Supposition, that your Majesty's Subjects give nothing but with Adjunction of their own Interest, interlacing in one and the same Act your Majesty's Relief, their own Liberties; not that your Majesty's Piety was ever suspected, but because the best Princes are ever the least jealous, your Majesty judging others by your self who have abused your Majesty's Trust. The feared Continuance of the like Abuse may persuade the Provision. But this Caution, however it seemeth at first Sight, your Majesty shall perceive, by many Examples following, but frivolous. The Bonds of Subjects to their Kings should always be wrought out of Iron, the Bonds of Kings unto Subjects but with Cobwebs.

Thus it is (most renowned Sovereign) that this Traffick of Assurances hath been often urged, of which, if the Conditions have been easy, our Kings have as easily kept them; if hard and prejudicial, either to their Honours or Estates, the Creditors have been paid their Debts with their own Presumption.

For all Binding of a King by Law upon the Advantage of his Necessity makes the Breach itself lawful in a King, his Charters and all other Instruments being no other than the surviving Witnesses of unconstrained Will: Princeps non subjicitur nisi sua voluntate libera, mero motu & certa scientia: *Necessary Words in all the Grants of a King, witnessing that the same Grants were given freely and knowingly.*

The second Resolution will rest in your Majesty, leaving the new Impositions, all Monopolies, and other Grievances of the People, to the Consideration of the House, provided,

that

that your Majeſty's Revenue be not abated; which if your Majeſty ſhall refuſe, it is thought that the Diſputes will laſt long, and the Iſſues will be doubtful: And on the contrary if your Majeſty vouchſafe it, it may perchance be ſtiled a yielding, which ſeemeth by the ſound to brave the Regality.

But (moſt excellent Prince) what other is it to the Ears of the Wiſe, but as the Sound of a Trumpet, having blaſted forth a falſe Alarm, becomes the common Air? Shall the Head yield to the Feet? certainly it ought, when they are grieved, for Wiſdom will rather regard the Commodity, than object the Diſgrace; ſeeing if the Feet lie in Fetters, the Head cannot be freed, and where the Feet feel but their own Pains, the Head doth not only ſuffer by Participation, but withal by Conſideration of the Evil.

Certainly the Point of Honour well weighed, hath nothing in it to even the Ballance; for by your Majeſty's Favour, your Majeſty doth not yield either to any Perſon or to any Power, but to Diſpute only, in which the Propoſition and Minor prove nothing without a Concluſion, which no other Perſon or Power can make but a Majeſty: yea, this in Henry *the Third his Time, was called a Wiſdom incomparable. For the King raiſed again, recovered his Authority: For, being in that Extremity that he was driven with the Queen and his Children,* Cum Abbatibus & Prioribus ſatis humilibus hoſpitia quærere & prandia. *For the reſt, may it pleaſe your Majeſty to conſider, that there can nothing befall your Majeſty in Matters of Affairs more unfortunately, than meeting the Commons of Parliament with ill Succeſs: A Diſhonour ſo perſuaſive and adventurous, as it will not only find Arguments, but it will take the leading of all Enemies that ſhall offer themſelves againſt your Majeſty's Eſtate.*

Le Tabourin de la pauvreté ne fait point de bruit: *Of which dangerous Diſeaſe in Princes, the Remedy doth chiefly conſiſt in the Love of the People, which how it may be had and held, no Man knows better than your Majeſty;*

how

how to loſe it, all Men know, and know that it is loſt by nothing more than by the Defence of others in wrong Doing. The only Motives of Miſchances that ever came to Kings of this Land ſince the Conqueſt.

It is only Love *(moſt renowned Sovereign) muſt prepare the way for your Majeſty's following Deſires. It is* Love *which obeys, which ſuffers, which gives, which ſticks at nothing; which Love, as well of your Majeſty's People, as the Love of God to your Majeſty, that it may always hold, ſhall be the continual Prayers of*

Your Majeſty's moſt humble Vaſſal,

WALTER RALEIGH.

THE

THE PREROGATIVE OF PARLIAMENTS.

Proved in a DIALOGUE between a Counſellor of State, and a Juſtice of Peace.

Counſellor.

NOW, Sir, what think you of Mr. *St. John's* Trial in the Star-Chamber? I know that the Bruit ran that he was hardly dealt withal, becauſe he was impriſoned in the Tower, ſeeing his Diſſuaſion from granting a Benevolence to the King was warranted by the Law.

Juſtice. Surely, Sir, it was made manifeſt at the Hearing, that Mr. *St. John* was rather in love with his own Letter; he confeſſed he had ſeen your Lordſhip's Letter, before he wrote his to the Mayor of *Marlborough*, and in your Lordſhip's Letter there was not a Word whereto the Statutes by Mr. *St. John* alledged, had reference; for thoſe Statutes did condemn the gathering of Money from the Subject, under Title of a Free Gift; whereas a Fifth, a Sixth, a Tenth, *&c.* was required. But, my good Lord, tho' divers Shires have given to his Majeſty, ſome more, ſome leſs, what is this to the King's Debt?

Counſ. We know it well enough, but we have many other Projects.

Juſt. It is true, my good Lord: But your Lordſhip will find, that when by theſe you have drawn many petty Sums from the Subjects, and thoſe ſometimes ſpent as faſt as they are gathered, his Majeſty being nothing enabled thereby, when you ſhall be forced to demand your *great Aid*, the Country will excuſe itſelf in regard of their former Payments.

Coun. What mean you by the *great Aid?*

Juſt. I mean the Aid of Parliament.

Counſ. By Parliament, I would fain know the Man that durſt perſuade the King unto it, for if it ſhould ſucceed ill, in what Caſe were he?

Juſt. You ſay well for yourſelf, my Lord, and perchance you that are Lovers of yourſelves, (under Pardon) do follow the Advice of the late Duke of *Alva*, who was ever oppoſite to all Reſolutions in Buſineſs of Importance; for if the Things enterprized ſucceeded well, the Advice never came in Queſtion; if ill, (whereto great Undertakings are commonly ſubject) he then made his Advantage by remembering his Country Counſel: But, my good Lord, theſe reſerved Politicians are not the beſt Servants; for he that is bound to adventure his Life for his Maſter, is alſo bound to adventure his Advice, *Keep not back Counſel* (ſaith *Eccleſiaſticus*) *when it may do good.*

Counſ. But, Sir, I ſpeak it not in other Reſpect than I think it dangerous for the King to aſſemble the three Eſtates, for thereby have our former Kings always loſt ſomewhat of their Prerogatives. And becauſe that you ſhall not think that I ſpeak it at random, I will begin with elder Times, wherein the firſt Contention began betwixt the Kings of this Land and their Subjects in Parliament.

Juſt. Your Lordſhip ſhall do me a ſingular Favour.

Counſ. You know the Kings of *England* had no formal Parliament till about the Eighteenth Year of *Henry*

Henry the Firſt for in his Seventeenth Year for the Marriage of his Daughter, the King raiſed a Tax upon every Hide of Land by the Advice of his Privy Council alone. But you may remember how the Subjects ſoon began to ſtand upon Terms with the King, and drew from him by ſtrong Hand and the Sword the *great Charter*,

Juſt. Your Lordſhip ſays well, they drew from the King the *great Charter* by the Sword, and thereof the Parliament cannot be accuſed, but the Lords.

Counſ. You ſay well, but it was after the Eſtabliſhment of the Parliament, and by Colour of it, that they had ſo great daring for before that Time they could not endure to hear of St. *Edward*'s Laws, but reſiſted the Confirmation in all they could, although by thoſe Laws the Subjects of this Iſland were no leſs free than any of all *Europe*.

Juſt. My good Lord, the Reaſon is manifeſt; for while the *Normans* and others of the *French* that followed the Conqueror made ſpoil of the *Engliſh*, they would not endure that any thing but the Will of the Conqueror ſhould ſtand for Law: But after a Deſcent or two, when themſelves were become *Engliſh*, and found themſelves beaten with their own Rods, they then began to favour the Difference between Subjection and Slavery, and inſiſt upon the Law of *Meum & Tuum*, and to be able to ſay unto themſelves, *hoc fac & vives*: Yea, that the conquering *Engliſh* in *Ireland* did the like, your Lordſhip knows it better than I.

Counſ. I think you gueſs aright: And to the end the Subject may know that being a faithful Servant to his Prince he might enjoy his own Life, and paying to his Prince what belongs to a Sovereign, the Remainder was his own to diſpoſe, *Henry* the Firſt to content his Vaſſals, gave them the *great Charter* and the *Charter of Foreſts*.

Juſt. What Reaſon then had King *John* to deny the Confirmation?

Counſ. He did not; but he on the contrary confirmed both the *Charters* with Additions, and required the Pope, whom he had then made his Superior, to ſtrengthen him with a *Golden Bull.*

Juſt. But your Honour knows, that it was not long, that he repented himſelf.

Counſ. It is true, and he had Reaſon ſo to do; for the Barons refuſed to follow him into *France*, as they ought to have done; and to ſay true, this *great Charter* upon which you inſiſt ſo much, was not originally granted regally and freely; for *Henry* the Firſt did uſurp the Kingdom, and therefore the better to aſſure himſelf againſt *Robert* his eldeſt Brother, he flattered the Nobility and People with thoſe *Charters.* Yea, King *John* that confirmed them, had the like Reſpect: For *Arthur* Duke of *Britain* was the undoubted Heir of the Crown, upon whom *John* uſurped. And ſo to conclude, theſe Charters had their Original from Kings *de facto*, but not *de jure.*

Juſt. But King *John* confirmed the *Charter* after the Death of his Nephew *Arthur*, when he was then *Rex de jure* alſo.

Counſ. It is true, for he durſt do no other, ſtanding accurſed, whereby few or none obeyed him; for his Nobility refuſed to follow him into *Scotland*, and he had alſo grieved the People by pulling down all the Park-pales before Harveſt, to the end his Deer might ſpoil the Corn: And by ſeizing the Temporalities of many Biſhopricks into his Hands, and chiefly for practiſing the Death of the Duke of *Britain* his Nephew, as alſo having loſt *Normandy* to the *French*, the Hearts of all Men were turned from him.

Juſt. Nay, by your Favour, my Lord, King *John* reſtored King *Edward*'s Laws after his Abſolution, and wrote his Letters in the Fifteenth of his Reign to all Sheriffs, countermanding all former Oppreſſions; yea, this he did, notwithſtanding the Lords refuſed to follow him into *France.*

Counſ.

Counſ. Pardon me, he did not reſtore King *Edward*'s Laws then, nor yet confirmed the Charters, but he promiſed upon his Abſolution to do both: But after his Return out of *France* in his Sixteenth Year he denied it, becauſe without ſuch a Promiſe he had not obtained Reſtitution, his Promiſe being conſtrained, and not voluntary.

Juſt. But what think you, was he not bound in Honour to perform it?

Counſ. Certainly no, for it was determined, in the Caſe of King *Francis* the Firſt of *France*, that all Promiſes by him made, whilſt he was in the Hands of *Charles* the Fifth his Enemy, were void by Reaſon, the Judge of Honour, which tells us he durſt do no other.

Juſt. But King *John* was not in Priſon.

Counſ. Yet for all that, Reſtraint is Impriſonment, yea, Fear itſelf is Impriſonment, and the King was ſubject to both. I know there is nothing more kingly in a King, than the Performance of his Word; but yet of a Word freely and voluntarily given. Neither was the *Charter* of *Henry* the Firſt ſo publiſhed, that all Men might plead it for their Advantage, but a *Charter* was left *(in depoſito)* in the Hands of the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury* for the Time, and ſo to his Succeſſors. *Stephen Langthon*, who was ever a Traytor to the King, produced this *Charter*, and ſhewed it to the Barons, thereby encouraging them to make War againſt the King. Neither was it the old *Charter* ſimply the Barons ſought to have confirmed, but they preſented unto the King other Articles and Orders, tending to the Alteration of the whole Commonwealth, which when the King refuſed to ſign, the Barons preſently put themſelves into the Field, and in rebellious and outrageous Faſhion ſent the King Word, except he confirmed them, they would not deſiſt from making War againſt him, till he had ſatisfied them therein. And in concluſion, the King being betrayed of all his No-

bility, in Effect was forced to grant the Charter of *Magna Charta*, and *Charta de Foreſtis*, at ſuch Times as he was invironed with an Army in the Meadows of *Staynes*, which *Charters* being procured by Force, Pope *Innocent* afterward diſavowed, and threatened to curſe the Barons if they ſubmitted not themſelves as they ought to their ſovereign Lord; which when the Lords refuſed to obey, the King entertained an Army of Strangers for his own Defence, wherewith having maſtered and beaten the Barons, they called in *Lewis* of *France* (a moſt unnatural Reſolution) to be their King: Neither was *Magna Charta* a Law in the Nineteenth of *Henry* the Second, but ſimply a *Charter* which he confirmed in the Twenty-firſt of his Reign, and made it a Law in the Twenty-fifth, according to *Littleton*'s Opinion. Thus much for the Beginning of the *Great Charter*, which had firſt an obſcure Birth from Uſurpation, and was ſecondly foſtered and ſhewed to the World by Rebellion.

Juſt. I cannot deny, but that all your Lordſhip hath ſaid is true; but ſeeing the *Charters* were afterwards ſo many times confirmed by Parliament, and made Laws, and that there is nothing in them unequal or prejudicial to the King, doth not your Honour think it Reaſon they ſhould be obſerved?

Counſ. Yes, and obſerved they are in all that the State of a King can permit; for no Man is deſtroyed but by the Laws of the Land, no Man diſſeized of his Inheritance, but by the Laws of the Land; impriſoned they are by the Prerogative where the King hath cauſe to ſuſpect their Loyalty; for were it otherwiſe, the King ſhould never come to the Knowledge of any Conſpiracy or Treaſon againſt his Perſon or State; and being impriſoned, yet doth not any Man ſuffer Death but by the Law of the Land.

Juſt. But may it pleaſe your Lordſhip, were not *Cornwallis*, *Sharpe*, and *Hoſkins* impriſoned, being no Suſpicion of Treaſon there?

Counſ.

Counſ. They were; but it coſt them nothing.

Juſt. And what got the King by it? for in the Concluſion, (beſides the Murmur of the People) *Cornwallis*, *Sharpe*, and *Hoſkins*, having greatly over-ſhot themſelves, and repented them, a Fine of Five or Six hundred Pounds was laid on his Majeſty for their Offences, for ſo much their Diet coſt his Majeſty.

Counſ. I know who gave the Advice, ſure I am that it was none of mine: But thus I ſay, if you conſult your Memory, you ſhall find that thoſe Kings which did in their own Times confirm the *Magna Charta*, did not only impriſon, but they cauſed many of their Nobility and others to be ſlain without Hearing or Tryal.

Juſt. My good Lord, if you will give me leave to ſpeak freely, I ſay, that they are not well adviſed that perſuade the King not to admit the *Magna Charta* with the former Reſervations: For as the King can never loſe a Farthing by it, as I ſhall prove anon; ſo except *England* were as *Naples* is, and kept by Garriſons of another Nation, it is impoſſible for a King of *England* to greaten and enrich himſelf by any way ſo aſſuredly, as by the Love of his People: For by one Rebellion the King hath more Loſs than by an hundred Years Obſervance of *Magna Charta*. For therein have our Kings been forced to compound with Rogues and Rebels, and to pardon them; yea, the State of the King, the Monarchy, the Nobility have been endangered by them.

Counſ. Well, Sir, let that paſs. Why ſhould not our Kings raiſe Money as the Kings of *France* do by their Letters and Edicts only? For ſince the Time of *Lewis* the Eleventh, of whom it is ſaid, that he freed the *French* Kings of their Wardſhip, the *French* Kings have ſeldom aſſembled the States for any Contribution.

Juſt. I will tell you why; the Strength of *England* doth conſiſt of the People and Yeomanry, the Peaſants of *France* have no Courage nor Arms: In *France* every Village and

Borough hath a Caſtle, which the *French* call *Chaſteau Villain*; every good City hath a good Citadel; the King hath the Regiments of his Guards, and his Men at Arms, always in Pay; yea, the Nobility of *France*, in whom the Strength of *France* conſiſts, do always aſſiſt the King in thoſe Levies; becauſe themſelves being free, they make the ſame Levies upon their Tenants. But, my Lord, if you mark it, *France* was never free in Effect from civil Wars, and lately it was endangered either to be conquered by the *Spaniard*, or to be cantonized by the rebellious *French* themſelves, ſince that Freedom of Wardſhip. But, my good Lord, to leave this Digreſſion, that wherein I would willingly ſatisfy your Lordſhip, is, that the Kings of *England* have never received Loſs by Parliament, or Prejudice.

Counſ. No, Sir! you ſhall find that the Subjects in Parliament have decréed great Things to the Diſadvantage and Diſhonour of our Kings in former Times.

Juſt. My good Lord, to avoid Confuſion, I will make a ſhort Repetition of them all, and then your Lordſhip may object where you ſee cauſe; and I doubt not but to give your Lordſhip Satisfaction. In the Sixth Year of *Henry* the Third there was no Diſpute; the Houſe gave the King Two Shillings of every plough'd Land within *England*, and in the End of the ſame Year he had *Eſcuage* paid him, (to wit) for every Knight's Fee, two Marks in Silver. In the Fifth Year of that King, the Lords demanded the Confirmation of the *Great Charter*, which the King's Council for that time preſent excuſed, alledging, that thoſe Privileges were extorted by Force during the King's Minority; and yet the King was pleaſed to ſend forth his Writ to the Sheriffs of every County, requiring them to certify what thoſe Liberties were, and how uſed; and in Exchange of the Lords Demand, becauſe they preſſed him ſo violently, the King required all the Caſtles and Places which the Lords held of his, and had held in time of his Father, with thoſe Mannors and Lordſhips

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which they had heretofore wreſted from the Crown, which at that time (the King being provided of Forces) they durſt not deny. In the Fourteenth Year he had the Fifteenth Penny of all Goods given him, upon Condition to confirm the *Great Charter*: For by reaſon of the Wars in *France*, and the Loſs of *Rochel*, he was then enforced to conſent to the Lords in all they demanded. In the Tenth of his Reign, he fined the City of *London* at 50000 Marks, becauſe they had received *Lewis* of *France*. In the Eleventh Year, in the Parliament at *Oxford*, he revoked the *Great Charter*, being granted when he was under Age, and governed by the Earl of *Pembroke*, and the Biſhop of *Wincheſter*. In this Eleventh Year, the Earls of *Cornwal* and *Cheſter*, *Marſhal*, *Edward* Earl of *Pembroke*, *Gilbert* Earl of *Gloceſter*, *Warren*, *Hereford*, *Ferrars*, *Warwick*, and others, rebelled againſt the King, and conſtrained him to yield unto them, in what they demanded for their particular Intereſt, which Rebellion being appeaſed, he ſailed into *France*, and in his Fifteenth Year, he had a Fifteenth of the Temporality, and a Diſms and a half of the Spirituality, and withal Eſcuage of every Knight's Fee.

Counſ. But what ſay you to the Parliament of *Weſtminſter*, in the Sixteenth of the King, where notwithſtanding the Wars of *France*, and his great Charge in repulſing the *Welſh* Rebels, he was flatly denied the Subſidy demanded?

Juſt. I confeſs, my Lord, that the Houſe excuſed themſelves by reaſon of their Poverty, and the Lords taking of Arms; in the next Year it was manifeſt, that the Houſe was practiſed againſt the King: And was it not ſo, my good Lord, think you in our two laſt Parliaments? For in the Firſt, even thoſe whom his Majeſty truſted moſt, betrayed him in the Union; and in the Second, there were other of the great Ones ran counter. But your Lordſhip ſpake of Dangers of

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Parliaments; in this, my Lord, there was a Denial, but there was no Danger at all: But to return where I left, what got the Lords by practiſing the Houſe at that time? I ſay, that thoſe that brake this Staff upon the King, were overturned with the Counterbuff, for he reſumed all thoſe Lands which he had given in his Minority, he called all his exacting Officers to account, he found them all faulty, he examined the Corruption of other Magiſtrates, and from all theſe he drew ſufficient Money to ſatisfy his preſent Neceſſity; whereby he not only ſpared his People, but highly contented them with an Act of ſo great Juſtice: Yea *Hubert*, Earl of *Kent*, the Chief Juſtice whom he had moſt truſted, and moſt advanced, was found as falſe to the King as any one of the reſt. And for concluſion, in the End of that Year, at the Aſſembly of the States at *Lambeth*, the King had the Fortieth Part of every Man's Goods given him freely toward his Debts: For the People, who the ſame Year had refuſed to give the King any thing, when they ſaw he had ſqueezed thoſe Spunges of the Commonwealth, they willingly yielded to give him Satisfaction.

Counſ. But I pray you, what became of this *Hubert*, whom the King had favoured above all Men, betraying his Majeſty as he did?

Juſt. There were many that perſuaded the King to put him to Death, but he could not be drawn to conſent; but the King ſeized upon his Eſtate which was great; yet in the End he left him a ſufficient Portion, and gave him his Life, becauſe he had done great Service in former Times: For his Majeſty, though he took advantage of his Vice, yet he forgot not to have conſideration of his Virtue. And upon this Occaſion it was that the King, betrayed by thoſe whom he moſt truſted, entertained Strangers, and gave them their Offices, and the Charge of his Caſtles and ſtrong Places in *England*.

Counſ.

Counſ. But the drawing in of thoſe Strangers was the Cauſe that *Marſhal* Earl of *Pembroke* moved War againſt the King.

Juſt. It is true, my good Lord, but he was ſoon after ſlain in *Ireland*, and his whole maſculine Race Ten Years extinguiſh'd, tho' there were Five Sons of them; and *Marſhal* being dead, who was the Mover and Ringleader of that War, the King pardoned the reſt of the Lords that had aſſiſted *Marſhal*.

Counſ. What Reaſon had the King ſo to do?

Juſt. Becauſe he was perſuaded, that they loved his Perſon, and only hated thoſe corrupt Counſellors, that then bare the greateſt Sway under him; as alſo becauſe they were the beſt Men of War he had, whom if he had deſtroyed, having War with the *French*, he had wanted Commanders to have ſerved him.

Counſ. But what Reaſon had the Lords to take Arms?

Juſt. Becauſe the King entertained the *Poictovins*, were not they the King's Vaſſals alſo? Should the *Spaniards* rebel, becauſe the *Spaniſh* King truſts to the *Neapolitans*, *Portugueſe*, *Milanois*, and other Nations his Vaſſals? ſeeing thoſe that are governed by the Vice-Roys and Deputies are in Policy to be well entertained, and to be employed, who would otherwiſe deviſe how to free themſelves; whereas, being truſted and employed by their Prince, they entertain themſelves with the hopes that other of the King's Vaſſals do: If the King had called in the *Spaniards*, or other Nations not his Subjects, the Nobility of *England* had Reaſon of Grief.

Counſ. But what People did ever ſerve the King of *England* more faithfully than the *Gaſcoigns* did, even to the laſt of the Conqueſt of that Dutchy?

Juſt. Your Lordſhip ſays well, and I am of that Opinion, that if it had pleaſed the Queen of *England* to have drawn ſome of the chief of the Nobility into *England*, and by Exchange have made them good Free-holders in *England*, ſhe had ſaved about Two Millions of

of Pounds, which were conſumed in Times of thoſe Rebellions. For what held the great *Gaſcoign* firm to the Crown of *England* (of whom the Duke of *Eſpernon* married the Inheritrix) but his Earldom of *Kendal* in *England*, whereof the Duke of *Eſpernon* (in right of his Wife) bears the Title to this Day? And to the ſame end I take it, hath *James* our Sovereign Lord given Lands to divers of the Nobility of *Scotland*. And if I were worthy to adviſe your Lordſhip, I ſhould think, that your Lordſhip ſhould do the King great Service, to put him in mind to prohibit all the *Scottiſh* Nation to alienate and ſell away their Inheritance here; for they ſelling, they not only give Cauſe to the *Engliſh* to complain, that the Treaſure of *England* is tranſported into *Scotland*, but his Majeſty is thereby alſo fruſtrated of making both Nations one, and of aſſuring the Service and Obedience of the *Scots* in future.

Counſ. You ſay well, for though thoſe of *Scotland* that are advanced and enriched by the King's Majeſty, will no doubt ſerve him faithfully, yet how their Heirs and Succeſſors having no Inheritance to loſe in *England*, may be ſeduced, is uncertain. But let us go on with our Parliament. And what ſay you to the Denial, in the Twenty-ſixth Year of his Reign, even when the King was invited to come into *France* by the Earl of *March*, who had married his Mother, and who promiſed to aſſiſt the King in the Conqueſt of many Places loſt?

Juſt. It is true, my good Lord, that a Subſidy was then denied, and the Reaſons are delivered in *Engliſh* Hiſtories; and indeed the King not long before had ſpent much Treaſure in aiding the Duke of *Britain* to no Purpoſe; for he drew over the King, but to draw on good Conditions for himſelf, as the Earl of *March* his Father-in-law now did: As the *Engliſh* Barons did invite *Lewis* of *France* not long before, as in elder Times all the Kings and States had done, and

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in late Years the Leaguers of *France* entertained the *Spaniards*, and the *French* Proteſtants and *Netherlands*, Queen *Elizabeth*, not with any Purpoſe to greaten thoſe that aid them, but to purchaſe to themſelves an advantageous Peace. But what ſay the Hiſtories to this Denial? They ſay, with a World of Payments, there mentioned, that the King had drawn the Nobility dry. And beſides, that whereas not long before great Sums of Money were given, and the ſame appointed to be kept in four Caſtles, and not to be expended but by the Advice of the Peers, it was believed, that the ſame Treaſure was yet unſpent.

Counſ. Good Sir, you have ſaid enough; judge you whether it were not a Diſhonour to the King to be ſo tyed, as not to expend his Treaſure but by other Men's Advice, as it were by their Licenſe.

Juſt. Surely, my Lord, the King was well-adviſed to take the Money upon any Occaſion, and they were Fools that propounded the Reſtraint; for it doth not appear, that the King took any great Heed to thoſe Overſeers: *Kings are bound by their Piety, and by no other Obligation.* In Queen *Mary*'s Time, when it was thought that ſhe was with Child, it was propounded in Parliament, that the Rule of the Realm ſhould be given to King *Philip*, during the Minority of the hoped Prince or Princeſs; and the King offered his Aſſurance in great Sums of Money, to relinquiſh the Government at ſuch Time as the Prince or Princeſs ſhould be of Age: At which Motion, when all elſe were ſilent in the Houſe, Lord *Dacres* (who was none of the wiſeſt) aſked, Who ſhall ſue the King's Bonds? Which ended the Diſpute, (for what other Bonds is between a King and his Vaſſals, than the Bond of the King's Faith?) But, my good Lord, the King, notwithſtanding the Denial at that Time, was with Gifts from particular Perſons, and otherwiſe, ſupplied for proceeding of his Journey for that Time into *France*; he took with him thirty Caſks filled with Silver and

Coin.

Coin, which was a great Treaſure in thoſe Days. And laſtly, notwithſtanding the firſt Denial, in the King's Abſence he had Eſcuage granted him (to wit) 20 s. of every Knight's Fee.

Counſ. What ſay you then to the Twenty-eighth Year of that King, in which when the King demanded Relief, the States would not conſent, except the ſame former order had been taken for the appointing of four Overſeers for the Treaſure: As alſo that the Lord Chief Juſtice and the Lord Chancellor ſhould be choſen by the States, with ſome Barons of the Exchequer and other Officers?

Juſt. My good Lord, admit the King had yielded to their Demands, then whatſoever had been ordained by thoſe Magiſtrates to the Diſlike of the Commonwealth, the People had been without Remedy, whereas while the King made them, they had their Appeal and other Remedies. But thoſe Demands vaniſhed, and in the End the King had Eſcuage given him, without any of their Conditions. It is an excellent Virtue in a King to have Patience, and to give way to the Fury of Men's Paſſions. The Whale when he is ſtrucken by the Fiſherman, grows into that Fury, that he cannot be reſiſted, but will overthrow all the Ships and Barks that come in his Way; but when he hath rumbled a while, he is drawn to the Shore with a twin'd Thread.

Counſ. What ſay you then to the Parliament in the Twenty-ninth of that King?

Juſt. I ſay, that the Commons being unable to pay, the King relieves himſelf upon the richer Sort; and ſo it likewiſe happened in the Thirty-third of that King, in which he was relieved, chiefly by the City of *London*. But, my good Lord, in the Parliament in *London* in the Thirty-eighth Year, he had given him the Tenth of all the Revenues of the Church for Three Years, and Three Marks of every Knight's Fee throughout the Kingdom, upon his Promiſe and Oath upon the

the obſerving of *Magna Charta*; but in the End of the ſame Year, the King being then in *France*, he was denied the Aids which he required. What is this to the Danger of a Parliament? eſpecially at this Time they had Reaſon to refuſe, as they had given ſo great a Sum in the Beginning of the ſame Year. And again, becauſe it was known that the King had but pretended War with the King of *Caſtile*, with whom he had ſecretly contracted an Alliance, and concluded a Marriage betwixt his Son *Edward*, and the Lady *Eleanor*. Theſe falſe Fires do but fright Children, and it commonly falls out, that when the Cauſe given is known to be falſe, the Neceſſity pretended is thought to be feigned. Royal Dealing has evermore Royal Succeſs; and as the King was denied in the Eight and thirtieth Year, ſo was he denied in the Nine and thirtieth Year, becauſe the Nobility and the People ſaw it plainly, that the King was abuſed by the Pope, who as well in Deſpite to *Manfred*, Baſtard Son to the Emperor *Frederick* the Second, as to cozen the King, and to waſte him, would needs beſtow on the King the Kingdom of *Sicily*; to recover which, the King ſent all the Treaſure he could borrow or ſcrape to the Pope; and withal gave him Letters of Credence, for to take up what he could in *Italy*, the King binding himſelf for the Payment. Now, my good Lord, the Wiſdom of Princes is ſeen in nothing more than in their Enterprizes. So how unpleaſing it was to the State of *England* to conſume the Treaſure of the Land, and in the Conqueſt of *Sicily* ſo far off, and otherwiſe, for that the *Engliſh* had loſt *Normandy* under their Noſes, and ſo many goodly Parts of *France*, of their own proper Inheritances. The Reaſon of the Denial is as well to be conſidered as the Denial.

Counſ. Was not the King alſo denied a Subſidy in the Forty-firſt of his Reign?

Juſt. No, my Lord: for although the King required Money as before, for the impoſſible Conqueſt

of

of *Sicily*, yet the Houſe offered to give Fifty-two Thouſand Marks, which whether he refuſed or accepted, is uncertain; and whilſt the King dreamed of *Sicily*, the *Welſh* invaded and ſpoiled the Borders of *England*; for in the Parliament of *London*, when the King urged the Houſe for the proſecuting the Conqueſt of *Sicily*, the Lords utterly diſliking the Attempt, urged the proſecuting of the *Welſhmen*: Which Parliament being again prorogued, did aſſemble at *Oxford*, and was called the mad Parliament, which was no other than an Aſſembly of Rebels; for the royal Aſſent of the King, which gives Life to all Laws formed by the three Eſtates, was not a royal Aſſent, when both the King and the Prince were conſtrained to yield to the Lords. A conſtrained Conſent is the Conſent of a Captive, and not of a King, and therefore there was nothing done there either legally or royally. For if it be not properly a Parliament where the Subject is not free, certainly it can be none where the King is bound; for all Kingly Rule was taken from the King, and Twelve Peers appointed, and as ſome Writers have it, Twenty-four Peers, to govern the Realm; and therefore the Aſſemby made by *Jack Straw* and other Rebels, may as well be called a Parliament as that of *Oxford*. *Principis nomen habere, non eſt eſſe Princeps*, for thereby was the King driven not only to compound all Quarrels with the *French*, but to have Means to be revenged on the rebellious Lords: but he quitted his Right to *Normandy*, *Anjou*, and *Mayne*.

Counſ. But Sir, what needed this Extremity, ſeeing the Lords required but the Confirmation of the former Charter, which was not prejudicial to the King to grant?

Juſt. Yes, my good Lord, but they inſulted upon the King, and would not ſuffer him to enter into his own Caſtles; they put down the Purveyor of the Meat for the Maintenance of his Houſe, as if the King had been a Bankrupt; and gave Order that without

ready

ready Money he ſhould not take up a Chicken. And though there is nothing againſt the Royalty of a King in theſe Charters (the Kings of *England* being Kings of Freemen, and not of Slaves) yet it is ſo contrary to the Nature of a King to be forced even to thoſe Things, which may be to his Advantage, as the King had ſome Reaſon to ſeek the Diſpenſation of his Oath from the Pope, and to draw in Strangers for his own Defence : yea, *jure ſalvo Coronæ noſtræ* is intended incluſively in all Oaths and Promiſes exacted from a Sovereign.

Counſ. But you cannot be ignorant how dangerous a Thing it is to call in other Nations, both for the Spoil they make, as alſo, becauſe they have often held the Poſſeſſion of the beſt Places with which they have been truſted.

Juſt. It is true, my good Lord, that there is nothing ſo dangerous for a King as to be conſtrained and held as a Priſoner to his Vaſſals, for by that *Edward* II. and *Richard* II. loſt their Kingdoms and their Lives. And for calling in of Strangers, was not King *Edward* the Sixth driven to call in Strangers againſt the Rebels in *Norfolk*, *Cornwall*, *Oxfordſhire*, and elſewhere ? Have not the Kings of *Scotland* been oftentimes conſtrained to entertain Strangers againſt the Kings of *England* ? And the King of *England* at this Time, had he not been divers Times aſſiſted by the Kings of *Scotland*, had been endangered to have been expelled for ever.

Counſ. But yet you know thoſe Kings were depoſed by Parliament.

Juſt. Yea, my good Lord, being Priſoners, being out of Poſſeſſion, and being in their Hands that were Princes of the Blood, and Pretenders. It is an old Country Proverb, that *Might overcomes Right* ; a weak Title that wears a ſtrong Sword, commonly prevails againſt a ſtrong Title that wears but a weak One ; otherwiſe *Philip* the ſecond had never been Duke of *Portugal*, nor Duke of *Milan*, nor King of *Naples* and

Sicily. But my Lord, *Errores non ſunt trahendi in exemplum.* I ſpeak of regal, peaceable and lawful Parliaments. The King at this Time was but a King in Name, for *Glouceſter*, *Leiceſter*, and *Chicheſter* made choice of other Nine, to whom the Rule of the Realm was committed, and the Prince was forced to purchaſe his Liberty from the Earl of *Leiceſter*, by giving for his Ranſom the County Palatine of *Cheſter.* But my Lord, let us judge of thoſe Occaſions by their Events, what became of this proud Earl? Was he not ſoon after ſlain in *Eveſham?* Was he not left naked in the Field, and left a ſhameful Spectacle, his Head being cut off from his Shoulders, his Privy Parts from his Body, and laid on each Side of his Noſe? And did not God extinguiſh his Race? After which, in a lawful Parliament at *Weſtminſter* (confirmed in a following Parliament of *Weſtminſter)* were not all the Lords that followed *Leiceſter* diſinherited? And when that Fool *Glouceſter*, after the Death of *Leiceſter* (whom he had formerly forſaken) made himſelf the Head of a ſecond Rebellion, and called in Strangers, for which not long before he had cried out againſt the King, was not he in the end, after that he had ſeen the Slaughter of ſo many of the Barons, the Spoil of their Caſtles and Lordſhips, conſtrained to ſubmit himſelf, as all the Survivers did, of which they that ſped beſt paid their Fines and Ranſoms, the King reſerving his younger Son, the Earldoms of *Leiceſter* and *Derby.*

Counſ. Well, Sir, we have diſputed this King to the Grave, tho' it be true, that he outlived all his Enemies, and brought them to Confuſion; yet thoſe Examples did not terrify their Succeſſors, but the Earl *Marſhal*, and *Hereford*, threatened King *Edward* the firſt, with a new War.

Juſt. They did ſo, but after the Death of *Hereford*, the Earl *Marſhal* repented himſelf, and to gain the King's Favour, he made him Heir of all his Lands. But what is this to the Parliament? for there was never

never King of this Land had more given him for the time of his Reign, than *Edward* the Son of *Henry* the third had.

Counſ. How doth that appear?

Juſt. In this ſort, my good Lord; in this King's Third Year he had given him the Fifteenth Part of all Goods. In his Sixth Year a Twentieth; in his Twelfth Year a Twentieth; in his Fourteenth Year he had Eſcuage, (to wit) Forty Shillings of every Knight's Fee; in his Eighteenth Year he had the Eleventh Part of all moveable Goods within the Kingdom; in his Nineteenth Year, the Tenth Part of all Church Livings in *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland* for Six Years, by agreement from the Pope; in his Three and twentieth Year, he raiſed a tax upon Wool and Fells, and on a Day cauſed all the religious Houſes to be ſearched, and all the Treaſure in them to be ſeized and brought to his Coffers, excuſing himſelf by laying the Fault upon his Treaſurer: He had alſo in the end of the ſame Year of the Goods of all Burgeſſes, and of the Commons, the Tenth Part; in the Twenty-fifth Year of the Parliament of St. *Edmundſbury*, he had an Eighteenth Part of the Goods of the Burgeſſes, and of the People in general, the Tenth Part. He had alſo the ſame Year by putting the Clergy out of his Protection, a Fifth Part of their Goods, and in the ſame Year he ſet a great Tax upon Wools, to wit, from half a Mark to Forty Shillings upon every Sack, whereupon the Earl *Marſhal*, and the Earl of *Hereford*, refuſing to attend the King to *Flanders*, pretended the Grievances of the People. But in the End, the King having pardoned them, and confirmed the Great Charter, he had the Ninth Penny of all Goods from the Lords and Commons; of the Clergy, in the South he had the Tenth Penny, and in the North the Fifth Penny. In the Two and thirtieth Year he had a Subſidy freely granted. In the Three and thirtieth Year, he confirmed the Great Charter of his own Royal Diſpoſition; and the States to ſhew their

Thankfulneſs gave theKing for oneYear, the Fifth Part of all the Revenues of the Land, and of the Citizens the Sixth Part of their Goods. And in the ſame Year, the King uſed the Inquiſition called *Trai le Baſton*; By which all Juſtices and other Magiſtrates were grievouſly fined, that had uſed Extortion or Bribery, or had otherwiſe miſ-demeaned themſelves to the great Contentation of the People. This Commiſſion likewiſe did enquire of Entrudors, Barators, and all other the like Vermin, whereby the King gathered a great Maſs of Treaſure, with a great deal of Love. Now for the whole Reign of this King; who governed *England* thirty-five Years, there was not any Parliament to his Prejudice.

Counſ. But there was taking of Arms by *Marſhal* and *Hereford.*

Juſt. That's true, but why was that? becauſe the King, notwithſtanding all that was given him by Parliament, did lay the greateſt Taxes that ever King did without their Conſent. But what loſt the King by thoſe Lords? one of them gave the King all his Lands, and the other died in Diſgrace.

Counſ. But what ſay you to the Parliament in *Edward* the Second's time, his Succeſſor? did not the Houſe of Parliament baniſh *Pierce Gaveſton*, whom the King favoured?

Juſt. But what was this *Gaveſton* but an Eſquire of *Gaſcoigne*, formerly baniſh'd the Realm by King *Edward* the Firſt, for corrupting the Prince *Edward* now reigning. And the whole Kingdom fearing and deteſting his venomous Diſpoſition, they beſought his Majeſty to caſt him off, which the King performed by an Act of his own, and not by Act of Parliament; yea, *Gaveſton's* own Father-in-Law, the Earl of *Glouceſter*, was one of the chiefeſt of the Lords that procured it. And yet finding the King's Affection to follow him ſo ſtrongly, they all conſented to have him recalled. After which when his Credit ſo increaſed, that he deſpiſed and ſet at nought all the ancient Nobility, and not only

only perſuaded the King to all manner of Outrages and Riots, but withal tranſported what he liſted of the King's Treaſure and Jewels, the Lords urged his Baniſhment the ſecond Time; but neither was the firſt nor ſecond Baniſhment forced by Act of Parliament, but by the forceable Lords his Enemies. Laſtly, he being recalled by the King, the Earl of *Lancaſter* cauſed his Head to be ſtricken off, when thoſe of his Party had taken him Priſoner. By which preſumptuous Act, the Earl and the reſt of his Company committed Treaſon and Murder: Treaſon, by raiſing an Army without Warrant; Murder, by taking away the Life of the King's Subjects. After which, *Gaveſton* being dead, the *Spencers* got Poſſeſſion of the King's Favour, though the younger of them was placed about the King, by the Lords themſelves.

Counſ. What ſay you then to the Parliament held at *London*, about the Sixth Year of that King?

Juſt. I ſay that the King was not bound to perform the Acts of this Parliament, becauſe the Lords being too ſtrong for the King, inforced his Conſent; for theſe be the Words of our own Hiſtory, *They wreſted too much beyond the Bounds of Reaſon.*

Counſ. What ſay you then to the Parliaments of the white Wands, in the Thirteenth of the King?

Juſt. I ſay the Lords that were ſo moved, came with an Army, and by ſtrong Hand ſurprized the King, then conſtrained (ſaith the Story) the reſt of the Lords, and compelled many of the Biſhops to conſent unto them. Yea it ſaith further, that the King durſt not but grant to all that they required, (to wit) for the Baniſhment of the *Spencers*. Yea, they were ſo inſolent, that they refuſed to lodge the Queen coming through *Kent* in the Caſtle of *Leeds*, and ſent her to provide her Lodging, where ſhe could get it ſo late in the Night, for which notwithſtanding ſome that kept her out, were ſoon after taken and hang'd; and therefore your Lordſhip cannot call this a Parliament for

the Reaſons before alledged. But, my Lord, what became of thoſe Law-givers to the King, even when they were greateſt? A Knight of the North called *Andrew Herkley*, aſſembled the Forces of the Country, overthrew them and their Army, ſlew the Earl of *Hereford*, and other Barons, took their General *Thomas*, Earl of *Lancaſter*, the King's Couſin-German at that Time poſſeſſed of five Earldoms, the Lords *Clifford*, *Talbot*, *Moubray*, *Maudint*, *Willington*, *Warren*, Lord *Darcy*, *Withers*, *Knevill*, *Leybourne*, *Bekes*, *Lovell*, *Fitzwilliams*, *Watervild*, and divers other Barons, Knights and Eſquires; and ſoon after the Lord *Percy* and the Lord *Warren* took the Lords *Baldſmere*, and the Lord *Audley*, the Lords *Teis*, *Gifford*, *Tuchet*, and many others that fled from the Battle, the moſt of which paſt under the Hands of the Hangman, for conſtraining the King under Colour and Name of a Parliament By this your good Lordſhip may judge, to whom thoſe tumultuous Aſſemblies (which our Hiſtories falſly call Parliaments) have been dangerous; the King in the End ever prevailed, and the Lords loſt their Lives and Eſtates. After which the *Spencers* in their Baniſhment at *York* in the Fifteenth of the King, were reſtored to their Honours and Eſtates, and therein the King had a Subſidy given him, the Sixth Penny of Goods throughout *England*, *Ireland*, and *Wales*.

Counſ. Yet you ſee the *Spencers* were ſoon after diſſolved.

Juſt. It is true, my Lord, but that is nothing to our Subject of Parliament, they may thank their own Inſolency, for they branded and deſpiſed the Queen, whom they ought to have honoured as the King's Wife; they were alſo exceeding greedy, and built themſelves upon other Men's Ruins; they were ambitious, and exceeding malicious, whereupon that came, that when Chamberlain *Spencer* was hanged in *Here-*

Hereford, a Part of the Twenty-fourth *Pſalm* was written over his Head : *Quid gloriaris in malitia potens ?*

Counſ. Well, Sir, you have all this while excuſed yourſelf upon the Strength and Rebellions of the Lords; but what ſay you now to King *Edward* the Third, in whoſe Time (and during the Time of this victorious King, no Man durſt take Arms or rebel) the three Eſtates did him the greateſt Affront that ever King received or endured; therefore I conclude where I began, that theſe Parliaments are dangerous for a King.

Juſt. To anſwer your Lordſhip in order, may it pleaſe you firſt to call to Mind, what was given to this great King by his Subjects before the Diſpute betwixt him and the Houſe happened, which was in his latter Days : From his Firſt Year to his Fifth Year there was nothing given the King by his Subjects. In his Eighth Year at the Parliament at *London*, a Tenth and a Fifteenth was granted. In his Tenth Year he ſeized upon the *Italians* Goods here in *England* to his own Uſe, with all the Goods of the *Monks*, *Cluniacs*, and others of the Order of the *Ciſtercians*. In the Eleventh Year, he had given him by the Parliament a noble Relief, the one Half of the Wools throughout *England*, and of the Clergy all their Wools ; after which, in the End of the Year he had granted in his Parliament at *Weſtminſter*, 40 *s.* upon every Sack of Wool, and for ever Thirty Woolfells 40 *s.* for every Laſt of Leather as much, and for all other Merchandizes after the ſame Rate. The King promiſing that this Year's Gathering ended, he would thenceforth content himſelf with the old Cuſtom. He had over and above this great Aid, the Eighth Part of all Goods of all Citizens and Burgeſſes; and of other, as of foreign Merchants, and ſuch as lived not of the Gain of Breeding of Sheep and Cattle, the Fifteenth of their Goods. Nay, my Lord, this was not all, though more than ever was granted to any King, for the ſame Parliament beſtowed on the King the ninth Sheaf of all the Corn within the Land,

the ninth Fleece, and the ninth Lamb for two Years next following; now what thinks your Lordſhip of this Parliament?

Counſ. I ſay they were honeſt Men.

Juſt. And I ſay, the People are as loving to their King now, as ever they were, if they be honeſtly and wiſely dealt withal; and ſo his Majeſty had found them in his laſt two Parliaments, if he had not been betrayed by thoſe whom he moſt truſted.

Counſ. But I pray you, Sir, whom ſhall a King truſt, if he may not truſt thoſe whom he hath ſo greatly advanced?

Juſt. I will tell your Lordſhip whom the King may truſt.

Counſ. Who are they?

Juſt. His own Reaſon, and his own excellent Judgment, which have not deceived him in any thing wherein his Majeſty hath been pleaſed to exerciſe them; *Take Counſel of thine Heart* (ſaith the Book of *Wiſdom*) *for there is none more faithful unto thee than it.*

Counſ. It is true, but his Majeſty found that thoſe wanted no Judgment whom he truſted, and how could his Majeſty divine of their Honeſties?

Juſt. Will you pardon me if I ſpeak freely, for I ſpeak out of *Love*, which (as *Solomon* ſaith) *covereth all Treſpaſſes*; the Truth is, that his Majeſty would never believe any Man that ſpeaks againſt them, and they knew it well enough, which gave them Boldneſs to do what they did.

Counſ. What was that?

Juſt. Even, my good Lord, to ruin the King's Eſtate ſo far as the State of ſo great a King may be ruined by Men ambitious and greedy without Proportion. It had been a brave Increaſe of Revenue, my Lord, to have raiſed 50000 *l.* Land of the King's to 20000 *l.* Revenue, and to raiſe the Revenue of Wards to 20000 *l.* more, 40000 *l.* added to the reſt of his Majeſty's Eſtate, had ſo enabled his Majeſty,

as

as he could never have wanted. And, my good Lord, it had been an honeſt Service to the King, to have added 7000 *l.* Lands of the Lord *Cobham*'s, his Woods and Goods being worth 30000 *l.* more.

Counſ. I know not the Reaſon why it was not done.

Juſt. Neither doth your Lordſhip, perchance, know the Reaſon why the 10000 *l.* offered by *Swinnerton* for a Fine of the *French* Wines, was by the then Lord Treaſurer conferred on *Devonſhire* and his Miſtreſs.

Counſ. What moved the Treaſurer to reject and croſs that raiſing of the King's Lands?

Juſt. The Reaſon, my good Lord, is manifeſt, for had the Land been raiſed, then had the King known when he had given or exchanged Land, what he had given or exchanged.

Counſ. What Hurt had it been to the Treaſurer, whoſe Office is truly to inform the King of the Value of all that he giveth?

Juſt. So he did, when it did not concern himſelf nor his Particular, for he could never admit any one Piece of a good Mannor to paſs in my Lord *Aubigne*'s Book of 1000 *l.* Land, till he himſelf had bought, and then the remaining Flowers of the Crown were culled out. Now had the Treaſurer ſuffered the King's Lands to have been raiſed, how could his Lordſhip have made Choice of the old Rents, as well in that Book of my Lord *Aubigne*, as in Exchange of *Theobalds*, for which he took *Hatfield*, which the greateſt Subject or Favourite Queen *Elizabeth* had, never durſt have named unto her by way of Gift or Exchange. Nay, my Lord, ſo many other goodly Mannors have paſſed from his Majeſty, as the very Heart of the Kingdom mourneth to remember it, and the Eyes of the Kingdom ſhed Tears continually at the beholding it: yea the Soul of the Kingdom is

heavy

heavy unto Death with the Conſideration thereof, that ſo magnanimous a Prince ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be ſo abuſed.

Counſ. But, Sir, you know that *Cobham*'s Lands were entailed upon his Couſins.

Juſt. Yea, my Lord, but during the Lives and Races of *George Brooke* his Children, it had been the King's, that is to ſay, for ever in Effect, but to wreſt the King, and to draw the Inheritance upon himſelf, he perſuaded his Majeſty to relinquiſh his Intereſt for a petty Sum of Money; and that there might be noCounter-working, he ſent*Brooke* ſix thouſand Pounds to make Friends, whereof Lord *Hume* had two thouſand Pound back again, *Buckhurſt* and *Barwick* had the other four thouſand Pound, and the Treaſurer and his Heirs the Maſs of Land for ever.

Counſ. What then I pray you came to the King by this Confiſcation?

Juſt. My Lord, the King's Majeſty by all thoſe goodly Poſſeſſions, Woods and Goods, loſeth five hundred Pounds by the Year, which he giveth in Penſion to *Cobham*, to maintain him in Priſon.

Counſ. Certainly, even in Conſcience they ſhould have reſerved ſo much of the Land in the Crown as to have given *Cobham* Meat and Apparel, and not made themſelves ſo great Gainers, and the King five hundred Pounds *per Annum* Loſer by the Bargain, but it's paſt: *Conſilium non eſt eorum quæ fieri nequeunt.*

Juſt. Take the reſt of the Sentence, my Lord: *Sed conſilium verſatur in iis quæ ſunt in noſtra poteſtate.* It is yet, my good Lord, *in poteſtate Regis*, to right himſelf. But this is not all, my Lord; and I fear me, knowing your Lordſhip's Love to the King, it would put you in a Fever to hear all; I will therefore go on with my Parliaments.

Counſ. I pray do ſo, and amongſt the reſt, I pray you, what ſay you to the Parliament holden at *London* in the Fifteenth Year of King *Edward* III.

Juſt.

Juſt. I ſay there was nothing concluded therein to the Prejudice of the King. It is true, that a little before the Sitting of the Houſe, the King diſplaced his Chancellor and his Treaſurer, and moſt of all his Judges and Officers of the Exchequer, and committed many of them to Priſon, becauſe they did not ſupply him with Money, being beyond the Seas; for the reſt, the States aſſembled beſought the King, that the Laws of the two Charters might be obſerved, and that the great Officers of the Crown might be choſen by Parliament.

Counſ. But what Succeſs had theſe Petitions?

Juſt. The Charters were obſerved, as before, and ſo they will be ever; and the other Petition was not rejected, the King being pleaſed, notwithſtanding, that the great Officers ſhould take an Oath in Parliament to do Juſtice. Now for the Parliament of *Weſtminſter* in the Seventeenth Year of the King, the King had three Marks and a half for every Sack of Wool tranſported; and in the Eighteenth he had a Tenth of the Clergy, and a Fifteenth of the Laity for one Year. His Majeſty forbare after this to charge his Subjects with any more Payments, until the Twenty-ninth of his Reign, where there was given the King by Parliament Fifty Shillings for every Sack of Wool tranſported for Six Years, by which Grant the King received a thouſand Marks a Day, a greater Matter than a thouſand Pounds in theſe Days, and a thouſand Pound a Day amounts to 365,000 *l.* a Year, which was one of the greateſt Preſents that ever was given to a King of this Land. For beſides the Cheapneſs of all Things in that Age, the King's Soldiers had but Three-pence a Day Wages, a Man at Arms Six-pence, a Knight but Two Shillings. In the Parliament at *Weſtminſter*, in the Three and thirtieth Year he had Twenty-ſix Shillings and Eight-pence for every Sack of Wool tranſported, and in the Forty-ſecond Year three Diſmes and three Fifteens. In his Forty-fifth Year he had Fifty thouſand Pound of the Laity; and becauſe

the

the Spirituality diſputed it, and did not pay ſo much, the King changed his Chancellor, Treaſurer, and Privy-Seal, being Biſhops, and placed Lay-men in their Room.

Counſ. It ſeems that in thoſe Days the Kings were no longer in Love with their great Chancellors than when they deſerved well of them.

Juſt. No, my Lord, they were not, and that was the Reaſon they were well ſerved, and it was the Cuſtom then, and in many Ages after, to change the Treaſurer and the Chancellor every three Years, and withal to hear all Men's Complaints againſt them.

Counſ. By this often Change, the Saying is verified, that there is no Inheritance in the Favour of Kings. *He that keepeth the Fig-tree* (ſaith *Solomon*) *ſhall eat the Fruit thereof*; for Reaſon it is that the Servant live by the Maſter.

Juſt. My Lord, you ſay well in both; but had the Subject an Inheritance in the Prince's Favour, where the Prince hath no Inheritance in the Subject's Fidelity, then were Kings in more unhappy Eſtate than common Perſons: for the reſt *Solomon* meaneth not, that he that *keepeth the Fig-tree* ſhould ſurfeit; though he meant he ſhould eat, he meant not that he ſhould break the Branches in gathering the Figs, or eat the Ripe, and leave the Rotten for the Owner of the Tree; for what ſaith he in the following Chapter: He ſaith, that *he that maketh Haſte to be rich, cannot be innocent.* And before that he ſaith, *that the End of an Inheritance haſtily gotten, cannot be bleſſed.* Your Lordſhip hath heard of few or none great with Kings, that have not uſed their Power to oppreſs, that have not grown inſolent and hateful to the People; yea, inſolent towards thoſe Princes that advanced them.

Counſ. Yet you ſee that Princes can change their Fancies.

Juſt.

Juſt. Yea, my Lord, when Favourites change their Faith, when they forget that how familiar ſoever Kings make themſelves with their Vaſſals, yet they are Kings: *He that provoketh a King to Anger* (ſaith *Solomon*) *ſinneth againſt his own Soul.* And he farther ſaith, That *Pride goeth before Deſtruction, and a high Mind before a Fall.* I ſay therefore, that in diſcharging thoſe *Lucifers*, how dear ſoever they have been, Kings make the World know, that they have more of Judgment than of Paſſion, yea, they thereby offer a ſatisfactory Sacrifice to all their People. Too great Benefits of Subjects to their King, where the Mind is blown up with their own Deſervings, and too great Benefits of Kings conferred upon their Subjects, where the Mind is not qualified with a great Deal of Modeſty, are equally dangerous. Of this latter and inſolenter, had King *Richard* the Second delivered up to Juſtice but three or four, he had ſtill held the Love of the People, and thereby his Life and Eſtate.

Counſ. Well, I pray you go on with your Parliaments.

Juſt. The Life of this great King *Edward* draws to an End, ſo do the Parliaments of his Time, where in Fifty Years Reign he never received any Affront, for in his Forty-ninth Year, he had a Diſme, and a Fifteenth granted him freely.

Counſ. But Sir, it is an old Saying, that all is well that ends well: Judge you whether that in his Fifteenth Year in Parliament at *Weſtminſter*, he received not an affront, when the Houſe urged the King to remove and diſcharge from his Preſence the Duke of *Lancaſter*, the Lord *Latimer* his Chamberlain, Sir *Richard Sturry*, and others whom the King favoured and truſted. Nay, they preſſed the King to thruſt a certain Lady out of Court, which at that time bare the greateſt Sway therein.

Juſt. I will with Patience anſwer your Lordſhip to the full; and firſt your Lordſhip may remember by that

which

which I even now ſaid, that never King had ſo many Gifts as this King had from his Subjects, and it hath never grieved the Subjects of *England* to give to their King, but when they knew there was a devouring Lady, that had her Share in all Things that paſſed; and the Duke of *Lancaſter* was as ſcraping as ſhe; that the Chancellor did eat up the People as faſt as either of them both. It grieved the Subjects to feed theſe Cormorants. But my Lord, there are two Things by which the Kings of *England* have been preſs'd, (to wit) by their Subjects, and by their own Neceſſities. The Lords in former Times were far ſtronger, more warlike, better followed, living in their Countries, than now they are. Your Lordſhip may remember in your reading, that there were many Earls could bring into the Field a thouſand barbed Horſes, many a Baron five or ſix hundred barbed Horſes, whereas now very few of them can furniſh twenty fit to ſerve the King. But to ſay the Truth, my Lord, the Juſtices of Peace in *England*, have oppoſed the injuſtices of War in *England*; the King's Writ runs over all, and the great Seal of *England*, with that of the next Conſtables, will ſerve the Turn to affront the greateſt Lords in *England*, that ſhall move againſt the King. The Force therefore by which our Kings in former Times were troubled, is vaniſh'd away; but the Neceſſities remain. The People therefore in theſe latter Ages, are no leſs to be pleaſed than the Peers; for as the latter are become leſs, ſo by reaſon of the training through *England*, the Commons have all the Weapons in their Hand.

Counſ. Was it not ſo ever?

Juſt. No, my good Lord; for the Noblemen had in their Armories, to furniſh ſome of them a thouſand, ſome two thouſand, ſome three thouſand Men, whereas now there are not many that can arm fifty.

Counſ. Can you blame them? But I will only anſwer for myſelf, between you and me be it ſpoken; I hold it not ſafe to maintain ſo great an Armory or Stable,

Stable, it might cauſe me, or any other Nobleman to be ſuſpected, as the preparing of ſome Innovation.

Juſt. Why ſo, my Lord, rather to be commended as preparing againſt all Danger of Innovation?

Counſ. It ſhould be ſo; but call your Obſervation to account, and you ſhall find it as I ſay; for indeed ſuch a Jealouſy hath been held ever ſince the time of the civil Wars, over the military Greatneſs of our Nobles, as made them have little Will to bend their Studies that way: Wherefore let every Man provide according as he is rated in the Muſter-Book; you underſtand me.

Juſt. Very well, my Lord, as what might be replyed in the perceiving ſo much; I have ever (to deal plainly and freely with your Lordſhip) more fear'd at Home popular Violence, than all the Foreign that can be made; for it can never be in the Power of any foreign Prince without a papiſtical Party, either to diſorder or endanger his Majeſty's Eſtate.

Counſ. By this it ſeems, it is no leſs dangerous for a King to leave the Power in the People, than in the Nobility.

Juſt. My good Lord, the Wiſdom of our own Age, is the Fooliſhneſs of another, the Time preſent ought not to be preferr'd to the Policy that was, but the Policy that was to the Time preſent; ſo that the Power of the Nobility being now withered, and the Power of the People in the Flower, the Care to content them would not be neglected, the way to win them often practiſed, or at leaſt to defend them from Oppreſſion. The Motive of all Dangers that ever this Monarchy hath undone, ſhould be carefully heeded, for this Maxim hath no Poſtern, *Poteſtas humana radicatur in voluntatibus hominum.* And now, my Lord, for King *Edward*, it is true, tho' he were not ſubject to Force, yet was he ſubject to Neceſſity, which becauſe it was violent, he gave way unto it; *Poteſtas* (ſaith *Pythagoras*)

juxta

juxta neceſſitatem habitat. And it is true, that at the Requeſt of the Houſe he diſcharged, and put from him thoſe before named, which done, he had the greateſt Gift (but one) that ever he received in all his Days, (to wit) from every Perſon, Man and Woman, above the Age of fourteen Years, Four-pence of old Money; which made many Millions of Groats, worth Six-pence of our Money. This he had in general; beſides he had of every beneficed Prieſt, Twelve-pence, and of the Nobility and Gentry, I know not how much, for it is not ſet down. Now, my good Lord, what loſt the King by ſatisfying the Deſires of the Parliament Houſe? For as ſoon as he had the Money in Purſe, he recalled the Lords, and reſtored them; and who durſt call the King to account, when the Aſſembly were diſſolved? *Where the Word of a King is, there is Power,* (ſaith *Eccleſiaſticus*) *who ſhall ſay unto him, What doſt thou?* ſaith the ſame Author, *For every Purpoſe there is a Time and Judgment.* The King gave way to the Time, and his Judgment perſuaded him to yield to Neceſſity: *Conſiliarius nemo melior eſt quam tempus.*

Counſ. But yet you ſee the King was forced to yield to their Demands.

Juſt. Doth your Lordſhip remember the Saying of *Monſieur de Lange?* That he that hath Profit of the War, hath alſo the Honour of the War, whether it be by Battle or Retreat; the King you ſee hath the Profit of the Parliament, and therefore the Honour alſo. What other End had the King than to ſupply his Wants? A wiſe Man hath evermore reſpect unto his Ends: And the King alſo knew that it was the Love that the People bare him, that they urged the removing of theſe Lords; there was no Man among them that ſought himſelf in that Deſire, but they all ſought the King, as by the Succeſs it appeared. My good Lord, hath it not been ordinary in *England* and *France*, to yield to the Demands of Rebels? Did not King *Richard* the Second grant Pardon to the outrageous Rogues

Rogues and Murderers that followed *Jack Straw*, and *Wat Tyler*, after they had murthered his Chancellor, his Treaſurer, Chief Juſtice, and others; broke open his Exchequer, and committed all manner of Outrages and Villainies? And why did he do it, but to avoid a greater Danger? I ſay, the Kings have then yielded to thoſe that hated them and their Eſtates, (to wit) to pernicious Rebels; and yet without Diſhonour. Shall it be called Diſhonour for the King to yield to the honeſt Deſires of his Subjects? No, my Lord, thoſe that tell the King thoſe Tales, fear their own Diſhonour, and not the King's; for the Honour of the King is ſupreme, and being guarded by Juſtice and Piety, it cannot receive either Wound or Stain.

Counſ. But, Sir, what Cauſe have any about our King to fear a Parliament?

Juſt. The ſame Cauſe that the Earl of *Suffolk* had in *Richard* the Second's Time, and the Treaſurer *Fareham*, with others; for theſe great Officers being generally hated for abuſing both the King and the Subject, at the Requeſt of the States were diſcharged, and others put in their Rooms.

Counſ. And was not this a Diſhonour to the King?

Juſt. Certainly no; for King *Richard* knew that his Grandfather had done the like; and though the King was in his Heart utterly againſt it, yet had he the Profit of this Exchange; for *Suffolk* was fined at twenty thouſand Marks, and a thouſand Pounds Lands.

Counſ. Well, Sir, we will ſpeak of thoſe that fear the Parliament ſome other Time: But I pray you go on with that, that happened in the troubleſome Reign of *Richard* the Second who ſucceeded, the Grandfather being dead.

Juſt. That King, my good Lord, was one of the moſt unfortunate Princes that ever *England* had; he was cruel, extreme prodigal, and wholly carried away with his two Minions, *Suffolk*, and the Duke of *Ireland*,

by whoſe ill Advice and others, he was in Danger to have loſt his Eſtate; which in the end (being led by Men of the like Temper) he miſerably loſt. But for his Subſidies he had given him in his Firſt Year, being under Age, two Tenths, and two Fifteens: In which Parliament, *Alice Pierce*, who was removed in King *Edward*'s time, with *Lancaſter*, *Latimer*, and *Surrey*, were confiſcated and baniſhed. In his Second Year at the Parliament at *Glouceſter*, the King had a Mark upon every Sack of Wool, and Six-pence the Pound upon Wards. In his Third Year at the Parliament at *Winchester*, the Commons were ſpared, and a Subſidy given by the better Sort, the Dukes gave Twenty Marks, and Earls Six Marks, Biſhops and Abbots with Mitres Six Marks, every Mark Thirteen Shillings and Four-pence, and every Knight, Juſtice, Eſquire, Sheriff, Parſon, Vicar, and Chaplain, paid proportionably according to their Eſtates.

Counſ. This methinks was no great Matter.

Juſt. It is true, my Lord, but a little Money went far in thoſe Days: I myſelf once moved it in Parliament, in the time of Queen *Elizabeth*, who deſired much to ſpare the common People, and I did it by her Commandment; but when we caſt up the Subſidy-Books, we found the Sum but ſmall, when the Thirty Pound Men were left out. In the beginning of his Fourth Year, a Tenth, with a Fifteenth were granted upon Condition, that for One whole Year no Subſidies ſhould be demanded; but this Promiſe was as ſuddenly forgotten as made, for in the end of that Year, the great Subſidy of Poll-Money was granted in the Parliament at *Northampton*.

Counſ. Yea, but there followed the terrible Rebellion of *Baker*, *Straw*, *Leiſter*, *Wrais*, and others.

Juſt. That was not the Fault of the Parliament, my Lord, it is manifeſt that the Subſidy given was not the Cauſe; for it is plain that the Bondmen of *England* begun it, becauſe they were grievouſly oppreſs'd by their Lords

Lords in the Tenure of Villainage, as alſo for the Hatred they bare to the Lawyers and Attorneys; for the Story of thoſe Times ſays, that they deſtroyed the Houſes and Mannors of Men of Law, and ſuch Lawyers as they caught, ſlew them, and beheaded the Lord Chief Juſtice; which Commotion being once begun, the Head-money was by other Rebels pretended: A Fire is often kindled with a little Straw, which oftentimes takes hold of greater Timber, and conſumes the whole Building: And that this Rebellion was begun by the diſcontented Slaves, (whereof there have been many in elder Times the like) is manifeſt by the *Charter* of *Manumiſſion*, which the King granted *in hæc verba*, *Rich. Dei gratiâ, &c. Sciatis quod de gratiâ noſtrâ ſpeciali manumiſſimus, &c.* to which ſeeing the King was conſtrained by Force of Arms, he revoked the Letters Patents, and made them void, the ſame Revocation being ſtrengthened by the Parliament enſuing, in which the King had given him a Subſidy upon Wools, called a *Maletot*. In the ſame Fourth Year was the Lord Treaſurer diſcharged of his Office, and *Hales* Lord of St. *John's* choſen in his Place: In his Fifth Year was the Treaſurer again changed, and the Staff given to *Segrave*, and the Lord Chancellor was alſo changed, and the Staff given to the Lord *Scroope*: Which Lord *Scroope* was again in the beginning of his Sixth Year turned off, and the King after that he had for a while kept the Seal in his own Hand, gave it to the Biſhop of *London*, from whom it was ſoon after taken and beſtowed on the Earl of *Suffolk*, who they ſay had abuſed the King, and converted the King's Treaſure to his own Uſe. To this the King condeſcended. And though (ſaith *Walſingham*) he deſerved to loſe his Life and Goods, yet he had the Favour to go at Liberty, upon good Sureties: and becauſe the King was but young, and that the Relief granted was committed to the Truſt of the Earl of *Arundel*, for the furniſhing of the King's Navy againſt the *French*.

Counſ. Yet you ſee it was a Diſhonour to the King, to have his beloved Chancellor removed.

Juſt. Truly no, for the King had both his Fine, a Thouſand Pound Lands, and a Subſidy to boot. And though for the preſent it pleaſed the King to fancy a Man all the World hated, (the King's Paſſion overcoming his Judgment) yet it cannot be called a Diſhonour, for the King is to believe the general Council of the Kingdom, and to prefer it before his Affection, eſpecially when *Suffolk* was proved to be falſe even to the King; for were it otherwiſe, Love and Affection might be called a Frenzy and a Madneſs; for it is the Nature of human Paſſions, that the Love bred by Fidelity, doth change itſelf into Hatred, when the Fidelity is firſt changed into Falſhood.

Counſ. But you ſee there were thirteen Lords choſen in the Parliament, to have the Overſight of the Government under the King.

Juſt. No, my Lord, it was to have the Overſight of thoſe Officers, which (ſaith the Story) had imbezzelled, lewdly waſted, and prodigally ſpent the King's Treaſure, for the Commiſſion to thoſe Lords, or to any Six of them, joining with the King's Council, was one of the moſt royal and moſt profitable that ever he did, if he had been conſtant to himſelf. But, my good Lord, Man is the Cauſe of his own Miſery, for I will repeat the Subſtance of the Commiſſion granted by the King, and confirmed by Parliament, which, whether it had been profitable for the King to have proſecuted, your Lordſhip may judge. The Preamble hath theſe Words: *Whereas our Sovereign Lord the King perceiveth, by the grievous Complaints of the Lords and Commons of this Realm, that the Rents, Profits, and Revenues of this Realm, by the ſingular and inſufficient Counſel and Government, as well of ſome his late great Officers and others, &c. are ſo much withdrawn, waſted, given, granted, alienated, deſtroyed, and evil diſpended, that he is ſo much impoveriſhed and void of Treaſure and Goods, and the Sub-*

ſtance

ſtance of the Crown ſo much diminiſhed and deſtroyed, that his Eſtate may not honourably be ſuſtained as appertaineth. The King of his free Will, at the Requeſt of the Lords and Commons, hath ordained William *Archbiſhop of* Canterbury, *and others, with his Chancellor, Treaſurer, Keeper of his Privy-Seal, to ſurvey and examine as well the Eſtate and Governance of his Houſe, &c. as of all the Rents, and Profits, and Revenues that to him appertaineth, and to be due, or ought to appertain and be due, &c. And all manner of Gifts, Grants, Alienations, and Confirmations made by him of Lands, Tenements, Rents, &c. bargained and ſold to the Prejudice of him and his Crown, &c. And of his Jewels and Goods which were his Grandfather's, at the Time of his Death, &c. and where they be become.*

This is in Effect the Subſtance of the Commiſſion, which your Lordſhip may read at large in the Book of Statutes, this Commiſſion being enacted in the Tenth Year of the King's Reign. Now if ſuch a Commiſſion were in theſe Days granted to faithful Men that have no Intereſt in the Sales, Gifts, nor Purchaſes, nor in the keeping of the Jewels at the Qneen's Death, nor in the obtaining Grants of the King's beſt Lands, I cannot ſay what may be recovered, and juſtly recovered; and what ſays your Lordſhip, was not this a noble Act for the King, if it had been followed to Effect?

Counſ. I cannot tell whether it were or no, for it gave Power to the Commiſſioners to examine all the Grants.

Juſt. Why, my Lord, doth the King grant any Thing, that ſhames at the Examination? are not the King's Grants on Record?

Counſ. But by your Leave, it is ſome Diſhonour to a King, to have his Judgment called in Queſtion.

Juſt. That is true, my Lord, but in this, or whenſoever the like ſhall be granted in the future, the King's Judgment is not examined, but their Knavery that abuſed the King. Nay, by your Favour, the contrary

is true, that when a King will ſuffer himſelf to be eaten up by a Company of petty Fellows, by himſelf raiſed, therein both his Judgment and Courage is diſputed. And if your Lordſhip will diſdain it at your own Servant's Hands, much more ought the great Heart of a King to diſdain it. And ſurely, my Lord, it is a greater Reaſon (tho' it undercreep the Law) to tear from the Crown the Ornaments thereof: And it is an infallible Maxim, that he that loves not his Majeſty's Eſtate, loves not his Perſon.

Counſ. How came it then, that the Act was not executed?

Juſt. Becauſe thoſe, againſt whom it was granted, perſuaded the King to the contrary: As the Duke of *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, the Chief Juſtice *Treſilian*, and others; yea, that which was lawfully done by the King, and the great Council of the Kingdom, was (by the Maſtery which *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, and *Treſilian* had over the King's Affections) broken and diſavowed. Thoſe that deviſed to relieve the King, not by any private Invention, but by general Council, were by a private and partial Aſſembly adjudged Traytors, and the moſt honeſt Judges of the Land, enforced to ſubſcribe to that Judgment. In ſo much that the Judge *Belknap* plainly told the Duke of *Ireland*, and the Earl of *Suffolk*, when he was conſtrained to ſet his Hand, that he wanted but a Rope, that he might therewith receive a Reward for his Subſcription. And in this Council of *Nottingham* was hatched the Ruin of thoſe which governed the King, of the Judges by them conſtrained, of the Lords that loved the King and ſought a Reformation, and of the King himſelf; for though the King found by all the Shrieves of the Shires, that the People would not fight againſt the Lords, whom they thought to be moſt faithful unto the King, when the Citizens of *London* made the ſame Anſwer, being at that time able to arm Fifty thouſand Men, and told the Mayor that they would never

never fight againſt the King's Friends, and Defenders of the Realm, when the Lord *Ralph Baſſet*, who was near the King, told the King boldly, that he would not adventure to have his Head broken for the Duke of *Ireland*'s pleaſure, when the Lord of *London* told the Earl of *Suffolk* in the King's preſence, that he was not worthy to live, *&c.* yet would the King in the Defence of the Deſtroyers of his Eſtate, lay Ambuſhes to entrap the Lords, when they came upon his Faith, yea, when all was pacified, and that the King by his Proclamation had cleared the Lords, and promiſed to produce *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, and the Archbiſhop of *York*, *Treſilian*, and *Bramber*, to anſwer at the next Parliament. Theſe Men confeſs, that they durſt not appear; and when *Suffolk* fled to *Calais*, and the Duke of *Ireland* to *Cheſter*, the King cauſed an Army to be levied in *Lancaſhire*, for the ſafe Conduct of the Duke of *Ireland* to his preſence, when as the Duke being encountered by the Lords, ran like a Coward from his Company, and fled into *Holland*. After this was holden a Parliament, which was called, that wrought Wonders, in the Eleventh Year of this King, wherein the aforenamed Lords, the Duke of *Ireland* and the reſt, were condemned and confiſcated, the chief Juſtice hanged, with many others, the reſt of the Judges condemned, and baniſh'd, and a Tenth and a Fifteenth given to the King.

Counſ. But, good Sir, the King was firſt beſieged in the Tower of *London*, and the Lords came to the Parliament, and no Man durſt contradict them.

Juſt. Certainly in raiſing an Army, they committed Treaſon; and though it appear that they loved the King, (for they did him no Harm, having him in their Power) yet our Law doth conſtrue all levying of War without the King's Commiſſion, and all Force raiſed, to be intended for the Death and Deſtruction of the King, not attending the Sequel. And it is ſo judged upon good Reaſon; for every unlawful and ill Action

is ſuppoſed to be accompanied with an ill Intent. And beſides thoſe Lords uſed too great Cruelty, in procuring the Sentence of Death againſt divers of the King's Servants, who were bound to follow and obey their Maſter and Sovereign Lord in that he commanded.

Counſ. It is true, and they were alſo greatly to blame to cauſe then ſo many Seconds to be put to Death, ſeeing the Principals, *Ireland*, *Suffolk* and *York* had eſcaped them. And what Reaſon had they to ſeek to reform the State by a ſtrong Hand? Was not the King's Eſtate as dear to himſelf as to them? He that maketh a King know his Error mannerly and privately, and gives him the beſt Advice, is diſcharged before God and his own Conſcience. The Lords might have retired themſelves, when they ſaw they could not prevail, and have left the King to his own Ways, who had more to loſe than they had.

Juſt. My Lord, the taking of Arms cannot be excuſed in Reſpect of the Law; but this might be ſaid for the Lords, that the King being under Years, and being wholly governed by their Enemies and the Enemies of the Kingdom, and becauſe by thoſe evil Mens Perſuaſions, it was adviſed, how the Lords ſhould have been murthered at a Feaſt in *London*, they were excuſable during the King's Minority to ſtand upon their Guard againſt their particular Enemies. But we will paſs over and go on with our Parliaments that followed, whereof that of *Cambridge* in the King's Twelfth Year, was the next, therein the King had given him a Tenth and a Fifteenth, after which being twenty Years of Age, rechanged (ſaith *H. Knighton*) his Treaſurer, his Chancellor, the Juſtices of either Bench, the Clerk of the Privy Seal and others, and took the Government into his own Hands. He alſo took the Admiral's Place from the Earl of *Arundel*, and in his Room he placed the Earl of *Huntingdon* in the Year following, which was the Thirteenth Year of the

King,

King. In the Parliament at *Weſtminſter* there was given to the King upon every Sack of Wool 14 *s.*; and 6 *d.* in the Pound upon other Merchandiſe.

Counſ. By your Leave, the King was reſtrained this Parliament, that he might not diſpoſe of but a third Part of the Money gathered.

Juſt. No, my Lord, by your Favour: But true it is, that part of this Money was by the King's Conſent aſſigned towards the Wars, but yet left in the Lord Treaſurer's Hands; and, my Lord, it would be a great Eaſe, and a great Saving to his Majeſty, our Lord and Maſter, if it pleaſed him to make his Aſſignations upon ſome Part of his Revenues, by which he might have a Thouſand Pound upon every Ten Thouſand, and ſave himſelf a great deal of Clamour. For ſeeing of Neceſſity the Navy muſt be maintained, and that thoſe poor Men, as well Carpenters as Ship-keepers muſt be paid, it were better for his Majeſty to give an Aſſignation to the Treaſurer of his Navy, for the receiving ſo much as is called ordinary, than to diſcontent thoſe poor Men, who being made deſperate Beggars, may perchance be corrupted by them that lie in wait to deſtroy the King's Eſtate. And if his Majeſty did the like in all other Payments, eſpecially where the Neceſſity of ſuch as are to receive, cannot poſſibly give Days, his Majeſty might then in a little Roll, behold his Receipts and Expences; he might quiet his Heart when all Neceſſaries were provided for, and then diſpoſe the reſt at his Pleaſure. And, my good Lord, how excellently and eaſily might this have been, if the Forty Thouſand Pound had been raiſed as aforeſaid upon the King's Lands and Wards? I ſay, that his Majeſty's Houſe, his Navy, his Guards, his Penſioners, his Munition, his Ambaſſadors, and all elſe of ordinary Charge, might have been defrayed, and a great Sum left for his Majeſty's caſual Expences and Rewards. I will not ſay they were not in Love with

the

the King's Eſtate, but I ſay they were unfortunately born for the King that croſs'd it.

Counſ. Well, Sir, I would it had been otherwiſe: But for the Aſſignments, there are among us that will not willingly endure it. Charity begins with itſelf; ſhall we hinder ourſelves of Fifty Thouſand Pounds *per Annum* to ſave the King Twenty? No, Sir, what will become of our New-years-gifts, our Preſents and Gratuities? We can now ſay to thoſe that have Warrants for Money, that there is not a Penny in the Exchequer, but the King gives it away unto the *Scots* faſter than it comes in.

Juſt. My Lord, you ſay well, at leaſt you ſay the Truth, that ſuch are ſome of our Anſwers; and hence comes that general Murmur to all Men that have Money to receive. I ſay, that there is not a Penny given to that Nation, be it for Service or otherwiſe, but is ſpread over all the Kingdom; yea they gather Notes, and take Copies of all the Privy Seals and Warrants that his Majeſty hath given for the Money for the *Scots*, that they may ſhew them in Parliament. But of his Majeſty's Gifts to the *Engliſh* there is no Bruit, though they may be ten times as much as the *Scots*. And yet, my good Lord, howſoever they be thus anſwered, that to them that ſue for Money out of the Exchequer, it is due to them for Ten or Twelve, or Twenty in the Hundred, abated according to their Qualities that ſue, they are always furniſhed. For Concluſion, if it would pleaſe God to put into the King's Heart to make theſe Aſſignations, it would ſave him many a Pound, and gain him many a Prayer, and a great deal of Love; for it grieveth every honeſt Man's Heart to ſee the Abundance which even the petty Officers of the Exchequer, and others, gather both from the King and Subject, and to ſee a World of poor Men run after the King for their ordinary Wages.

Counſ. Well, well, did you never hear this old Tale, that when there was a great Contention about the Weather, the Seamen complaining of contrary Winds,

Winds, when thoſe of the high Countries deſired Rain, and thoſe of the Valleys Sun-ſhining Days; *Jupiter* ſent them Word by *Mercury*, that when they had all done, the Weather ſhould be as it had been. And it ſhall ever fall out ſo with them that complain; the Courſe of Payments ſhall be as they have been, what care we what petty Fellows ſay? or what care we for your Papers? have we not the King's Ears, who dares conteſt with us? though we cannot be revenged on ſuch as you are for telling the Truth, yet upon ſome other Pretence, we'll clap you up, and you ſhall ſue to us ere you get out. Nay, we'll make you confeſs that you were deceived in your Projects, and eat your own Words. Learn this of me, Sir, that as a little good Fortune is better than a great deal of Virtue; ſo the leaſt Authority hath Advantage over the greateſt Wit. Was he not the wiſeſt Man that ſaid, *The Battle was not to the ſtrongeſt, nor yet Bread for the Wiſe, nor Riches to Men of Underſtanding, nor Favour to Men of Knowledge: But that Time or Chance came to them all.*

Juſt. It is well for your Lordſhip that it is ſo. But Queen *Elizabeth* would ſet the Reaſon of a mean Man, before the Authority of the greateſt Counſellor ſhe had; and by her Patience therein ſhe raiſed upon the uſual and ordinary Cuſtoms of *London*, without any new Impoſition, above 50000 *l.* a Year. For though the Treaſurer *Burleigh*, and the Earl of *Leiceſter*, and Secretary *Walſingham*, all Three Penſioners to Cuſtomer *Smith*, did ſet themſelves againſt a poor Waiter of the Cuſtom-Houſe called *Carwarden*, and commanded the Grooms of the Privy-Chamber not to give him Acceſs, yet the Queen ſent for him, and gave him Countenance againſt them all. It would not ſerve the Turn, my Lord, with her; when your Lordſhips would tell her, that the diſgracing her great Officers by hearing the Complaints of buſy Heads, was a Diſhonour to herſelf; but ſhe had always this Anſwer,

That

That if any Man complain unjuſtly againſt a Magiſtrate, it were Reaſon he ſhould be ſeverely puniſhed; if juſtly, ſhe was the Queen of the ſmall, as well as of the great, and would hear their Complaints. For, my good Lord, a Prince that ſuffereth himſelf to be beſieged, forſaketh one of the greateſt Regalities belonging to a Monarchy, to wit, the laſt Appeal, or as the *French* call it, *le dernier reſort.*

Counſ. Well, Sir, this from the Matter; I pray you go on.

Juſt. Then, my Lord, in the King's Fifteenth Year he had a Tenth and Fifteenth granted in the Parliament of *London.* And that ſame Year there was a great Council called at *Stamford*, to which divers Men were ſent for, of divers Counties, beſides the Nobility, of which the King took Advice whether he ſhould continue the War, or make a final End with the *French.*

Counſ. What needed the King to take the Advice of any but of his own Council in Matters of Peace or War?

Juſt. Yea, my Lord, for it is ſaid in the Proverbs, *Where is many Counſellors, there is Health*; and if the King had made the War by a general Conſent, the Kingdom in general were bound to maintain the War, and they could not then ſay when the King required Aid, that he undertook a needleſs War.

Counſ. You ſay well, but I pray you go on.

Juſt. After the Subſidy in the Fifteenth Year, the King deſired to borrow 10000 *l.* of the *Londoners*, which they refuſed to lend.

Counſ. And was not the King greatly troubled therewith?

Juſt. Yea, but the King troubled the *Londoners* ſoon after, for the King took the Advantage of a Riot made upon the Biſhop of *Saliſbury*'s Men, ſent for the Mayor, and other the ableſt Citizens, committed the Mayor to Priſon in the Caſtle of *Windſor*, and others to other Caſtles, and made a Lord Warden of this City;

City; till in the End what with 10000 *l.* ready Money, and other rich Preſents, inſtead of lending 10000 *l.* it coſt them 20000 *l.* Between the Fifteenth Year and Twentieth Year, he had two Aids given him in the Parliaments of *Wincheſter* and *Weſtminſter*; and this latter was given to furniſh the King's Journey into *Ireland*, to eſtabliſh that Eſtate which was greatly ſhaken ſince the Death of the King's Grandfather, who received thence yearly 30000 *l.* and during the King's Stay in *Ireland*, he had a Tenth and Fifteenth granted.

Counſ. And good Reaſon, for the King had in his Army Four Thouſand Horſe, and Thirty Thouſand Foot.

Juſt. That, by your Favour, was the King's Safety: For great Armies do rather devour themſelves than deſtroy Enemies. Such an Army (whereof the fourth Part would have conquered all *Ireland*) was in reſpect of *Ireland* ſuch an Army as *Xerxes* led into *Greece*. In his Twentieth Year, wherein he had a Tenth of the Clergy, was the great Conſpiracy of the King's Uncle the Duke of *Gloceſter*, and of *Moubray*, *Arundel*, *Nottingham*, and *Warwick*, the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, and the Abbot of *Weſtminſter*, and others, who in the One and Twentieth of the King were all redeemed by Parliament. And what thinks your Lordſhip, was not this Aſſembly of the three States for the King's Eſtate, wherein he ſo prevailed, that he not only overthrew thoſe popular Lords, but beſides (the *Engliſh* Chronicle ſaith) the King ſo wrought and brought Things about, that he obtained the Power of both Houſes to be granted certain Perſons, to Fifteen Noblemen and Gentlemtn, or to ſeven of them.

Counſ. Sir, whether the King wrought well or ill I cannot judge; but our Chronicles ſay, that many Things were done in this Parliament to the Diſpleaſure of no ſmall Number of People, to wit, for that divers rightful Heirs were diſinherited of their Lands

and

and Livings, with which wrongful Doings the People were much offended, ſo that the King with thoſe that were about him, and chief in Counſel, came into great Infamy and Slander.

Juſt. My good Lord, if your Lordſhip will pardon me, I am of Opinion that thoſe Parliaments wherein the Kings of this Land have ſatisfied the People, as they have been ever proſperous, ſo where the King hath reſtrained the Houſe, the contrary hath happened; for the King's Atchievements in the Parliament, were the ready Preparations to his Ruin.

Counſ. You mean by the general Diſcontentment that followed; and becauſe the King did not proceed legally with *Glocester* and others. Why, Sir, this was not the firſt Time that the Kings of *England* have done Things without the Council of the Land; yea contrary to Law.

Juſt. It is true, my Lord, in ſome Particulars, as even at this Time the Duke of *Glocester* was made away at *Calais* by a ſtrong Hand without any lawful Trial; for he was a Man ſo beloved of the People, and ſo allied, having the Dukes of *Lancaſter* and *York* his Brethren, the Duke of *Aumarle* and the Duke of *Hereford* his Nephews, the great Earls of *Arundel* and *Warwick*, with divers others of his Part in the Conſpiracy, as the King durſt nor try him according to the Law: For at the Tryal of *Arundel* and *Warwick*, the King was forced to entertain a pretty Army about him. And though the Duke was greatly lamented, yet it cannot be denied but that he was then a Traitor to the King. And was it not ſo, my Lord, with the Duke of *Guiſe?* Your Lordſhip doth remember the ſpur-gall'd Proverb, that *Neceſſity hath no Law:* And, my good Lord, it is the Practice of doing Wrong, and of general Wrong done, that brings Danger, and not where Kings are preſs'd in this or that Particular; for there is great Difference between natural Cruelty and accidental.

And

And therefore it was *Machiavel*'s Advice, That *all that a King did in that Kind, he ſhall do at once, and by his Mercy afterwards make the World know, that his Cruelty was not affected.* And, my Lord, take this for a general Rule, that the immortal Policy of a State cannot admit any Law or Privilege whatſoever, but in ſome Particular or other, the ſame is neceſſarily broken; yea in an *Ariſtocracy* or popular Eſtate, which vaunts ſo much of Equality and common Right, more Outrage hath been committed than in any Chriſtian Monarchy.

Counſ. But whence came this Hatred between the Duke and the King his Nephew ?

Juſt. My Lord, the Duke's conſtraining the King, when he was young, ſtuck in the King's Heart; and now the Duke's proud Speech to the King when he had rendered *Breſt* formerly engaged to the Duke of *Britain*, kindled again thoſe Coals that were not altogether extinguiſhed, for he uſed theſe Words : *Your Grace ought to put your Body in great Pain to win a ſtrong Hold or Town by Feats of Arms, ere you take upon you to ſell or deliver any Town gotten by the Manhood and ſtrong Hand and Policy of your noble Progenitors.* Whereat, ſaith the Story, the King changed his Countenance,*&c.* and to ſay Truth, it was a proud and maſterly Speech of the Duke ; beſides that incluſively he taxed him of Sloth and Cowardice, as if he had never put himſelf to the Adventure of winning ſuch a Place. Undutiful Words of a Subject do often take deeper Root than the Memory of ill Deeds do : The Duke of *Biron* found it when the King had him at Advantage. Yea, the late Earl of *Eſſex* told Queen *Elizabeth*, that her Conditions were as crooked as her Carcaſe ; but it coſt him his Head, which his Inſurrection had not coſt him but for that Speech. *Who will ſay unto a King*, (ſaith *Job*) *Thou art wicked ?* Certainly it is the ſame Thing to ſay unto a Lady, Thou art crooked, (and perchance more) as to ſay unto a King

than

that he is wicked: and to ſay that he is a Coward, or to uſe any other Words of Diſgrace, it is one and the ſame Error.

Counſ. But what ſay you for *Arundel*, a brave and valiant Man, who had the King's Pardon of his Contempt during his Minority.

Juſt. My good Lord, the Parliament which you ſay diſputes the King's Prerogative, did quite contrary, and deſtroyed the King's Charter and Pardon formerly given to *Arundel*; and, my good Lord, do you remember that at the Parliament that wrought Wonders, when theſe Lords compounded that Parliament, as the King did this, they were ſo mercileſs towards all that they thought their Enemies, as the Earl of *Arundel* moſt inſolently ſuffered the Queen to kneel unto him three Hours for the ſaving of one of her Servants, and that Scorn of his, *manebat alta monte repoſtum.* And to ſay the Truth, it is more barbarous and unpardonable than any Act that ever he did, to permit the Wife of his Sovereign to kneel to him, being the King's Vaſſal. For if he had ſaved her Lord's Servant freely at her firſt Requeſt, it is like enough that the Queen would alſo have ſaved him: *Miſeris ſuccurrens paria obtinebis aliquando.* For your Lordſhip ſees that the Earl of *Warwick*, who was as far in the Treaſon as any of the reſt, was pardoned. It was alſo at this Parliament that the Duke of *Hereford* accuſed *Moubray* Duke of *Norfolk*, and that the Duke of *Hereford*, Son to the Duke of *Lancaſter*, was baniſhed, to the King's Confuſion, as your Lordſhip well knows.

Counſ. I know it well, and God knows, that the King had then a ſilly and weak Council about him, that perſuaded him to baniſh a Prince of the Blood, a moſt valiant Man, and the beſt beloved of the People in general of any Man living, eſpecially conſidering that the King gave every Day more than other Offence to his Subjects. For beſides that, he fined the Inhabitants

bitants that aſſiſted the Lords in his Minority, (of the ſeventeen Shires) which Offence he had long before pardoned, his blank Charters, and letting the Realm to farm to mean Perſons, by whom he was wholly adviſed, increaſed the People's Hatred toward the preſent Government.

Juſt. You ſay well, my Lord; Princes of an ill Deſtiny do always follow the worſt Counſel, or at leaſt embrace the beſt after Opportunity is loſt. *Qui conſilia non ex ſuo corde ſed alienis viribus colligunt, non animo ſed auribus cogitant.* And this was not the leaſt Grief of the Subject in general, that thoſe Men had the greateſt Part of the Spoil of the Commonwealth, which neither by Virtue, Valour, or Counſel, could add any thing unto it.----*Nihil eſt ſordidius, nihil crudelius* (ſaith *Anto. Pius*) *quam ſi Remp. ii arrodunt, qui nihil in eam ſuo labore conferunt.*

Counſ. Indeed, the letting to farm the Realm was very grievous to the Subject.

Juſt. Will your Lordſhip pardon me, if I tell you that the letting to farm of his Majeſty's Cuſtoms (the greateſt Revenue of the Realm) is not very pleaſing?

Counſ. And why, I pray you? doth not the King thereby raiſe his Profits every third Year, and one Farmer outbids another to the King's Advantage?

Juſt. It is true, my Lord, but it grieves the Subject to pay Cuſtom to the Subject; for what mighty Men are thoſe Farmers become? And if thoſe Farmers get many Thouſands every Year, as the World knows they do, why ſhould they not now (being Men of infinite Wealth) declare unto the King upon Oath, what they have gained, and henceforth become the King's Collectors of his Cuſtom? Did not Queen *Elizabeth*, who was reputed both a wiſe and juſt Princeſs, after ſhe had brought Cuſtomer *Smith* from 14000*l.* a Year to 42000*l.* a Year, make him lay down a Recompence for that which he had gotten?

And if theſe Farmers do give no Recompence, let them yet preſent the King with the Truth of their Receivings and Profits. But, my Lord, for Concluſion, after *Bullingbrook*, arriving in *England* with a ſmall Troop, notwithſtanding the King at his Landing out of *Ireland* had a ſufficient and willing Army, yet he wanting Courage to defend his Right, gave Leave to all his Soldiers to depart, and put himſelf into his Hands that caſt him into his Grave.

Counſ. Yet you ſee he was depoſed by Parliament.

Juſt. As well may your Lordſhip ſay he was knock'd in the Head by Parliament; for your Lordſhip knows that if King *Richard* had ever eſcaped out of their Fingers that depoſed him, the next Parliament would have made all the Depoſers Traytors and Rebels, and that juſtly. In which Parliament, or rather unlawful Aſſembly, there appeared but one honeſt Man, to wit, the Biſhop of *Carliſle*, who ſcorned his Life, and Eſtate, in reſpect of Right and his Allegiance, and defended the Right of his ſovereign Lord againſt the King elect and his Partakers.

Counſ. Well, I pray go on with the Parliaments held in the Time of his Succeſſor *Henry* the Fourth.

Juſt. This King had in his Third Year a Subſidy, and in his Fifth a Tenth of the Clergy without a Parliament: In his Sixth Year he had ſo great a Subſidy, as the Houſe required there might be no Record thereof left to Poſterity, for the Houſe gave him 20 *s.* of every Knight's Fee, and of every 20 *l.* Land, 20 *d.*; and 12 *d.* the Pound of Goods.

Counſ. Yea in the End of this Year, the Parliament preſs'd the King to annex unto the Crown all temporal Poſſeſſions belonging to Church-men within the Land, which at that Time was the third Foot of all *England*. But the Biſhops made Friends, and in the End ſaved their Eſtates.

Juſt.

Juſt. By this you ſee, my Lord, that *Cromwel* was not the firſt that thought on ſuch a Buſineſs; and if King *Henry* the Eighth had reſerved the Abbies, and other Church-lands, which he had given at that Time, the Revenue of the Crown of *England* had exceeded the Revenue of the Crown of *Spain*, with both the *Indies*, whereas uſed as it was (a little enriched the Crown) it ſerved but to make a number of Pettifoggers and others Gentlemen.

Counſ. But what had the King inſtead of this great Revenue?

Juſt. He had a Fifteenth of the Commons, and a Tenth and a half of the Clergy, and withal all Penſions granted by King *Edward* and King *Richard* were made void. It was alſo moved that all Crown-lands formerly given (at leaſt given by King *Edward* and King *Richard*) ſhould be taken back.

Counſ. What think you of that, Sir? would it not have been a Diſhonour to the King? And would not his Succeſſors have done the like to thoſe that the King had advanced?

Juſt. I cannot anſwer your Lordſhip, but by diſtinguiſhing; for where the Kings had given Land for Services, and had not been over-reached in their Gifts, there it had been a Diſhonour to the King, to have made void the Grants of his Predeceſſors, or his Grants; but all thoſe Grants of the Kings, wherein they were deceived, the very Cuſtom and Policy of *England* makes them void at this Day.

Counſ. How mean you that, for his Majeſty hath given a great deal of Land among us ſince he came into *England*, and would it ſtand with the King's Honour to take it from us again?

Juſt. Yea, my Lord, very well with the King's Honour, if your Lordſhip, or any Lord elſe, have under the Name of 100 *l.* Land a Year, gotten 500 *l.* Land, and ſo after that Rate.

Counſ. I will never believe that his Majeſty will ever do any ſuch thing.

Juſt. And I believe as your Lordſhip doth, but we ſpake erewhile of thoſe that diſſuaded the King from calling a Parliament: and your Lordſhip aſked me the Reaſon, why any Man ſhould diſſuade it, or fear it, to which this Place gives me an Opportunity to make your Lordſhip anſwer; for though his Majeſty will of himſelf never queſtion thoſe Grants, yet when the Commons ſhall make humble Petition to the King in Parliament, that it will pleaſe his Majeſty to aſſiſt them in his Relief, with that which ought to be his own, which, if it will pleaſe his Majeſty to yield unto, the Houſe will moſt willingly furniſh and ſupply the reſt; with what Grace can his Majeſty deny that honeſt Suit of theirs, the like having been done in many Kings Times before? This Proceeding, my good Lord, may perchance prove all your Phraſes of the King's Honour, falſe *Engliſh*.

Counſ. But this cannot concern many, and for myſelf, I am ſure it concerns me little.

Juſt. It is true, my Lord, and there are not many that diſſuade his Majeſty from a Parliament.

Counſ. But they are great ones, a few of which will ſerve the Turn well enough.

Juſt. But, my Lord, be they ever ſo great, (as great as Giants) yet if they diſſuade the King from his ready and aſſured Way of his Subſiſtence, they muſt deviſe how the King may be elſewhere ſupplied, for they otherwiſe run into a dangerous Fortune.

Counſ. Hold you contented, Sir, the King needs no great Diſſuaſion.

Juſt. My Lord, learn of me, that there is none of you all that can pierce the King. It is an eſſential Property of a Man truly wiſe, not to open all the Boxes of his Boſom, even to thoſe that are neareſt and deareſt unto him; for when a Man is diſcovered to the very Bottom, he is after the leſs eſteemed. I dare

dare undertake, that when your Lordſhip hath ſerved the King twice Twelve Years more, you will find that his Majeſty hath reſerved ſomewhat beyond all your Capacities. His Majeſty hath great Reaſon to put off the Parliament, as his laſt Refuge, and in the mean time, to make Tryal of all your Loves to ſerve him, for his Majeſty hath had good Experience, how well you can ſerve yourſelves : But when the King finds, that the building of your own Fortunes and Factions hath been the diligent Studies, and the Service of his Majeſty, but the Exerciſes of your Leiſures, he may then perchance caſt himſelf upon the general Love of his People : of which (I truſt) he ſhall never be deceived, and leave as many of your Lordſhips as have pilfered from the Crown, to their Examination.

Counſ. Well, Sir, I take no great pleaſure in this Diſpute ; go on I pray.

Juſt. In that King's Fifteenth Year, he had alſo a Subſidy, which he got by holding the Houſe together from *Eaſter* to *Chriſtmas*, and would not ſuffer them to depart. He had alſo a Subſidy in his Ninth Year. In his Eleventh Year the Commons did again preſs the King to take all the Temporalities of the Churchmen into his Hands, which they proved ſufficient to maintain 150 Earls, 1500 Knights, and 6400 Eſquires, with 100 Hoſpitals; but not prevailing, they gave the King a Subſidy.

As for the notorious Prince, *Henry* the Fifth, I find, that he had given him in his Second Year 300000 Marks, and after that Two other Subſidies, one in his Fifth Year, another in his Ninth, without any Diſputes.

In the time of his Succeſſor *Henry* the Sixth, there were not many Subſidies. In his Third Year, he had a Subſidy of a Tunnage and Poundage. And here (ſaith *John Stow*) began thoſe Payments, which we call Cuſtoms ; becauſe the Payment was continued, whereas

before that time it was granted but for a Year, Two or Three, according to the King's Occaſions. He had alſo an aid and gathering of Money in his Fourth Year, and the like in his Tenth Year, and in his Thirteenth Year a Fifteenth. He had alſo a Fifteenth for the conveying of the Queen out of *France* into *England*. In the Twenty-eighth Year of that King, was the Act of Reſumption of all Honours, Towns, Caſtles, Signiories, Villages, Mannors, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Reverſions, Fees, &c. But becauſe the Wages of the King's Servants, were by the Strictneſs of the Act alſo reſtrained, this Act of Reſumption was expounded in the Parliament at *Reading*, the One and Thirtieth Year of the King's Reign.

Counſ. I perceive that thoſe Acts of Reſumption were ordinary in former Times; for King *Stephen* reſumed the Lands, which in former Times he had given to make Friends during the Civil Wars. And *Henry* the Second reſumed all (without exception) which King *Stephen* had not reſumed; for although King *Stephen* took back a great deal, yet he ſuffered his truſtieſt Servants to enjoy his Gifts.

Juſt. Yes, my Lord, and in After-times alſo; for this was not the laſt, nor ſhall be the laſt, I hope. And judge you, my Lord, whether the Parliaments do not only ſerve the King, whatſoever is ſaid to the contrary; for as all King *Henry* the Sixth's Gifts and Grants were made void by the Duke of *York*, when he was in Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom by Parliament, ſo in the Time of King *Henry*, when King *Edward* was beaten out again, the Parliament of *Weſtminſter* made all his Acts void, made him and all his Followers Traytors, and gave the King many of their Heads and Lands. The Parliaments of *England* do always ſerve the King in Poſſeſſion. It ſerved *Richard* the Second to condemn the popular Lords. It ſerved *Bullinbrook* to depoſe *Richard*, when *Edward* the Fourth had the Scepter. It made them all Beggars that had followed

Henry

Henry the Sixth. And it did the like for *Henry*, when *Edward* was driven out. The Parliaments are, as the Friendſhip of this World is, which always followeth Proſperity. For King *Edward* the Fourth, after that he was poſſeſſed of the Crown, had in his Thirteenth Year a Subſidy freely given him: and in the Year following he took a Benevolence through *England*, which arbitrary taking from the People, ſerved that ambitious Traytor the Duke of *Bucks*. After the King's Death was a plauſible Argument to perſuade the Multitude, that they ſhould not permit (ſaith Sir *Thomas Moore*) his Line to reign any longer upon them.

Counſ. Well, Sir, what ſay you to the Parliament of *Richard* the Third in his Time?

Juſt. I find but one, and therein he made divers good Laws. For King *Henry* the Seventh in the beginning of ~~his~~ Third Year, had by Parliament an Aid granted unto him, towards the Relief of the Duke of *Britain*, then aſſailed by the *French* King. And although the King did not enter into the War, but by the Advice of the three Eſtates, who did willingly contribute: Yet thoſe Northern Men which loved *Richard* the Third, raiſed Rebellion under colour of the Money impos'd, and murther'd the Earl of *Northumberland* whom the King employed in that Collection. By which your Lordſhip ſees, that it hath not been for Taxes and Impoſitions alone, that the Ill-diſpoſed have taken Arms; but even for thoſe Payments which have been appointed by Parliament.

Counſ. And what became of theſe Rebels?

Juſt. They were fairly hanged, and the Money levied notwithſtanding. In the King's Firſt Year, he gathered a marvellous great Maſs of Money, by a Benevolence, taking Pattern by this kind of Levy from *Edward* the Fourth. But the King cauſed it firſt to be moved in Parliament, where it was allowed, becauſe the poorer Sort were therein ſpared. Yet it is true, that the King uſed ſome Art, for in his Letters he declared

that he would meaſure every Man's Affections by his Gifts. In the Thirteenth Year he had alſo a Subſidy, whereupon the *Corniſh* Men took Arms, as the *Northern* Men of the Biſhoprick had done in the Third Year of the King.

Counſ. It is without Example, that ever the People have rebelled for any thing granted by Parliament, ſave in this King's Days.

Juſt. Your Lordſhip muſt conſider, that he was not overmuch beloved, for he took many Advantages upon the People and the Nobility both.

Counſ. And I pray you what ſay they now of the new Impoſitions lately laid by the King's Majeſty? do they ſay that they are juſtly or unjuſtly laid?

Juſt. To impoſe upon all Things brought into the Kingdom is very ancient: Which impoſing, when it hath been continued a certain Time, is then called Cuſtoms, becauſe the Subjects are accuſtomed to pay it; and yet the great Tax upon Wine is ſtill called Impoſt, becauſe it was impoſed after the ordinary Rate of Payment had laſted many Years. But we do now-a-days underſtand thoſe Things to be Impoſitions, which are raiſed by the Command of Princes, without the Advice of the Commonwealth, though (as I take it) much of that which is now called Cuſtom, was at the firſt impoſed by Prerogative Royal. Now whether it be Time or Conſent that makes them juſt, I cannot define. Were they unjuſt becauſe new, and not juſtifiable yet by time, or unjuſt becauſe they want a general Conſent? yet is this Rule of *Ariſtotle* verified in reſpect of his Majeſty, *Minus timent homines injuſtum pati à principe quem cultorem Dei putant.* Yea, my Lord, they are alſo the more willingly born, becauſe all the World knows they are no new Invention of the King's. And if thoſe that adviſed his Majeſty to impoſe them, had raiſed his Lands (as it was offered them) to 20000*l.* more than it was, and his Wards to as much as afore-

ſaid,

ſaid, they had done him far more acceptable Service. But they had their own Ends in refuſing the one, and accepting the other. If the Land had been raiſed, they could not have ſelected the beſt of it for themſelves: If the Impoſitions had not been laid, ſome of them could not have their Silk, or other Pieces in Farm, which indeed grieved the Subject ten times more than that which his Majeſty enjoyeth. But certainly they made a great Advantage that were the Adviſers, for if any Tumult had followed, his Majeſty's ready way had been to have delivered them over to the People.

Counſ. But think you that the King would have delivered them, if any Troubles had followed?

Juſt. I know not, my Lord; it was *Machiavel*'s Counſel to *Cæſar Borgia* to do it, and King *Henry* the Eighth delivered up *Empſon* and *Dudley*: Yea, the ſame King, when the great Cardinal *WOOLSEY*, who governed the King and all his Eſtate, had (by requiring the Sixth Part of every Man's Goods for the King) raiſed a Rebellion, the King I ſay diſavowed him abſolutely; that had not the Dukes of *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* appeaſed the People, the Cardinal had ſung no more Maſs: for theſe are the Words of our Story: The King then came to *Weſtminſter* to the Cardinal's Palace, and aſſembled there a great Council, in which he proteſted, That *his Mind was never to aſk any Thing of his Commons which might ſound to the Breach of his Laws.* Wherefore he then willed them to know by whoſe Means they were ſo ſtrictly given forth. Now my Lord, how the Cardinal would have ſhifted himſelf, by ſaying, *I had the Opinion of the Judges*, had not the Rebellion been appeaſed, I greatly doubt.

Counſ. But, good Sir, you blanch my Queſtion, and anſwer me by Examples. I aſk you whether or no, in any ſuch Tumult, the People pretending againſt any one or two great Officers, the King ſhould deliver them, or defend them?

Juſt.

Juſt. My good Lord, the People have not ſtaid for the King's Delivery, neither in *England* nor in *France*. Your Lordſhip knows how the Chancellor, Treaſurer, and Chief Juſtice, with many others at ſeveral times, have been uſed by the Rebels: And the Marſhals, Conſtables, and Treaſurers in *France*, have been cut in pieces in *Charles* the Sixth's time. Now to your Lordſhip's Queſtion, I ſay, that where any Man ſhall give a King perilous Advice, as may either cauſe a Rebellion, or draw the People's Love from the King, I ſay, that a King ſhall be adviſed to baniſh him: But if the King do abſolutely command his Servant to do any Thing diſpleaſing to the Commonwealth, and to his own Peril, there is the King bound in Honour to defend him. But, my good Lord, for Concluſion, there is no Man in *England* that will lay any Invention either grievous or againſt Law upon the King's Majeſty: and therefore your Lordſhips muſt ſhare it amongſt you.

Counſ. For my part, I had no Hand in it, (I think) *Ingram* was he that propounded it to the Treaſurer.

Juſt. Alas, my good Lord, every poor Waiter in the Cuſtom-houſe, or every Promoter might have done it, there is no Invention in theſe Things. To lay Impoſitions, and ſell the King's Lands, are poor and common Devices. It is true that *Ingram* and his Fellows are odious Men, and therefore his Majeſty pleas'd the People greatly to put him from the Coffer-ſhip. It is better for a Prince to uſe ſuch a kind of Men, than to countenance them; Hangmen are neceſſary in a Commonwealth, yet in the *Netherlands*, none but a Hangman's Son would marry a Hangman's Daughter. Now, my Lord, the laſt gathering which *Henry* the Seventh made, was in the Twentieth Year, wherein he had another Benevolence both of the Clergy and Laity, a part of which taken of the poorer Sort, he ordained by his Teſtament that it ſhould be reſtored. And for King *Henry* the Eighth, although he was left in a moſt plentiful

plentiful Eſtate, yet he wonderfully preſs'd his People with great Payments; for in the beginning of his Time, it was infinite that he ſpent in Maſking, and Tilting, Banqueting, and other Vanities, before he was entered into the moſt conſuming Expence of the moſt fond and fruitleſs War, that ever King undertook. In his Fourth Year, he had one of the greateſt Subſidies that ever was granted; for beſides Two Fifteens and Two Diſmes, he uſed *David*'s Law of Capitation or Head-money, and had of every Duke Ten Marks, of every Earl Five Pounds, of every Lord Four Pounds, of every Knight Four Marks, and every Man rated at Eight Pound in Goods Four Marks, and ſo after the rate: yea, every Man that was valued but at Forty Pound, paid Twelve-pence, and every Man and Woman above Fifteen Years, Four-pence. He had alſo in his Sixth Year divers Subſidies granted him. In his Fourteenth there was a Tenth demanded of every Man's Goods, but it was moderated. In the Parliament following, the Clergy gave the King the half of their ſpiritual Livings for one Year, and of the Laity there was demanded 800000 *l.* which could not be levied in *England*, but it was a marvellous great Gift that the King had given him at that time. In the King's Seventeenth Year, was the Rebellion before ſpoken of, wherein the King diſavowed the Cardinal: In his Seventeenth Year, he hath a Tenth and Fifteenth given by Parliament, which were before that time paid to the Pope. And before that alſo the Money that the King borrowed in his Fifteenth Year were forgiven him by Parliament in his Seventeenth Year. In his Thirty-fifth Year, a Subſidy was granted of Four-pence the Pound of every Man worth in Goods from Twenty Shillings to Five Pounds, from Five Pounds to Ten Pounds, and upward of every Pound Two Shillings. And all Strangers, Denizens and others doubled this Sum, Strangers not being Inhabitants, above Sixteen Years, Four-pence a Head. All that

had

had Lands, Fees and Annuities, from Twenty to Five, and ſo double as they did for Goods: And the Clergy gave Six Pence the Pound. In the Thirty-ſeventh Year, a Benevolence was taken not voluntary, but rated by Commiſſioners, which becauſe one of the Aldermen refuſed to pay, he was ſent for a Soldier into *Scotland*. He had alſo another great Subſidy of Six Shillings the Pound of the Clergy, and Two Shillings Eight Pence of the Goods of the Laity, and Four Shillings the Pound upon Lands.

In the Second Year of *Edward* the Sixth, the Parliament gave the King an Aid of Twelve Pence the Pound of Goods of his Natural Subjects, and Two Shillings the Pound of Strangers, and this to continue for Three Years. And by the Statute of the Second and Third of *Edward* the Sixth, it may appear the ſame Parliament did alſo give a ſecond Aid, as followeth, (to wit) of every Ewe kept in ſeveral Paſtures, Three Pence; of every Weather kept as aforeſaid, Two Pence; of every Sheep kept in the Common, Three-half-pence. The Houſe gave the King alſo Eight Pence the Pound of every Woollen Cloth, made for Sale throughout *England* for Three Years. In the Third and Fourth of the King, by reaſon of the troubleſome gathering of the Pole Money upon Sheep, and the Tax upon Cloth, this Act of Subſidy was repeal'd, and other Relief given the King; and in the Seventh Year, he had a Subſidy and two Fifteenths.

In the Firſt Year of Queen *Mary*, Tunnage and Poundage were granted: In the Second Year a Subſidy was given to King *Philip*, and to the Queen. She had alſo a third Subſidy, *in Annis* 4 & 5.

Eliz. Reg. Now, my Lord, for the Parliaments of the late Queen's Time, in which nothing new, neither Head-money, Sheep-money, Eſcuage, nor any of theſe Kinds of Payments, was required, but only the ordinary Subſidies, and thoſe as eaſily granted as demanded. I ſhall not need to trouble your Lordſhip with any of them;

them; neither can I inform your Lordſhip of all the Paſſages and Acts which have paſſed, for they are not extant, nor printed.

Counſ. No, it were but Time loſt to ſpeak of the latter; and by thoſe that are already remembered, we may judge of the reſt, for thoſe of the greateſt Importance are publick. But I pray you deal freely with me; what you think would be done for his Majeſty, if he ſhould call a Parliament at this Time, or what would be required at his Majeſty's Hands?

Juſt. The firſt Thing that would be required, would be the ſame that was required by the Commons in the Thirteenth Year of *Henry* the Eighth, (to wit) that if any Man of the Commons Houſe ſhould ſpeak more largely, than of Duty he ought to do, all ſuch Offences to be pardoned, and that to be of Record.

Counſ. So might every Companion ſpeak of the King what they liſt.

Juſt. No, my Lord; the Reverence which a Vaſſal oweth to his Sovereign, is always intended for every Speech, howſoever it muſt import the Good of the King, and his Eſtate, and ſo long it may be eaſily pardoned, otherwiſe not; for in Queen *Elizabeth*'s time, who gave Freedom of Speech in all Parliaments, when *Wentworth* made thoſe Motions, that were but ſuppoſed dangerous to the Queen's Eſtate, he was impriſoned in the Tower, notwithſtanding the Privilege of the Houſe, and there dyed.

Counſ. What ſay you to the *Sicilian Veſpers* remembered in the laſt Parliament?

Juſt. I ſay he repented him heartily that uſed that Speech, and indeed beſides that it was ſeditious, this Example held not. The *French* in *Sicily* uſurped that Kingdom, they neither kept Law nor Faith; they took away the Inheritance of the Inhabitants, they took from them their Wives, and raviſhed their Daughters, committing all other Inſolencies that could be imagined. The King's Majeſty is the natural Lord of *England*, his

his Vaſſals of *Scotland* obey the *Engliſh* Laws, if they break them, they are puniſhed without Reſpect. Yea, his Majeſty put one of his Barons to a ſhameful Death, for being conſenting only to the Death of a common Fencer: And which of theſe ever did or durſt commit any Outrage in *England*; but to ſay the Truth, the Opinion of packing the laſt was the Cauſe of the Contention and Diſorder that happened.

Counſ. Why, Sir? Do you not think it beſt to compound a Parliament of the King's Servants and others that ſhall in all obey the King's Deſires?

Juſt. Certainly no; for it hath never ſucceeded well, neither on the King's part, nor on the Subjects, as by the Parliament before remembered, your Lordſhip may gather; for from ſuch a Compoſition do ariſe all Jealouſies and all Contentions. It was practiſed in elder times, to the great Trouble of the Kingdom, and to the Loſs and Ruin of many. It was of latter time uſed by King *Henry* the Eighth, but every way to his Diſadvantage. When the King leaves himſelf to his People, they aſſure themſelves they are truſted and beloved of their Kings; and there was never any Aſſembly ſo barbarous, as not to anſwer the Love and Truſt of their King. *Henry* the Sixth, when his Eſtate was in effect utterly overthrown and utterly impoveriſhed, at the humble Requeſt of his Treaſurer made the ſame known to the Houſe: Or otherwiſe uſing the Treaſurer's own Words, He humbly deſired the King to take his Staff, that he might ſave his Wardſhip.

Counſ. But you know, they will preſently be in hand with thoſe Impoſitions, which the King hath laid by his own Royal Prerogative.

Juſt. Perchance not, my Lord; but rather with thoſe Impoſitions that have been by ſome of your Lordſhips laid upon the King, which did not ſome of your Lordſhips fear more than you do the Impoſitions laid upon the Subjects, you would never diſuade his

his Majeſty from a Parliament: For no Man doubted, but that his Majeſty was adviſed to lay thoſe Impoſitions by his Council, and for particular Things on which they were laid; the Advice came from petty Fellows (tho' now great ones) belonging to the Cuſtom-houſe. Now, my Lord, what Prejudice hath his Majeſty (his Revenue being kept up) if the Impoſitions that were laid, were laid by the general Council of the Kingdom, which takes off all Grudging and Complaint.

Counſ. Yes, Sir, but that which is done by the King, with the Advice of his Private or Privy Council, is done by the King's abſolute Power.

Juſt. And by whoſe Power is it done in Parliament, but by the King's abſolute Power? Miſtake it not, my Lord: The three Eſtates do but adviſe, as the Privy Council doth, which Advice if the King embrace, it becomes the King's own Act in the one, and the King's Law in the other; for without the King's Acceptation, both the publick and private Advices be but as empty Egg-ſhells; and what doth his Majeſty loſe, if ſome of thoſe Things, which concern the poorer Sort, be made free again, and the Revenue kept up upon that which is ſuperfluous? Is it a Loſs to the King to be beloved of the Commons? If it be Revenue which the King ſeeks, is it not better to take it of thoſe that laugh, than thoſe that cry? Yea, if all be content to pay upon Moderation and Change of the Species, is it not more honourable and more ſafe for the King, that the Subject pay by Perſuaſion, than to have them conſtrained? If they be contented to whip themſelves for the King, were it not better to give them the Rod into their Hands, than to commit them to the Executioner? Certainly it is far more happy for a Sovereign Prince, that a Subject open his Purſe willingly, than that the ſame be opened by Violence. Beſides, that when Impoſitions are laid by Parliament, they are gathered by the

the Authority of the Law, which (as aforeſaid) rejecteth all Complaints, and ſtoppeth every mutinous Mouth: It ſhall ever be my Prayer, that the King embrace the Council of Honour and Safety, and let other Princes embrace that of Force.

Counſ. But, good Sir, it is his Prerogative which the King ſtands upon, and it is the Prerogative of the King's, that the Parliaments do all diminiſh.

Juſt. If your Lordſhip would pardon me, I would ſay then, that your Lordſhip's Objections againſt Parliaments is ridiculous. In former Parliaments, three Things have been ſuppoſed Diſhonour to the King. The Firſt, that the Subjects have conditioned with the King, when the King hath needed them, to have the Great Charter confirmed. The Second, That the Eſtates have made Treaſurers for the neceſſary and profitable diſburſing of thoſe Sums by them given, to the End, that the Kings, to whom they were given, ſhould expend them for their own Defence, and for the Defence of the Commonweal. The Third, That theſe have preſs'd the King to diſcharge ſome great Officers of the Crown, and to elect others. As touching the firſt, my Lord, I would fain learn what Diſadvantage the Kings of this Land have had by confirming the Great Charter, the Breach of which hath ſerved only Men of your Lordſhip's Rank, to aſſiſt their own Paſſions, and to puniſh and impriſon at their own Diſcretion the King's poor Subjects, covering their private Hatred, with the Colour of the King's Service. For the King's Majeſty takes no Man's Inheritance, (as I have ſaid before) nor any Man's Life, but by the Law of the Land, according to the Charter. Neither doth his Majeſty impriſon any Man (Matter of Practice, which concerns the Preſervation of his Eſtate excepted) but by the Law of the Land. And yet he uſeth his Prerogative as all the Kings of

England

England have ever uſed it. The ſupreme Reaſon cauſeth to practiſe many things without the Advice of the Law. As for Inſurrections and Rebellions, it uſeth the Martial, and not the Common Law, without any Breach of the Charter, the Intent of the Charter conſidered truly. Neither hath any Subject made Complaint, or been grieved, in that the Kings of this Land, for their own Safeties, and Preſervation of their Eſtates, have uſed their Prerogatives, the great Engine, on which there is written *Soli Deo.* And, my good Lord, was not *Buckingham* in *England*, and *Biron* in *France*, condemned, their Peers uncalled? And withall, was not *Biron* utterly (contrary to the Cuſtoms and Privileges of the *French*) denied an Advocate to aſſiſt his Defence? For where Laws forecaſt cannot provide Remedies for future Dangers, Princes are forced to aſſiſt themſelves by their Prerogatives. But that, which hath been ever grievous, and the Cauſe of many Troubles, very dangerous, is, that your Lordſhips abuſing the Reaſons of State, do puniſh and impriſon the King's Subjects at your Pleaſure. It is you, my Lords, that when Subjects have ſometimes need of the King's Prerogative, do then uſe the Strength of the Law; and when they require the Law, you afflict them with the Prerogative, and tread the Great Charter (which hath been confirmed by ſixteen Acts of Parliament) under your Feet, as a torn Parchment or waſte Paper.

Counſ. Good Sir, which of us do in this Sort break the Great Charter? Perchance you mean, that we have adviſed the King to lay the new Impoſitions.

Juſt. No, my Lord; there is nothing in the Great Charter againſt Impoſitions; and beſides that, Neceſſity doth perſuade them. And if Neceſſity do in ſomewhat excuſe a private Man, *à fortiori* it may then excuſe a Prince. Again, the King's Majeſty hath Profit and Increaſe of Revenue by the Impoſitions.

But there are of your Lordſhips (contrary to the direct Letter of the Charter) that impriſon the King's Subjects, and deny them the Benefit of the Law, to the King's Diſprofit. And what do you otherwiſe thereby (if the Impoſitions be in any ſort grievous) but *Renovare dolores?* And withal dig out of the Duſt the long buried Memory of the Subjects former Contentions with the King.

Counſ. What mean you by that?

Juſt. I will tell your Lordſhip, when I dare: in the mean time, it is enough for me put your Lordſhip in mind, that all the Eſtates in the World, in the Offence of the People, have either had Profit or Neceſſity to perſuade them to adventure it; of which, if neither be urgent, and yet the Subject exceedingly grieved, your Lordſhip may conjecture, that the Houſe will be humble Suitors for a Redreſs. And if it be a Maxim in Policy to pleaſe the People in all things indifferent, and never ſuffer them to be beaten for the King's Benefit (for there are no Blows forgotten with the Smart but theſe) then, I ſay, to make them Vaſſals to Vaſſal, is to batter down thoſe maſterly Buildings, erected by *Henry* the Seventh, and fortified by his Son, by which the People and Gentry of *England* were brought to depend on the King alone. Yea, my good Lord, our late dear Sovereign Queen *Elizabeth* kept them up, and to their Advantage, as well repair'd as ever Prince did. Defend me, and ſpend me, ſaith the *Iriſh* Churl.

Counſ. Then you think, that this violent Breach of the Charter will be the Cauſe of ſeeking the Confirmation of it in the next Parliament, which otherwiſe could never have been moved.

Juſt. I know not, my good Lord, perchance not; for if the Houſe preſs the King to grant to them all that is theirs by the Law; they cannot in Juſtice refuſe the King all that is his by the Law. And where will be the Iſſue of ſuch a Contention? I dare not

not divine, but ſure I am, that it will tend to the Prejudice both of the King and Subject.

Counſ. If they diſpute not their own Liberties, why ſhould they then diſpute the King's Liberties, which we call his Prerogative?

Juſt. Among ſo many and ſo diverſe Spirits, no Man can foretell what may be propounded; but however, if the Matter be not ſlightly handled on the King's Behalf, theſe Diſputes will ſoon diſſolve; for the King hath ſo little need of his Prerogative, and ſo great Advantage by the Laws, as the Fear of impairing the one, *viz.* the Prerogative, is ſo impoſſible, and the Burthen of the other, *viz.* the Law, ſo weighty, as but by a Branch of the King's Prerogative, namely, of his Remiſſion and Pardon, the Subject is no way able to undergo it. This, my Lord, is no Matter of flouriſh, that I have ſaid; but it is the Truth, and unanſwerable.

Counſ. But to execute the Laws very ſeverely would be very grievous.

Juſt. Why, my Lord, are the Laws grievous, which ourſelves have required of our Kings? And are the Prerogatives alſo, which our Kings have received to themſelves, alſo grievous? How can ſuch a People then be well pleaſed? And if your Lordſhip confeſs, that the Laws give too much, why does not your Lordſhip urge the Prerogative, that gives more? Nay, I will be bold to ſay it, that except the Laws were better obſerved, the Prerogative of a religious Prince hath manifold leſs Perils than the Letter of the Law hath. Now, my Lord, for the ſecond and third, to wit, for the appointing Treaſurers, and removing of Counſellors, our Kings have evermore laughed them to Scorn, that have preſſed either of theſe, and after the Parliment diſſolved, took the Money of the Treaſurers of the Parliament, and recalled or reſtored the Officers diſcharged; or elſe they have been contented, that ſome ſuch Perſons ſhould be removed at the

Requeſt of the whole Kingdom, which they themſelves, out of their noble Natures, would not ſeem willing to remove.

Counſ. Well, Sir, would you, notwithſtanding all theſe Arguments, adviſe his Majeſty to call a Parliament?

Juſt. It belongs to your Lordſhips, who enjoy the King's Favour, and are choſen for your able Wiſdom, to adviſe the King. It were a ſtrange Boldneſs in a poor and private Perſon, to adviſe Kings attended with ſo underſtanding a Council. But belike your Lordſhips have conceived ſome other way how Money may be gotten otherwiſe. If any Trouble ſhould happen, your Lordſhip knows, that then there were nothing ſo dangerous for a King as to be without Money. A Parliament cannot aſſemble in haſte, but preſent Dangers require haſty Remedies. It will be no time then to diſcontent the Subjects by uſing any unordinary Ways.

Counſ. Well, Sir, all this notwithſtanding we dare not adviſe the King to call a Parliament; for if it ſhould ſucceed ill, we, who adviſe, ſhould fall into the King's Diſgrace. And if the King be driven into any Extremity, we can ſay to the King, that becauſe we found it extremely unpleaſing to his Majeſty to hear of a Parliament, we thought it no good Manners to make ſuch a Motion.

Juſt. My Lord, to the firſt, let me tell you, that there was never any juſt Prince, that hath taken any Advantage of the Succeſs of Counſels, which have been founded on Reaſon. To fear that, were to fear the Loſs of the Bell, more than the Loſs of the Steeple, and were alſo the way to beat all Men from the Studies of the King's Service. But for the ſecond, where you ſay you can excuſe yourſelves upon the King's own proteſting againſt a Parliament, the King upon better Conſideration may encounter that Fineſſe of yours.

Counſ. How, I pray you?

Juſt.

Juſt. Even by declaring himſelf to be indifferent, by calling your Lordſhips together, and delivering to you, that he hears how his loving Subjects in general are willing to ſupply him, if it pleaſe him to call a Parliament; for that was the common Anſwer to all the Sheriffs in *England*, when the late Benevolence was commanded. In which reſpect, and becauſe you come ſhort in all your Projects, and becauſe it is a thing moſt dangerous for a King to be without Treaſure, he requires ſuch of you, as either miſlike, or rather fear a Parliament, to ſet down your Reaſons in Writing, for which you either miſliked or feared it. And ſuch, as wiſh and deſire it, to ſet down Anſwers to your Objections; and ſo ſhall the King prevent the calling or not calling a Parliament, as ſome of your great Counſellors have done in many other things, ſhrinking up their Shoulders, and ſaying, The King will have it ſo,

Counſ. Well, Sir, it grows late, and I will bid you farewell: only you ſhall take well with you this Advice of mine, that in all, that you have ſaid againſt our greateſt, thoſe Men in the end ſhall be your Judges in their own Cauſe: You, that trouble yourſelf with Reformation, are like to be well rewarded. Hereof you may aſſure yourſelf, that we will never allow of any Invention, how profitable ſoever, unleſs it proceed, or ſeem to proceed, from ourſelves.

Juſt. If then, my Lord, we may preſume to ſay, that Princes may be unhappy in any thing, certainly they are unhappy in nothing more, than in ſuffering themſelves to be ſo incloſed. Again, if we may believe *Pliny*, who tells us, that 'tis an ill Sign of Proſperity in any Kingdom or State, where ſuch, as deſerve well, find no other Recompence than the Contentment of their own Conſciences; a far worſe Sign is it, where the juſtly Accuſed ſhall take Revenge of the juſt Accuſer. But, my good Lord, there is this Hope remaining, that ſeeing he hath been abuſed by them he truſted moſt, he

will not for the future diſhonour his Judgment, (ſo well informed by his own Experience) as to expoſe ſuch of his Vaſſals as have had no other Motives to ſerve him, than ſimply the Love of his Perſon and Eſtate to their Revenge, who have only been moved by the Love of their own Fortunes, and their Glory.

Counſ. But, good Sir, the King hath not been deceived by all.

Juſt. No, my Lord, neither have all been truſted; neither doth the World accuſe all, but believe, that there be among your Lordſhips very juſt and worthy Men, as well of the Nobility as others; but thoſe, tho' moſt honoured in the Commonwealth, yet have not been moſt employed. Your Lordſhip knows it well enough, that Three or Four of your Lordſhips have thought your Hands ſtrong enough to bear up alone the weightieſt Affairs in the Commonwealth; and ſtrong enough all the Land have found them, to beat down whom they pleaſed.

Counſ. I underſtand you, but how ſhall it appear, that they have only ſought themſelves?

Juſt. There needs no Perſpective Glaſs to diſcern it; for neither in Treaties of Peace and War, in Matters of Revenue, and Matters of Trade, any thing hath happened either of Love or Judgment. No, my Lord, there is not any Action of theirs eminent, great or ſmall, the Greatneſs of themſelves only excepted.

Counſ. It is all one, your Papers can neither anſwer, nor reply; we can. Beſides, you tell the King no News in delivering theſe Complaints, for he knows as much as can be told him.

Juſt. For the firſt, my Lord, whereas he hath once the Reaſons of Things delivered him, your Lordſhips ſhall need to be well adviſed in their Anſwers. There is no Sophiſtry will ſerve the Turn, where the Judge and Underſtanding are both Supreme. For the ſecond, to ſay, that his Majeſty knows and cares not, that, my Lord,

Lord, were but to deſpair all his faithful Subjects. But by your Favour, my Lord, we ſee it is contrary: we find now, that there is no ſuch ſingular Power as there hath been. Juſtice is deſcribed with a Balance in her Hand, holding it even, and it hangs as even now, as ever it did in any King's Days; for ſingular Authority begets but general Oppreſſion.

Counſ. However it be, that's nothing to you, that have no Intereſt in the King's Favour, nor perhaps in his Opinion; and concerning ſuch a one, the miſliking, or but miſconceiving of any hard Word, Phraſe, or Sentence, will give Argument to the King, either to condemn or reject the whole Diſcourſe. And however his Majeſty may neglect your Informations, you may be ſure, that others (at whom you point) will not neglect their Revenges: you will therefore confeſs it (when it is too late) that you are exceeding ſorry, that you have not followed my Advice. Remember Cardinal *Woolſey*, who loſt all Men for the King's Service; and when their Malice (whom he grieved) had outlived the King's Affection, you know what became of him as well as I.

Juſt. Yea, my Lard, I know it well, that Malice hath a longer Life, than either Love or Thankfulneſs; for as we always take more care to put off Pain, than to enjoy Pleaſure, becauſe the one has no Intermiſſion, and with the other we are often ſatisfied; ſo it is in the Smart of Injury, and Memory of good Turns. *Wrongs are written in Marble; Benefits are ſometimes acknowledged, rarely requited.* But, my Lord, we ſhall all do the King great Wrong, to judge him by common Rules, or ordinary Examples: for ſeeing his Majeſty hath greatly enriched and advanced thoſe, that have but pretended his Service, no Man need doubt of his Goodneſs towards thoſe, that perform any thing worthy Reward. Nay, the not taking Knowledge of thoſe of his own Vaſſals, that have done him Wrong, is more to be lamented, than the relinquiſhing of thoſe, that do

him Right is to be ſuſpected. I am therefore, my Lord, held to my Reſolution, by theſe Two, beſides the former: The firſt, that God would never have bleſt him with ſo many Years, and in ſo many Actions, yea, in all his Actions, had he paid his honeſt Servants with Evil for Good. The ſecond, where your Lordſhip tells me, that I ſhall be ſorry for not following your Advice; I pray your Lordſhip to believe, that I am no way ſubject to the common ſorrowing of worldly Men, this Maxim of *Plato* being true, *Dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus naſcuntur:* But for my Body, my Mind values it at nothing.

Counſ. What is it then you hope for, or ſeek?

Juſt. Neither Riches nor Honour, or Thanks, but only ſeek to ſatisfy his Majeſty, (which I would have been glad to have done in Matters of more Importance) that *I have lived and will die an honeſt Man.*

9 Jacobi.

A DISCOURSE *touching a Match propounded by the* Savoyan, *between the Lady* ELIZABETH *and the Prince of* PIEDMONT.

TO obey the Commandment of my Lord, the Prince, I have ſent you my Opinion of the Match lately deſired by the Duke of *Savoy*, and propounded by his own Ambaſſador, between the Lady *Elizabeth*, his Majeſty's eldeſt and only ſurviving Daughter, and the Prince of *Piedmont*; with an Overture (as I have heard) of a croſs Marriage between the moſt excellent and hopeful Prince of *Wales*, and the eldeſt Daughter of the ſaid Duke.

Now as by the firſt, to wit, by the Match with the Lady *Elizabeth*, the Duke's Son, of a *Spaniſh* Race, may in the future (if it ſhould pleaſe God to lay ſuch a heavy Burthen upon us) become King of *England*; ſo by the ſecond, tho' the *Savoyan* had no Heirs Male, yet would it not be eaſy for a King of *England* to recover the Right of thoſe Principalities, all *France* being interjacent. For one of the moſt renowned Kings, and the moſt valiant, that ever *France* had, ſpent more in the obtaining and Defence of that Part of *Savoy* and *Piedmont*, which fell unto him by *Louiſa* his

his Mother, Heir to her Brother *Philibert*, than both thoſe petty Provinces could be valued to be worth. And if thoſe of the Houſe of *Auſtria* and of *Spain* thought it a Matter ſo exceeding perilous for a *French* King to poſſeſs that barren Diadem; much more will the *French* eſteem it dangerous for them, that a King of *England* ſhould inherit it. The Reaſon why I need not tell you. But we will leave theſe Conſiderations to their far-off Poſſibilities; and in the mean time take it for granted, that Marriages between foreign Princes, for the moſt part, are but Politick. For whereſoever they employ their own Affections, judging by Perſons preſented, and not by Pictures repreſenting, they commonly make Choice of their own Subjects. Now this Policy in Marriages hath either Reſpect to the enlarging of Dominion and uniting of Kingdoms, Dukedoms, and other Principalities; as by a Marriage the Dutchy of [a] *Bretagne*, and other Signories in *France*, were annexed to that Crown; by a [b] Marriage the *Netherlands* became ſubject to the Princes of *Auſtria*, and *Caſtille* to *Arragon*, and *Portugal* to *Caſtille*, &c. or to the ending of ſome great War, and the eſtabliſhing of Peace; as when *Ferdinand* of *Arragon* married the Lady *Germaine* of *Foix*; when King *Francis* the Firſt married Queen *Eleanor*; *Philip* the Second the Lady *Elizabeth* of *France*; and *Philibert Emanuel*, Duke of *Savoy*, the Lady *Margaret*, Siſter to King *Henry* the Second of *France*: Or, laſtly, it hath reſpect to the Combination and League againſt ſome other King, or Eſtate, powerful and ſuſpected.

Now for the firſt, I think his Majeſty holds nothing more impoſſible, nor any thing leſs profitable, than the Inheritance of *Savoy*. For as long as there is a King

[a] Charles VIII. [b] Mary of Burgundy to the Archduke, Son to the Emperor.

King of *France* or a King of *Spain*, they will never (if their Powers fail them not) endure the uniting of *Savoy* and *Piedmont* to an abſolute Monarchy powerful in itſelf. It was a long War, a cruel and coſtly one, made for the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, and to keep it a Dutchy apart from the *Imperial*, *Spaniſh*, and *French*. For the ſecond, to wit, the eſtabliſhing a Peace after a long War, as there never was any Effect without a Cauſe; ſo to thoſe things, that never had Beginning, there never was any Man, that took Care to give End or Concluſion.

For the third, namely, a Combination againſt ſome powerful or ſuſpected Enemy, I know no Chriſtian Prince ſo powerful as the King of *Great Britain*; and out of doubt, the Eſtate of *Savoy* cannot be changed by any Alliance, for it hath ever depended, and muſt ever depend, either upon *France*, or *Spain*. And for the ſtrengthening our King, or the Levy of an Army in thoſe Parts, either againſt *France* or *Spain*, the leaſt of the Cantons of *Switzers*, or the meaneſt of the *German* Princes, may be of far more uſe to the King's Majeſty, than the Duke of *Savoy* can be. Certainly that *Savoy* cannot but depend on *Spain*, it is manifeſt enough. For thus the Caſe ſtands between thoſe Princes. The Duke hath yet living four Sons. He had five, but the eldeſt was poiſoned in *Spain*, becauſe the King bound himſelf to give the Dutchy of *Milan* to the firſt and eldeſt Son borne by his Daughter.

The ſecond is now Prince of *Piedmont*, called Don *Philibert*; lives with the Duke his Father, but of leſs hope, by far, than Don *Philip* his Brother was.

His third Son, Don *Victorio Amadeo*, Knight of *Malta*, is the great Commander of St. *John*'s in *Spain*, worth one hundred thouſand Crowns a Year; and withal General of all the King of *Spain*'s Gallies; a Place of great Honour and Profit.

The

The fourth Son is a Cardinal, and hath the one half of the Profit of the Archbiſhoprick of *Toledo*, and is promiſed the whole after the Death of the now Biſhop; an Eſtate worth three hundred thouſand Crowns a a Year.

The fifth, Don *Thomaſo*, with whom the Mother the Lady *Catharine* of *Auſtria* died, a Prince of fifteen Years of Age; and hath alſo a Penſion out of *Spain*, but hath not yet acquired any particular Title.

Hereby it is eaſy to judge, whether the Duke of *Savoy*, by the Power of *Savoy*, will abandon all theſe Penſions and Preferments; and enter into a War with the King of *Spain* for the Dutchy of *Milan*, or for the Quarrel of any other Prince; ſeeing *Milan* itſelf, when it was a Dutchy apart, was ever a Principality of greater Force than *Savoy* and *Piedmont*. Shall we then hope, that he will offend the King of *Spain* in reſpect of *England?* Certainly it were Madneſs ſo to do. *Milan* is too near him; and ſo are both *Spain* and *Naples*; and *England* too far off. They are ever like to be Neighbours: *England* never like to be. Again, that he will ever be uſed againſt the *French* for the *Engliſh*, it is very improbable. He hath been too well beaten for that Fault; I mean for joining himſelf againſt the *French*, tho' not for us. For that he is a Prince of no Strength, if the King of *France* draw his Sword againſt him, *Francis* I. hath reſolved us; who, in Deſpite of all the Aſſiſtance of *Charles* V. when he returned victorious out of *Africa*, and notwithſtanding the great Armies, which the ſaid Emperor employed in the Duke's Defence; and notwithſtanding his forcible invading of *Picardy*, thereby to drain the *French* out of *Piedmont*; and notwithſtanding, (ere yet the War had ended) that King *Henry* VIII. of *England* did alſo invade *France* with a moſt puiſſant Army; yet did *Francis* I. by the Earl of St. *Paul*, take from him his Dutchy of *Savoy* in a ſhort time, and by other his Com-

Commanders poſſeſs *Turin*, the chief City of *Piedmont*, with the greateſt Part of all that Principality; and held both the one and the other from the Year 1538, to the Year 1544, when with a Daughter of *France*, or rather out of Commiſeration, it was reſtored.

This is true; and it is all the Good our King of *England* can expect from *Savoy*, that he muſt either abandon his Son-in-law, if either *France* or *Spain* oppreſs him, which were too great a Diſhonour; or he muſt enter into a War for his Defence, which were too great a Charge. And his Majeſty doth well know, that while the League ſtands between him and the *Low-Countries*, that he is invincible by them, and they by him: And that all other petty Combinations will be rather chargeable than profitable.

And if any Man ſhall tell the King, that by having the Duke of *Savoy* at his Devotion, he may offend *France* whenever he pleaſeth; his Majeſty may look into the Exploits of *Henry* VIII. and what Flowers and Fruit that War of his in *France* brought forth. For King *Henry* VIII. had not only a Duke of *Savoy*, but a Duke of *Bourbon*, a King of *Arragon*, and an Emperor, the moſt ambitious and undertaking Prince that *Germany* hath ſeen for many Ages: he had alſo the *Low-Countries*, *Flanders*, *Hainault*, and *Artois* to join with him, and he with them, againſt the *French*: But let us ſee what he brought to paſs.

In the Year 1512, *Ferdinand* of *Arragon* perſuaded *Henry* VIII. to ſend an Army of *Engliſh* into *Biſcay*, and by the Way of *Bayonne*, to invade *Guienne*; by the Countenance of whoſe Forces, and while the *Engliſh* affronted the *French* in thoſe Parts, *Ferdinand* conquered the Kingdom of *Navarre*, deferring his Aſſiſtance of King *Henry* VIII. till the next Year, and ſo the *Engliſh* returned with a great deal of Loſs, and more Diſhonour.

In

In the Year 1513, King *Henry* did not only ſet out a Fleet of Ships of War againſt the *French*, and gave the Emperor One hundred thouſand Ducats towards the levying an Army to invade *Burgundy*; but the King landed in *France* with 40000 Foot and 5000 Men at Arms, and was perſuaded by the Emperor to beſiege *Terouenne*, a Town of as much Uſe to the *Engliſh*, as if it had been ſeated in *Arabia*. Neither did he gain any Foot of Ground elſe by the Emperor's Aſſiſtance; neither could he ſuccour or relieve that City, without an Army of equal Strength to that by which it was won, to wit, an Army conſiſting of 40000 Foot and 5000 barbed Horſe.

In the Year 1515, he again paid divers Regiments of *Switzers* againſt King *Francis* (becauſe the ſaid King ſent the Duke of *Albany* into *Scotland)* for the Protection of King *James* V. King *Henry*'s own Nephew, and his Majeſty's Grandfather.

In the Year 1522, he renew'd the War againſt *Francis* I. and entered into League againſt him with the Emperor, the Pope, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*; and after the *Engliſh* Army had in vain beſieged *Heſdin*, and ſet Fire on *Dourlans*, diſpeopled and abandoned unto them; they privately haſted homeward; and in Exchange for a great deal of Treaſure, and Time ſpent, they returned again loaden with nothing but Poverty and Diſeaſes.

In the Year 1523, he invaded *France* with the like Succeſs by the Duke of *Suffolk*; took certain ſmall Towns to-day, and loſt them again to-morrow; and ſpent a world of Treaſure to be laugh'd at.

In the Year 1524, it was promis'd, that all former Errors ſhould be amended, and *France* ſhould be conquer'd, for King *Henry*, by the Emperor and the Duke of *Bourbon*, who received of King *Henry* 100,000 Crowns for the firſt Month; and ſo much they were to have monthly during the ſame War.

But

But the Duke of *Bourbon*, to whom the Preſervation of the Dutchy of *Milan* was more profitable than the Invaſion of *France*, ſpent our King's Crowns merrily in that good City. So as when King *Henry* had ſpent all the Treaſure left him by that provident King *Henry* VII. all that Maſs of Monies made by the Diſſolutions of the Abbies, and all that *England* could yield him beſides, in War againſt the *French*, aſſiſted alſo therein by all the Foreign Princes and States, he had nothing remaining of all thoſe great Expences of Treaſure, Arms, and the Body of Men, but the poor Town of *Boulogne*, the Reſtitution of which, to the *French*, King *Henry* himſelf promis'd; but being prevented by Death, the ſame was delivered up by *Edward* his Son. What Account can we make therefore of *Savoy*, ſince neither *Charles* the Emperor, nor all that joined with him and with the *Engliſh* againſt the *French*, would put us in Poſſeſſion of one good Place, in eighteen or twenty Years War? But, Sir, That, which we are to conſider in this Treaty is, Whether it doth not drag after it ſome *Spaniſh* Exploit. For it is certain, that the *Caſtilians*, and thoſe, of whom theſe Princes are deſcended, have gotten no leſs by the Traffick of their Marriages than they have done by the Trade of their *Indies*; of which, becauſe the Inſtances are many, I will remember unto you ſome few, and leave the reſt to your own reading.

In the Year 1503, *Philip*, Archduke of *Auſtria*, (authorized by *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, his Father-in-law) made a Peace with *Lewis* XII. promiſing, that his Son *Charles* (afterwards Emperor) ſhould marry the Lady *Claudia*, the King's Daughter; which Marriage was ſolemnly ſworn and performed at *Blois*. But what was the End of this Love-making, other than to perſuade King *Lewis*, that according to the Diviſion made of the Kingdom of *Naples* between the *Spaniſh* and *French*, the *French* King ſhould enjoy his Part, and the *Spaniſh* his, and all War and Debate take end?

Where-

Whereupon, while *Lewis* (meaning all things in good Faith) neglected to reinforce and to ſupply his Army in thoſe Parts, *Gonſalvo*, according to his ſecret Inſtructions (and notwithſtanding that this Peace was proclaimed through all *Naples*, and Commandments ſent to *Gonſalvo* by the Archduke to abſtain from all Acts of Hoſtility) ſet upon the *French* unawares, defeated the Duke of *Artry* and Monſ. *D'Aubigny*, and following the Advantage of his former Victory, overthrew the Remainder of the *French* Army, led by that valiant Duke of *Nemours*, who loſt himſelf, with all, in Effect, that the *French* poſſeſſed in that Kingdom. And yet this was not all the Uſe the *Spaniard* made of this Lady; for after that *Lewis* XII. had ſent a new Army into *Italy*, for the Recovery of *Naples*, commanded at the Time of the Overthrow thereof, by the Marquiſs of *Salluco*, (the *Spaniard* being not as yet ſtrongly ſettled in his new Conqueſts) the former Marriage was again to be confirmed, and in Recompence of one half of the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Inveſtiture of the Dutchy of *Milan* was promis'd to King *Lewis*, and his Heirs Male, and for want of Heirs Male to the Lady *Claudia*, and *Charles* her imaginary Huſband: And to make it a plain Bargain, King *Lewis* was to pay unto *Maximilian* a great Sum of Money, which was preſently ſent by the Cardinal of *Amboiſe* at *Haguenau* in *Alſatia*; but this Money was never repaid, this Match never effected, nor the Dutchy of *Milan* ever delivered into the *French* Poſſeſſion. In the Neck of this, and upon the Death of *Iſabella*, Queen of *Caſtille*, *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, fearing to be diſpoſſeſſed of *Caſtille* and *Leon* by his Son-in-law the Archduke *Philip*, (who, by the Right of his Wife, the Daughter of Queen *Iſabel*, was now lawful King thereof) ſought Peace with *Lewis* XII. and to that End took to Wife the Lady *Germaine de Foix*, Siſter to *Gaſton de Foix*, the King's Niece, upon Condition, that *Lewis* ſhould reſign

reſign all that Part of *Naples*, unto which he had Right; and that *Ferdinand* ſhould pay to *Lewis* 700,000 Ducats.

In Concluſion the *Spaniards* got the Start; for the *French* King delivered thoſe few Places, which they had held in *Naples*; and withal reſign'd his Right to the reſt; but as for the Money promis'd, the ſame was never paid unto this Day.

What Uſe *Ferdinand* of *Arragon* made by giving his Daughter in Marriage to *Henry* VIII. of *England*, the Conqueſt of *Navarre* hath told us.

For a fifth Marriage (the Archduke *Philip*, Father to *Charles*, afterwards Emperor, being dead) it was accorded, that *Charles*, now Archduke of *Auſtria*, and King of *Caſtille*, ſhould take to Wife *Renée*, Daughter to *Lewis* XII. deceas'd; and that *Francis* I. his Succeſſor, ſhould give in Dowry with the ſaid Lady the Dutchy of *Berry*, and 600,000 Crowns; and that *Renée* ſhould give up to King *Francis* all her Right both by Father and Mother of the Dutchy of *Milan*; and this Marriage proceeded ſo far, as all Conditions were agreed on and ſworn between the Princes.

In the mean while the great *Ferdinand* dies, and now comes *Charles* Archduke of *Auſtria* King of *Caſtille* and *Arragon* upon the Stage; who inherited his Grandfather *Ferdinand*, as well in all his Kingdoms, as in his Subtleties and Breach of Faith.

And to the end that he might obtain of King *Francis* a Paſſage by the Way of *France* into *Spain*, as well to poſſeſs himſelf of his Kingdoms there, as to fortify *Navarre*, lately conquered, he creates a Peace with *France* (made fearful unto him by the great Overthrow given to the *Switzers* at the Battle of *Marignan*) and inſtead of *Renée*, Daughter to *Lewis*, he deſired the Lady *Louiſa*, Daughter to King *Francis*, preſently reigning, *Renée* being afterwards married to the Duke of *Ferrara*.

For the Accompliſhment of this Alliance, *Lyons* was appointed, where it was concluded by the Deputies, that the Kingdom of *Navarre* ſhould be reſtored to *Henry* of *Albent*, Son to *John* of *Albret*, and Father to *Foix*, lately deceaſed.

That King *Francis* ſhould, by way of Dowry to his Daughter, clearly reſign all his Right in the Kingdom of *Naples*; and *Charles* was to pay unto the King 150,000 Ducats yearly towards the Maintenance of *Louiſa* his Wife, till ſhe became of full Age; with divers other Conditions agreed to and ſworn.

But this Lady dying after, a Marriage was concluded between the ſaid *Charles* and King *Francis*'s younger Daughter, upon the former Conditions.

But in the mean while the Emperor *Maximilian* leaves the World; and *Charles* not contented with all the Kingdoms of *Spain*, (*Portugal* excepted) nor with all the Dukedoms and Earldoms of the *Netherlands*, nor with the Kingdoms of *Sicily*, but he affects the Empire of *Germany*, and dealt not therein, as King *Francis*, who had the ſame Ambition; but having new ſettled his Eſtates in *Spain*, *Naples*, and *Navarre*, which he could not but by the Pretence of the aforeſaid Marriage, he raiſed an Army on the ſudden, which marched towards *Francfort*; and aſſuring thereby thoſe of his own Party, and diſcouraging the reſt, he was forthwith elected Emperor of *Germany*.

And now he forgets his Father-in-law King *Francis*; forgets the Reſtitution of *Navarre*; forgets the Penſion promiſed to the Lady *Louiſa*; and, in Concluſion, he took to Wife the Siſter of *John*, King of *Portugal*, with whom he had a great Maſs of Money, to maintain his War againſt the *French*.

By this you may ſee, to what great Advantage theſe Princes uſed the Sacrament of Marriage; for being twice promiſed to *Renée*, and twice married to the Daughters of *Francis* I. and once given to the Lady *Mary*, Daughter of *Henry* VIII. having ſerved his

his Turn by them all, he left them to ſeek new Paramours. And it is well noted by thoſe, that knew the Stories of thoſe Times, that before the Battle of *Pavia*, where King *Francis* was made Priſoner, *Charles* always wrote to King *Henry* VIII. *Your Son and Couſin Charles*; but never after that time did he afford him one Line but by his Secretaries; nor ever after ſubſcribed more than ſimple *Charles*. And by deluding King *Henry* by Promiſe of being his Son-in-law, he did not only borrow great Sums of Money of him, but drew him often into *France*, to the great Prejudice of that Nation.

But we may not end here; for *Charles*, that had himſelf married ſo many Wives, had alſo Store for other Men; for the better to confirm the Duke of *Bourbon* in his Diſloyalty againſt his Sovereign Lord King *Francis*, he promiſed him his own Siſter, *Eleanor*, Widow of *Emanuel*, King of *Portugal*; but that poor Duke finding himſelf derided, died ſoon after in the Ditch of *Rome*, as he offered to aſſail the Walls thereof.

And *Charles* the Emperor having now King *Francis* his Priſoner at *Madrid* in *Spain*, made a Match between him and his ſaid Siſter, formerly promiſed to *Bourbon*, upon Condition, that *Francis* ſhould reſign all his Right in *Italy*; render unto the Emperor the Dutchy of *Burgundy*; quit the Sovereignty of *Flanders* and *Artois*; with many other inſolent and cruel Conditions; whereby you may perceive, that although the *Spaniard* had often abuſed the *French* by offering them Marriages, never meant; yet at laſt they made a Bargain outright, but ſuch a coſtly one, as ſhould coſt for ever the *French* the Price of a *Spaniſh* Wife.

But this matrimonial Traffick is not yet at an End; the Market is ſtill continued by the Emperor. For *Francis* I. reſolving to recover the Dutchy of *Milan*, and to take an Account of the Duke of *Savoy* for

his Mother's Inheritance therein, prepares an Army to effect it.

The Emperor being newly returned out of *Africa*, and from the taking of *Tunis*, finding his Forces marvellouſly decayed by the great Heat of that Country and Toils of War, and therefore not in Caſe at preſent to reſiſt King *Francis*, he created a Marriage between the Infanta of *Portugal* and the Dauphin of *France*; and between the Duke *Angouleſme*, the King's younger Son, and the Infanta of *Spain*, though he did not directly name her. He offered to give to any one of the King's Sons 100,000 Crowns a Year out of the Dutchy of *Milan*, deſiring withal, that the Duke of *Orleans* might accompany him in the Conqueſt of *Algiers*; than which, and than any of theſe Marriages, he never meant any thing leſs. And doubting, that the King would not bite at any of theſe Baits, he alſo offered to inveſt the Duke of *Angouleſme* in the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Theſe goodly Offers the King could not refuſe, tho' he had Experience enough of the *Spaniſh* Treachery: but while the Emperor held the King in this Treaty, he got Time to levy an Army in *Germany*, to prepare his Fleet by *Andrew Dorea* at *Genoa*, to make a Confederacy in *Italy*, and to draw thither all the *Spaniſh* Garriſons out of *Sicily* commanded by *Gonſalvo*. After which he never ſpake Word of theſe Marriages, nor of any Penſion, nor Reſtitution of *Milan*.

Now for Concluſion, we will remember the goodly Marriage between King *Philip* II. and Queen *Mary* of *England*, formerly promiſed to his Father *Charles*; for after that *Charles* had failed in his Deſign to make *England* a Province, and ſubject to *Spain*, he drew the good Queen into a War againſt the *French*: but after his Turn was ſerved, and the Victory at St. *Quintin*'s, he, *Philip*, concluded a Peace with *France*, not ſo much as including the Queen his Wife; who,

being,

being abandoned by her Huſband, ſhe loſt the good Town of *Calais*, which had remained in the Poſſeſſion of the Crown of *England* from the Year 1347, to the Year 1558.

Neither had King *Philip*'s ſecond Wife, the Lady *Elizabeth* of *France*, the Daughter of King *Henry* II. any great Cauſe of Joy in that her Advancement; for ſhe died in *Spain* after a ſtrange manner, as it was ſuſpected.

Now, methinks I hear ſome *Engliſhmen Hiſpaniolized* ſay unto the King, that ſeeing the Kings of *France*, but eſpecially of *Spain*, have often matched themſelves with the Dukes of *Savoy*; why ſhould not his Majeſty alſo accept of their Alliance? But his Majeſty, being of an univerſal Underſtanding, will eaſily find the Difference. For tho' the Kings of *Polonia* found it greatly to their Advantage to match with the Dukes of *Lithuania*; yet if ſuch an Overture were made to our King, he would find it exceedingly ridiculous. For the *French* King, and the Kings of *Spain*, who have often quarrelled for *Italy*, *Naples*, and *Milan*, and who are like hereafter ſo to do, have great Reaſon to make the Dukes of *Savoy* theirs: *France* in reſpect of a Paſſage into *Italy*; *Spain* in reſpect of a Bulwark againſt *France*.

But our Kings of *England*, who have no Buſineſs over the *Alps*, and who pretend no Title to *Milan* or *Naples*, but as Kings of *France*, (which if ever God reſtore unto them, they ſhall as eaſily beat the *Savoyan*, as the *French* hath done) can make no Uſe of that Alliance other than to draw them into a War for the Defence of thoſe Dukes. But let us ſomewhat, amongſt theſe other Reſpects, enter into the due Conſideration of the Perſon of this excellent young Princeſs, the only Daughter of our Sovereign, the dear beloved Siſter of our Prince, and one of the precious Jewels of this Kingdom; let us, I ſay, but indifferently examine what Increaſe of Honour and Dignity, what great

Comfort and Contentment ſhe can expect, or hope for, by the Benefit of this Match.

For the firſt, to wit, Honour and Dignity; as ſhe is born the eldeſt, and now the only Daughter of one of the mightieſt Kings of *Chriſtendom*, ſo is ſhe thereby of higher Place and State than the Wife of a Duke of *Savoy*: beſides, in her Birth and Blood, both of Father and Mother, deſcended of ſuch Royal Races, as *Savoy* cannot add any greater Grace or Glory unto; and, by Nature and Education, endow'd with ſuch princely Perfections both of Body and Mind, as may well deſerve to be reputed a worthy Spouſe for the greateſt Monarch of *Chriſtendom*; eſpecially conſidering the Poſſibilities of the Daughters of *England*, whereof we have had many Precedents; and at this Time is happily manifeſted in the King's Majeſty, our Sovereign, being deſcended of a Daughter of *England*, whereby the Iſland, formerly divided, is again now made one *Great Britain*, to the mutual Strength of either.

Now to confer the Poſſibility of ſuch a Fortune upon a poor Popiſh Prince of *Savoy*, that can return no Recompence of Benefit to this State, were greatly for his Glory, though little for the Advancement of this noble Princeſs, and leſs for the Safety of this Kingdom, conſidering the Dangers it may draw upon our worthy magnanimous Prince, and the noble Duke of *York*, if the Ambition of this Match ſhould tice the *Savoyan* to look after Poſſibilities; wherein there would want neither Means, Perſuaſions, nor Pardons from *Rome*, to practiſe any Villainy in that Behalf, whereby to benefit or ſtrengthen an Appendix of *Spain*, and ſo devoted a Son to the *Romiſh* See.

For the ſecond, namely, the Comfort and Contentment of this young Lady by this Match; as there is little in Appearance preſently, ſo is there leſs to be hoped for in the future. For, at firſt, ſhe muſt be removed far from her neareſt Blood both by Father

Father and Mother, into a Country far eſtranged from our Nation, as any Part of *Chriſtendom*, and as far differing from us in Religion as in Climate.

And what true Correſpondency or matrimonial Affection there can be maintained between thoſe Perſons, whoſe Minds are different and oppoſite in the religious Points of their Chriſtian Faith, is greatly to be doubted. Moreover, it is no leſs to be feared, with what Safety and Security ſhe can long live free from ſecret Practices and Treacheries in a Country ſo near the Pope's Juriſdiction, inviron'd with the Plots of the Jeſuits, who, we ſee, do daily traffick the Lives and Fortunes of all Princes, that are not wholly devoted to the *Romiſh* Obedience; and therefore how they will entertain or tolerate one of the Race of our King, were too great an Error and Preſumption to truſt unto.

So as when the worthy Lady hereafter, by her Children, or otherwiſe, hath furniſhed their Deſire, and fully ſerved their Turn; ſhe ſhall be then either forced to wound her Conſcience by forſaking her Faith, or elſe to undergo the Scorns and Dangers, which ſhall be daily caſt upon her, and her Family, for the Exerciſe of their Religion.

And this alſo we may be well aſſur'd of, that if ſhe ſhould have any Iſſue by the Prince of *Piedmont*, they muſt all be bred and brought up contrary to her Conſcience, which can be no ſmall Grief to a virtuous and natural Mother, and as little Comfort to our moſt religious King, their Grandfather.

Laſtly, the very binding Cauſe of Amity between all Kings, Princes, and States, is their Trade and Intercourſe of their Subjects.

Now there is not any Prince or State of *Europe*, (the Inland Counties of *Hungary* and *Tranſylvania* excepted) but the *Engliſh* have Trade withal; yea, even with the *Turk*, *Barbarian*, *Perſian*, and *Indians*: only with the Subjects of *Savoy*, I do not know that we have any

meddling or interchange at all. For the Duke hath no Port, (his Ditch of *Villa Franca* excepted, which is only capable of a few Gallies,) either to furniſh Ships from, or to receive them being Strangers. And therefore, for his Majeſty of *England* to match his eldeſt and only Daughter with a Prince, which hath his Dependence upon other Kings; a Prince Jeſuited; which can neither ſtead us in Time of War, nor trade with us in Time of Peace; a Prince, by the Situation of his Country, every way unprofitable unto us, and no leſs perilous for his Child to live in; I reſolve myſelf, that his Majeſty is of too excellent a Judgment ever to accept of it; and his Honourable Council too wiſe and provident, to adviſe the Proſecution thereof.

Now if his Highneſs ſhould be pleaſed to aſk my Opinion, with what Chriſtian Prince he ſhould match his Siſter, were it in his own Power and Choice to make Election? I humbly deſire to be excuſed herein, nor would it become me to preſume ſo far.

It is true, I have heard it, that ſome Overtures have been made for the Prince *Palatine* of the *Rhine*. Certainly he is as well born as the Duke of *Savoy*, and as free a Prince as he is. The Nation is faithful. He is of our Religion; and by him we ſhall greatly faſten unto us the *Netherlands*. And for the little Judgment God hath given me, I do prize the Alliance of the *Palatine* of the *Rhine*, and of the Houſe of *Naſſau*, more than I do the Alliance of ten Dukes of *Savoy*,

9 Jacobi.

A DISCOURSE *touching a Marriage between Prince* HENRY *of* England, *and a Daughter of* Savoy.

THERE is no body, that perſuades our Prince to match with *Savoy*, for any Love to the Perſon of the Duke, nor, as I hope, for his Religion; neither will any Man oppoſe it for any particular Diſlike. For as there hath never been Quarrel between our Nation and his; ſo hath he, for ought I have heard, never given Offence to any of ours. It ſhould therefore ſeem, that it is for the Good of *England*, that he, that deſires it, deſires it; and for the ſame Good it is, that he, that deſires it not, diſſuades it.

The Points in it, which are conſiderable, are theſe:

The Firſt, wherein it concerns the Duke to ſeek the Alliance of *England*.

The Second, that the Pretences of Marriages between Princes are ſeldom the ſame with their Intents, that propounded them; and what hidden Danger may lie under the Alliance preſently deſired.

The Third, wherein it may concern us to match with *Savoy*; and againſt whom he can aſſiſt us.

The

The Fourth, that *Savoy* and *Spain* are inſeparable, and that *Savoy* dare not offend the Pope nor the Emperor.

The Fifth, againſt whom the *Engliſh* ſhall need his Aſſiſtance.

The Sixth, of the Inconveniences in general.

The Seventh, of the Inconveniences in particular to the Prince.

The Eighth, with what Prince it were be moſt fit for his Highneſs's Advantage to match withal.

The Reaſons, that are apparent on the Duke's Behalf, are theſe:

The Firſt, that, either by the Countenance or Aſſiſtance of his Majeſty, he may hope to poſſeſs himſelf of the Dutchy of *Milan*, which was promiſed him on Dowry with his Wife by the King of *Spain*.

The Second, to recover *Breſſe* from the *French*.

The Third, to obtain *Geneva* from the Proteſtants.

The Fourth, to make his Daughter a great Queen; and ſo he and his ſhall be able to ſay in future Times, that the Kings of *England* are of the Race of *Savoy*.

Theſe Pretences are exceeding fair, if the Pretences in the Traffick of Marriages between Kings and Princes were the ſame with their Intents. But we know by Experience, how many of theſe fraudulent Propoſitions have been made both to the *French*, *Engliſh*, and other Princes, by the Houſe of *Auſtria*, of which the Daughters of *Savoy* are deſcended; and by which Kind of Traffick thoſe Kings have prevailed more than by all their Forces and Arms.

For by theſe falſe Goods they carried *Naples* and *Milan* from the *French*. So prevailed they with our King *Henry* VIII. when they drew his Army into *Biſcay* to invade *France*; they conquered *Navarre*.

They had it alſo in their Hope to have poſſeſſed *England* by a Match with Queen *Mary*; which, tho' they failed to gain, yet thereby we failed not to loſe *Calais*.

Calais. What Marriage had a fairer Pretence in the World than that of the King of *Navarre* (afterwards King *Henry* the IVth of *France*) with the Lady *Margaret* of *Valois*, now living, by which a Peace was concluded between the King and the Party of the Religion, and by which the miſerable Civil Wars in *France* were concluded? And yet the Intent was ſo far from the Pretence, as one hundred thouſand Proteſtants were thereby murdered in one Day within *Paris* and elſewhere. Nay, what greater Treaſon and Cruelty was there ever covered under a Pretence of Marriage, than that of *Francis Sforza* Duke of *Milan*, who, under Pretence to win that brave *Italian* Captain to his Party, gave him his Daughter *Druſiana* in Marriage, and ſent him with his Army to ſerve *Ferdinand* King of *Naples*; where, by the Practice of *Sforza*, *Picininus* and his Son were murdered by the King, after he had royally received him in his own Court and Caſtle.

Laſtly, becauſe Examples are infinite, I will conclude with the Practice of *Bentivoglio*, Prince of *Bologna*, who, to the End to make himſelf Maſter of *Farenza*, gave his Daughter to the Lord thereof; and ſhe, according to her Father's Inſtructions, cauſed her Huſband to be murdered in her own Chamber.

There is a kind of noble and royal deceiving in Marriages between Kings and Princes; yea, and it is, of all others, the faireſt and moſt unſuſpected Trade of betraying. It has been as ordinary amongſt them to adventure or caſt away a Daughter, to bring ſome Purpoſe to paſs, as at other times, for ſaving of Charges, to make them Nuns. I ſpeak not this to prejudice or forejudge ſo worthy a Prince as the Duke of *Savoy*; for there is no Example to be followed or to be feared, where like Occaſions and like Citcumſtances do not occur. He cannot betray us, till we truſt him. There is nothing of ours near him, nor of his near us.

It is the *Spaniard*, that is to be feared; the *Spaniard*, who layeth his Pretences and Practices with a long Hand. In which reſpect, it were not amiſs to conſider of the Plots of our *Engliſh* Prieſts, who not long ſince have publiſhed and printed certain far-fetch'd Titles both of the King of *Spain*, and of the Infanta his Daughter; for it were an horrible Diſhonour to be over-reached by any of thoſe dry and ſubtle-headed *Spaniards*.

Parſons, under the Name of *Doleman*, hath caſt abroad a moſt peſtilent Book in our *Engliſh* Tongue; wherein, after he hath laboured with all his Strainings and Subtleties, to weaken all other Titles, and his Majeſty's, which is undoubted, moſt of all, he prefers that of the Infanta, and of the King her Father, and Brother, for the moſt clear and antient.

The firſt he draws from *Conſtance*, the eldeſt Daughter of *William the Conqueror*; the ſecond from *John* of *Gaunt*.

Now this Title, or Pretence of the Title, of the Infanta, of which all our Papiſts had ſo great Hope in the latter Times of Queen *Elizabeth*, is, for want of Heirs of her Body, fallen upon the Heirs of her Siſter the Dutcheſs of *Savoy*, the Infanta and her Siſter being two Daughters of *Philip* II. And I cannot tell, I leave it to wiſer Men to judge, whether the Lady *Elizabeth*, the eldeſt Daughter of *England*, were not therefore ſought, both by the King of *Spain*, and the *Savoyan*, by her to ſtrengthen and revive the former Pretences; and ſeeing both of them have failed in that Hope, the Duke of *Savoy* would now ſend a Daughter into *England*, who might practiſe a Party, either for her Brother, or for her Uncle. Certainly it were a brave Subject for our malicious Papiſts to work upon, who are all better learned in *Doleman*'s Book, than in the New Teſtament. For having a Daughter of *Savoy*, the Infanta failing, they have the ſame Princeſs, in whoſe Title and Religion they believe, they

they have the ſame for all their Purpoſes, by having the Infanta's Siſter's Daughter, as the Infanta herſelf. Nay, it will ſerve their Turns better. For the Infanta being our next Neighbour, they may, under the Colour of Viſitations, practice at Pleaſure; and it is the Infanta, that hath the beſt Army in *Europe* in her Hands; and it may be paſt over into *England* in one Night.

And that it may not be thought, that this Point has been framed by me, theſe are *Parſons*'s own Words, fol. 164. " I ſaid alſo, that this Lady Infanta, or " ſome other, by her Title, and her Father's good " Will, was likelieſt of all Strangers to bear it away. " For if the Infanta ſhould either die, or be married " into any other Country, or otherwiſe be diſpoſed of, " ſo as her Pretence to *England* ſhould be diſenabled " before this Affair came to be tried, then may the " ſaid Father and ſhe, (if they liſt) caſt their aforeſaid " Intereſt and Titles (as divers Men think they would) " upon ſome other Prince of their own Houſe and " Blood. " Which is as much as to ſay, they will reſign their ſuppoſed Right to the Children of the Duke of *Savoy*; nay, to mend the Matter, *Parſons* gives a Title to the Duke of *Savoy* himſelf by the Lady *Beatrice* of *Portugal*, his Grandmother.

It is true, that any Title will ſerve the *Spaniard*'s Turn. *Braganza*, *Parma*, and *Antonio*, were before *Philip* in the Kingdom of *Portugal*. He came behind them all in Right; but he went before them all in Power, which needs no Advocate; and tho' it ſeems to be reſolved, that the King of *Spain* and the Duke are at Difference for the preſent; yet the King of *Spain* hath him in his Hand, and the Duke's Children receive the very Bread they feed on from the *Spaniard*; which being denied them, they have nothing wherewith to ſuſtain themſelves; for the Duke is extreme poor. They are of the Blood of *Spain*, to whom the Dukes of *Savoy* have always been Servants, and very often

often the Commanders of their Armies. I ſay, that herein whatſoever is pretended to the contrary, it is *Spain*, that we ought to ſuſpect. *Savoy* from *Spain* is inſeparable; *Spain*, to which *England* is irreconcileable.

For thus the Caſe ſtands between thoſe two Princes. The Duke hath yet living four Sons. He had five, but the eldeſt was poiſoned in *Spain*, becauſe the King of *Spain* bound himſelf to give the Dutchy of *Milan* to the firſt and eldeſt Son of his Daughter.

The ſecond, which is now Prince of *Piedmont*, called Don *Philibert*, lives with his Father, but of leſs hope, by far, than his Brother *Philip*.

His third Son, Don *Victorio Amadeo*, Knight of *Malta*, is the great Commander of St. *John*'s in *Spain*, worth one hundred thouſand Crowns a Year; and withal General of all the *Spaniſh* Gallies; a Place of great Honour and Profit.

The fourth Son is a Cardinal, and hath the one half of the Profit of the Archbiſhoprick of *Toledo*, and is promiſed the whole after the Death of the now Biſhop; an Eſtate worth three hundred thouſand Crowns a a Year.

The fifth, Don *Thomaſo*, with whom the Mother the Lady *Catharine* of *Auſtria* died, a Prince of fifteen Years of Age; and hath alſo a Penſion out of *Spain*, but hath not yet acquired any particular Title.

For his four Daughters, the eldeſt, a very goodly, wiſe, and virtuous Lady, is yet unmarried.

The ſecond is married to the Duke of *Mantua*.

The third is married to the firſt Son to the Duke of *Modena* and *Reggio*, Baſtard Son to the Duke of *Ferrara*, that laſt died without lawful Heirs Male, whereby *Ferrara* was eſcheated to the Pope.

The youngeſt, the Lady *Catharine*, is yet undiſpoſed.

Here it is eaſy to judge, whether the Duke of *Savoy* will abandon all theſe Penſions and Preferments;

ments; and enter into a War with the King of *Spain* for the Dutchy of *Milan*, or for the Quarrel of any other Prince; seeing *Milan* itself, when it was a Dutchy apart, was ever a Principality of greater Force than *Savoy* and *Piedmont*. To think, that they can be assisted by us, they have, (as I believe) by far exceeded their Commission, that have given him that Hope. For if *England* itself quarrel with *Spain*, it must of Necessity maintain the War by the War; as the *Netherlands* did after they lost the Trade with *Spain*, and as we ourselves did in our late Queen's Time. If it be against *France*, that the Duke pretends, he cannot forget yet how *Francis* I. thrust him out of all he had, because he refused him a Passage into *Italy*, when *Charles* I. that great Emperor, and King of *Spain*, sought to defend him; and that the late King *Henry* IV. took from the Duke now living *Bourg* in *Bresse*, with the Territories, and forced him to come to *Paris* in Person to buy his Peace. I say they are betrayed by their own Ignorance, that persuade themselves, that *Savoy* dare lift up her Hands against either of these two Kings; against *Spain*, without the Help of *France*; or against *France*, without the Assistance of such a League or Civil War, as the House of *Lorrain* made and moved in the Year 1585, against *Henry* III. and afterwards against *Henry* IV. at which Time the Duke of *Savoy* recovered the Marquisate of *Salluces*.

Thirdly, For the obtaining of *Geneva*, I am persuaded, that his Majesty will never be a Party in that Enterprize. And if the Duke should offer it to our King, he might well answer him, as *Alexander* did *Darius*, that the Gift of those Things, that are not in our Possession, is not Thank-worthy: And were it his to give, how shall his Majesty keep it so far off? seeing the *Brill* and *Flushing*, seated so near us, are in such sort ours, as the *Hollanders* and *Zealanders* may thrust us out of them when they please, those

Places

Places being daily enlarged and encreaſed wtth Peoples and Power; and our Garriſons, if they do not diminiſh, increaſe not.

For the Fourth, that the Duke hath a Deſire (and it may be that is his Ambition) to ſee his Daughter a great Queen, and to be on one Side the Parent of the Kings of *England*.

For the Firſt I am of Opinion, that his Daughter will be a very old Lady ere that come to paſs; for his Majeſty being ſubject to no Sickneſs, is by God's Favour like to live long. For the other, it cannot be doubted, ſeeing the Mother of this Daughter had nine Children in nine Years, but the Duke's Sons may call our Kings Couſins.

Now the Third Conſideration is, of what uſe the Match of *Savoy* may be to us.

Firſt, it may be ſaid, that for want of Heirs-Male the Principality may fall to our Prince, or to his. I confeſs it poſſible, but there is no Hope, that the Prince can have it, being ſo far off; for the Duke hath four Sons yet living. And if theſe fail, yet were there any collateral Heir-Male in the World to be found, he ſhould be ſure of the Aſſiſtance of *Spain*, *Naples*, *Milan*, and the Pope, and of the Strength the Provinces of the *Netherlands* under the Archduke can aſſemble. And therefore, as the State of Things doth now ſtand in the World, the Expectation is nothing worth. *Francis* I. that had Right to it by his Mother, quitted it. *Ireland* is near us, and in our Sight; and yet have we often wiſhed it in the Bottom of the Sea: For having been governed neither as a Country conquered, nor free, it hath ſerved us but as a Grave for our beſt Captains and Soldiers, and for Conduits to draw from us the greateſt Part of all our Proviſions and Treaſure. The *Low Countries* and *Ireland* have beggared *England* and *Spain*.

If then the Hope of Principality be not great, what is there elſe, that our King and Prince can expect from

Savoy?

Savoy? You will ſay Aſſiſtance againſt our Enemies. Certainly if the King had a Quarrel againſt *Spain* or *France*, the Duke knows not how to help us in either; for if he declare himſelf againſt *Spain*, *Milan* would eaſily waſte or maſter all *Piedmont*; if againſt *France*, the Frontier Countries of *Provence*, *Dauphiné*, *Lyons* and *Breſſe* are ſtronger than he. Againſt the Pope, all the World knows, that he dares not ſtir; and our King hath no Enemy ſo malicious as that Prelate. For the Emperor, of all others, he cannot move againſt him. For whatever his own Lawyers may ſay, and whatever has been concluded in his own Parliaments, yet *Felinus*, and others excellently learned, make him a feodary Prince of the Empire: and both *Adolph* and *Winceſlaus* were depoſed; and *Bodin* doth not acknowledge the Emperor himſelf for an abſolute Sovereign, but for the Sovereign Officer of the Empire. And therefore, for the Wrong they did, and for abuſing their Authority, did the States of the Empire, in whom the Sovereignty reſideth, depoſe that *Adolph* and *Winceſlaus*; and if the Emperor be not a Sovereign, much leſs he, that holdeth of the Empire. *Sovereigne eſt celui, qui ne recognôit point de ſuperieur:* A Sovereign is he, that acknowledgeth no Superior. But he, that is the Emperor's Vicar in his own Territory, acknowledgeth a Superior; the Word, Vicar, importing as much as Lieutenant or Deputy.

The Earldom of *Savoy* was one of the four Earldoms of the Empire; and ſo it continued well near four hundred Years from the Time of *Henry* the Vth till the Time of *Sigiſmund*, who, at the Council of *Conſtance*, made the Earls of *Savoy*, Dukes. And it is no longer ſince than the Time of *Charles*, this Man's Grandfather, that after he had taken his Oath to the Emperor, within two Years after he made Suit to have the Form of his Allegiance altered. If the King had Quarrel againſt any other State or Prince of the *Romiſh*

Religion, the Pope would preſently ſtile the War, Catholick, and curſe and excommunicate all Princes and States ſubject to the See of *Rome*, that ſhould offer us Aſſiſtance.

The little Princes of *Italy* have not that Daring, that they had in former Time; when *Philip Viſconti*, *Fortibraccio*, *Francis Sforza*, and other Lords and Commonwealths, invaded the Territories of the Church, and inforced the *Romans* themſelves to thruſt the Pope *Eugenius* out of *Rome*, to ſave their City from ſacking. No, the great King of *Spain* will not now offend his Holineſs; for the Pope, in favour of *Philip* II. becauſe he was waſted in a War againſt the *Lutherans*, cut off by his Authority, I know not how many Millions of his Debts to the *Genoeſe*. The Pope hath given him in Favour all the Pardons, which are ſent to the *Indies*, worth to the King a Million every Year. He giveth to him the Collation of the Benefices and Biſhopricks. He ſuffered him to enjoy the rich Orders of *Calatrava* and St. *James*. He gives him the Service of the *Jeſuits*, Aſſaſſins, to murder all Kings and Princes his Enemies; witneſs *William* of *Naſſau*, Prince of *Orange*, *Henry* III. and IV. of *France*. Proportionally hath the Duke of *Savoy* many Benefits from the Pope. His Son *Victorio* hath received from him the Cardinal's Hat. Cardinal *Aldobrandino*, Nephew to *Clement* the VIII. hath purchaſed *Racenſe* in *Piedmont* of the Duke, after whoſe Death that rich Territory muſt fall to the Church, if the Pope, of his Grace, doth not confer it upon the Duke.

In brief, the Duke is ſo tied to the See of *Rome*, both by Religion and Benefit, as he can be no more ſeparate from it and ſubſiſt, than the Body of Man be from his Soul and live.

What then remains of Profit to our Prince by this Alliance? A Sum of Money and a beautiful Lady. For Beauty was never ſo cheap in any Age; and it is ever

ever better loved in the Hope, than when it is had. For the Million of Crowns offered, which makes but two of our Subſidies, I ſpeak it confidently, when all thoſe Dukes, Lords, and great Ladies, which will attend the Princeſs in her Paſſage hither, ſhall be all preſented with Gifts according to their Degrees and the King's Honour; when the Preparations, Triumphs, and Feaſtings are paid for; there will nothing remain but a great Increaſe of Charge, and perchance a great deal of Melancholy.

If then, by the Duke of *Savoy*, we can neither ſtrengthen, or enrich ourſelves; let us ſee, who they are, that for the preſent we have Cauſe to fear, and againſt whom we have Need of Aſſiſtance. There are but two Princes, that the King hath Cauſe to look after; to wit, *France*, and *Spain*. As for the Archduke, the States, for their own Intereſt, will attend him.

In *France*, his Majeſty hath a Party ſtrong enough, both of his own Allies and of the Religion: at leaſt he is ſure, that during the King's Minority, the Queen will keep all quiet, if ſhe can.

For *Spain*, it is a Proverb of their own, That the Lion is not ſo fierce as he is painted. His Forces in all Parts of the World (but the *Low-Countries*) are far under the Fame.—And if the late Queen would have believed her Men of War, as ſhe did her Scribes, we had in her Time beaten that great Empire in Pieces, and made their Kings, Kings of Figs and Oranges, as in old Times. But her Majeſty did all by Halves, and by petty Invaſions taught the *Spaniard* how to defend himſelf, and to ſee his own Weakneſs; which, till our Attempts taught him, was hardly known to himſelf.

Four thouſand Men would have taken from him all the Ports of his *Indies*; I mean all his Ports, by which his Treaſure doth or can paſs. He is more hated in that Part of the World by the Sons of the Conquer'd,

than the *Engliſh* are by the *Iriſh*. We were too ſtrong for him by Sea; and had the *Hollanders* to help us, who are now ſtrongeſt of all. Yea, in Eighty-eight, when he made his great and fearful Fleet, if the Queen would have hearkened to Reaſon, we had burnt all his Ships and Preparations in his own Ports, as we did afterwards upon the ſame Intelligence and Doubt in *Cadiz*.

He, that knows him not, fears him; but excepting his *Low-Country* Army, which hath been continued and diſciplined ſince *Charles* the Fifth's Time, he is no where ſtrong. They are but Fables ſpoken of him elſewhere; and what can the *Low-Country*'s Army do, if the *Indies* pay them not, but mutiny and ſpoil his own Territories, as they have often done, and of late Years, almoſt to the Ruin of the Archduke? But perchance you will ſay, that being combined with *France*, he is now more powerful than ever. It is true, if *France* and *Spain* were married together, as their Princes are; or if theſe Marriages were not more politick than faithful. The *French* and *Spaniſh* will never agree, that either of them ſhall over-much endanger *England*, if it were in their Power ſo to do.

When the Emperor *Charles* V. the King of *England*, the Pope, and moſt Princes of *Italy* had made a League againſt *Francis* I. as ſoon as he was taken Priſoner at *Pavia*, ſome of them fell preſently off, and the reſt made a League againſt the Emperor to ſave *France*.

Kings are not like private Men. They forſake not one another in Adverſity, though not for their Sakes perchance, that are oppreſſed, but for their own; becauſe they fear the ſurmounting Greatneſs of any one. What they may do by the Preſervation of the Jeſuits for Matters of Religion, I do not know; but theſe Marriages of *France* and *Spain* may vaniſh away in Smoke, as many of them have done heretofore, when they have been as ſolemnly confirmed and ſworn unto as theſe are.

How-

However it be, the Queen of *France* hath Reaſon to keep all quiet during the Minority of the King her Son, and till ſuch Time he be able to draw his own Sword. The *Auſtrians* have oftentimes over-reach'd *France*, and made them Children with the Marriages of Children; and therefore made the Time more fruitful for their Affairs than the Daughters of *France*.

The *French* at this Time may, for ought we know, pay them with the like Coin; for it was well ſaid by *Machiavel* in his *Florentine* Hiſtory, *Intra gl' huomini, chi aſpirano a una medeſſima grandezza, ſi può facilmente far parentado, ma non amicitia:* "Between Men, "that aſpire to one and the ſame Greatneſs, Alliance "may eaſily be made, not Friendſhip.

Now the Fourth Part of this Diviſion is the Conſideration of the Inconveniences in general.

At firſt, if we join in Amity with *Savoy*, we loſe all the Proteſtant Cantons, and break the Hearts of the People of *Geneva*, which our late Queen greatly favoured and relieved; which all the *German* Proteſtant Princes cheriſh; which the King of *France*, though of a contrary Religion, hath ever protected. The Duke of *Savoy* will ever be an Enemy to their Common-wealth, and they to him. Intereſt of Dominion and Religion will for ever ſeparate them, till one be Maſter.

Secondly, that, which is a Matter of the greateſt Importance, that our State can look after, we ſhall by this Means increaſe the Jealouſies of the *Netherlands*. They began to cool towards us, when we made Peace without them, which enforced them to make a long Truce. They were the laſt, that put down Arms; and though they compounded upon the greateſt Diſadvantage, *France* and *England* having firſt compounded, yet they made a far more noble Peace with *Spain* than we did.

Since that Time, they have neglected us by Degrees. Let us look to it with all the Eyes we have; for to which of the three thoſe People faſten themſelves, as either to *England*, *France*, or *Spain*, he, that hath them, will become the greateſt, and give the Law to the reſt. If any Man doubt it, he knows not much; but this hath been our own Fault, and the deteſted Covetouſneſs of ſome great Ones of ours. For whereas in my Time, I have known one of her Majeſty's Ships command forty of theirs to ſtrike Sail, they will now take us one to one, and not give us a Good-morrow; they maſter us both in their Number, and in their Mariners; and they have our own Ordnance to break our own Bones withal. We had good Reaſon to help them, but not to ſet them up to that Heighth, as to make them able to tread upon our own Heads.

Henry IV. of *England* gave Aſſiſtance to the Faction of *Burgundy* againſt *Orleans*; but as ſoon as he found, that *Orleans* began to ſink, he drew his Sword on the weaker Side: but *de præteritis non eſt conſilium*: There is no Counſel of things paſt, other than how to prevent the like, the like Occaſions ariſing.

For the laſt, the Match with *Savoy* divides us from *France*. The narrow Seas cannot ſo much ſunder us, as that Alliance will do. It diſſolves their Hope; and whereas now they are faſtened to *Spain* but with Cords of Cobweb, they will then perchance chain themſelves with Steel.

You will then aſk me, Where the Prince ſhall marry? Neither in *Savoy* nor in *Florence*; for the Money receiv'd from either being told, you have told the beſt of the Tale for them. Not to object what I have heard hath been objected againſt thoſe Princes, that they are meanly deſcended; for the *Medici* were ancient, and ancient in Virtue and Fame. It is true, that long agone they were Merchants; and ſo was King

Solomon

Solomon too. The Kings in old Times had their Herdſmen, their Shepherds, and their Plowmen; they traded with Nature and with the Earth; a Trade, by which all that breathe upon the Earth live. All the Nobility and Gentry in *Europe* trade their Graſs and Corn, and Cattle, their Vines and their Fruits: They trade them to their Tenants at home, and other Merchants adventure them abroad.

The King of *Spain* is now the greateſt Merchant: the King of *Portugal* was. The Kings of *France* are twice come out of the *Florentines*, and therefore their ſuppoſed Ignobility cannot diſvalue them; but, as I have ſaid already, they can give us but Money, and the Sum is but the ſame, which the *Savoyan* hath offered. If you aſk me, if I like of any *German* Lady? I ſay, that I like it well enough in reſpect of the Nation, who are juſt, and free from Treachery: but the Match between the Palatine of the *Rhine*, and the Lady *Elizabeth*, will make us ſtrong enough in *Germany*; and by reaſon of his Alliance with the Houſe of *Naſſau*, better aſſured of the *Netherlands*, than we were. But as the Merchant doth not hazard all his Eſtate in one Veſſel, no more do well-adviſed Princes lay all their Hopes on one Nation.

Now, if, by theſe Diſlikes of the former Alliances, you make Judgment, that it is my Deſire, that the Prince ſhould not marry at all; I ſay, my Deſire is not, that he ſhould not marry at all, but not as yet; and I am exceeding ſorry the Prince hath not the ſame Deſire. For, ſeeing his Majeſty is yet but young, and by God's Favour like to live very many Years; and that his Highneſs, if he ſhould now marry, may have many Children born unto him before he be thirty Years old; and ſeeing all his Children ſhall be Princes, and muſt be provided for as Princes; I think it will much perplex him to find himſelf ſo inviron'd,

inviron'd, till his Majeſty have ſomewhat repaired his Eſtate, and provided beautiful Gardens fit to plant thoſe Olive Branches in. While the Prince is unmarried, all the Eyes of *Chriſtendom* are upon him; for with what King ſoever he ſhall be balanced, he will caſt the Scale; but to have him weighed with a little Prince, I ſhould be ſorry, and he himſelf will be as ſorry after.

All the Princes in *Chriſtendom* wooed *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, while his Daughter was unmarried; and while our Prince is free, (our Enemies not knowing on what Ground to build their Practices) his Majeſty's Safety in the mean while will be infinitely more aſſured; but the Prince once diſpoſed of, they will preſently muſter our Forces, meaſure our Fortunes, ſound us to the Bottom, and make their Approaches accordingly: they will then ſay we have ſeen the utmoſt of the Prince of *Wales*.

Seeing therefore we have nothing yet in hand; ſeeing there is nothing moves; ſeeing the World is yet in a Slumber; and that this long Calm will ſhortly break out in ſome terrible Tempeſt; I would adviſe the Prince to keep his own Ground for a while, and no way to engage or entangle himſelf. While he is yet free, all have Hope; but a great deal of Malice will follow us after he is had, from thoſe, that have been refuſed. We ſhall ſay, *Manebit* (tho' it mar the Verſe) *altâ mente repoſtum*

Judicium Paridis ſpretæq; injuria formæ.

He, that hath been ſought by many, and hath refuſed many, ſhall be hated by many.

I ſhould therefore wiſh, that the Prince were faſtened to ſuch a Party, when he is faſtened, as could beſt ſuſtain it. And ſeeing there is none but a Catholick Lady for us, let us have a King on our Side to boot. If you object the Daughter of *France* is too young; I hope the Prince doth not find himſelf too

too old to tarry a while; and for any Reaſon, that I know to the contrary, if Money be the Matter, it may be had in the mean while. This Match, I ſay, will give the new League ſuch an Alarm, as they will hardly know how to cover themſelves in their own Trenches.

There was never Nation had ſo much Cauſe to hate another, as *France* hath to hate *Spain*. They hold from him the Kingdom of *Navarre*, without ſo much as the Colour of a Title: They betray'd him in *Naples*, and did not overcome their Army there, but murder'd it after a Peace proclaimed. They hold *Milan* from them by ſtrong Hand; and after that *Charles* V. (to have Leave to paſs thro' *France* into into *Flanders* to pacify the Tumults of *Ghent*) had promiſed the *French* King to reſtore it, the Emperor derided him, and ſaid, that he promiſed him *Milan*, which is the *French* Word for a *Kite*. They have betrayed them in many Offers of Marriages; they poiſoned the Dauphin at *Viennoys*; they have murthered their Ambaſſadors; they diſplanted them in *Florida*, and, contrary to Faith, killed the Poſſeſſors in cold Blood. They tore *Strozza* in Pieces at *Terceres*; they ſet the Subjects of *Henry* III. and *Henry* IV. againſt them; they invaded *France*, poſſeſſed *Paris*, and moſt of the Cities of *France*, and, in Concluſion, practiſed to murther both theſe Kings. Now, if theſe Injuries be not far more memorable than marriageable, let the World judge. On the contrary, againſt us the *French* have no Pretence. They hold from us that, which we never had from them but by our lawful Inheritance; yet did her Majeſty aſſiſt them in all their Extremities; and as all her Majeſty's Anceſtors have been moſt conſtant Friends unto them, ſo did King *James* V. ſend 16000 of his Nation to ſuccour *Francis* I. when the Emperor invaded *Provence*.

If therefore our Prince ſhall alſo take a Daughter of *France*, (the Lady promiſed to *Spain* being yet taken but in Terms) we may well aſſure ourſelves, if there remains Virtue in Nobility, or Gratitude in the *French* Nation, that the Queen of *France* will make great Difference between her Sons-in-law; and the King of *France*, between his Brother-in-law of *England*, and *Spain*.

By holding *France*, we hold the *Low-Countries*, which will make us invincible; for they dare not abandon us both. On the contrary, although theſe Princes, a-part and diſunited, are not (as before is ſaid) to be feared; yet were it a needleſs Hazard to neglect the Love of *France*, and to ſuſtain the Hatred of the Archduke, of the Pope, and of the King of *Spain*: A Hatred more than immortal (if more can be) to our Nation and State. The Wounds are too many and too deep, that we have given them, to be healed with the Plaiſter of a Peace. And herein the different Affections of theſe two Nations were made manifeſt; that the *Spaniards* did utterly ſhun, and the *French* did earneſtly ſeek, the Love of our Prince.

If then the former Princes ſhall combine againſt us, from whom may we hope for Help? If it be from *Savoy*, or *Florence*; God help us! Our Friends inhabit beyond the Mountains; our Enemies hard at Hand. We leave thoſe, that are ſtrongeſt and neareſt us, for thoſe, that are weakeſt and furtheſt off. We leave thoſe, that can help us, or harm us, for thoſe, that can do neither; thoſe we leave, that depend on themſelves, to wit, the *French*, for thoſe, that depend on others, to wit, the *Savoyans* and *Florentines*.

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